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Abstract
To the everyday man or woman on the street, the! termvacant possession' raises its head
most noticeably in the residential sphere, with many everyday people buying and selling
property and being obliged to give, or entitled to receive, vacant possession.
Furthermore, the term is by no means limited to a 'lay' usage: a wide range of business
and professional people use the expression 'vacant possession' on a daily basis, and the
term is in the lexicography of judges, conveyancers, litigators, surveyors, estate agents,
commentators and others connected to property, including property owning landlords
and tenants. All these stakeholders make use of the term in a formal and professional
sense, and with reference to legal transactions for which vacant possession is an
essential element.
Although it is an everyday term that is used by many, a common feature of these usages
of the term is a lack of attention to what it actually means. For example, estate agents,
who invariably use the term in their advertising particulars, seem able to distinguish
between 'full vacant possession', 'immediate vacant possession' or 'complete vacant
possession', with ostensibly no real justification as to how the prefacing adjective in
each case adds anything to the message that they are seeking to convey to prospective
purchasers, as to what they can expect to obtain on completion. Lawyers talk about
'giving VP on completion', but few documents ever actually define what vacant
possession means with a capitalised 'V' and 'p,.l Furthermore, the courts have made
decisions as to whether vacant possession was or was not given in a particular instance,
but rarely found it necessary to explain what the term actually meant, or sought to
explicitly apply an understanding of the concept to the facts of any particular case.
I See Shaw, K. 'Bone of contention' (2009) 1 Aug 2009 Estates Gazette 58-59.
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Indeed, behind the familiarity of this common expression, lie years of uncertainty,
misunderstanding and general neglect c.f the development of a sound and coherent
theoretical model of vacant possession. There is very little case law and even less
judicial guidance available. In 1988, and in two editions of the Conveyancer and
Property Lawyer, Charles Harpum wrote what probably remains the most insightful
learned article on the subject.' but since then the concept appears to have warranted
very little scholarly or practitioner attention.
This thesis explores the concept of vacant possession and its meaning. Expounding the
inconsistent evolution and development of the concept, the thesis explains the
constituent elements of the concept of vacant possession, along with the practical
manifestation of the term in everyday property cases. In doing so, it highlights the
difficulties that lawyers, surveyors, judges and other third parties face on a day-to-day
basis when seeking to interpret the nature, scope and extent ofthe obligation. Further, to
link this work to wider theoretical debate in literature pertaining to possession, the thesis
draws on other common property law concepts, those of actual occupation and adverse
possession; such a discussion helps to explain why the inherently infra-jural concept of
vacant possession cannot be 'tied down' to a precise legal definition or formulation.
In conclusion, and to facilitate understanding and usage of the term, the thesis draws on
the analysis undertaken to promulgate a working articulation of the concept, and
considers other provisions that can ameliorate the remedial entitlements for an injured
party in the event of a breach of the obligation. These may go some way to assist all
those who will encounter the concept in future legal transactions.
2 Harpum, C. 'Vacant possession - chameleon or chimaera?' (1988) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer
324,400 (C.H.).
v
Table of Cases
Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1989] (The Times 15 March); [1991] 1 AC 56
Abbott v Sullivan [1952] 1 KB 189
A-G v Blake [2000] All ER (D) 1074
A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 (HL)
Alfred McAlpine Projects Limited v Tilebox Limited [2005] EWHC 281 (TCC)
Ali Shipping Corpn v Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All ER 136
Ali v Christian Salvesen Food Services Ltd [1997] 1 All ER 721
Alici v LR Butlin Ltd [2006] 1 WLR 201
Allan v Liverpool Overseers (1874) LR 9 QB 180
Allen v Seckham (1879) 11 ChD 790
Alpha Trading Ltd v Dunshaw-s Paiten Ltd [1981] QB 290
Amalgamated Investment & Property Co Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd [1977] 1
W.L.R.164
Appleby v Myers (1867) LR 2 CP 651
Appleton v Aspin [1988] 4 EG 123
Ashmore v Corpn ofLloyd's (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 620
Au-Gen v Horner (No.2) [1913] 2 Ch 140
Att-Gen v Horner (1885) 11 App Cas 66
Att-Gen v Simpson [1901] 2 Ch 671
Attica Sea Carriers Corpn v Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Reederei GmbH [1976] 1
Lloyd's Rep 250
Bacchiochi! v Academic Agency Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 1313
Bain v Fothergill (1874) LR 7 HL 158
Bakewell Management Ltd v Brandwood [2004] 2 AC 519
Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel & Co [1919] AC 435
vi
Bank ofCredit and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251
Bank ofNova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risk Association (Bermuda) Ltd, The Good
Luck [1990] 1 Q13 818; [1989] 3 All ER 628
Bank ofNova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War Risk Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1989] 3
AlIER628
Barlett v Tuchin (1815) 1 Marsh 586
Barnett v O'Sullivan [1994] 1 WLR 1667
Barnett v Wheeler (1841) 7 M&W 364
Bass v Gregory (1890) 25 QBD 481
Beard v Porter [1948]1 KB 321
Becker v Partridge [1966] 2 QB 155 CA
Belvedere Court Management Ltd v Frogmore Development Ltd [1997] QB 858
Bamford v Neville [1904] 1 IR 474
Botham v TSB Bank PTc [1996] 73 P & CR D1 CA
Bourne v Fosbrooke (1865) 18 CB (NS) 515, 526; 144 ER 545
Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408
Brewer v Broadhead (1882) 22 CH D 105
British and Commonwealth Group plc v Quadrex Holdings Inc [1989] 3 All ER 492
Bruton v London and Quadrant Housing Trust (1874) 2 EGLR 59
Buckland v Butterfield (1820) 2 Brad & Bing 54
Caballero v Henty (1874) LR 9 Ch 447
Carr-Saunders v Dick McNeil Associates Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 922
Carter v Green [1950] 2 KB 76 CA
Cato v Thompson (1882) 9 QBD 616
Chamber Colliery Co Ltd v Twyerould [1915] 1 Ch 268
Charter Reinsurance v Fagan [1997] AC 313
vii
Chhokar v Chhokar [1984] FLR 313
Chinnock v Hocaoglu [2008] EWCA Civ 1175
Clarke v Ramuz [1891] 2 QB 456
Cieadon Trust Ltd v Davis [1940] Ch 940
Clippens Oil Co v Edinburgh District Water Trustees [1904] AC 64
Colbeam Palmer Ltd v Stock Affiliates Pty Ltd [1968] 122 CLR 25
Collins v Hopkins [1923] 2 KB 617
Condor v The Barron Knights [1966] 1 WLR 87
Cook v Taylor [1942] Ch 349
Cooper v Mysak [1986] 54 OR (2d) 346
Cumberland Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264
Curtis v French [1929] 1 Ch 253
Dale v Humfrey (1858) EB & E 1004
Dalton v Angus (1881) 6 App Cas 812
Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956] AC 696
Davis v Whitby [1974] Ch 186
Davron Estates Ltd v Turnshire Ltd [1982] CAT
Deakins v Hookings [1994] 14 EG 133
Deen v Andrews [1986] 52 P & CR 17
Denny Matt & Dickson Ltd v James B Fraser & Co Ltd [1944] AC 265
District Bank Ltd v Webb [1958] 1 WLR 148
Duke ofWestmister v Guild [1985] QB 688
Dyer v Hargreave (1805) 10 Yes 505
EE & Brian Smith (1928) Ltd v Wheatsheaf.Mills Ltd [1939] 2 KB 302
E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Ltd v NSR Ltd [1997] AC 400
viii
Eagle Limited v Golden Achievement Limited [1997] CPC 16
Edgewater Developments Co v Bailey [1974] 118 Sol Jo1312
El Awadi v BCCI SA [1990] 1 QB 606; [1989] 1 All ER 242
Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 1 WLR 687; [1997] 2 All ER 513
Elwes v Law (1802) 3 East 38
Engell v Finch and others (1869) LR 4 QB 659
Ennstone Building Products Ltd v Stanger Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 916; [2002] 2 All ER
(Comm) 479
Epps v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1973] 1 WLR 1071
ES Schwab & Co v McCarthy [1975] 31 P&CR 196
Esselte v Pearl Assurance [1997]1 WLR 981
Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Naid Ltd [2001] All ER(D) 324
Experience Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc and Edwards Chaplin [2003] EWCA
Civ 323
Fal Bunkering ofSharjah v Grecale Inc ofPanama [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 369
Farrell v Green [1974] 232 EG 587
Ferrishurst Ltd v Wallcite Ltd [1999] Ch 355
Flight v Booth (1834) 1 Bing (NC) 370
Foley's Charity Trustees v Dudley [1910] 1 KB 317
Forbes v Git [1922] 1 AC 256
Forsyth-Grant v Allen [2008] All ER (D) 110 (Apr)
Fox-Bourne v Vernon & Co Ltd (1894) 10 TLR 647
Gardner v Coutts & Co [1968] 1 WLR 173
General Estates Co v Beaver [1914] 3 KB 926
Gibson v Small (1853) 4 HL Cas 353
Goodman v Saltash Corp (1882) 7 App Cas 633
lx
Goodtitle v Baldwin (1809) 11 East 490
Graysim Holdings v P&0 Property Holdings [1996] 1 WLR 109
Gunatunga v Dealwis [1996] 72 P&CR 161
Halbert v Dale [1909] 2 Ch 570
Hamp v Bygrave [1983] I EGLR 174
Hancock v BWBrazier (Anerley) Ltd [1966]1 WLR 1317
Hare v Murphy Bros [1974] ICR 603
Harrods Ltd v Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd [1997] FSR 420
Herkanaidu v Lambeth London Borough Council [1999] All ER (D) 1420
Hillingdon Estates Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd [1952] Ch 627
Hissett v Reading Roofing Co Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1757
Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892
Holland v Hodgson (1872) LR 7 CP 328
Horton v Kurzke [1971] 1 WLR 769
Hughes v Greenwich London Borough Council [1994] 1 AC 170
Hughes v Jones (1861) 3 De GF&J 307
Hulbert v Dale [1909] 2 Ch 570
Hulme v Brigham [1943] KB 152
Hunt v Luck [1901] 1 Ch45
Hunter v Canary Whart [1997] AC 655
Hutton v Warren (1836) 1 M & W 466
Hynes v Vaughan [1985] 50 P & CR 444
Ibrend Estates BVv NYK Logistics (UK) Ltd [2010] PLSCS 186
Ibrosa v Fairbairn [1943] AC 32
ICS Ltd v West Bromwich BS [1998] 1 WLR 896
x
Impresa Castelli SpA v Cola Holdings Ltd [2002] EWHC 1363
Industrie Chimiche Italia Centrale and Cerealjin SA v Alexander G Tsavlisis & Sons
Maritime Co, The Choko Star [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 516
Institute ofPatent Agents v Lockwood [1894] AC 347
Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich BS [1998] 1 WLR 896
Isaacs v Diamond (1880) WN 75
Isaacs v McGuire (1888) 14 VLR 815
James Macara, Ltd v Barclay [1945] KB 148
John Laing Construction Limited v Amber Pass Limited [2004] 2 EGLR 128
Johnson v O'Neill [1911] AC 552
Jordan v May [1947] KB 427
KC Sethia (1944) Ltd v Partabmull Rameshwar [1950] 1 All ER 51
Kennedy v Secretary ofState for Wales [1996] EGCS 17
Keppell v Bailey (1834) 39 Eng Rep 1042
Kingsnorth Finance Ltd v Tizard [1986] 1 WLR 783
Kirby v Cowderoy [1912] AC 599
Kling v Keston Properties Ltd [1983] 49 P & CR 212
Korogluyan v Matheou [1975] 239 EG 649
Lake v Dean (1860) 28 Beav 607
Lee v Soames (1888) 36 WR 884
Leek and Moorland Building Society v Clark [1952] 2 QB 788
Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v Expeditors International (UK) Ltd [2006]
EWHC 1008 (Ch); [2006] L&TR 22
Leominster Properties Ltd v Broadway Finance Ltd [1981] 42 P & CR 372
Lewis v Price (1761) 2 Wms Saund
Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239
xi
Livingstone v Raywards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25
Lloyd's Bank Pic v Rosset [1988] 3 WRL 1301; [1989] Ch 350; [1991] 1 AC 107
(appeal)
London County Council v Wilkins [1955] 2 QB 653
Long v Tower Hamlets LBC [1996] 2 All ER 683
Lord Eldon v Hedley Bros [1935] 2 KB 1
LordAdvocate v Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App Cas 273
Lord Rivers v Adams (1878) 3 ExD 365
Lunn Poly Ltd v Liverpool & Lancashire Properties Ltd [2006] All ER (D) 264 (Mar);
[2006] EWCA Civ 430
Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108
Lyell v Kennedy (1887) 18 QBD 79
Lyme Valley Squash Club Ltd v Newcastle under Lyme Borough Council [1985] 2 All
ER405
Lynch v Thorne [1956] 1 WLR 303
Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499
Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997] AC 749
Marine and General Mutual Lift Assurance Society v St James' Real Estate Co Ltd
[1991] 38 EG 230
Marlborough v Wilks Head & Eve [1996] NLD 138
McVitae v Unison [1996] IRLR 33
Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] QB 54
Meeluish v BMI (No 3) Ltd [1996] AC 454
Merttens v Hill [1901] 1 Ch 851
Midland Bank Ltd v Farmpride Hatcheries Ltd [1981] 2 EGLR 147
Mosvolds Rederi AlS v Food Corpn ofIndia, The Demoder General T J Parke and King,
Theras [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 68
Mount v Oldham Corpn [1973] QB 309
xii
National Bank ofGreece SA v Pinios Shipping Co, The Maira [1990] 1 AC 637; [1989]
1 AllER213
North v Loomes [1919] 1 Ch 378
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Preston [1957] 1 WLR 813; [1957] 2 All ER .
428
Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler (1885) 15 QBD 261
Novorossisk Shipping Co v Neoptera Co Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 425
Pearson v IRC [1981] AC 753
Perry v Sharon Development Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 390
Peyman v Lanjani [1985] Ch 457
Phillips v Caldcleugh [1868] LR 4 QB 159
Phillips v Halliday (1891) AC 228
Pike, Sons & Co v Ongley & Thornton (1887) 18 QBD 708
Pinekerry Ltd v Needs (Kenneth) (Contractors) Ltd [1992] 64 P & CR 245
Pips (Leisure Productions) Ltd v Walton [1980] 43 P & CR 415
Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage Motor Co Limited [1915] AC 79
Port ofLondon Authority v Ashmore [2009] EWHC 954 (Ch)
Powell v McFarlane [1977] 2 EGLR 125; [1977] 38 P&CR 452
Prasad v Wolverhampton BC [1983] 2 All ER 140
Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381
Produce Brokers Co Ltd v Olympia Oil and Cake Co Ltd [1916] 1 AC 314
Property and Bloodstock Ltd v Emerton [1968] Ch 94; [1967] 3 All ER 321
Re Allen and Driscoll's Contract [1904] 2 Ch 226
Re Boyle's Claim [1961] 1 WLR 339
Re Crosby's Contract v Houghton [1949] 1 All ER 830
Re Englefield Holdings, Ltd v Sinclair's Contract [1962] 1 WLR 1119
xiii
Re Gloag and Miller's Contract (1883) 23 ChD 320
Re Haedicke and Lipski's Contract [1901] 2 Ch 666
Re Lyne-Stephenson and Scott-Miller's Contract [1920] 1 Ch 472
Re Ossemsley Estates Ltd [1937] 3 All ER 774
Re Puckett and Smith's Contract [1902] 2 Ch 258 CA
Re Shipton, Anderson & Co [1915] 3 KB 676
Re Viola's Indenture ofLease [1909] 1 Ch244
Re Winslow Hall Estate Company v United Glass Bottle Manufacturers Ltd [1941] Ch
503; [1941] 3 All ER 124
Reardon Smith Line v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989
Red House Farms (Fhorndon) Ltd v Catchpole [1977] 2 EGLR 125
Regan v Paul Properties DPF No 1 Ltd [2006] All ER (D) 327 (Oct)
Reynolds v Ashby & Son [1904] AC 466
Reynolds v Bannerman [1922] 1 KB 719
Reynolds v Doyle [1919] 19 SR (NSW) 108
Rhodes v Forwood (1876) 1 App Cas 256
Rignall Developments Ltd v HaW [1988] Ch 190
Roper v Coombs (1827) 9 Dow1 & Ry 562
Royal Bristol Permanent Building Society v Bomash [1886-90] All ER Rep 283
Royal Permanent Building Society v Bomash [1887] 35 ChD 390
Rutherford v Acton-Adams [1915] AC 866
Savage v Dent (1736) 2 Stra 1064
Scotland v Solomon [2002] EWHC 1886 (Ch)
Secretary ofState for the Environment v Baylis and Bennett [2000] 80 P & CR 324
. "
Secretary Of State For The Environment, Transport And The Regions viBaylis
(Gloucester) Ltd and Another [2000] 3 PLR 61
xiv
Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge [1987] Ch 305
Sheikh v O'Connor [1987] 2 EGLR 269
Shell UK v Lostock Garages [1977] 1 All ER 481
Shirlaw v Southern Foundaries Ltd [1939] 2.KB 206
Simpson v Godmanchester Corp (1897) AC 696
Sirius International Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance [2004] 1 WLR 3252
Smith v Marrable (1843) 11 M&W 5
Society ofLloyd's v Clementson [1995] CLC 117
Somersetshire Drainage Commissioners v Bridgwater Corp [1904] 81 LT 729
Sophisticated Developments v Steladean and Moschi [1978] CLYB 347 (CA)
Spring v NA.S.D.S. [1956] 1 WLR 585
Squarey v Harris-Smith [1981] 42 P & CR 118
Stearn v Twitchell [1985] 1 All ER 631
Stevens v Adamson (1818) 2 Stark 422
Stoner v Skene [1918] 44 OLR 609
Strand Securities v Caswell [1965] 1 Ch 958
Tamares (Vincent Square) Ltd v Fairpoint Properties (Vincent Square) Ltd [2007] All
ER(d) 103 (Feb)
Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B&S 826
Taylor v Hamer [2002] EWCA Civ 1130
Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd [1958] Ch 110
Tisdall v McArthur & Co (Steel and Metal) Ltd [1951] IR 228
Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] 1 EGLR 161; [1979] 1 WLR446
Treloar v Nute [1976] I WLR 1295
Trollope & Colis Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board [1973] 2 All
ER260
xv
Tucker v Linger (1882)21 ChD 18
UCB Group Ltd vHedworth [2002] 46 EG 200
United Australia Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] AC 1
Walling v Przyblo (7 NY 3d 228 2006)
Watson v Saunders-Roe [1947] KB 437 CA
Webb v Bevis Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 247
Webb v Pollmount [1966] Ch 584
Weir v Area Estates Limited [2009] All ER (D) 189 (Dec)
Wessex Reserve Forces and Cadets Association v White [2005] 3 EGLR 127
Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland [1981] AC 487 HL
Wilson v Finch Hatton (1877) 2 Ex D 336
Wiltshear v Cottrell (1853) I E & B 674
Wroth v Tyler [1964] Ch 30
Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd [1974] 2 All ER 321
Yandle v Sutton [1922] 2 Ch 199
xvi
Table of Legislation
Increase in Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920
Law ofProperty Act 1925
Land Registration Act 1925
Law ofProperty (Consolidation) Bill 1925
Land Registration Rules 1925
Landlord and Tenant Act 1927
Defence (General) Regulations 1939
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1939
Emergency Powers (Defence) Act 1940
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954
Chancery Amendment Act 1958 (known as the Lord Cairns' Act)
Housing Act 1961
Compulsory Purchase Act 1965
Matrimonial Homes Act 1967
Rent Act 1977
Sales of Goods Act 1979
Housing Act 1985
Housing Act 1988
Law of Property Act 1989
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989
Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994
Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act 1995
Land Registration (Implied Covenant for Title) Rules 1995
Land Registration Act 2002
xvii
Land Registration Rules 2003
Land Registration (Amendment) Rules 2008
xviii
Chapter 1
The Importance of Vacant Possession
The obligation to give vacant possession is generally understood to refer to the legal
commitment to ensure that at the relevant date (for example, on completion of contracts
or termination of a lease) a given property is in a state fit to be occupied (both
physically and legally) and enjoyed.' Vacant possession is known to be relevant to the
sale of freehold land and property (e.g. the transfer of estates in fee simple) and upon
the grant, transfer and termination of leases and other tenancies (and perhaps informal
agreements to occupy by consentj.' Vacant possession is an essential element of any
land transaction where the right to occupy a property is being vested in, or passed to, a
third party.'
Figures obtained from the Land Registry Annual Reports and Accounts 2008/9 confirm
that in the 255 working days of the year to which these accounts referred, there were
over 319,000 first registrations (comprising land conveyed or leases granted out of
unregistered titles). There were over 198,000 leases granted out of existing registered
titles during this period. There were around four million dealings with registered titles
(the transfer of whole or part of an existing registered title). These types of transactions
will all have involved the issue of vacant possession. That is nearly five million
transactions each year, some twenty thousand transactions per working day,
approximately sixty transactions every minute. In other words, a transaction to which
I Shaw, K. 'Fitto be occupied' (2007) 27 Jan 2007 Estates Gazette 182; Shaw, K. 'More to it than meets the eye!
(2010) 1 May 2010 Estates Gazette 4 and Shaw, K. 'All that you can't leave behind' (2010) 256 Property Law Journal
6.
2 This is determined by what definition of Vacant Possession is adopted, as is discussed in later chapters. Upon
termination of a licence a tenant will normally he obligedto vacate the premises, but it is arguable as to whether this
. is giving vacant possessionas the tenant is not returning possession(as, for example, on termination of a lease). The
essence of a licence, as opposed to a lease, is that it does not involve the grant of possession and this is what
distinguishes it from a lease. Accordingly, as such, it does not amount to a legal estateor interest in landanddoes not
bindthird parties; butit is common-for licences to (wrongly) makeuse ofthe term,
? Williams, T.e. 'Sale of Land with Vacant Possession' (1928) 114 The Law Journal 339 describes the receipt of
vacant possession as "an integral part of the contract". The only category of transaction for which vacant possession
will not be relevant concerns the purchase of reversionary interests (for example, a freehold subject to a long lease)
.and other estates thatare not 'vestedin possession',Themeaning of the term 'possession' is discussed in more detailin
chapter 5.
vacant possession will be relevant takes place the equivalent of every second of each
working day in England and Wales.4
It is therefore unsurprising that vacant possession is one of the most commonly used
terms in the property professional's dictionary. Given that vacant possession arises on
the majority of land transactions in England and Wales, the sheer scale on which the
obligation is engaged causes the term to be relevant to a wide range of people. These
include sellers and purchasers, landlords and tenants and third party occupiers both on
residential and commercial transactions. From the outset it is important to appreciate
why vacant possession is something of interest, and concern, to such people.
Who does Vacant Possession affect?
On the sale of a residential property, a seller will be keen to ensure that vacant
possession is provided; otherwise the buyer may refuse to complete the purchase. If the
buyer refused to complete because the premises could not be occupied without difficulty
or objection on completion.' the buyer could serve a notice to complete and ultimately
rescind the contract. All this will concern a seller who may have exchanged and be
seeking completion themselves on the related purchase of a new property which he or
she will not be able to effect until the sale of their current property has completed. On
the purchase of the new property the seller (as buyer in respect of that purchase) could
lose their deposit if they are unable to complete on time because the sale of their
property has not taken place," causing them not to have the funds required to complete
the purchase. It is known for people in such circumstances to ultimately end up
homeless in the interim when difficulties in completing the sale of their current property
cause them to lose the right to purchase the property for which they have contracted to
buy."
4 See the Land Registry Annual Report and Accounts 2008/9. Calculation based on a working day comprising 6
working hours. Report Available at hltD:iiwww.lanolre&E;.ov.uk/ar09iAnnual Report 0809 Ol.html.
5 Therests to determine whether vacantpossessionis given are discussed in detailin chapter 6.
6 For a discussion of the return of deposits see Bowes, C. and Shaw K. 'Can I have my money back?' (2008) 204
Property Law Journal 2.
7 See Madge, N. 'Possession - the Changing Regime' (2001) Law Society Gazette 39 in which the importance of
vacant possession is discussed in various contexts.
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Normally on the sale of a residential property the parties will complete the transaction
before an inspection of the property has taken place." If the buyer does complete, only
to then find that vacant possession has not been given, this could leave the buyer
entitled to damages as a consequence of the seller's default. Such damages could be
quite significant and pose a fmancial burden on the seller.9 A seller is therefore well
advised to ensure that the premises are fit for occupation by the buyer on completion
irrespective ofwhether they have a related purchase to complete.l"
The difficulties caused by not giving vacant possession can be even more onerous in the
commercial context. A buyer may be a commercial organisation requiring immediate
possession on completion in order to ensure business continuity from their previous
premises. If vacant possession is not given on completion, then putting aside the legal
remedies available, the buyer could lose important contracts or strain business relations
and goodwill with existing suppliers and trades people because of its inability to
continue to trade normally. Commercial organisations are often tied to service and other
contracts which will include fixed penalties for non-compliance in accordance with
contractual agreements. Such agreements may include pre-arranged liquidated damages
clauses or other financial penalties. The consequences of not being able to immediately
occupy a given premises can therefore be very serious.' 1
The most common situation in which vacant possession is relevant in the commercial
context is with respect to the grant and termination of business leases over properties. It
is common for a tenant to wish to bring their lease to an end before its contractual
8 It is stated on Lexis Nexis Butterworths Document [547] 10 Occupiers (accessible via subscriber service) that
ideally lithe buyer's conveyancers should check for any- evidence as to rights of occupiers by either personally
inspecting the property or advisingthe buyerclientto do so... the buyer's conveyancers should raisea requisition of
the seller's conveyancers requesting confirmation thatvacantpossession of the whole of the premises will be given on
completionandthatall occupiershave agreedto vacate". In practice, however, this does not normally occur.
9 As discussed in later chapters, theobligation to give vacant possession is still actionable after completion.
10 For a discussion of the doctrine of constructive notice (with respect to overriding interests and other adverse
interests to whicha sale may be subject), see Howell,J. 'Notice: A Broad View anda Narrow View'(1996) Conv 34;
Partington, M. 'Implied Covenants for Title in Registered Freehold Land' (1988) Conv 18 and Sheridan, L.A. 'Notice
andRegistration' (1950) NILQ 33. The doctrine of constructive notice deems a party with havingknowledge which
they did not in facthave. Many havereferred to the inequity of constructive notice; for example, "The doctrine is a
dangerous one. It's contrary to the truth. It is wholly founded on the doctrine thata man does not knowthe facts, and
yet it is said that constructively he does know them" - Allen v Seckham (1379) 11 ChD 790, per Lord Esher at 794. In
respect of issuesconcerning title, registration has sought to obviate constructive notice considerations in recent years
by protecting purchasers fromthe undiscoverable interests in their otherwise cleantitle. This is discussed in detailin
chapter 7, where comparisons to thetestsforvacant possession and policy decisionmaking arc critically evaluated.
II See Bowes, C. and ShawK. Time's up...but I'm staying!' (2008) 218 Property Law Journal 9 and Bowes, C. and
ShawK. 'Reneging onthe deal' (2009) 222 Property Law Journall3 for a discussion of issuesrelevant to remaining
in possession of property andthenon-performance of obligations in legalagreements.
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expiry by exercise of a break option, which allows the term of the lease to come to an
end sooner than originally agreed. Commonly, exercise of the break can be conditional
upon the procurement of vacant possession, or compliance with all covenants lin the
lease up to and including the break date. If the lease includes a covenant to 'yield-up' the
premises on termination, this is likely to include an obligation to give vacant possession
in any event, even if the procurement of vacant possession is not an express pre-
condition for operation of the break.12
In a changing, and recently downward, property market, it is common for tenants to
seek to reduce operating overheads and source alternative (and normally smaller)
premises. This can only be achieved if their current lease is brought to an end. Giving
vacant possession is therefore essential for the tenant in order to ensure that its current
lease does not continue past the break date. If the tenant fails to operate the break option
successfully and remains tied to its current lease along with a new tenancy that may
already have commenced, or the tenant has become contractually bound to enter into,
this couId lead to dire financial circumstances. It is common for tenants to
misunderstand the requirements for successful operation of a break option and
unwittingly find that they remain liable and tied to the covenants contained in their
current lease because of vacant possession not being given at the material time.13
The financial or covenant strength of the tenant, are relevant considerations for the
landlord in such a situation. If the landlord has a tenant in occupation of its premises
under the terms of a lease with a 'good covenant strength', or the tenant is paying rent
higher than current market value, then there can be little incentive in allowing the tenant
to move on. This may leave the landlord having to find a new tenant or face paying
empty rates tax on a property earning no revenue for them in the short term.14 The
bespoke nature of some premises can cause the potential for an open market letting to
be very restrictive in respect of appealing to only a limited range of potential new
tenants. Further, commonly to secure a new letting a landlord may have to offer other
12 See Martin, J. 'Tenant's Break Options' (2003) 153 New Law Journal 759' where the requirement to give vacant
possession when operating a break option in a lease is discussed.
13 See Higgs, R. 'Leave YourKeys on YourWayOut' (2005) 155New Law Jourruz1149dn whichthe difficulties of
appreciating what 'yielding-up' atthe end of the leasemayinvolve werediscussed. Higgs states "there hasbeenvery
little guidance from case law as to what constitutes yielding up... [njeither has Parliament ever prescribed the
meaning of the expression".
14 See Todd, L. 'Emply Property Rate Relief-Have thefears become a reality?' (2008) 217 Property Law Journal 6.
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fmancial incentives (such as rent free periods) to potential new tenants, which can also
be straining financially on the landlord. Allthis work would cause the landlord to incur
time and cost in any event, and is therefore not appealing or attractive.
A landlord may wish to seek to prevent a tenant successfully exercising a break option
in such circumstances, and use whatever arguments are available to it to claim that the
lease has not come to an end. Common arguments include an invalid break notice
served pursuant to the express terms of the lease," or non-payment of all amounts due
up to and including the break date (which are normal pre-conditions for the exercise of a
break optionj.l" However, vacant possession can be used as perhaps the most effective
and decisive means of preventing a lease coming to an end as per the tenant's intention.
If the landlord can construct an argument to the effect that vacant possession was not
given at the material time (whether this is because of a physical or legal impediment
preventing enjoyment of the property at the relevant date)17 the landlord may thereby
force a tenant to remain principally liable under the terms of the lease, with the
corresponding ongoing liabilities (including, most notably, the payment of rent). In such
a case, a tenant may only be able to divest itself of its ongoing liability by assigning or
subletting the lease to a third party (but this will be determined by the terms of the lease
and relevant applicable statute).18 This is a better situation for the landlord given that the
original tenant can be made to effectively 'underwrite' any default by an immediate
assignee to a lease originally granted after 199519 (or remains liable in any event for
leases granted before 1995). The post-1995 legislation is a mechanism by which the
original tenant, with perhaps the stronger covenant strength, can be held to perform the
covenants in the lease even after assignment." in the event that the new tenant was to
default and the Authorised Guarantee Agreement was to be called upon.
15 This would normally involve taking a technical point, for example in respect of the content or form of the notice, or
the service thereof.
16 -Martin, above n12, explains that a common pre-condition to exercise a tenant's break: option includes, along with
vacant possession, payment of all rent(s) due up to and including the break date. This can be an issue when the break
date falls on a quarter day, upon which the whole quarter's rent falls due in advance.
H Impediments to vacant possession are summarised below, acd discussed in more detail in chapters 5 and 6. Madge,
above n7, also discusses vacant possession in such circumstances.
18 For example, the statutory provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927.
19, These are known as Authorised Guarantee Agreements (AGAs) - section 6, Landlord and Tenant (Covenants) Act
1995.
20 Subject to a subsequent assignment of a post-1995 lease, which would cause the AGA to fall away.
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Further, if the tenant who has' failed to comply with his obligation to give vacant
possession is forced to divest its ongoing liabilities by seeking to sublet the whole or
part of the premises to a thirdparty, then this is also not a fully satisfactory solution as
far as the tenant is concerned. A subletting takes effect out of the tenant's interest and
therefore the tenant remains principally liable to the landlord under the terms of the
(head) lease for compliance with covenants under the (head) lease. In the event that the
sub-tenant defaults on payments under the sub-lease (as between tenant and sub-tenant)
this is an issue between tenant and sub-tenant (and not landlordj." The tenant will still
remain principally liable to the landlord for compliance with covenants under the (head)
lease.22 To mitigate loss a tenant can often find that they are faced with the prospect of
having to sub-let at a lower passing rent than they currently pay to their landlord (if the
terms ofthe lease permit this) and to make up any shortfall themselves.r'
Vacant possession is also relevant to the return of possession when a lease comes to an
end by effluxion of time (and no statutory or common law rights to remain in the
property are engagedj.i" It is common for landlords to advance damages claims when a
tenant does not vacate by the contractual termination date in a lease and this causes loss
or inconvenience. Normally, such a claim will be part of other so called 'terminal'
claims including claims for dilapidations (as a consequence of the tenant's failure to
keep the premises in the state ofrepair required by the covenants contained in the lease).
Vacant possession is therefore key to the majority of land transactions in a residential
and commercial context and presents a significant area of risk for sellers and buyers,
and landlords and tenants. It can be an issue when, innocently, two people agree to the
sale and purchase of a property and something prevents the premises being fit for
occupation at the relevant time. In contrast, it can be invoked as a 'commercial sword'
when landlords seek to use the vacant possession obligation to protect their financial
position in the current market place by preventing a tenant bringing a lease to an end
21 A sub-lease does not affectthe contractual relationship between superior landlord and tenant - see Skinner, P.G.,
Schear, AI. and Katz 8,S. 'Assignment vs subletting: Do you care which you use? Why?' (2002) 4 Journal of
Corporate Real Estate 337.
22 Ibid. A sublease will be expressed to haveno effectontheheadlease outofwhich title is derived.
2l See Shaw, K. 'Reoccupation and Renewal' {2006) 174 Property Law Journal 3; and Baker, M. and Shaw K. 'New
lease ...new rent' (2007) 187 Property Law Journal 22.
24 See Bowes. C. and ShawK. 'Time's up... butI'm staying!' (2008) 218 Property Law Journal 9; and Bowes, C and
Shaw K. 'Term of years...uncertain' (2009) 225 Property Law Journal? in respect of possession on the termination
of leases.
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prematurely. It is therefore an issue that has a real impact on people and their lives, and
so it is important to have a clear understanding of the nature and effect of the obligation.
An understanding of the obligation is essential in order to appreciate the responsibilities
and liabilities of each party in a given instance, and the issues of risk and responsibility •
which are engaged in transactions of this kind.
What is the obligation?
The obligation to give vacant possession will normally appear as a term in a legal
agreement, conveyance, contract or transfer. This can either be express or implied.
Express terms are terms that have been specifically mentioned and agreed by both
parties at the time the contract is made.25They can be oral but will usually be in writing
as part of the legal contact or agreement.26 It is common, however, for a term which has
not been mentioned by either party to nevertheless be incorporated as part of a contract,
because the term is necessary for the contract to have commercial sense. These terms
are known as implied terms and can be implied by either statute (for example, various
implied terms in the Sales of Goods Act 1979) or the courts. When implied by the
courts this can be as a matter of fact, or as a matter oflaw.27
When implying terms in fact, the exercise involved is that of ascertaining the presumed
intention of the parties,28 that of both parties to the contract, collected from the words of
25 Furmston, M.P. The Law a/Contract (3 rd edn Butterworths Tolley, London 2007) 3.1.
26 It is good practice for express terms to appear in writing in the contract or legal agreement in order for there to be a
valid contract under section 2 of the Law ofProperty (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989.
27 Some terms are generally known to he included in contracts in a particular trade or locality as well by a course of
dealings of by custom. For example, amongst bakers, 'one dozen! means thirteen but it is not necessary to include
terms in every contract specifying this. See Hutton v Worren (1836) 1 M & W 466; Gibson v Small (1853) 4 HL Cas
353; Dale v Humfrey (1858) EB & E 1004; Tucker v Linger (1882) 21 Ch D 18; Pike, Sons & Co v Ongley &
Thornton (1887) 18 QBD 708; Fox-Bourne v Vernon & Co Ltd (1894) 10 lLR 647; Produce Brokers Co Ltd v
Olympia Oil and Cake Co Ltd [1916] 1 AC 314; Lord Eldon v Hedley Bros [1935] 2 KB 1; EE & Brian Smith (1928)
Ltd v WheatsheafMills Ltd [1939] 2 KB 302; Mount v Oldhom Corpn [1973] QB 309 and Novorosstsk Shipping Co v
Neoptera Co Ltd [1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 425 at 431.
28 See Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239, per Lord Edmund-Davies at 266; Rhodes v Forwood (1876) 1
App Cas 256, per Lord Chehnsford at 268; Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd v Cooper [1941] AC 108, per Lord Wright at
137; KC Sethia (I944) Ltd v Partabmull Rameshwar [1950] 1 All ER 51, per Jenkins 1..1. at 59; Abbott v Sullivan
[1952] 1 KB 189, per Morris 1..1. at 219; Trollope & Colis Ltd v North West Metropolitan Regional Hospital Board
[1973] 2 All ER 260, per Lord Pearson at 267; Attica Sea Carriers Corpn v Ferrostaal Poseidon Bulk Reederei
GmbH [1976] 1 Lloyd's Rep 250, per Lord Denning M.R. at 254; Shell UK v Lostock Garages [1977] 1 All ER 481,
per Lord Denning M.R at 488; Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 249; Duke of Westmister v Guild [1985]
QB 688, per Slade 1..1. at 699; Bank ofNova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual Wor Risk Association (Bermuda) Ltd, The
Good Luck [1990]1 QB 818, [1989)3 All ER 628; National Bonk ofGreece SA v Pintos Shipping Co, The Maira
[1990] 1 AC 637, [1989] 1 All ER 213; Ashmore v Corpn ofLloyd's (No 2) [1992] 2 Lloyd's Rep 620, per Gatehonse
1. at 626; Hughes v Greenwich London Borough Council [1994] 1 AC 170, per Lord Lowry at 179; McVitae v Unison
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the agrccrnenr'" and the surrounding circumstances.30 Something that is so obviously
included that it did not need to be mentioned in the contract will normally be implied as
a matter of fact. In Shirlaw v Southern Foundaries Ltd, Mackinnon L.1. said:
"Prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be
expressed is something so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if while
the parties were making their bargain an officious bystander were to suggest
some express provision for it in the agreement, they would testily suppress him
with a common 'Oh, of course'.,,31
Terms can also be implied by the courts as a matter of law, and this concerns more
general considerations of public policy where the courts are prescribing how the parties
to certain types of contract ought to behave. It is said that "tenus implied in law are in
reality incidents attached to standardised contractual relationships'v" Tenus are implied
in law where the contract is of a defmed type, encompassing "those relationships which
are of common occurrence, such as... seller and buyer, owner and hirer, master and
servant, landlord and tenant, carrier by land or by sea, contracts for building work and
so forth".33 The implication is not based on the parties' intention "but on more general
considerations".34 There are two basic requirements for the implication of a term in law:
"the first requirement is that the contract in question should be of a defined type... [t]he
second requirement is that the implication of the tenus should be necessary".35
Examples of tenus implied by law in established contracts include the lease of a
[1996] IRLR 33, per Harrison 1. at 39; Harrods Ltd v Harrods (Buenas Aires) Ltd [1997] FSR 420, per Neuberger 1.
at 453 and Ennstane Building Products Ltdv Stanger Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 916, [2002] 2 All ER (Comm) 479.
29 Duke a/Westminster. above n28 per Slade L.J. at 69 and Bank a/Nova Scotia, above n28.
30 Ali v Christian Salvesen Food Services Ltd [1997] I All ER 721,per Waite L.1. at 726.
31 [1939] 2 KB 206 at 227. See also Spring v N.A.S.D.S. [1956] I WLR 585, per Sir Leonard Sachs V-C at 599;
Gardner v Coutts & Co [1968] I WLR 173, per Cross 1. at 176-7, Alpha Trading Ltd v Dunshaw - Patten Ltd [1981]
QB 290, per Lawton L.J. at 308; Mosvolds Rederi A/S v Food Corpn ofIndia, The Demoder General T J Parke and
King Theras [1986] 2 Lloyd's Rep 68, per Steyn J. at 71; El Awadi v BCCI SA [1990] 1 QB 606, [1989] I All ER
242, per Hutchioson J. at 252 and Fal Bunkering ofSharjah v Grecale Inc ofPanama [1990] I Lloyd's Rep 369.
32 Funnston, M.P. The Law of Contract (2nd rev edn Butterworths, London 2003), section 3.21. Also Society of
Lloyd's v Clementson [1995] CLC 117, per Steyn L.J. at 131; Shell UK, above n28 per Lord Denning M.R. at 487;
Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] QB 54; Ali Shipping Corpn v Shipyard Trogir [1998] 2 All ER 136, per Potter
L.J. at 147 where it is stated that "[c]onsiderations of business efficacy, particularly when based on the "officious
bystander" test, are likely to involve a detailed examination of the circumstances existingat the time of the relevant
contract... whereas the parties haveindicated theirpresumed intention simplyby entering into a contract to whichthe
court attributes particular characteristics".
33 Shell UK, above n28, per Lord Denning M.R. at 487; EI Awdi v BCCI [1989] I AIl ER 242, per Hutchinson 1. at
253; Bank ofNova Scotia, aboven28.
34 Industrie Chtmtche Italia Centrale and Cereatfin SAvAlexander G Tsavlists & SonsMaritime Co, The -ChokoStar
[1990] 1 Lloyd's Rep 516, per Slade LJ. at 526; Luxor (Eastbourne) Ltd, above n28,per Lord Wright at 137; Shell
UK, aboven28, per LordDenningM.R. at487. It has been suggested that lithe essence of the test is a consideration
of the contract andhow to maximise the social utility of the relationship" - see Peden, E. 'Policy Concerns Behind
Implication ofTerms in Law' (2001) 117 LQR 459.
35 SeeEI Awadi, aboven3I,per Hutchinson J. at253."
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furnished house where it has long been accepted that a term will be implied that at the
time of commencement of the tenancy the house will be reasonably fit for habitation."
The same applies in relation to a contract for the.sale of land and the building of a house
on it that will be reasonably fit for habiration"
Vacant possession, when operating as an implied term, can be seen as a term implied by
the courts as a matter of law. Various cases have confirmed this,38 including the
decision in Cook v Taylor" in which Simons J. said in general terms that:
"where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and silent as to any tenancy
to which the property is subject, there is impliedly a contract that vacant
possession will be given on completion. ,,40
In Edgewater Developments Co v Bailey it was said that "[w]here nothing was said
about possession it was often said that there was an implication that property was to be
sold with vacant possession't.f This is logical given that the seller/buyer relationship is
embodied in a sale and purchase contract which is of an established and defined type,
and it is illogical for a contract for the sale of land or property not to provide the buyer
with a right to possession of the estate in land on completion when an immediate right
of possession is being conveyed (that is, the sale is not of an estate in reversion).42 This
type of sale and purchase contract ought to "behave in such a way" .43 As discussed in
chapter 4, the treatment of vacant possession as an express and implied term in the
standard form conditions of sale has changed over time, and this has an effect on the
responsibilities and entitlements of the parties to any given transaction.
36 See Smith v Marrable (1843) 11 M&W 5; Wi/son v Finch Hatton (1877) 2 Ex D 336 and Collins v Hopkins [19231
2KB 617.
J7 See Perry v Sharon Development Ltd [193714 All ER 390; Lynch v Thorne [195611 WLR 303; and Hancock v BW
Brazier (Anerley) Ltd [196611 WLR 1317.
38 See also Midland Bank Ltd v Farmpride Hatcheries Ltd [1981] 2 EGLR 147, per Shaw L.J. at 148: "Prima facie a
prospective vendor of property offersthe property with vacant possession unlesshe otherwise states andthatwould
ordinarily be implied in the contract of sale in the absence of stipulation to the contrary", and Walford, E.O.
Contracts and Conditions of Sale of Land (Sweet and Maxwell Limited, London 1957) 169. Wilkinson, H.W.
Standard conditions ofsale of land: a commentary on the Law Society and National general conditions ofsale of
land (4th Edition Longman, London 1989) 15 reports that where a person contracts to sell a dwelling-house with
vacant possession, there is also term implied into the contract that the vendor will procure the cancellation of any
Class F land charge registered against the property, pursuant to section 4(1) of the Matrimonial Homes Act 1967.
These decisions are discussed in later chapters but show how vacant possession as an implied term has been
established by decisionsin case law.
39 [1942] Ch. 349,per Simonds L at 352.
40 Ibid, 352.
41 [1974] 118 SoIJol312,per Lord Denning M.R. at 314.
42 Williams, aboven3, describes receiving vacantpossessionasnan Integral part of the contractu.
43 See Shell, above n28 at 487; El Awdi, ahove n33 at 253; Bank ofNova Scotia, above n28; Perry; Lynch; and
Hancock; all aboven37.
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How is the obligation breached?
It has been suggested that where a property is sold with vacant possession, the vendor
has to satisfy the purchaser that there is no adverse claimant and no occupier of the
premises at the relevant time.44 It has been stated that:
"An undertaking that vacant possession will be given is usually taken to mean
that possession will be given free from any occupation by the vendor or a third
party and free from any claim to a right to possession of the premises. ,,45
Over time, case law has tended to take broad VIeW of the proposition that any
impediment which prevents the purchaser from obtaining the quality of possession for
which he/she had contracted, will constitute a breach of the seller's obligation." Indeed,
it would appear that there are various potential obstacles to the receipt of vacant
possession and that these can be divided into several different categories, each category
raising issues which the law has failed to adequately address. These are discussed
further in chapter 2, but summarised briefly below by way of introduction.
Tangible impediments
The most common example of an impediment to vacant possession is when items that
should have been removed by the seller or party required to give vacant possession are
left at a property on completion. There has been a plethora of case law dealing with the
non-procurement of vacant possession in these terms. Some of the very oldest case law,
concerning the service of summons in ejectment cases47 dealt (somewhat crudely) with
vacant possession not being given due to items being left in the premises on completion.
In Savage v Dent, 48 beer was left in a cellar by the party required to give vacant
possession on completion and this was held to amount to a breach of the obligation. In
Isaacs v Diamond." furniture and goods remaining on the premises at completion was
44 Williams on Vendor and Purchaser (4 th eOO Sweet and Maxwell, London 20(8) 201.
" Ennnet, L.E. Emmet on Title (19th rev edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008) 6.006.
46 Korogluyan v Matheou [19751239 E.G. 649.
47For example, removalof personsfor the non-payment ofrentor othercontractual amounts falling dueunder a lease
orother legal document.
48 [1736] 2 Stra 1064.
49 (1880) WN 75. It is arguable that these are not authorities for the conventional-use of the term 'vacant possession'
as is discussed later inthis chapter, buttheprinciple of vacantpossessioncan beextracted from thecases.
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held to be a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession. In each case, the items
being left at the premises were seen to be consistent with the seller keeping possession
of the premises for their own purposes.50
Persons in occupation
A second common obstacle to the receipt of vacant possession IS that of persons
remaining in the property on completion. There is a wealth of case law confirming that
the presence of an existing tenant or other occupier at the premises on completion will
prevent vacant possession being given. This is commonly because the lease is still
continuing (i.e. the party has contractual or statutory rights to remain in occupation of
the property) or because other persons prevent the delivery of vacant possession on
completion.51 In Royal Bristol Permanent Building Society v Bomash52 the purchaser
agreed to buy two houses, vacant possession of which was to be given on completion.
When the day fixed for completion arrived, the houses were occupied by someone who
was 'holding over' (that is, continuing to occupy on the same terms of the tenancy which
had technically come to an end by effluxion of time). It was held that the vendor was in
breach of his obligation to give vacant possession on completion and damages were
awarded accordingly. Similarly in Beard v Porter" the vendor had agreed to sell to the
purchaser a dwelling-house which was occupied by a sitting tenant. The vendor
expressly agreed that the purchaser was to be given vacant possession on completion.
The purchase was completed, but the tenant refused to quit the house. The purchaser
sued and was awarded damages for breach of the vendor's undertaking to give vacant
possession on that date.54 Case law has, however, taken an inconsistent view as to how
50 More recent examples include Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264 and Hynes v
Vaughan [1985] 50 & CR 444. See also Scotland v Solomon [2002] EWHC 1886 (Ch) (discussed further in chapter
22·
S Fora discussion of the problems of so-called 'sitting tenants', see Stocker, 1. 'The Problem of the Protected Sitting
Tenant' (1988) 85 Law Society Gazette 14 and the Legal Update in (1988) 85 Law Society Gazette 36.
52 [1886-90] All ER Rep 283 and Engel/ v Finch and others (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 659.
53 [1948]1 KB 321. Other similar cases include SharneY.fordSupplies Ltd v Edge [1987] Ch 305; Cleadon Trust Ltd v
Davis [1940] Ch. 940; Leek and Moorland Building Society v Clark [1952]2 QB 788 and Appleton v Aspln [1988]4
EG.123. See also Reynolds v Bannerman [1922]1 KB 719; Watson v Saunders-Roe [1947] KB 437 CA and Carter v
Green [1950]2 KB 76 CA in relation to protected rights of tenants, along with The Rent Act 1977 and The Housing
Act 1988. See also News Report in (1987) 84 Law Society Gazette 2417.
54 For a discussion of the problems caused by unlawful third parties being in occupation on completion, and
preventing the delivery of vacantpossession, see Jones. P.V. 'Squatting and Squatting' (1991) 141 New Law Journal
1543.Thisis further discussed in chapter 5 withreference to the decision inSheikh v O'Connor [1987]2 EGLR 269.
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this affects vacant possession where the persons in occupation have no lawful claim to
possession of the property.55,
Legal impediments
The third main type of impediment to the receipt of vacant possession are obstacles of a
legal nature. Examples include the transfer of a strip of land subject to dedication as a
public highway. In Secretary ofState for the Environment v Baylis and Bennett56 it was
held that vacant possession of the land could not be given because the highway
authority had the right to possession rather than the owner of the sub-soil. Other
instances include a property (with an existing first floor tenancy) being sold with 'vacant
possession of the ground floor' but with a Housing Act notice limiting occupation of the
whole house to one household, thus preventing the delivery of vacant possession as far
as the ground floor was concerned.57 A number of cases concern the property in
question being compulsorily purchased or requisitioned in some way after the exchange
of contracts,58 ostensibly creating a legal obstacle which prevents the giving of vacant
possession on completion.
How do you defme the obligation?
As the obligation to give vacant possession is relevant to so many transactions, and so
widely used and referred to in legal agreements, it could be reasonable to assume that
the concept would have a clear, settled and agreed definition. This is far from the case.
Whilst of universal use, the term is one of the most misunderstood among all property
terms, with few being able to explain what procuring vacant possession actually means
or involves. Over time, lawyers, surveyors, judges and laymen have all struggled in
seeking to interpret what the obligation to give vacant possession actually refers to in
cases where the procurement of vacant possession is a decisive issue.
55 See Sheikh V O'Connor [1987] 2 EGLR 269. This is discussed in detail in chapter 5.
" [2000180 P.&C.R. 324. .
57 Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [197911 W.L.R. 446.
" SeeRe Winslow Hall Estate Company v United Glass Bottle Manufacturers Ltd [1941] Ch 503; Hillingdon Estates
Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd [1952] Ch. 627; E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Ltd v NSR Ltd [1997] AC 400; James'
Macara, Ltd v Barclay [1945] K. B. 143; Cook v Taylor [1942] Ch 349 and Korogluyan, see above n46. These
decisions are critically evaluated in chapter 6.
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The expression 'vacant possession', when used in legal transactions, does not seem to
have any great foundation in theoretical analysis, or historical root. Indeed, in the case
of Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland 59 counsel for the Defendant
summarised by stating that:
.....there are two classes of cases in which the question arises of what is meant
by 'vacant possession'. The first class to which Savage v. Dent and Isaacs v.
Diamond belong are cases relating to service of proceedings for recovery of
land when personal service cannot be effected. In those cases it is essential that
the premises by means of which substituted service is to be effected shall be
completely deserted...As between vendor and purchaser, however, vacant
possession involves the absence of anla adverse claim by anyone else to a right
in respect of the property being sold." 0
Counsel for the Claimant clarified that a lack of authority existed as to the obligation:
"vacant possession' is not limited in meaning to the absence of any adverse
claim. This limited meaning only applies to cases relating to substituted service
and that is because in dealing with service the fmding of a person is essential
and substituted service can only be made on deserted premises. That does not
assist in determining the meaning of 'vacant possession' as between vendor and
purchaser, a matter not decided by any authority."61
Counsel correctly stated that the expression 'vacant possession' had never been
authoritatively defined.62 It has been noted by the judiciary that the law surrounding
vacant possession is an area deficient in legal authority63 with various leading counsel
struggling, in vain, to cite relevant case law to support the legal positions that they
advance. Various judges have grappled to explain exactly what is meant by 'vacant
possession'. Further, the meaning of the words 'vacant possession' have been said to
vary according to the context in which they are used." providing little certainty to those
who are eager to ensure that vacant possession is procured at the relevant time (for
example, commercial tenants) but, perhaps, hope to those who would argue that it has
59 Above, n50 at 268.
60 Ibid at 268, per Ashworth (for the Defendant). Emphasis added.
61 Ibid at 268, per Heilpem (for the Claimant). Emphasis added.
62 See alsoHiggs, above n13, ill whichthe difficulties of understanding what 'yielding-up' atthe endofthe leasemay
involve is discussed with reference to the requirement to give vacant possession. See also Dowding, M.A., Morgan,
H.H.J., Rodger, M. and Peters E. (eds) Wood/all's Landlord and Tenant (Sweet and Maxwell, March 2010) 19.003.
63 See Sheikh, above n55.
64 According to Top/ell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [197911 EGLR 161,per Templeman J. at 162. The intention of
theparties willalsobe a materially relevant consideration.
13
not been (such as commercial landlords who want their current tenant to remain liable
under the terms of a lease).
Where a vendor expressly or impliedly contracts to convey an estate in land. free. from
incumbrances, it has been established that it is, in principle, a term of the contract that
the purchaser shall on completion obtain the right to actual (and not constructive)
possession of the estate in land that is transferrcd.f It has been said that:
"the phrase 'vacant possession' is no doubt generally used in order to make it
clear that what is being sold is not an interest in a reversion. ,,66
This would seem to imply that vacant possession IS a legal issue inextricably
interrelated with the passing of possession itself. In practice, however, it is clear that
vacant possession has been held not to have been given ifthe purchaser cannot enjoy the
legal right of possession without first having to take action itself. 67 Indeed, the term
vacant possession would seem to go beyond just a legal transfer of possession (and the
right thereto) and be concerned also, on a practical level, with actual occupation (in a
factual and practical sense) of the property in question:
"... the right to actual unimpeded physical enjoyment is comprised in the right
to vacant possession. ,,68
As will be shown later, the tests that have developed to determine whether vacant
possession has been given are objective in nature and focus on whether the purchaser
(or party with the right to vacant possession on completion) can occupy without
difficulty or objection. The courts are required to determine whether the physical or
legal impediment complained of substantially prevents or interferes with the enjoyment
of a substantial part of the property. These seem to embody the practical dimension of
vacant possession as a factual, as well as legal, matter. This then causes one to question,
whether vacant possession is actually concerned with the transfer of 'possession', or
'occupation' which follows from a transfer of possession (or perhaps, both). Indeed,
other authorities have taken a restrictive view of the obligation to give i vacant
esHughes v Jones (1861) 3 De. G.F. & J.307 and Horton v Kurzke [197111 WLR 769, per Goffl at 771-2.
66 Cumberland, above050 at270.
67 Thiswas a pointdiscussed in Sheikh, above 055.
6& Cumberland, aboveu50 at272.
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possession as being just a legal 'right', claiming that such a right "in the; absence of some
competing legal claim, passes to the purchaser on completion", so that the purchaser can
then take county court action of their own to enforce if necessary. Such comments are
potentially a source of confusion and uncertainty as to whether illegal or unlawful
occupiers should be treated differently to persons who remain in occupation with legal
claims. The scope of the obligation to give vacant possession in various differing
contexts is analysed in detail in chapter 5.
Conclusion and chapter outline
The obligation to give vacant possession is pervasive to land transactions in England
and Wales, and ofrelevance to a wide range of people and other legal entities. Given the
lack of understanding associated with the term, it is not surprising that the nature, scope
and extent of the commonly misunderstood obligation to give vacant possession causes
a wide range of problems to the thousands of people that the term affects in everyday
property transactions. Chapter 2 outlines the problems with 'vacant possession' in the
current legal system in order to demonstrate the magnitude ofthe issues associated with
the term. The chapter explains how problems arise in interpreting the obligation at every
stage: whether the obligation has arisen; what the obligation relates to; what can
constitute a breach of the obligation; whether there has, in fact, been a breach; and, if so
the remedies available to parties. In doing so, this chapter sets these issues, analysed in
more detail throughout the thesis, in context. This chapter also highlights the issues of
risk and responsibility which are engaged when parties contract (expressly or impliedly)
to give vacant possession.
In chapter 3 the role of vacant possession as a term of a contract for the sale or lease of
land is explored by reviewing its interaction with other terms or conditions. In
particular, the interactions between a clause providing for vacant possession and two
other more standard clauses (namely, 'subject to local authority requirement' clauses and
'no annulment, no compensation' clauses) are discussed through an analysis of relevant
case law. The decisions in case law on such interactions were inconsistent prior to 1979
(when the landmark decision in Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltcf9 was laid down).
69 Above, n64.
15
The decisions and lack of reasoning by trial judges in cases prior to 1979 demonstrate
that there was a misunderstanding (and apparent failure to take full account of) the force
and effect of the obligation. As the decisions related only to situations in which there
was a conflict with an express clause providing for vacant possession (when appearing
as a special condition), this chapter also discusses how the position may differ when
there is a conflict with only an express general (as opposed to special) condition for
vacant possession, or when the conflict arises with an implied obligation to give vacant
possession. Here, different rules of construction and interpretation may apply even
though, as the chapter will demonstrate, a lack of authority continues to leave the
position unclear.
Having established that vacant possession will be a term of the contract, chapter 4
develops this understanding of vacant possession by proceeding on a chronological
journey through the editions and versions of the standard conditions of sale, first
published in 1902, and since then routinely incorporated into the majority of contracts
for the sale and purchase of freehold land (and leasehold estates and interests). By
documenting how the obligation has been incorporated through the history of the
conditions of sale, much is revealed about the profession's understanding at various
intervals since the publication of the first conditions of sale. This analysis, providing
contemporaneous evidence of the development of the concept, sheds light on the
understanding and recognition by practitioners and other professionals of the nature,
scope and extent of the obligation to give vacant possession and its implications for sale
and purchase transactions over the history of the conditions of sale.
In the first of two chapters that explore the nature and form of the obligation, chapter 5
seeks to develop a more coherent and informed understanding with reference to persons
in occupation of a property on completion. Inconsistencies in case law as to whether the
obligation can be breached by unlawful as well as legal occupiers being present in the
property on completion raises questions as to the content of this commonly undertaken
obligation, as a matter of fact and law. What is particularly noteworthy from these
decisions (nearly all of which were at first instance) is that the.actual meaning of 'vacant
possession' was never discussed or debated, and was a term that was rather 'assumed' to
have a recognised meaning by the courts. This, it will be seen, is one explanation for the
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lack of consistency across a range of decisions relating to similar issues or statutory
provisions.
This chapter proposes a model of the obligation to give vacant possession as comprising
both a legal and factual dimension. Scholarly literature surrounding the development
. and evolution of the concept of 'possession' is also analysed to further substantiate the
binary nature of possession in the context of vacant possession. Vacant possession,
which necessarily concerns actual (de facto) possession on completion, pursuant to the
right to possession which is transferred with the legal estate in land (de jure), is
contrasted with notions of constructive possession (i.e. possession otherwise than by
actual occupation) in order to demonstrate why the legal and factual elements are
intrinsic to the obligation.
As such, it is demonstrated that only a proper understanding of both the legal and
factual dimensions of vacant possession can enable a coherent interpretation of the
essential nature of the obligation as manifest in the body ofcase law which has emerged
on this subject. This analysis also helps to explain what otherwise may seem to be
contradictory decisions in case law. It is suggested that these previous inconsistencies
are a consequence of there not having been sufficient conceptual infrastructure to
explain the vacant possession obligation.
This understanding of the legal and factual dimensions to the obligation is then applied
to cases concerning so-called 'legal obstacles' to the receipt of vacant possession in
chapter 6. 'Legal obstacles' relate to impediments of a legal nature, such as the
requisitioning of a property for government purposes, or compulsory purchase orders. In
this chapter, the model of vacant possession expounded in the previous chapter is used
to explain why the applicable case law provides an inconsistent understanding of the
vacant possession construct. Whilst the obligation is interpreted in the wider context of
the transaction more generally, it is suggested that this is another area in which the case
jaw appears to demonstrate that the concept has not been coherently understood.
. Analysis of these cases based on the model proposed in the previous chapter enables the
inconsistencies to be explained, and further supports the proposition that the constituent
elements of vacant possession comprise both the right to possession (pursuant to the
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transfer of an estate vested in possession) and the factual enjoyment of that estate in
land on completion, or at the operative date.
Whilst the obligation must have an inherently legal and factual dimension, it is
necessary to evaluate in more detail what will amount to a breach of the factual element
of the obligation at the point of completion, and how case law has sought to determine a
breach. In providing such an analysis, chapter 7 also compares the obligation to give
vacant possession with other (more developed) property law concepts, such as actual
occupation and adverse possession, and draws parallels between the respective
determinations in each case. The respective limbs of the test to determine a breach of
the obligation to give vacant possession are found to be highly context and fact specific,
in similar terms to the tests to establish actual occupation and adverse possession.
Further, in similar terms to actual occupation and factual possession, in the context of
adverse possession, one limb of the test for vacant possession is shown to be an
objective test with reference to the specific circumstances of the land and other relevant
contextual factors pertaining to the property. In particular, the conclusions drawn from
this chapter are used to locate the model of vacant possession posed by this work within
the broader theoretical framework of possession, and also used to further elaborate on
the understanding of the concept of possession in the law of England and Wales. This
supports, and expands, current legal thinking in this regard.
Having discussed the tests to determine a breach of the obligation, chapter 8 identifies
which potential obstacles to the receipt of vacant possession (for example, chattels) the
scope of the obligation will/should include, and what potential 'barriers' to vacant
possession may be outside of the scope of the obligation. For example, traditionally,
fixtures are not seen to be relevant to the vacant possession obligation. As this chapter
will demonstrate, whilst the nature of the obligation can be explained by reference to the
model proposed, the scope and extent of the obligation remains unclear in a variety of
respects. The analysis suggests that traditional distinctions between, for example,
fixtures and chattels, are not relevant in the context of vacant possession, and that the
crucial issue relates to whether the item is a 'substantial obstacle' to the receipt of the
'right to possession'. In the context of a new understanding of impediments proposed by
this chapter, so called 'lesser interests' (such as certain profits) are also discussed and
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found not be relevant to the vacant possession determination, given that (by their very
natnre) they do not amount to impediments that can affect the right to 'possession'.
Further, analysis of the obligation's interaction with a third common type of general
condition ('actual state and condition' clauses), in the context of impediments to vacant
possession that are more akin to the nature of the premises, alsoprovides further support
for the conclusions reached in chapter 3 with respect to the interaction between vacant
possession and other conflicting contractual terms.
When an obligation to give vacant possession exists, and a breach of that obligation is
held to have taken place, the next determination for a court will be the remedy or relief
that can be awarded to the successful party. The remedy normally awarded to an injured
party for a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession will be damages, which
can often be largely unsatisfactory to a purchaser who, having already paid their money
before finding the property is not vacant, will be unable to occupy the property as they
wish to. Chapter 9 explores the remedies available with reference to the connection and
interaction between vacant possession and title, in seeking to consider whether vacant
possession as a proprietary, rather than contractual, obligation would more evenly
balance the issues of risk and fairness between parties. This goes to the heart of an
academic inquiry into the nature and form of the obligation to give vacant possession
and its place in the wider theoretical understanding of possession in property law; it also
addresses the thematic issues of risk and responsibility and their relevance to the
operation of the obligation in real life scenarios.
The conclusion to this thesis draws together the historical evolution and development of
the vacant possession concept. Demonstrating that an informed understanding of the
concept contributes to the current literature in the field of possession, the conclusion
explains how this work can be placed in the wider theoretical framework of possession
literature. Suggesting how the obligation should subsequently be moved forward, both a
'definition' of the term, and provisions that would enhance the remedies available in the
: event of a breach of the obligation, are provided, along with other proposals that may
. ameliorate the problems associated with vacant possession in the leasehold context. The
conclusion also provides a comprehensive overview of other findings of the thesis, and
identifies where further academic enquiry may be progressed in the futnre.
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Chapter Z
The Current Problems with 'Vacant Possession
There is no generally accepted understanding of the nature, scope and extent of the
obligation to give vacant possession. Not surprisingly, this causes a wide range of issues
for the cross section of people to whom the obligation frequently affects. In order for all
the problematic issues currently associated with the term to be fully appreciated, it is
appropriate to provide an insight into the real life scenarios in which the expression
'vacant possession' is used and applied. This will assist in explicating the difficulties
faced by this wide variety of people on a day-to-day basis and the issues of risk and
responsibility which overshadow the giving ofvacant possession.
An appreciation of the contexts in which the obligation is engaged reveals a number of
problems which the law has hereto failed to satisfactorily address. Whilst the nature,
scope and extent of the obligation, and the remedies that flow from a breach of the term,
can be properly described as opaque (as shall be discussed shortly), these only become
relevant if an obligation to give vacant possession has actually arisen - something
which cannot be assumed to be self evident in every case.
Has an obligation to give Vacant Possession arisen?
The issue of vacant possession can arise on the sale of freehold land (for example, the
transfer of estates in fee simple) and upon the grant, transfer and termination of leases
and other tenancies (and perhaps informal agreements to occupy by consent).' With
respect to leases, procuring vacant possession is generally seen as an essential, and
likely, element of the obligation to yield-up the premises at the contractual termination
of the lease. Further, vacant possession itself can also be an express pre-condition for
the exercise, by a tenant, of a break' option in a lease or tenancy? From the outset it is
1 Upon termination of a licence a tenant will normally be obliged to vacate the premises, but it is arguable as to
whether this is giving vacant possession as the tenant is not returning possession (as, for example, on termination ef a
lease). See chapter !, 2.. . .
2 Shaw, K. 'Fit to be occupied' (2007) 27 Jan 2007 Estates Gazette 182; Shaw, K. 'More to it than meets,the eye'
(2010) 1 May 2010 Estates Gazette 4 and Shaw, K. 'All that ynn can't leave behind' (2010) 256 Property Law Journal
6. See also Martin, 1. 'Tenant's Break Options' (2003) 153 New Law Journal 759 where the requirement to give
vacantpossession whenoperating a break optionin a leaseis discussed.
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important to be aware of whether an obligation to give vacant possession has arisen and,
if so, on what basis. This is because the manner in which the obligation arises would
seem to determine what that obligation may encompass.
It is common for a contract for the sale and purchase of land to include an express
obligation to give vacant possession on completion, for example 'the property is sold
with vacant possession on completion', but often the contract will simply prescribe that
the property must be 'transferred free from all incumbrances'. It is unclear whether this
can be construed as simply referring to legal incumbrances on title3 or whether this may
actually relate to providing vacant possession in respect of referring to any and all
impediments that could affect enjoyment of the property on completion. Whilst, in
practice, the question is ultimately one of the intention of the parties as shown by the
contract," it is sometimes difficult to determine the intention of the parties especially
when a specific clause is read in conjunction with the standard conditions of sale (which
have over time included clauses relating to vacant possession), given that these will
normally have been incorporated into the contract only by reference and not specifically
considered by the contracting parties.'
Indeed, even when the contract clearly includes an express obligation to give vacant
possession, it has over time been unclear as to whether such an obligation can be
contradicted by other general conditions of sale that do not directly refer to vacant
possession, for example, a general condition that a purchaser buys subject to notices and
to anything which would have been revealed by local searches and enquiries. In Topfell
Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd,6 it was held that an express obligation to give vacant
possession could not be contradicted by the usual general conditions of sale, but this
decision is in direct conflict with the decision in Krogluyan v Matheou7 (concerning so-
called 'subject to local authority requirements' clauses)" and also with the decision in
, 3 The meaning of the term 'incumbrances' has itself been said to vary according to the circumstances, see Belvedere
Court Management Ltd v Frogmore Development Ltd [19971 QB 858 at 887.
'See Lake v Dean (1860) 28 Beav 607 and Re Crosby's Contract [1949] 1 ALL E.R. 830. Farrand, J.T. Conveyancing
contracts: Conditions ofSale and Title (Oyez Publications, London 19.6-4-) 209 wrote"Whatthe purchaser is entitled
.to get in thewayof vacantpossessionon completion depends, ofcourse, on what the contract says".
5 See chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the incorporation of vacant possessionin conditions of salesince 1904.
. 6 [1979] 1 EGLR 161.
7 [1975] 239 E.G. 649.
.SA clause like this will providethatthe purchaser is to take the land: 'subject to all notices, orders or requirements
given, madeorrequired by the local or other authorities'. See Korogluyan, aboven7. Such a clausemaybe relevant to
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Curtis v French9 (concerning so-called 'no annulment, no compensation' clauses)'"
where the exact opposite was held. It has therefore proven difficult to interpret the
extent of an obligation to give vacant possession when such an express obligation has
been found to interact with (or be qualified by) other standard conditions of sale that are
incorporated into the contract more generally.11
Further, even if other contractual conditions can modify an obligation to give vacant
possession, it is unclear which will (and will not) be relevant to the obligation to give
vacant possession. Indeed, it has been argued that standard conditions relating to the
state and condition of the property can operate to affect or otherwise modify the express
obligation.V but there remains no actual authority on the position where the seller's
inability to give vacant possession is due to the physical state ofthe property, and how a
general condition in these terms could be relevant.F It is therefore unclear which 'other
conditions' are actually relevant to the obligation, given its nature and form.
While a vacant possession obligation can appear as an express clause in the contract, it
is also common for conditions to fail to cater for vacant possession expressly.
Ordinarily, this will mean that vacant possession will be no more than an implied term
of the contract. Cheshire notes that "it is an implicit term of the contract of sale that
vacant possession shall be given to the purchaser on completion".14 In Cook v Taylor it
was held that where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and silent as to any
tenancy to which the property is subject, there is impliedly a contract that vacant
the obligation to give vacant possessionwhere a legal obstacle (such as a compulsory purchase order) purportedly
prevents the giving ofvacant possession on completion.
9 [1929] 1 Ch. 253,per Eve J.
10 Clauses like these are likely to state that: 'no error, misstatement or omission in the particulars, sale plan or
conditions shallannul the sale, norshall any compensation be allowedeitherby the vendororthe purchaser in respect
thereof. See Curtis v French, above n9. If a seller expressly contracted to sell land with vacantpossession but then
found that he could not, because of animpediment of which he hadbeenunaware atthetimeof contract, theeffect of
a general condition of this kind on the express obligation given by the seller as to vacant possession must be
considered. In theory, ifthe impediment amounted to an'error, misstatement or omission! from theparticulars of sale,
a general condition of this kindmayhave an effecton the express condition as to vacant possession, as explained in
chapter 3. .
11 The interaction between vacant possession and standard contractual terms, and the treatment of vacant possession
as a special orstandard condition of sale, is discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4.
12 See Topfell Ltd, above n6.
13 According to Harpum, C. 'Vacant possession- chameleon or chimaera?' (1988) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer
324,400 (C.H.) C.f. Hynes v Vaughan [1985] 50 P. & C.R. 444, per Scott J. (and discussed in detail in chapter 8).
14 Cheshire, G.C. and Burn E.H. Modern law of real property (12'" edn Butterworths, London 1976) 740. See also
Farrand, above n4 at 209-213.
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possession will be given on completion." The case concerned a vendor who had entered
into a written agreement (which incorporated the Law Society's Conditions of Sale
1934) with a purchaser for the sale of a freehold property. The agreement contained no
reference to vacant possession, but particulars containing the statement 'vacant
possession on completion' had been delivered by the vendor's agents to the purchaser.
Before the date fixed for completion, the house was requisitioned by the Government
under the Defence (General) Regulations 1939 (which were war time provisions for the
compulsory acquisition ofproperty). The judge decided that the particulars were used in
connection with the contract and were incorporated therein by the Law Society's
Conditions of Sale; therefore there was a contract expressly to sell the property with
vacant possession. Apart from that, however, it was held that according to the general
law there was an implication that the property was to be sold with vacant possession.
This decision was later followed in Re Crosby's Contract, Crosby v Houghton. 16
When an obligation to give vacant possession has arisen impliedly, it is important to
note that the implied assumption will be subject to specific circumstances and actual
knowledge of the parties. For example, where one party is aware, when entering into a
contract, that the interest is subject to some impediment to vacant possession, case law
suggests that if the purchaser knows that the obstacle to the receipt of vacant possession
is irremovable, then the implied obligation to give vacant possession will not extend so
as to include that obstacle. In Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd17 the vendor
brought an action for damages for repudiation of a contract to buy certain freehold
property under an oral agreement. The defendants contended, inter alia, that the
documents relied on a memorandum that did not comply with section 40 of the Law of
Property Act 1925 and (amongst other matters) omitted to state that the property was
sold subject to a lease. It was held that the omission to refer to the lease did not vitiate
the memorandum and that the defendants, by virtue of their knowledge (that the
15 [1942] Ch. 349 at 352. In this case some importance was attached to the fact that the property was seento be vacant
on inspection, but Simons 1. did say in general terms that "where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and
silent as to any tenancy to which the property is subject, there is impliedly a contract that vacant possession will be
given on completion". See also Walford, RO. Contracts and Conditions of Sale of Land (Sweet and Maxwell
Limited, London 1957) 169. See also chapter I, n38.
16[1949] I AU ER 830. See also Midland Bank Ltd v Farmpride Hatcheries Ltd [1981] 2 EGLR 147: "Prima facie a
prospective vendorof property offers the property with vacant bossession unless he otherwise states and that would
ordinarily be impliedin the contract of sale in the absence, of stipulation to the contrary", per Shaw L.J. at 148; and
Lord Denning M.R. in Edgewater Developments Co v Bailey [1974] 118 Sol Jo1312: "Where nothing was saidabout
possession it was often said that there was an implication that property was to be sold with vacant possession".
Walford, above 015 also discussedthe impliedterm asto vacant possession.
17 [1958] Ch 110.
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plaintiff's interest was subject to the lease) when they entered into the contract, were
precluded by implication of law from objecting to take the property subject to the lease
(whether it was or was not referred to in the memorandum). Their knowledge of the
lease (as an irremovable obstacle) on exchange meant that an implied obligation to give
vacant possession did not extend so as to include that obstacle on cornpletion.Y and
accordingly the lease was not held to constitute a breach of the obligation to give vacant
possession on completion.
If at the time the contract was made, the purchaser knew of only a removable obstacle
however, then the implied obligation to give vacant possession will not be deemed to
exclude such an obstacle, and if the removable obstacle is still on the premises on
completion, the obligation to give vacant possession will have been breached.19 In
Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Preston20 a mortgagor was ordered, on 10 July
1956, within twenty-eight days, to deliver possession to the mortgagees of the
mortgaged premises. In September 1956, the order was served on the mortgagor, and in
December 1956, possession not having been given, a writ of possession was issued. In
January 1957, the sheriff's officer evicted the mortgagor. The mortgagor left his
furniture in the mortgaged premises and refused to remove it, contending that the order
for possession was spent. The mortgagees applied for an order that the mortgagor
should within four days remove his furniture. It was held that the mortgagees were
entitled to the order because the mortgagor had not given vacant possession in
compliance with the order. Leaving his furniture on the premises was seen by the court
to amount to the mortgagor claiming a right to continue to use the premises for his own
purposes. It did not matter that the mortgagee was aware of the presence of the furniture
at the material time, for such items were clearly capable of being removed. The implied
obligation to give vacant possession did therefore include the removable items, which
18 Ibid, c.f Farrell v Green [1974] 232 EG 578 at 589 which was decided per incuriam on the point lbat knowledge
of irremovable impediments is irrelevant to the scope of the implied obligation. It remains an authority for the
proposition that vacant possession can be an implied term however. Note also thatin Lake v Dean (1860) 28 Beav
607 noticethat the property was 'in the occupation of a third party! (as opposed to the disclosure of express terms of
tenancies) washeldnot to be sufficient to amount to the disclosure of a tenancy sufficient to constitute knowledge of
an irremovable obstruction that couldmodifyan implied obligation to give vacant possession. However constructive
noticeof theexistenceof a tenancy maybe imputed to thebuyer; for example, if thepurchaser knowsthat a person is
in occupation of the property, he is presumed to knowthe rights of the occupier, and where the occupier hassuch a
legal tenancy lbe buyer will, according to Hunt v Luck [1902] LRA 2002 24, take snbject to lbattenancy.
19 Subject to the removable items not being de minimis - as discussed in chapter 7. The analogy and similarity
between the obligation to give vacant possession andthe requirement to give good title in this regard canbe used to
construct anargument thatvacant possessionshould notbe merely a contractual term, butrather proprietary in nature.
This is explored in chapter 9.
2°[1957] 1 WLR 813. As such, a purchaser's knowledge ofa removable obstruction to vacant possessionis irrelevant.
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were known of on exchange, and as they were not removed (and the items were
sufficiently substantial in nature) there was accordingly a breach by the mortgagor of
the obligation to give 'vacant possession at the material time.
The position on removable and irremovable obstructions with respect to the implied
obligation to give vacant possession, can be contrasted with the position where there is
an express obligation to give vacant possession. Here the position is entirely different. It
has been held that an express obligation to give vacant possession will prevail regardless
of the nature of any known potential impediment to vacant possession (removable or
irremovable). In Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge21 the plaintiff purchased land from
the defendant by a contract which incorporated the Law Society's General Conditions of
Sale (1973 revision). It provided by general condition 3(1) that, unless the special
conditions otherwise provided, the property was sold with vacant possession on
completion. The plaintiff, aware that the land was occupied, had stressed from the outset
that vacant possession was required and had received answers to pre-contractual
enquiries from the defendant that the occupants had no right to remain in possession.
The occupants refused to vacate the land on completion. The express obligation to give
vacant possession meant that the defendant was in breach even though the purchaser
knew, at the time the contract was formed, of the irremovable obstruction to the delivery
ofvacant possession (i.e. the lease).22 As Parker L.J. observed:
"If ... a vendor sells land, which he knows is subject to a tenancy, and
contracts specifically to sell with vacant possession, he makes in effect, a
specific promise that he will get the tenants out. ,,23
That is, an express clause providing for vacant possession makes knowledge of any
potential obstructions (whether removable or irremovable) entirely irrelevant.
From a practitioner's point of view, ascertaining how the obligation to give vacant
possession has arisen (by express provision or implied by law)24 is therefore essential in
order to determine what the obligation can be deemed to encompass. Imagine that a
21 [1987] Ch 305.
22 See also Hissett v Reading Roofing Co Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1757.
23 [1987] Ch. 305,per Parker LT. at 325.
24 Discussed in further detail below.
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seller contracts to convey land to a purchaser and that, upon exchange, the purchaser
knew of large items in the property (which we will assume were clearly irremovable).
The only possible reference to vacant possession in the contract was a clause stating that
'the property is sold free from legal incumbrances on completion'. It is therefore unclear
whether this refers to vacant possession expressly. On completion, the large items
remain on the property and the purchaser claims that the seller has not given vacant
possession because of the existing presence of these goods. The purchaser claims that
the seller expressly contracted to provide vacant possession, and is therefore in breach.
Conversely, the seller claims that the clause in question referred only to title issues and
therefore that any obligation to procure vacant possession is implied. The seller further
claims that because the purchaser was aware of the large items in the property on
exchange, and that they were clearly irremovable, the implied obligation to give vacant
possession did not extend to include these items. The seller therefore contends that it is
not in breach and was not required to remove such items. How the obligation arose
(expressly or impliedly) will determine whether the seller or purchaser is correct in their
respective claims as to whether the irremovable obstruction constitutes a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession.
It is common for contracts to include other ambiguous clauses that could be construed
as referring expressly to the procurement of vacant possession, for example:
"Thepurchaser will be entitled to actual possession on completion"
"On completion the purchaser is to have undisturbed enjoyment of the
property"
"[T]he seller will convey the landfree from all legal impediments"
"[Tfhe purchaser will be entitled to free occupation on completion"
"[Tjhe legal right to unencumbered enjoyment...will pass on completion" 25
2S Theseare allexamples that have appeared in documents reviewed by the author.
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, It is not clear as to whether any of these would amount to an express obligation to give
vacant possession, and the context of the clause in the contract and the intention of the
parties would have to be considered in making any determination.
The example referred to above assumed that the large items in question were
irremovable but, unhelpfully, there is no actual guidance as to what is deemed
removable or irremovable in this context. In Hughes v Jones'" a lease was said to be
irremovable, but a seller may claim that they will seek to agree a surrender of that
interest between exchange and completion and, in that regard, a purchaser could
legitimately claim to have assumed it to be removable before completion, causing the
implied obligation to technically encompass the leasehold interest.27
Whether an obligation to give vacant possession has arisen is by no means limited to the
sale and purchase of freehold land and buildings. Whether, and how, the obligation can
arise is equally as important to leases. For example, in the leasehold context, a tenant
may have the right to exercise a break option in a lease and bring that lease to an end
earlier than the contractual termination date. Practically speaking, it is advantageous
that a tenant avoids the procurement of vacant possession as a pre-condition for exercise
of the break option (and that any agreement to provide vacant possession is entirely
separate from the exercise of the break option). This way, the tenant will not be
prevented from exercising the break if vacant possession cannot be given and the
landlord, rather than seeking to contend that the lease is still continuing, will instead be
forced to rely on other remedies to deal with the vacant possession issue. In practice
however, vacant possession is often an express pre-condition for the exercise ofa break,
or alternatively, can be implied by virtue ofa more general pre-condition upon exercise
of the break option, namely that the tenant has 'materially complied' with all tenant
covenants under the lease. Where a break option is conditional upon the tenant's
26 (1861) 3 De GF & T 307. Also Re Englefield Holdings, Ltd v Sinclair's Contract [19621 1 WLR 1119. This is
obviouslysubject to contra-indications orother intentions of the parties as shownby thecontract.
27 In District BankLtd v Webb [1958] 1 WLR 148 a lease was not treated as an incumbrance. Whilst these cases are
in the context of defects of title, as discussed in chapter 8 the principles relevant to vacant possession in this regard
bear a strong resemblance to those applicable to a vendor's duty to disclose latent defects in title, which can be
implied in a Eke manner. It is also relevant to consider the nature and form of the lease or tenancy. Walford, £.0.
Conditions ofSale ofLand (SweetandMaxwell Limited, London 1940) 189 states that lilt must notbe supposed that
a general statement thatthe property is "inthe occupation" of a third party will cover lengthy tenancies". In Caballero
v Henty (1874) LR 9 Ch 447, such a description was held not to cover a lease of which the unexpired terms was
around eightyears (this was prior to the 1954 Act and various RentActs comingintoforce however). The pointto
note is that a lease Of other tenancy or agreement pertaining to occupation may not always be an irremovable
incumbrance on thisanalysis.
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material compliance with covenants up to and including the break:date, this will almost
certainly encompass the 'yielding-up' obligation that will take effect on termination of
the lease. The yielding-up obligation will include the return of the premises as demised
which can therefore be seen to include the obligation to give vacant possession on
completion."
For example, imagine that a tenant has trouble paying the rent on a lease and decides to
move to smaller premises. The tenant exercises a break: option in its lease with the
landlord which is conditional upon compliance with all covenants in the lease up to and
including the break: date. On the break date the premises are not cleared of tenant's
chattels. The tenant claims that vacant possession was not a condition of the break:
option in the lease. The landlord takes the position that the condition that the tenant
must have complied with all covenants up to and including the break date includes the
tenant's covenant to yield-up at the end of the lease, which itself includes the return of
the premises as demised (and therefore the giving of vacant possession). The landlord is
likely to be correct, in which case the tenant remains liable under the terms of the lease,
which continues. In this regard, a landlord can use the issue of vacant possession to
prevent the tenant exercising a contractual break:option in a lease if the landlord would
prefer the lease to continue. The implied requirement to give vacant possession thus
arises as a consequence of the yielding-up obligation in the lease being incorporated as a
condition of the break. In such a case, it is likely that a tenant will not appreciate this
until the issue is raised, normally after the break date, when the tenant's opportunity to
give vacant possession will have passed.t"
It is therefore clear that, in everyday transactions, confusion is rife as to when an
obligation to give vacant possession is engaged or operative and, in tum, what that
obligation will actually refer to or encompass. In the freehold context, lawyers struggle
to advise clients as to whether a contractual provision amounts to an express obligation
to give vacant possession and therefore, in tum, whether a purchaser's knowledge of an
28 The actual wording of the yielding-up obligation will be crucial. The normal phrase is 'on the expiry or sooner
determination of the term' butif there is reference only to 'expiry' then compliance maynotbe required at anearlier ., ,
gaint intimewhen the lease is broken.
9The situation is more complexwhentheyielding-up obligation refers Datto 'material compliance' butrather to just
'compliance' or 'reasonable compliance'. In such cases, whether the yieldingup obligation causes a breach of vacant
possession would then he a question of factfor a court to determine withreference to aninterpretation of themeaning
of the covenants inthe lease, causing greater uncertainty forallparties.
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irremovable obstruction at the time that contracts were exchanged is relevant to the
delivery of vacant possession on completion'. In cases where the obligation to give
vacant possession is only implied, whether an obstruction is properly classified as
removeable or irremovable has currently not been clarified with sufficient precision,
thus causing further uocertainty for all involved. With respect to leases, it is generally
not appreciated how vacant possession can creep into the operation of break options in
leases by virtue of the drafting of the lease more generally, thus causing the obligation
to have arisen (almost inadvertently). As such, the parties subject to a given transaction
can find themselves in a difficult position given the ambiguity in cases of this kind, and
therefore fail to appreciate the risk involved in entering into a given transaction, and
what responsibilities may be engaged with respect to the other party to a transaction.
Chapters 3 and 4 explore how vacant possession, as a term of contract, can arise and
how its interaction with other contractual terms can affect the parties to a given
transaction.
What does an obligation to give Vacant Possession refer to?
As noted in chapter 1, obstacles to the receipt of vacant possession can be divided into
several different categories, each category raising issues that the law has currently failed
to adequately address. It is insightful to elaborate on the common types of obstacle to
the receipt of vacant possession in more detail, in order to explain the problems
associated with each.
Tangible impediments
The most common example of an impediment to vacant possession is when items that
should have been removed by the seller or party required to give vacant possession are
left at a property on completion. Beer in the cellar,30 furniture and goods remaining on
the premises'! and other chattels of the party required to give vacant posscssiorr'f have
been held to breach the obligation. In each case, the items being left at the premises
30 Savage v Dent [1736\ 2 Sir. 1064.
Jl Isaacs v Diamond (1880) WN 75.
32 Cumberland Holdings Ltd v Ireland [19461 KB 264.
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were seen to be consistent with .the seller keeping possession of the premises for their
own purposes.
Whilst determined by the facts of each case, historically case law never sought to
extract general principles which could be applied universally across the board in order
to determine what giving vacant possession actually means. In some cases rubbish and
left over chattels caused a breach of the obligation, whereas in other cases items such as
furniture being left behind were seen as irrelevant.F Historically it was unclear whether
a de minimis threshold operated with respect to left over items which may have
explained the differing decisions reached by respective judges on ostensibly similar
questions of fact. More recently, case law has sought to develop tests to avoid ad hoc
value judgments being made as to whether left over items prevented the delivery of
vacant possession in any given instance but, as discussed in the next section, it is
arguable whether such tests have resolved a number of issues posed by the vacant
possession obligation.
Later case law has indicated that the vacant possession obligation is subject to a de
minimis rule." but how that operates in practice and what such a threshold refers to
remains unclear. The quantity of items left, their size, movability and degree and
purpose of annexation would seem to be relevant factors in determining whether the
items left behind cause a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession. Further,
case law also seems to suggest that it may be relevant to consider the location of items
in, around or outside the property concerned. In Hynes v Vaughan'" a vendor left large
amounts of rubbish (rotting vegetation, soil, timber, broken glass, paint tins and rubble)
in the garden which, it was claimed, prevented the transfer of vacant possession. The
rubbish was held to be consistent with the character of the property sold and could not
be said to substantially prevent or interfere with the enjoyment of the right ofpossession
of a substantial part of the property, since it was outside in the garden. However, a
33 Even in recent times this is still true, for example: Scotland v Solomon [2002] EWHC 1886 (Ch).
34 Following Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264 where the obligation was stated as
beingsubject to sucha rule.
35 [1985]50 & CR444.
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different decision may very well have been reached if the rubbish had been inside the
premisesr"
Another problem commonly experienced is with regard to the status of items left at the
property on completion. Disputes can arise as to whether items left behind at a property
are fixtures (and therefore part of the land) or chattels (personal property of the tenant
obliged to procure vacant possessionj" Traditionally the law has been clear that if the
seller's failure to give vacant possession is due to the presence on the property of
chattels which affect usability of the premises, then provided the chattels substantially
interfere with enjoyment of a substantial part of the premises on completion, a breach
will have occurredr" Conversely, fixtures (which pass as part of the land conveyed
under the contract of sale) would not be relevant to the obligation to give vacant
possession.
Imagine that a seller contracts to convey a property to a purchaser, the contract
providing expressly that vacant possession is to be given on completion. The purchaser
intends to grant a lease to a business tenant of the property on the same day. The tenant
requires occupation that day given the nature of its business. On the morning of
completion the transaction completes and the purchaser is given the keys. Later in the
day the purchaser meets his proposed new tenant at the premises to sign the lease and
hand the keys over. Upon inspection of the property, however, the purchaser and the
proposed tenant see that furniture and other items have been left by the seller. The
proposed tenant refuses to sign the lease because he cannot immediately occupy the
property as he needs to. Instead he takes a lease of an adjacent unit the following week.
Two months later the purchaser manages to lease out the property to a third party tenant
at a rent lower than had been agreed with the proposed tenant due to a decline in the
market. The purchaser claims that the seller was in breach of his express contractual
obligation to give vacant possession and claims that loss has been suffered as a
consequence. The seller argues that the items left were fixtures (and therefore part ofthe
land) or, in the alternative, that they came within the de minimis threshold and therefore
, i that no breach arose. The proper determination of the status <if the items can be seen as a
36 See chapter 8 for ananalysis of how the scope and extentof theobligation is-context specific.
37 Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997] 2 All ER 513, whichsought to differentiate betweenfixtures andchattels based on
theirrespective degree and purpose of annexation.
38 See Cumberland, aboven34.
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preliminary issue in seeking to establish whether the items had been left behind by:the
seller unlawfully, and therefore caused a breach of the vacant possession obligation.
Whether the items could be argued to be de minimis would also be a relevant point: As
will be scen in chapter 7 however, it can be argued that this distinction: is itself
misleading and artificial in the context ofvacant possession.
As the next section highlights, determining what will constitute a sufficient impediment
to prevent the delivery of vacant possession in any particular instance remains a difficult
task, even following the tests that have developed to assist in this regard.
Persons in occupation
There is a wealth of case law confirming that the presence of an existing tenant or other
legal occupier at the premises on completion will prevent vacant possession being
given." This may be because the lease is still continuing, or because the party has
contractual or statutory rights to remain in occupation of the property. In Sharneyford
Supplies Ltd v Edge40 the plaintiff purchased land from the defendant under a contract
that expressly provided for vacant possession on completion. The occupants refused to
vacate the land and claimed the benefit of a business tenancy within the Landlord and
Tenant Act 1954. The defendant was liable for not giving vacant possession at the
material time. Crucially, this decision, and decisions in similar cases such as Beard v
Porter." dealt with purportedly 'lawful' claims to remain in occupation of the property
(i.e. because of a statutory or common law continuation tenancy).
While the traditional definitions of vacant possession refer to delivery of the property
'free from any claim to a right to possession of the property', it has been questioned
whether this remains the case with respect to persons who may be in occupation with no
lawful claim or right (for example, squatters or trespassers). There is conflicting obiter
dicta with regard to whether people in unlawful occupation breach the obligation to
provide vacant possession. Some statementsf suggest that the obligation would he
39 Beard v Porter [1948] 1 KB 321.
40 [1987] Ch 305.
41 [1948] 1 KB 321.
42 Obiter comments in Cumberland, aboven34.
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breached in this situation, presumably on the basis that it is the duty ofthe seller (as the
person responsible for providing vacant possession) to ensure that trespassers are
evicted. -lnCumberland Holdings Ltd v Ireland'3 it was noted that a seller's duty extends
to removing unlawful occupants on completion. The case itself concerned left over
goods at the premises but the judge considered obiter that the existence of a physical
impediment, which substantially prevented or interfered with the enjoyment of the right
of possession of a substantial part of the property, stood in the same position as an
impediment caused by the presence of a trespasser."
Other obiter comments, however, suggest that a seller would not be in breach by virtue
of there being a person in unlawful occupation of the property at completion. Here
receiving a property free of unlawful occupants on completion seems to be treated as a
right which (in the absence of any competing legal claim) passed to the purchaser on
completion (and which the purchaser could take county court action of their own accord
to enforce if necessary), rather than an obligation of the seller. In Sheikh v O'Connor45
the vendor contracted to sell a property to the plaintiff. Most of the property was
tenanted but the vendor expressly contracted to sell one of the rooms with vacant
possession. After completion, the purchaser complained that the room which should
have been vacant was in fact occupied by one of the tenants as a trespasser. The
purchaser sued the vendor for damages for his failure to give vacant possession. One of
the issues was purely factual and concerned whether the tenant had taken possession of
the room before, or after, the completion date. Deputy Judge Wheeler concluded that it
had been after completion. That was enough to dispose of the case in the defendant's
favour, given that the presence of the tenant was not a barrier to the receipt of vacant
possession at the point of completion, and the action was dismissed. However, the judge
went on to consider the position in the event that his finding of fact was incorrect (and
as such the comments are obiter). The judge accepted that a vendor who had contracted
to give vacant possession did not fulfil his contractual obligation if, at the date fixed for
completion, there was a third party who had a legal claim to possession, but he
considered it to be otherwise in relation to a trespasser. In such a case he considered that
·13 Ibid at 246.
44 Supporting Royal Bristol Permanent Building Society v Bomash [1886-90] All ER Rep 283 aod Engell v Finch and
others (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 659.
45 [1987] 2 EGLR 269.
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it was for the purchaser to seek his remedy in the county court against the trespasser,
given that the right to possession had passed to him/her on completion.
While recent case law would seem to suggest that trespassers will be treated in similar
terms to persons with lawful claims to possession." understanding of the meaning of
vacant possession has historically been far from clear on this point. Indeed, in the
decision in Sheikh where this issue was specifically addressed, it was noted that neither
counsel could find any authority which pertinently dealt with the matter before the
judge."
The possible distinction between lawful and unlawful occupiers is moreover a problem
because of the way contracts and, in particular, (ostensibly) express obligations to give
vacant possession, are often drafted. For example, imagine a seller contracts to convey
land to a purchaser. The only possible reference to vacant possession in the contract is a
clause stating that 'the property is sold free from legal incumbrances on completion'. It
is unclear as to whether this refers to vacant possession expressly. On the evening
before completion, a group of new age travellers effect an entry to the premises and
commence using the premises as a place of refuge. On the day of completion the seller
and purchaser complete. The purchaser then goes round to the premises and realises that
persons are in unlawful occupation. The seller will claim that the clause in the contract
was an express contractual undertaking to give vacant possession that was restricted to
legal incumbrances. As such, and because the trespassers are clearly in the premises
nulawfully, the seller will argue that the squatters do not cause the obligation to have
been breached. The purchaser will claim that the seller has not given vacant possession
because of the trespassers. The purchaser's position will be that the clause does amount
to an express contractual obligation to give vacant possession (which therefore includes
all impediments to vacant possession, including unlawful occupiers) or that, if not, the
obligation to give vacant possession will be implied. The purchaser claims that any such
implied obligation will encompass the trespassers because they were not known of by
him on exchange (i.e. the purchaser did not know of an irremovable obstacle to the
receipt of vacant possession, at the time of contract) and that the implied obligation to
46 Cumberland, above n34.
47 Sheikh, above n45 at 271.
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give vacant possession refers to the delivery of the property free from all claims (lawful
and unlawful) to a right to possession by others.
'Clearly the issue above arises because of the uncertainty as to whether a distinction
between lawful and unlawful occupation call- be made. If a distinction can be made, it
would be necessary to consider what actually constitutes 'unlawful' occupation. It is
arguable that a further distinction may need to be made between, for example, squatters
(who never had a right to occupy) and former licensees (who at one time had consent to
occupy) but it is possible that both could be categorised as persons in occupation with
no lawful claim. Indeed, the example above would be even more confusing for a
practitioner if the party in occupation on completion was claiming some implied
periodic tenancy as a result of previous occupation, or rights under the Landlord and
Tenant Act 1954, which was disputed by the seller. Sitting tenants have previously been
treated as persons lawfully claiming rights,48 but when such claims are found to have no
justification it is difficult to understand why these should not be treated as unlawful
claims.f" If vacant possession only refers to the delivery of the premises free from legal
claims of right (following an understanding of vacant possession as being the transfer of
possession and the legal right thereto), 50 it would be questionable whether the presence
of illegal third parties should be a barrier to the delivery of vacant possession, as
between seller and purchaser. If, as it currently appears, vacant possession refers to all
claims (lawful and unlawful), then it would seem that understandings of vacant
possession have broadened over time, away from traditional understandings and
formulations concerning the transfer of possession in a strictly legal sense. As discussed
in chapter 5, a distinction between the transfer of 'possession' (and associated rights
thereto) and being in 'occupation' (which inevitably follows from the transfer of the
right to possession), and how these are both part of the obligation to give vacant
possession, further expounds the complexities associated with this issue as far as third
parties in occupation are concerned. 51 All these issues are relevant to sellers and
purchasers given that they determine which party will be held to be in breach and
(potentially) what remedies each will have against the other. Accordingly, these issues
are not purely theoretical, but must be understood as defming the responsibilities of
"SharneyJord Supplies Ltd v Edge [1987] Ch. 305.
49 See also Horton v Kurzke [1971] 2 All ER 577, discussedin detail in chapter8.
50 As discussed in moredetail in chapter 5.
51 See chapter 7 whichexplains whyvacant possession is an infra-jural concept.
35
each party in a given transaction, thus underlying the risks associated with non-
compliance in any particular respect,
Legal obstacles
It is possible that a legal obstacle may prevent the delivery of vacant possession on
completion, for example, the transfer of a strip of land subject to dedication as a public
highway,52 on the basis that the highway authority has the right to possession rather than
the owner of the sub-soil. Other instances would include a property (with an existing
first floor tenancy) being sold with 'vacant possession of the ground floor' but with a
Housing Act notice limiting occupation of the whole house to one household.53 While
these cases would seem clear, case law provides an inconsistent picture of whether
vacant possession can be, and is, given at the relevant time with respect to orders to
requisition a property or the service of notices of compulsory purchase.54
A small collection of cases concern the government requisitioning of properties under
certain provisions of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939; the common set of
circumstances to these cases being that the parties had entered into written agreements
for sale and purchase of a property that became subject to a requisitioning notice. Some
case law is clear that a requisitioning notice will not create an encumbrance on the land
so as to prevent a seller from giving vacant possession. In Re Winslow Hall Estate
Company v United Glass Bottle Manufacturers Ltd'5 a contract for the sale of land had
been entered into between the parties. Following this, but before completion, notice was
given on behalf of the government to the purchasers that it was intended to requisition
the land under the Defence (General) Regulations 1939. The Court held that at the
relevant date the vendors were able to give vacant possession. The 'giving' of the
requisition notice was held not to create an encumbrance on the land which prevented
the vendors from performing their contract.
52 Secretary a/State for the Environment v Baylis andBennett [2000J 80P. & C.R. 324.
53 Top/ell Ltd, above n6.
54 A sale contract may provide that it is for the purchaser (or seller) to comply with outstanding public requirements
or that the sale ofthe property will be subject to suchmatters as requisitions orcompulsory purchases. In sucha case,
the riskof such matters will already havepassed to the purchaser, orbeenretained by the seller(as appropriate). See
chapter 3.
55 [19411 Ch. 503.
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Other authorities suggest that from the moment when the requisition notice was served
on the seller they were not in a position to give vacant possession; that is, the notice
prevented the giving of vacant possession. In the Court of Appeal decision in James
Macara, Ltd v Barclay." the defendant agreed to sell certain property to the plaintiffs,
with vacant possession to be given on completion. Following exchange, but before
completion, the government served the defendant with a notice requisitioning the
property. The defendant's solicitors sent a copy of the requisition notice to the plaintiffs,
and the plaintiffs subsequently gave notice to the defendant that they rescinded the
contract on the ground of the defendant's inability to give vacant possession. The
defendant disputed this and contended that the requisition notice did not, upon its true
construction, amount to an exercise of the power to enter into possession under the
regulations, and that, in fact, no actual entry had been made. It was held that since actual
entry was not necessary to exercise the power given by the regulations, the serving of
the requisition notice on the defendant was sufficient to show a present intention to
enter into possession of the property. The vendor, therefore, was not at the date of
completion able to give vacant possession ofthe property and the first instance decision
was affirmed. It was noted in James Macara that the notice served was in the same form
as that in Re Winslow Hall. The differing decisions on the same provisions are difficult
to reconcile.
Cases relating to compulsory purchase orders also provide a confusing picture. Where a
compulsory purchase order is made over the property between exchange and completion
the question arises as to whether the purchaser may claim that the contract has been
frustrated (because vacant possession cannot be given) and that, as a result, he is not
obliged to complete.
In Hillingdon Estates Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd57 the parties agreed to the sale and
purchase of certain land. The contract provided that the purchasers were entitled to take
up the property in January 1939. The completion of the transaction was delayed by,
inter alia, the outbreak of war, and in October 1948, when the contract was still
uncompleted, the local county council made a compulsory.purchase order affecting the
whole of the property. In July 1949, notices to treat under the order were served. The
" [1945] K. B. 148.
57 [1952] Ch. 627.
37
purchasers claimed that, on or before the date of the service of the notices to treat, they
were discharged from their contract to purchase the property. The court held that the
purchasers were treated as owners in equity as soon as a binding contract was made.
The service of a notice to treat did not affect the sellers, whose sole interest was, to
receive the purchase money; it followed that the risk of compulsory purchase properly
fell on the purchasers, who were not entitled to rescind the contract. The sellers were
thus held to be in a position to give vacant possession on completion. The same decision
was reached in E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Ltd v NSR Ltd (a decision of the Privy
Councilj'" where the publication of a statutory notice warning that land under a contract
of sale was likely to be required for Crown purposes, did not amount to a frustrating
event, and the court held that vacant possession could be given by the sellers on
completion.
In Korogluyan v Matheou." the question to be decided was whether notices served
pursuant to the provisions of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, stating that the
acquiring authority would be entering upon the land, meant that it was no longer
possible for the seller to give vacant possession, and that the purchaser ought therefore
to be discharged from his obligation under the agreement. Here, however, it was said
obiter that, given the nature of the notices served, the plaintiff was not in a position to
sell with vacant possession in the sense in which the judge felt the words ought sensibly
to be construed in the context of the whole transaction. Whilst the seller escaped
liability for the payment of damages to the buyer because of other contractual
conditions.t" this case clearly suggested that the compulsory purchase notice prevented
the seller being able to deliver vacant possession (contrary to other case law).
Whilst the specific nature of the relevant provisions of the statute in question, and the
form of notice served, will have a bearing on the matter, as will express terms of the
legal documentation in question, the current case law does not appear to provide a
consistent position on these issues from which any general principles can be extracted.
58 [1997] AC 400.
S9 Above,n7.
60 See [1975l239 E.G. 649 where it said by Whitford J that" ... were it not for the fact that 1 think the defendant's case
.failson special condition 9 and general condition 6, I wouldhavecometo the conclusion that atthe relevant timethe
plaintiff was not in a position to sell with vacant possession". 'The express conditions in the documentation
determined the outcome of the case. An interaction between competing contractual conditions is discussed in-more
detail in chapter 3, and explains thisdecision.
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-Again it would seem that varions jndges have grappled with how a mandatory order to
.purchase a property affects a prior agreement of contracting parties that includes an
obligation to give vacant possession at a specific time in respect of the compulsorily
acquired property.'"
Further, it is unclear as to what can amount to a 'legal obstacle' to the procurement of
vacant possession. Indeed, the above cases are set in the context of fully fledged rights
to possession, but it is possible to acquire or be granted less extensive rights over land,
such as a profit aprendre or even the exercise of certain easements or rights of way
over a property. It is not clear if such rights, while amounting to less than possession but
still encumbering the estate being transferred in some way, would also be legal
obstacles to the receipt ofvacant possession.
Imagine that a seller contracts to convey land to a purchaser. The contract provides
expressly that vacant possession is to be given on completion. Between exchange and
completion a third party applies to register (and succeeds in registering) adverse rights
of way against the property that will prevent development of the land by the purchaser
in the manner desired. While the purchaser may have contractual remedies against the
seller with respect to disclosure of third party rights, from a vacant possession
perspective, it is questionable whether the seller is able to transfer the land to the
purchaser on completion in compliance with the seller's obligation to give vacant
possession. The third party's right of way is clearly an interest over the land rather than
a competing claim to possession, but it prevents delivery of the property free from a
claim of right over the land (i.e. the right to pass and re-pass) that is adverse to the
purchaser. Further the purchaser may claim that the third party's right to pass and re-
pass constitutes (albeit infrequent) third party occupation of the land. The purchaser
could clearly argue that the adverse right of way was a legal impediment that prevented
it from obtaining the quality of possession for which it had contracted. If a seller's
obligation to procure vacant possession does not refer to transferring the estate free.
from all conceivable adverse legal obstacles to enjoyment, it is necessary for the law to
determine what 'lesser interests' do and do not qualify as obstacles to the receipt of
vacant possession.
61 This issue is analysedin moredetail in chapter 6.
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The law at present has failed to address this or provide a satisfactory account of how an
obligation to give vacant possession is affected by intervening legal matters that
potentially act as obstacles to the procurement of vacant possession. Indeed, Horton v
Kurzke62 would appear to be the only case on this point. This case concerned the sale
and purchase of land (with vacant possession) where following exchange the purchaser
learnt of an agricultural grazing right purportedly affecting the land. It was (unhelpfully)
held that "whether one looks at it as a question of vacant possession or of title, one gets
back to the same position and must apply the same test".63 It can therefore be questioned
whether so called 'lesser-interests' are issues ofvacant possession or title, something that
would be of concern to both seller and purchaser in this example. Following a
discussion of the nature, scope and extent of the obligation, chapter 8 seeks to explain
the role of 'lesser interests' in cases concerning vacant possession and their similarity (or
difference) to the other legal obstacles referred to.
All these potential legal obstacles obviously put both the seller and purchaser in a
difficult position given that, through no fault of their own, it may not be possible to
complete the contract entered into. The seller may lose a sale at the agreed purchase
price to the purchaser (or the purchaser may advance a claim for damages against the
seller if consequential loss has been suffered as a result of the contract falling away).
Alternatively, the purchaser may be forced to take a property on completion that is
burdened with some supervening requisition that was not known of on exchange (and
which will shortly take effect thereafter, depriving them of what they had sought to
purchase in the long term). In essence, the purchaser will complain that it is receiving
far less than it had contracted for. Commercially, neither situation is satisfactory for
parties entering into a contract for the sale of land or property in good faith. The issues
of risk and responsibility which these situations pose are highlighted in more detail in
chapter 5.
Has the obligation been breached?
Given the uncertainty as to when an obligation to give vacant possession has arisen, and
what any obligation may specifically refer to, it is perhaps not surprising that there are
62 [197111 W.L.R. 769.
63 Ibid,per GoffJ. at 771.
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further complications in seeking to ascertain .whether a breach of the obligation has
taken place. Historically, decisions as to whether an obligation to give vacant possession
had been breached generally proceeded on an ad-hoc basis with respect to-the particular
case in issue. Whilst the specific facts of-any particular case will obviously have a
bearing on whether a breach of the obligation has arisen (that is, there will also be a fact
specific element to the determination), historically no general principles were
established to ensure consistency and continuity with respect to differing decisions on
(ostensibly) similar facts. It was not until 1946, in a case concerning rubbish that had
been left at the premises, that the court first laid down what could be seen as a 'test' to
determine whether vacant possession had been given.
In Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v IrelandA the plaintiffs contracted to buy a
disused freehold warehouse from the defendants. By a special condition the property
was sold 'with vacant possession on completion.' The cellars extending under the whole
warehouse were made unusable by rubbish including many sacks of cement that had
hardened. The defendant refused after completion to remove the rubbish and the
plantiffs brought proceedings for damages for breach of the condition for delivery of the
property with vacant possession on completion. It was held that the defendant had failed
to give vacant possession of the property sold. It was stated that a vendor who leaves his
own chattels on property sold by him to an extent depriving the purchaser of the
physical enjoyment of part of the property, failed to give vacant possession. Such acts
were consistent with the vendor seeking to continue to use the premises for his own
purposes.f rather than passing possession to the purchaser in accordance with the terms
of the contract. It was further noted that it was no answer for the vendor to claim to have
abandoned his/her ownership of the chattels on completion to prevent a breach of the
obligation. The court held that a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession
would occur where there was:
"...the existence of a physical impediment, which substantially prevented or
interfered with the enjoyment of the right of possession of a substantial part of
64 Above, n34. ',. i.
65 The decisionin Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499 discussed the use of the premises as a dump for one's own
purposes orfor leaving there that which substantially prevented or interfered with the enjoyment of possessionof a
substantial part ofthe property. See alsoNorwich Union Life Insurance Society v Preston [1957] 2 All ER428 where
a mortgagor whichhadleft furniture in the premises after a court order requiring himto give up possession was held
not to have complied with the law, andwas seen to be using the premises for his own purposes as a place for the
storage ofhis goods.
41
the property, to which the purchaser did not expressly or impliedly consent to
b it ,,66su Illi ...
This was qualified as being subject to a de minimis rule, even though no specific details
,
as to the nature and form of that rule were elaborated upon. The Cumberland test (as it
is known) remains good law, and was further elaborated upon in recent years in the
context of the procurement of vacant possession when exercising a contractual break
option in a lease.
In John Laing Construction Limited v Amber Pass Limite~7 the claimant was the tenant
of commercial premises under a lease granted by the defendant's predecessor-in-title. A
clause in the lease provided that the lease might be determined by, inter alia, the
'yielding-up of the entirety of the demised premises'. The claimant sought a declaration
that, pursuant to a notice given under the break clause, it had validly terminated the
lease. That claim was contested by the defendant, which sought to counter-claim for
declarations that the purported break notice was ineffective and the lease was therefore
still continuing. The defendant contended that the claimant had not 'yielded-up' the
property, relying, inter alia, on the continued presence of security guards at the
premises, and the claimant's failure to hand back the keys to the premises, claiming that
these were inconsistent with providing vacant possession at the end of the term.
The claim was allowed. On the facts of the case, it was held that the claimant had
plainly and obviously manifested a desire to terminate the lease and was accordingly
entitled to the declaration sought. The continued presence of security guards at the
premises and the tenant's failure to hand back the keys had not prevented vacant
possession being given. The Court held that the task of the court was:
"to look objectively at what had occurred and determine whether a clear
intention had been manifested by the person whose acts were said to have
brought about a termination to effect such termination, and whether the
landlord could, if it wanted to, occupy the premises without difficulty or
objection.,,68
. ,
66 [1946] KB 264, per Lord Greene at 269.
67 [2004] All ER (Il) 115 (Apr).
68 [2004] 2 EGLR 128, per Robert Hildyard QC at 131.
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The problem with these tests, however, is that they do not really help lawyers on a day
to day basis when the facts of a particular circumstance have to be applied. For
example, it is not clear what extent of difficulty is required and whether this must be
• !
general inconvenience or significant distress. Cumberland suggests that a tenant has to
remove all chattels and also rubbish which 'substantially prevents or interferes with
enjoyment of a substantial part of the property', but there is no definition of what
constitutes 'substantial' or whether this test is purely objective. Indeed, one can question
whether the test should be judged against any purchaser or any purchaser with particular
qualities to the purchaser in question. It can be questioned whether the court should
consider more generally whether rubbish left at the property on the break of a lease or
completion of a sale prevents the average purchaser or landlord (objectively speaking)
from (re) ~ccupying without difficulty or objection or (objectively speaking) the actual
purchaser or landlord in question given its specific characteristics and circumstances. It
is also unclear whether there has to be an actual interference, or whether the likelihood
or potential for the left over items to cause a substantial interference will be sufficient.
Further, what counts as a valid objection has not been clarified, and again whether
factors relating to the actual purchaser or landlord in question must be taken into
account when determining whether they can (objectively speaking) (re)occupy without
such an objection. This raises the likelihood that a materially similar objection could be
deemed valid in one context, but not in another, given the specific subjective
circumstances of the parties in question.
Imagine that a tenant has trouble paying the rent on a lease and decides to move to
smaller premises. The tenant exercises a break option in its lease which is conditional
on vacant possession being given on the break date. On the break date the premises are
empty except for one room that is half filled with boxes of floor tiles that the tenant
failed to remove in time for the break date under its lease. The tenant claims that vacant
possession was given and that the lease has come to an end. The landlord claims the
converse and argues the lease will now continue until its contractual expiry in another
10 years time. The answer to whether a room that is half filled with tiles breaches the
vacant possession condition may well tum on the nature of the tenant's business. If the
tenant is a carpet tile supplier, the landlord will have a good case for saying that the
tenant is still using the premises beneficially, for the storage of goods for the purposes
of its business and therefore that a clear intention has not been manifested by the tenant
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to effect a termination of the lease.69 Alternatively, if the same tiles were broughtonto
the premises by the tenant to re-carpet the floor but it did not complete this in time,
.different arguments would apply, and the tenant might succeed in establishing that the
tiles did not constitute a substantial impediment to the landlord's resumption, of
possession of the premises, and that the tiles remaining in the premises on completion
were not consistent with the tenant continuing to use the premises for its own purposes.
It must also be borne in mind that this confusion is in the context of physical and
tangible items which are claimed to cause a breach of the vacant possession obligation.
It would moreover be problematic to seek to apply the test laid down to a situation
where, for example, it was claimed that the difficulty or objection related to the state of
the premises (which may, for example, have been destroyed by fire immediately before
completion). As noted earlier, there remains no authority on how the tests would be
applied where the seller's inability to give vacant possession is due to the physical state
of the property.I" The specific nature and form of any potential legal impediment to
vacant position could also render the tests relatively ineffective in certain contexts. This
raises a question as to whether the current tests are adequate to determine whether there
has been a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession in a wide variety of
everyday circumstances.
The consequence of the current inadequacies is that the parties in any given case will be
unsure as to their legal rights and obligations, and accordingly unable to determine, with
certainty, how they should seek to resolve the situation. This potentially puts a greater
burden on the party with the weaker financial strength and resource who may be unable,
or unwilling, to litigate on any dispute that may arise. The effect of the uncertainty
surrounding what may constitute a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession on
parties 'negotiating in the shadow ofthe law' is analysed in detail in chapter 7, where the
tests (and integral parts thereof) for vacant possession are critically expounded; the
implications to the parties in question in any given case are also discussed with
reference to their obligations.
69 .Compare this with Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v Expeditors International (UK) Ltd [2006] EWHC
1008 (Ch), wherea major part of the judge's decisionthatvacant possessionhadnotbeen given rested on the factthat
the warehouse was still being used forthe storage of 'a few pallets andparcels in a largely empty warehouse', which
remained usefulto the tenant's business.
70 According to Harpum, above n13.
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-Remedies for breach
, On the-basis that an obli.gation to give vacant possession has arisen and- is breached by
the party required to give vacant possession, it must be considered where this leaves the
- party who had contracted for something more than is actually obtained at the relevant
time.
It has been argued that if vacant possession is a term of a contract (either expressly or
impliedly) and between exchange and completion some supervening event makes it
impossible for the seller to give vacant possession to the purchaser on completion, then
the contract may be deemed 'frustrated'. As noted above, examples include cases
relating to compulsory purchase orders71 and the requisitioning of a property for specific
purposcs.f Frustration is very rarely claimed however, and case law appears to have
shown an unwillingness to find frustration."
If on the day of completion (but before completion is effected) a purchaser were to
inspect the premises and see that they were not vacant, it could:
1. Apply to the court for an order for specific performance.i" and claim damages;
2. Serve a notice to complete on the seller and after expiry of that notice (which
will be determined by contractual provisions) rescind the contract, recover any
deposit paid and claim damages; or
3. Choose to complete without prejudice to a right to claim damages."
In perhaps 99% of cases, the property is not inspected prior to completion." The first
point at which a purchaser will know about the problem with vacant possession is after
7l Korog/uyan, above n7.
72 Cook, abovenlS and James Macara Ltd, aboven56.
TJ Hillingdon Estates Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd [1952] Ch 627, applied by Privy Council in E Johnson & Co
(Barbados)ad v NSR Ltd [1997] AC 400.
74 According to Wroth v Tyler [1964] Ch 30 a seller win not nonnaily be obliged by an order for specific performance
to undertake. 'hazardous' litigation to obtain possession, butwouldstill remain liable in damages. A'vendorwho sold
with vacant possession had, ifnecessary, to take proceedings against anywrongful occupant buthe would notusually
berequired to embark on difficult oruncertain litigation.
7trhe availability· and amount of damages will depend on the circumstances and the nature ·of the losses. A
purchaser's remedies may alsoberestricted by theexpress terms of the contract.
76 It is advisable fortheproperty to be inspected prior to completion - see chapter 1,n8.
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completion when they arrive at the premises to find that all is not as they had expected.
At this point, the contract has been completed (the seller has the sale monies in cleared
funds) and the purchaser is left having to claim damages for a property that they cannot
immediately occupy as they wished to. This is unsatisfactory because it leaves the
purchaser with the burden of having to advance a claim to recover the loss sustained as
a consequence of the breach of the vacant possession obligation; this may prove
difficult, or impossible, for example if the seller has weak covenant strength. If the
obstacle to vacant possession is a person or entity with a right to remain in occupation,
the purchaser may have difficulty in removing them from the premises and take subject
to their interest.77
It should be noted that there is authority for the position that the breach of an obligation
to give vacant possession gives a purchaser the right to rescind the contract even after
completion (rather than claiming damages). This is because the obligation to give
vacant possession has been held not to merge in the conveyance or transfer and thus
remains actionable after completion (even in the absence of an express non-merger
clause).
The decision in Bissett v Reading Roofing Co Ltd78 is authority for the obligation to
give vacant possession being actionable after completion. Here the defendants, by a
written contract, agreed to sell to the first plaintiff property comprising offices, depot
space and a flat; the property was sold subject to the special condition that vacant
possession be given on completion. Condition 33 of the Law Society's Conditions of
Sale 1953 stated that:
"Notwithstanding the completion of the purchase any General or Special
condition or any part or parts thereof to which effect is not given by the
conveyance and which is capable of taking effect after completion ... shall
remain in full force and effect.,,79
The contract was completed and on the direction of the first plaintiff it was transferred
to the second plaintiffs, a company. The plaintiffs were unable to get vacant possession
77 This is basedon thedoctrine of constructive notice - see chapter 1, nIO.
18 [1969] 1 WLR 1757. In Hissett the obligation was express but the result should be the same even if the term for
vacant possession was implied.
79 [1969] 1 WLR 1757.
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of the whole property because the flat was at aU material times occupied by a protected
tenant. It was held that the defendants had failed to give vacant possession in
accordance with the special condition which was (in the words of condition 33) a
condition 'capable oftaking effect after completion', Further the condition did not merge
with the conveyance which covered only part of the ground covered by the contract for
sale. In Gunatunga v Dealwiio it was noted that there was established authority for the
proposition that a contractual term that vacant possession shall be given on completion
did not merge in the conveyance. In that case the respondent's conduct post-completion,
seeking to run the business in order to prevent its collapse and the loss of its goodwill,
was not held to amount to affirmation of the contract. The failure by the appellants to
give vacant possession on the relevant date was held to have given rise to a new and
separate right to rescind the contract.
In practice, by the time a purchaser becomes aware of the breach of vacant possession a
period of time (sometimes a number of days) will have passed and the purchaser may
have commenced using the premises and can therefore, by conduct, be deemed to have
affirmed the contract (although as noted in Guntunga this will normally be a question of
fact and law given the circumstances of the case). Even then, with the monies having
been transferred over to the seller to effect completion, this leaves the purchaser having
to embark on expensive court action (which they may not be able to fund) to seek to
unravel the contract, and require the monies to be returned. There are further practical
problems with seeking to rescind post-completion given that the seller may have already
used the money or transferred it to third parties, in which case the purchaser would at
best obtain an order from the court for the return of the monies which would amount to
a contractual debt. The purchaser would then be left with no property and with the need
to enforce the contractual debt in some way. If enforcement proved futile (for example
if the seller is a trading company in some financial difficulty) the purchaser could be left
with having to bring an action petitioning for 'winding up' (if a company) or commence
bankruptcy proceedings (if an individual). Purporting to rescind after completion is
therefore fraught with danger (financially and otherwise) and, in practice, is rarely ever
claimed." As such, it is commonplace for a breach of the obligation to give vacant
80 [19961 72 P.& C.R. 16l.
81 Upon a survey of lawyers at Pinsent MasonsLLP it was.determined that (nationally) no lawyer in the employ of
the finn in-June 2008 hadever sought to argue this pointorcome across a case whereit hasbeen argued. There is no
other case lawdealing with this issue.
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possession to be actioned, post-completion, only by way of a damages claim against the
seller. As discussed in chapter 9, the basis of the assessment of damages reflects the
removability (or otherwise) of the impediment.
At present, the current law and practicalities of completion put the seller in a much
stronger position as far as a breach of a vacant possession obligation is concerned, with
the contract having been completed (and the seller having received the purchase
monies) before an inspection of the property has taken place. A purchaser will often
therefore be left in the difficult position of advancing a claim for damages having
suffered interruption as a consequence of not being able to immediately occupy without
difficulty or objection. The purchaser can sometimes suffer even greater detriment if
they had already contracted to demise the premises to a tenant on the basis that a
transfer to them takes place. This can result in the purchaser themselves being subject to
breach of contract claims (with respect to an anticipated tenant) giving rise to
consequential losses. As noted earlier, in the leasehold context, the landlord currently
has the upper hand and can use the issue of vacant possession to seek to prevent their
tenant exercising a contractual break option in a lease if the landlord would prefer the
lease to continue. This is not just when vacant possession is an express condition of
lawful operation of the break but also in circumstances where the break is conditional
upon material compliance with covenants which, by virtue of the yielding-up obligation,
will include a requirement to give a form of vacant possession in any event.
As such, the current remedies available for a breach of the vacant possession obligation
are intrinsically unsatisfactory, and highlight the risk, responsibility and potential
exposure to the injured party in any given situation. Chapter 9 discussed the issue of
remedies in more detail and, with reference to parties' obligation and responsibilities,
queries whether vacant possession, as a contractual obligation, is the most satisfactory
means by which parties can be treated equitably by the court in any given circumstance.
Conclusion
It is clear from the above that problems are manifest at every stage with respect to the
obligation to give vacant possession. Even if one can determine that an obligation has
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arisen (expressly or impliedly) what this will actually refer to is likely to be unclear, and
how a breach can be made out will potentially be difficult to establish. Even then,
remedies flowing from any breach established may be inadequate or unsatisfactory.
Therefore at every stage, the issues of risk and responsibility for the parties in question
can be seen to be a major issue and pervasive to all aspects of the obligation to give
vacant possession.
In order to consider how the obligation could be better understood, it is first necessary
to fully evaluate how it has been understood (or misunderstood) over time. As such, the
next chapter develops the notion of vacant possession as an express and implied term of
the contract by examining how the term has interacted with other terms, and what this
reveals about the nature of the obligation to give vacant possession in the context of
standard sale and purchase contracts, which then becomes the focus of chapter 4.
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Chapt,er3.
Vacant Possession and Contractnal Conditions
Chapter 2 highlighted the current problems with the obligation to give vacant
possession. It was shown that a number ofuncertainties surround the very essence of the
obligation in terms of when it may have arisen, what it refers to, how it may have been
breached and what remedies will be available for a breach. The uncertainties identified
through the case law suggest that, to date, there has been no coherent concept of vacant
possession but rather a lack of understanding as to the obligation's nature, scope and
extent throughout its evolution.
This chapter considers the role of vacant possession as a term ofa contract by reviewing
its interaction with other terms (or conditions) in case law over previous years. In
particular, the interaction between a clause providing for vacant possession and two
other more standard clauses is discussed. The decisions in case law on such interactions
were inconsistent prior to 1979 (when a landmark decision was laid down), and the
decisions and reasoning (or lack of) by the trial judges assist in demonstrating how, for
some time, there appears to have been a misunderstanding (and apparent failure to take
full account of) the obligation's full force and effect. As the decisions evaluated only
related to situations in which there was a conflict with an express clause providing for
vacant possession (when appearing as a special condition), this chapter also discusses
how the position may differ when there is a conflict with only an express general (as
opposed to special) condition for vacant possession, or when the conflict arises with an
implied obligation for vacant possession. Here, different rnles of construction and
interpretation are shown to apply even though, as discussed, a lack of authority
continues to leave the position largely unclear.
Express Vacant Possession clauses
The precise terms of the sale and purchase contract are key to understanding the issue of
vacant possession:
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"What the purchaser is entitled to get in the way of possession on completion
depends, of course, on what the contract says." I
As noted in chapter 1, the obligation to give vacant possession normally appears
expressly as a term in a legal agreement, conveyance, contract or transfer. In practice
(and since 1902), contracts for the sale of land have incorporated standardised
conditions of sale by reference (as an appendix to the contract) and these have included
conditions for vacant possession. These conditions of sale (which are incorporated as
terms of the contractr' ultimately determine the parties' rights and obligations under the
contract, and remedies in the event of a breach by either party.' The various editions and
versions of the conditions of sale each set out the 'general' and 'special' conditions of the
sale and purchase agreement.4 The general conditions dealt with various issues relevant
to the sale and purchase ofproperty and evolved over the twentieth century, for example
insurance, deposits, requisitions and matters relevant to completion. Special conditions
highlighted specific aspects of the transaction especially of importance to the parties and
provided an opportunity to address any unique factors that the general conditions did
not adequately cater for. Unlike the general conditions, which are a standard printed set
1 Farrand, IT. Conveyancing contracts: Conditions ofSale and Title (Oyez Publications, London 1964) 259, under
sectionentitled 'Vacant Possession'.
2 Cheshire, G.C. and Burn, E.H. Modern law o[realproperty (12" edn Butterworths, London (976) 74.
3 A detailed discussion of the standard conditions of sale and their origin follows in chapter 4.
4 See the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925 (The Law Society, London 1925); The Law Society's
General Conditions of Sale 1925, Second Edition issued 1928 (The Law Society, London 1928); The Law Society's
General Conditions of Sale 1934 (The Law Society, London 1934); The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale
1934 (1949 Revision) (The Law Society, London 1949); The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1953 (The
Law Society, London 1953); The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale (1970 Edition) (The Law Society,
London 1970); The Law Society's Contract for Sale (1973 Revision) (The Law Society, London 1973); The Law
Society's Contract for Sale (1980 Edition) (The Law Society, London 1980); The Law Society's Contract for Sale
(1984 Revision) (The Law Society, London 1984); The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) (The Law
Society, London 1990); The Standard Conditions of Sale (Second Edition) (The Law Society, London 1992); The
Standard Conditions of Sale (Third Edition) (The Law Society, London 1995); The Standard Conditions of Sale
(Fourth Edition) (The Law Society, London 2003); Standard Commercial Properly Conditions (First Edition) (The
Law Society, London 1999); Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition) (The Law Society, London
2003); The National Conditions of Sale, 11th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London
January 1930); The National Conditions of Sale, 12th Edition. (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited,
London August 1932); The National Conditions of Sale, 13th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society
Limited, London March 1935); The National Conditions of Sale, 14th Edition (The Solicitor's-Law Stationery Society
Limited, London May 1948); The National Conditions of Sale, 15th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society
Limited, London 'November 1948); The National Conditions of Sale, 16th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery
Society Limited,' London August 1953); The National Conditions of Sale, 17th Edition (The Solicitor's La'..
Stationery Society Limited, London 1959); The National Conditions of Sale, 18th Edition (The Solicitor's Law
Stationery Society Limited, London 1969); The National Conditions of Sale, 19th Edition (The Solicitor's Law
Stationery Society Limited, London 1976) and The National Conditions of Sale, 20th Edition, 1981 (The Solicitor's
Law Stationery Society Limited, London 1981).
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( ; of conditions attached to the main contract, special conditions are manually written or
typed on a separate page.'
A special condition (or express statement in the particulars of sale)" that required vacant
possession to be given on completion, was obviously something that the parties would
have specifically considered before recording it expressly in their agreement. Whilst it
was common for contracts to include such an express special condition for vacant
possession, it is also commonplace for such contracts to include other clauses within the
agreement that may have reference to, or an effect on, the issue of vacant possession
(for example, clauses dealing with liability for errors and omissions in particulars of sale
which themselves are likely to include references to vacant possession). When such
clauses could be construed as being at odds with each other in some respect, a conflict
arises in respect ofhow these conditions should be interpreted as modifying (or altering)
the vacant possession clause. When such a conflict arose between a term relating to
vacant possession and another contractual term, it would ultimately be the role of the
courts to determine which condition should prevail and which should be subordinate.
Historically, purely 'mechanical' type rules were employed to resolve such contradictory
provisions of contractual documents. In Forbes v Gil Lord Wrenbury said that:
"if in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause which destroys
altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause, the later clause is to be
rejected as repugnant and the earlier clause prevails.t'''
In recent years, a series of decisions in the House of Lords9 has led to a 'fundamental
ohange'l'' in the approach taken by the courts to the interpretation of documents of all
kinds. The insight lying behind the modem approach to the interpretation of documents
is that the meaning that should be attached to particular words is heavily dependent
upon the context in which those words have been used. The court is normally seen to try
5 See a copy of Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition) (The Law Society, London 2003) in the
Appendix (on page 297) as an example.
6 Special conditions are deemed to include the terms of the particulars of sale, see for example the National
Conditions of Sale, 20th Edition, 1981, above n4.
7 [1922] I A.C. 256,per Lord Wrenbury (p.C.) at 259.
8 Ibid, 259.
9 In particular, Prenn v Simmonds [1971] I WLR 1381; Reardon Smith Line v Hansen-Tangen [1976]1 WLR 989;
Charter Reinsurance v Fagan [1997] AC 313; Mannai Investment Co Ltd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997]
AC 749; Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich BS [1998] ! WLR 896; Bank of Credit and
Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 andSirius International Insurance Co v FAI General Insurance
[2004] I WLR 3252.
10 ICS Ltdv WestBromwichBS [1998]1 WLR 896, per Lord Hoffmann at 912.
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to give effect to every clause in the contract,'.' seeking to interpret each (so far as is
possible) in order:
"to bring them into harmony with the! other provisions of the [contract], if that
interpretation does no violence to the meaning of which they are naturally
susceptible."12 .
This will often lead to the court concluding that one clause qualifies another in some
way. A clause will be rejected as being contrary to the tenor of the agreement if there
really is no altemative.t' Normally, in the event that there are two competing or
conflicting clauses in a contract, the court will have to make a determination as to which
is the leading provision, and which must be viewed as subordinate, and therefore only
able to be given meaning to the extent that it does not contradict the express clause."
Vacant Possession: Express Special Conditions
Over time, a number of judges have ruled on the interaction between an express
obligation to give vacant possession (when appearing as a special condition) and other
contractual terms. The outcomes of some of these decisions have led to criticism15 and
subsequently been overruled (or not followed)," as the following sections will
demonstrate. It is appropriate to review two types of contractual condition that have
been found to interact with an express special condition for vacant possession to
elucidate how the court determined whether the express special condition for vacant
possession, or the conflicting contractual term, should take precedence, and how the
respective terms could be held to modify or interpret each other. This review serves to
highlight a misunderstanding, or lack of awareness, of the true nature, scope and extent
of a term for vacant possession over time.17
11 Chitty on Contracts (30" eOO Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008) 12-04l.
12 Chamber Colliery Co. Ltd v Twyerould [1915] I Ch. 268, per Lord Watson H.L. at272.
13 Forbes, above n7,per LordWrenbury at259.
l' Mackay, L. (eds) Halsbury's Laws (4" edn Butterworths, London 1983) 872; Institute ofPatent Agents v Lockwood
(1894) A.C. 347 at 360, per Lord Herschell.L.C. See also Harpum, C. 'Vacantpossession ~ Chameleon or chimaera?'
(1988) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 324, 400 (C.R.).
15 Ibid, Harpum. See also Bamsley, D.G. 'Completion of a contract for the sale andpurchase of land: Part 3' (1991)
Conv 185 at 188.
16 See Templeman J. in Top[ell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979]1 W.L.R. 446.
17 Harpurn, aboven14 discussestheseterms in a discussion ofthe comparison between vacant possessionandtitle.
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'No annulment, no compensation' clauses
The first specific context in which a conflict has been seen to arise is with respect to so-
called 'no annulment, no compensation' clauses. Clauses like these are likely to state
that:
"no error, misstatement or omission in the particulars, sale plan or conditions
shall annul the sale, nor shall any compensation be allowed either by the
vendor or the purchaser in respect thereof. ,,18
If a seller expressly contracted to sell land with vacant possession but then found that he
could not, because of an impediment that he had been unaware of at the time of
contract, the effect of a general condition of this kind on the express obligation given by
the seller as to vacant possession must be considered. In theory, if the impediment
amounted to an error, misstatement or omission from the particulars of sale, a general
condition of this kind may have an effect on the express special condition as to vacant
possession. The vendor may argue that he is not in breach of his obligation to give
vacant possession by virtue of the 'no annulment, no compensation' clause, which has
the effect of preventing the sale from being declared void as a result of an error or
misstatement. In such a case, the purchaser would be required to take the property
subject to the impediment even though the purchaser believed that he was contractually
entitled to vacant possession on completion. In other words, the clause may enable the
seller not to give vacant possession (as has been contracted for) and escape liability for
this breach.
This question arose in Curtis v French l 9 where the defendant contracted to sell a cottage
to the plaintiff. The contract incorporated the National Conditions of Sale (10th edition)
and included as condition lOa 'no annulment, no compensation' clause as a general
condition which provided that:
18 For example, see the National Conditions of Sale (10th edition) condition 10. Similar provisions are currently
included in the general conditions of the Standard Conditions of Sale (Fourth Edition) condition 7.1, and Standard
Commercial Property Conditions (SecondEdition) condition 9.1. All above04.
19 [1929] I Ch. 253, per Eve 1.
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"No error mis-statement or omission in the particulars ... shall annul the sale
nor shall any compensation be allowed either by the vendor or purchaser in
respect thereof. ,,20
The particulars of sale included an express special condition as to vacant possession and
stated that the property was let to:
"a local farmer, for one of his employees. The tenant formally and legally
terminated the tenancy, but has not yet handed over vacant possession, the
vendor has not yet pressed for possession, allowing the occupier to remain on
sufferance, but the premises will be sold with vacant possession.Y'
The statement in the particulars was materially incorrect. The local farmer had not
terminated the sub-tenancy and the sub-tenant was in any event a statutory protected
tenant uoder the Increase of Rent and Mortgage Interest (Restrictions) Act 1920. The
seller had uosuccessfully sought possession for some time but had not commenced any
proceedings to evict the occupier. Accordingly, the court was charged with determining
whether the seller could be allowed to rely on the 'no annulment, no compensation'
clause when the purchaser apparently 'affirmed' the contract22 and sought damages for
the seller's failure to give vacant possession.f
Eve J. decided that reliance could be placed on the 'no annulment, no compensation'
clause by the seller, even though the seller was fully aware that the presence of the
tenant would prevent him from giving vacant possession, and that he had failed to
adequately disclose this to the purchaser. In accordance with established principles and
case law, reliance on the clause should not have been permitted per se because of the
non-disclosure. 24 Specifically with reference to the issue of the procurement of vacant
possession, counsel for the purchaser argued that:
20 Ibid 260
21 Ibid: 260:
22 The purchaser suedfor specific performance, optingattrialfor loss of bargain damages in lieu under the Chancery
Amendment Act 1858 (known as 'Lord Cairns' Act'). Eve J.treated this as an affirmation of the contract. Generally in
these circumstances a purchaser may choose to affirm the contract or he compelled to (because the defect is
insubstantial, for example).
23 The decisionrestson a series of premises whichhave been questioned by subsequent authorities. Forexample, see
Sharneyford Supplies Ltd. v Edge [1987] Ch. 305 where a vendor who fails.to give vacant possessionbecause of the
presence of a tenant whomhe hastaken no stepsto evict is liableto damages.
24 See Flight v Booth (1834) 1 Bing. (N.C.) 370 in respect of mis-description andRe Puckett and Smith's Contract
[1902] 2 Ch. 258 c.A. concemiug non-disclosure. Also Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler (1885) IS
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"The vendor cannot use [the 'no annulment, no compensation' clause] for the
purpose of converting the express promise that the premises will be sold with
vacant possession on completion into the exact opposite. ,,25 ,
Whilst both these points were advanced in argument, neither was even referred to inithe
judgment. Eve J. did, however, show an appreciation of the hierarchy of special and
general conditions and the extent to which one type of condition should take precedence
over another:
"... there are the special conditions primarily, and, in a secondary sense, the
general conditions which are to be treated as incorporated with the special
conditions except so far as the special ones contradict, or are at variance or are
inconsistent with, the general ones. In those cases, if any there be, the special
conditions are to prevail. ,,26
However, on construction of the document, Eve J held that it was necessary to:
"...read into condition 10 of the general conditions condition 8 of the special
conditions, which provides that: "Each lot is sold subject to all tenancies,
outgoings and rights, easements and exceptions and any other matters referred
to in the particulars, and the conveyance to the purchaser of each lot shall
. .. fth ,,27contam reservations m respect 0 ese matters.
Eve J. considered that the interpretation of the general 'no annulment, no compensation'
condition in this context was such that it should override the special condition for vacant
possession, which should thus be subject to the general condition. Whilst not explicitly
dealt with in the judgment, it would seem that by reading into the general 'no
annulment, no compensation' clause the reference to "each lot is sold subject to all
tenancies" (from special condition 8), EveJ. considered it appropriate for the seller's
express statement that he was selling the land with vacant possession to be subordinate
to the general 'no annulment, no compensation' condition. This was notwithstanding the
misrepresentation by the seller in the particulars of sale as to the tenant remaining in the
property on sufferance and the seller not having pressed for possession. Crucially, this
required the purchaser to take the property subject to the non-disclosed tenancy,
Q.B.D. 261, per Wills J at 261; subsequently applied by Millett 1. in Rignall Developments Ltd v Halil [19881 Ch.
190 at 197-198.
2S [192911 Ch. 253, per Ronald Roxburgh (for the Purchaser) at 256.
26 Ibid, per EveJ. at257.
Z7 Ibid, at 257. Emphasis added.
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, rendering worthless the. seller's express undertaking to give vacant possession, by the
. exclusion of any remedy for its breach.28 This undermined the nature and effect of the
express special condition providing for vacant possession in the contract, thus casting
doubt on the force of a condition for vacant possession, which is a, if not the,
fundamental part of a contract for the sale and purchase of a (non-reversionary) estate in
land.29 The decision effectively subordinated the special condition for vacant possession
in favour of a general condition of the contract, and deprived the buyer of the right to
receive the property in the mauner in which he believed he had contracted with the
seller.
Commentators have criticised this decision and expressed doubt as to whether it could
be treated as good law. Farrand considered that the inclusion of such a general condition
amounted to an 'un-justifiable trap' and warned that reliance on the decision, in seeking
to deprive a purchaser of damages, "might yet turn out to be misplaced".30 Referring to
the decision as "difficult to understand or reconcile with other authorities", Walford31
supported the above analysis of the judgment and suggested that the misrepresentation
by the seller was 'ignored' by Eve J. because it was not made in bad faith. Walford said:
"... this decision may best be supported on the ground that the vendor's
representation as to the tenancy was an innocent one... although it is true that
the vendor had not actually put the legal status of the tenant to the test by
proceedings. ,,32
Williams' review of the decision specifically focused on the issue of the alleged
misstatement as to vacant possession. Stating that "with great respect... to the learned
judge ... the writer must venture to question its correctness", Williams argued that:
tt ••• the words aunexed as above mentioned to the Particulars, "the property will
be sold with vacant possession on completion" were not a statement or a
misstatement within the meaning of Condition 10 of the National Conditions,
but were a promise, and amounted to an undertaking, which was part of the
28 In theory, there is no reason why a 'no annulment., no compensation' clause cannot still be given meaning in the
overall context of the contract if it is confined to matters not affecting the express obligation to give vacant
possession (and other tenusto whichthe general condition should be subject).
29 See Williams, T.e. 'Sale of Land withVacant Possession' (1928) 114 The Law Journal 339 in whichhe described
vacant possessionas "an integral part of the contract",
30 Farrand, abovenl at264.
31 Walford, E.O. Conditions ofSale ofLand (Sweet and Maxwell Limited, London 1940) 91.
32 Ibid.
57
contract, that the purchaser should have vacant possession on the completion of
the purchase. And it is very respectfully contended that Condition lOis only
applicable to errors, either by statement or omission, in the description of the
property sold, and cannot rightly be read as nullifying an express promise by
the vendor to do some act in performance ofthe obligations he has undertaken.
Such a promise...is...an integral part of the contract... And it is contended that
"error" or "omission" mentioned in Condition 10 cannot reasonably be
construed as extending to the vendor's error or omission in not performing an
act [the procurement of vacant possession] which he had contracted to do; and
that those words were never intended to exempt the vendor from liability for
the non-performance of this act...'033
Williams clearly distinguished between a misstatement (or misrepresentation) and a
promise to cogently argue that the vendor's failure to perform his express promise to
give vacant possession on completion should not have been caught or modified by the
general condition which related to misstatements, and not such 'promises'. On this basis,
even on Eve J.'s construction of the general 'no annulment, no compensation' clause, the
general condition should have had no effect on the express undertaking to give vacant
possession, which should have prevailed. This view gains further support from the
established principle that special conditions should override general conditions of sale
where there is ambiguity. Indeed, the various versions of the conditions of sale
themselves confirm that special conditions (of which vacant possession will normally be
one, as was the case here) have priority over any inconsistent general provisions. The
special conditions provide that "the general conditions apply so far as they are not
varied by or inconsistent with these special conditions".34 An express undertaking to
give vacant possession (appearing as a special condition) should, according to the
various editions and revisions of standard conditions of sale, and as counsel suggested
in the case, have prevailed and overridden the general 'no annulment, no compensation'
condition. This would also now be in. line with the modem approach to the
interpretation of documents adopted by the court,35 which would have given meaning to
J3 Williams, above n29. See also Potter, H. 'Conditions of the Sale ofLand' (1937) 1 Conv 306.
34 For example, under the Law Society's Contract for Sale (1984 Revision), above n4, special condition A provides
that the general conditions apply lisa far as they arenot varied by or inconsistent withthese special conditions". The
National Conditions of Sale provide that the general conditions apply so far as they are "not inconsistent" with the
special conditions (see, for example, The National Conditions of Sale, 19th Edition, 1976, above n4). This was an
established principle from the conception of the Conditions of Sale, e.g. see (1953) 97 Sol Jo1395. The conditions of
sale are discussed in moredetail in chapter 4.
J5 In particular, Prenn v Simmonds [197111 WLR 1381; Reardon Smith Line v Hansen-Tangen [197611 WLR 989;
Charter Reinsurance V Fagan [1997] AC 313; Mannai Investment CoLtd v Eagle Star Life Assurance Co Ltd [1997]
AC 749; Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich BS [19981 1 WLR 896; Bank oj Credit and
Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 and Sirius International Insurance Co 1/ FAI General Insurance
[200411 WLR 3252.
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the general condition in so far as it did not affect or modify a superior provision in the
.contract (that being the express special condition for vacant possessionj/"
Moreover, it has since been established that a seller who fails to give vacant possession
because of the presence of a tenant, whom he has taken no steps to evict, will breach the
obligation to give vacant possession, and be liable to pay damages to the seller. In
Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge37 the plaintiffpurchased land from the defendant under
a contract that expressly provided for vacant possession on completion. The occupants
refused to vacate the land and claimed the benefit of a business tenancy within the
Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. The defendant was held in breach for not giving vacant
possession at the material time and ordered to pay damages assessed in accordance with
the general law. As such, there are a number of bases on which to claim that Curtis v
French was wrongly decided and that Eve J. failed to acknowledge the true nature,
scope and extent of the seller's express promise (appearing as a special condition) that
vacant possession would be given, in the context of the other conditions of sale. This
reflected an apparent failure by the court to fully appreciate the significance of an
express special condition for vacant possession, with the judge being prepared to give
effect to other general conditions of sale to the detriment of the special condition for
vacant possession, which was effectively subordinated as a consequence. As will be
shown in the next section, this decision was not the only case of its type, with a further
ruling also failing to appreciate the precedence of an express special condition for
vacant possession.
'Subject to local authorities' requirements' clauses
A second type of conflicting contractual condition which elucidates how the court has
had to determine whether the term for vacant possession or the conflicting term should
take precedence, and how the terms could be held to modify or interpret each other, is a
'subject to local authority requirements' clause. The sort of clause in issue here
commonly provides that a purchaser is required to accept the property on completion
36 It is. however, unclear how the position would have changed if the obligation to give vacant possession was
implied rather than express. In theory animplied term is as enforceable as anexpress term, buttheimplied obligation
cannotarise if that would be inconsistent with an express provision of the contract. See Rignall, aboven24 at 200.
The issue of interactions between contractual conditions and implied obligations to give vacant possession is
discussed inmore detail later inthischapter:
37 [1987] Ch. 305 CA. See also, Williams, above 029 and chapter 2.
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subject to any notices served in respect of the property. Examples of such notices
include compulsory purchase orders, Housing Act stipulations as to occupation or even
tree preservation orders. Such a clause would typically provide that the purchaser is to
take the land:
"subject to all notices, orders or requirements given, made or required by the
local or other authorities.,,38
Whitford J. considered a 'subject to local authorities' requirements' clause in Korogluyan
v Matheou. 39 This case has striking parallels, in principle, to the decision in Curtis v
French given that the court was also required to rule on the interaction between an
express clause (appearing as a special condition) providing for vacant possession and
other conflicting conditions of sale and, as discussed below, also gave precedence to the
other conditions. Both decisions also made similar, and yet fundamental, errors based
on their apparent disregard of the non-disclosure of burdens on title by the respective
sellers.
In Korogluyan v Matheou the property was sold at auction with the particulars of sale
stating that vacant possession would be given on completion (that is, there was an
express contractual obligation to give vacant possession, equivalent to a special
condition). The contract of sale incorporated a 'subject to local authorities' requirements'
general condition (as general condition 6):
"Each purchaser shall be deemed to purchase with full knowledge of the state
of repair of the lot or lots purchased by him and of the tenancies thereof (if
any) and shall be responsible for all repairs including sanitary requirements and
all requirements of the lessor local or other authorities. The properties are sold
subject to all notices, orders or requirements whether referred to in the
particulars or not, given, made or required by the local or other authorities.
Each property shall as from the date of the contract be at the sole risk of the
purchaser thereof. ,,40
38 Local authority requirement clauses are common to the various editions and revisions ofthe conditions of sale. For
example, see The National Conditions of Sale, 18th Edition, 1969, above n4, special condition 9. Such clauses are
incorporated into current editions as general conditions: Standard Conditions of Sale (Fourth Edition) condition
3.1.2(e) and Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition) condition 3.1.2(e), both above n4.
39 [1975] 30 P. & C.R. 309.
40 Ibid at315.
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The contract also contained a special condition (number 9) that the purchaser was
buying with full knowledge of burdens and requirements for the property. It provided
that the purchasers:
"having had the opportunity of making all appropriate inquiries of the local
authorities shall be deemed to purchase with full knowledge of all entries on
the registers kept by them and of all their requirements or proposals relating to
the property and shall raise no objection or requisition whatsoever in respect of
or in relation thereto. ,,41
Before the sale, the local authority served a notice to enter on the seller pursuant to a
compulsory purchase order, which was not revealed at auction. As such, on completion
it was not possible for the seller to give vacant possession as had been stipulated in the
particulars of sale.
In his judgment, Whitford J. held that the seller was able to rely on the general and
special conditions referred to above. Although the auction particulars clearly said that
vacant possession would be given on completion, according to the judge, general
condition 6 and special condition 9 of the agreement 'put the purchaser to inquiry' as to
local authority requirements and possible notices affecting the property. He considered
that the effect of those conditions was to preclude the possibility of any complaint that
as a result of any notice by the local authority it became impossible for the plaintiff to
give vacant possession:
"general condition 6 and special condition 9...do draw the attention of the
purchaser to the fact that it may be sensible to see what the position vis-a-vis
any local authority requirements may be in relation to this particular property,
and do draw the purchaser's attention to the fact that if notices may have been
served, then the purchase is going to be effected subject to such burdens as the
notices given may place upon the property in question. ,,42
Whitford 1. assumed that the conditions sufficiently alerted the purchaser to the risk that
there might be a compulsory purchase order, and treated this as sufficient to qualify the
express undertaking to grve vacant possession that the seller had provided in the
41 Ibid al 315.
"lbidaI31?
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particulars of sale. His decision was therefore that the express obligation to give vacant
possession was rightly qualified by these conditions.43
Given his knowledge of the compulsory purchase order at the time of the auction, but
corresponding lack of disclosure, in a similar manner to the seller in Curtis v French,
the seller in the present case should not have been able to rely on the (general) 'subject
to ... ' condition as a matter of law. This is because, as well documented in the law on
title, a vendor who knows or ought to have known of such a notice, order or
requirement, cannot rely on such a condition if the burden is not disclosed at the time of
contracts.44 Further, as outlined in chapter 2, case law has confirmed that a seller's
express guarantee/promise to give vacant possession had the effect of making a
purchaser's knowledge of any impediment (removable or irremovable) to vacant
possession irnmaterial.f As such, even if the purchaser could be deemed to have had
knowledge of the risk of such a notice being served (as the judge suggested), that
impediment to vacant possession should have been of no consequence in the light of the
express promise as to vacant possession." It is therefore arguable that special condition
9 was irrelevant per se because the seller expressly contracted to sell the property with
vacant possession.
Moreover, for the same reasons provided by Williams above, the seller should not have
been allowed to qualify his express undertaking to give vacant possession by other
conditions in any event, otherwise the express vacant possession term was being
undermined. The express condition that the seller will provide vacant possession on
completion, as an integral part of the contract, ought to have prevailed over such a
'subject to ... ' clause, and the other conditions of sale should not have been allowed to
negate the express undertaking as to vacant possession.V Logically, the operation of the
other conditions should have been confined to matters which did not modify, affect or
"Ibidat317.
" Nottingham Patent Brick and Tile Co v Butler (1885) 15 Q.B.D. 261, per Wills 1. at 271; subsequently applied by
Millett J. in Rignall above n24 at 197-198.
45 See chapter 2, page 26. t
"Shameyford; above n23. It should also be noted thatthe purchaser was not actually objecting to the compulsory
'purchase order in its ownright anyway, butto the seller's failure to provide vacant possession pursuant to his express
obligation to do so in the relevant particulars of sale. See also the closely analogous case on title - Phillips v
Caldcleugh (1868) L.R. 4 Q.B. 159.
47 As previously noted, the various versions of the conditions of sale themselves confirm thatspecial conditions (of
which vacant possession will normally be one) have priority over any inconsistent general provisions. See above,
n34.
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.derogate from the seller's ability to give vacant possession, as expressly contracted for.
This was a conclusion not reached in this case, thus rendering effectively worthless the
express promise as to vacant possession as a result.
.Whitford J. made no reference to the decision in Curtis v French in which Eve J. was
willing to disregard a special condition providing for vacant possession in favour of a
general condition in such similar terms. It could be argued that the decision in Curtis v
French actually supported, in principle, the conclusion reached in Korogluyan v
Matheou, namely that the seller could rely on other conditions of sale to effectively
'convert' the express promise that the premises would be sold with vacant possession on
completion into the exact opposite. It is therefore surprising that Curtis v French was
not cited as an authority in Korogluyan v Matheou. As such, over the period 1925 -
1975 decisions in case law which ruled on the interaction between a special condition
for vacant possession, and other contractual terms, gave precedence to the non-vacant
possession terms. These terms (whether general or special) were seen to take
precedence over a special condition for vacant possession, which was effectively
subordinated as a consequence. In both decisions referred to above, the sellers were
therefore able to escape liability for not giving vacant possession by virtue of these
'other terms'. As the discussion below will demonstrate, it was not until much later that
the courts clarified the correct position in this point.
Precedence ofthe obligation
The decisions in Curtis v French and Korogluyan v Matheou undermined the
precedence of an express special condition as to vacant possession, and seemed to
disregard the hierarchy between special conditions and general contractual conditions.
These decisions, negating the effect of an express promise as to vacant possession,
stood as authorities up to 1979 and the decision of Templeman J. in Topfell Ltd v Galley
Properties Ltd.48 This provided the first coherent statement of what a special condition
for vacant possession provided in the context of a contract for the sale and purchase of
hind, and what place it has with reference to other incorporated conditions. ,
48 Above, n16,per Templeman 1. at 450.
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In Topfell the purchaser acquired a property from the defendant with the particulars of
sale stating (in bold type) that the property was sold with vacant possession of the
ground floor.49 As such, it was an express special condition of the contract that vacant
possession would be given. Prior to the sale, the local authority served a notice under
the section 19 of the Housing Act 1961 directing that the house was to be occupied by
only one household. A pre-existing tenancy ofthe first floor precluded occupation of the
ground floor by another household. Vacant possession of the ground floor could not
therefore be given on completion contrary to the express contractual provision that
vacant possession would be given.
The sellers knew of this notice but did not disclose it to the purchaser. The purchaser
successfully sued for specific performance with an abatement of the price. The contract
contained, and the sellers relied upon by way of defence, a 'subject to local authorities'
requirements' clause (which was a general condition):
"Each purchaser shall be deemed to purchase with full knowledge of the state
of repair of the lot or lots purchased by him and of the tenancies thereof if any
and shall be responsible for all repairs including sanitary requirements and all
requirements of the lessor, local or other authorities. The properties are sold
subject to all notices, orders or requirements, whether referred to in the
particulars or not, given, made or required by the local or other authority. Each
property shall as from the date of the contract be at sole risk of the purchaser
thereof. ,,50
The sellers also relied upon a 'no annulment, no compensation' clause (which was a
special condition of the contract):
"The purchaser having had the opportunity of making all appropriate inquiries
of the local and other authorities shall be deemed to purchase with full
knowledge of all entries on the registers kept by them and of all their
requirements or proposals relating to the property and shall raise no objection
or requisition whatsoever in respect ofor in relation thereto. ,,51
49 Ibid, 450.
50 Ibid, 450.
51 Ibid, 450.
64
In a similar manner to Korogluyan v Matheou,52 :\t was argued in submissions that if the
purchaser had in fact made local searches and inquiries the direction imposed under the
Housing Act 1961 would have come to light. In other words, it was argued that the
purchasers had notice of the risk of such notices" and should therefore take the property
subject to that legal obstacle to the receipt of vacant possession, in accordance with the
aforementioned general and special conditions.
Templeman J. focused instead on how the interaction between the express special
condition for vacant possession, and these apparently contradictory general and special
conditions, should be dealt with. He said:
"... these special and general conditions cannot be allowed to contradict the
contractual obligation into which the [sellers] entered ... to give vacant
possession. ,,53
As a matter of construction, Templeman J. regarded the express special condition to
give vacant possession as the paramount provision, and the other special and general
conditions of sale as subordinate to it.54 Topfell therefore held that an express
undertaking to give vacant possession constitutes an overriding guarantee by the seller;
that is, an express vacant possession obligation (appearing as a special condition) is the
leading provision. Accordingly, Topfell held that any condition of sale which would
otherwise have limited or modified the obligation should be construed as being qualified
by, and therefore subordinate to, the express special condition. This was seen to apply
against general and other special conditions of the contract, with the express special
condition for vacant possession taking precedence.55
Harpum used the decisions discussed above to illustrate (inter alia) that established
principles of construction had not been applied correctly with respect to interactions
between competing conditions of sale, with a view to highlighting the similarities
52 Above, n39.
53 Topfell above nl6,per Templeman 1. at 450.
54 In light of their knowledge of the Housing Act notice, the vendors could not have relied upon the conditions of sale
in any event.
55 [1946] K.B. 264, per Heilpem (for the plaintiffs) at 269 discussing condition 9(3) (relating to the state and
condition of the property sold) notes that this did not assist the defendant: "That condition cannot prevail against the
special condition for vacant possession". Even though condition 9(3) referred to the state ofthe property of whatever
tenure, and was not held to applyto rubbish-left on the premisesin any event,the statementis of application to other
applicable conditions.
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between vacant possession and title:56 Harpum, discussing these decisions, concluded
that the decision in Top/ell was to be.preferred, and stated that:
"An express undertaking to give vacant possession constitutes an overriding
guarantee by the vendor, Any condition of sale which would otherwise have
limited the obligation should in general be construed as being qualified by the
express undertaking and not vice versa."S7
Harpurn did not explicitly indicate why the decision in Topfell was to be regarded as the
most correct, simply stating that "it is respectfully suggested that this conclusion is the
right one".S8 However, a number ofjustifications can be offered which support the claim
that Top/ell is the better decision.
Firstly, as Harpurn indicated, the decision in Top/ell supports the hierarchy that has long
been established between special and general conditions of sale whereby the obligation
to give vacant possession (when appearing as a special condition) should take
precedence over competing (or conflicting) general conditions. The decisions in Curtis v
French and Korogluyan v Matheou allowed general conditions to negate the express
special condition for vacant possession, contrary to established principles. The decision
in Top/ell supports the precedence on special conditions in the context of the entire
contract. Preferring Curtis v French and Korogluyan v Matheou would do violence to
the purpose and effect of the status of general and special conditions and the certainty
that the hierarchy creates in the context of such contracts. Indeed, Halsbury's Laws
states that:
"[s]ince special conditions prevail over general conditions, and since the
provision for vacant possession is usually stated in the special conditions, it is
essential that any ~ualification of that provision should also be stated in the
special conditions." 9 .
56 Discussed in more detail in chapter 8. Interestingly, no reference was madeto the earlier 'authorities! on thispoint,
thus leaving it unclear whether such decisions were overlooked or disregarded. The fact that Top/ell (like
Korogluyan) failed to cite previous decisions, in which a vacant possession condition conflicted with other conditions
of sale, suggested a lack of coherence with the development of the vacant possession concept. Indeed, one reason
whyvacantpossessiontook so long to developas a-term in its own right may have been as a resultof the courts' lack
of awareness as to similar andrelated decisions. See chapter 4.
57 Harpum, aboven14.
58 Ibid 400
59 Mackay, L. (eds)Halsbury's Laws (4th ednReissueButterworths, London 1999) 101. Emphasis added.
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Further, the passage from Halsbury's also supports the .reasoning in Topfell that the
special condition for vacant possession will prevail over other special conditions of the
contract. The passage confirms that any qualification to an express special condition for
vacant possession must be 'stated in the special conditions', in order to override the
special condition for vacant possession (which will otherwise have priority). The
discussion in chapter 4, exploring how vacant possession has been incorporated as a
general and special condition in sale and purchase contracts and the implications for the
transaction more generally, further supports this hierarchy and the appropriateness of
the Topfell decision.
Secondly, since the decision in Topfell gives substance to the integral obligation of a
sale and purchase contract, namely that vacant possession will be given, preferring that
decision would seem logical from a practitioners' perspective. In chapter I, the
importance of vacant possession for parties on all sides of the transaction was
highlighted. Vacant possession is an essential, if not the essential part of a contract for
the sale and purchase of land.6O The importance of vacant possession being given in
such cases is what led to the obligation being implied by the courts." as a matter oflaw,
into contracts of this kind.62 If the decision in Topfell is not preferred, the essential
element of such standard contracts would continue to be subordinated; if other
conditions can be argued to modify the vacant possession obligation, buyers would be
unable to require sellers to deliver the property to them in a state contemplated by the
contract. In such a case, the standard form contract would no longer 'behave in the way
that it should'.63
Thirdly, in the conveyancing process, a special condition (or express statement in the
particulars of sale) that required vacant possession to be given on completion, is
60 See Williams, T.e. above n29 in which he described vacant possession as "an integral part of the contractu.
61 Funnston,:MP The Law a/Contract (2nd rev edn Butterworths Law, London 2003) 3.21. Also Society ofLloyd's v
Clementson [1995] CLC 117, per Steyn L.J. at 131; Shell UK v Lostock Garages [1977] I All ER 481, per Lord
Denning M.R. at 487; Mears v Safecar Security Ltd [1983] QB 54 and Ali Shipping Corpn v Shipyard Trogir [1998]
2 All ER 136. per Potter L.J. at 147 where it is stated that "[c]onsiderations of business efficacy, particularly when
based on the "officious bystander" test, are likely to involve a detailed examination of the circumstances existing at
the time of the relevant contract. .. whereas the parties have indicated their presumed intention simply by entering into
a contract to which the court attributes particular characteristics".
62 See Shell UK, above n61, per Lord Denning M.R. at 487; EI Awdi v BCCf [1989] I AU ER 242, per Hntchinson J.
at 253; Bank ofNova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual War RiskAssociation (Bermuda) Ltd [1989] 3 All ER 628.
63 See Shell UK, above n61, per Lord Denning M.R. at 487; EI Awdi, above n62 per Hntchinson J. at 253; Bank of
Nova Scotia, above n62; Perry v Sharon Development Ltd [1937] 4 All ER 390; Lynch v Thorne [1956] I WLR 303
and Hancock v BWBrazier (Anerley) Ltd [1966]1 WLR 1317.
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obviously something that the parties specifically consider before recording expressly in
their agreement. In contrast, a similar amount of consideration is most likely not given
to the general conditions of a sale and purchase contract, which have been incorporated
as a generic printed set of terms and without special attention to detail. It is therefore
'fairer' for the parties to be held to an express promise over other conditions
incorporated only by reference.f" As such, the decision in Topfell makes sense in the
real legal world and with respect to the nature of the contract that the parties are
entering into.
Fourthly, adding weight to the claim that the decision in Topfell should be preferred, the
decision has been used to support arguments made in a number of subsequent decisions
where the meaning of vacant possession was in issue.65 By contrast, the decisions in
Curtis v French and Korogluyan v Matheou have never been approved or followed. The
judgment in Korogluyan did not even refer to Curtis, even though the decision in Curtis
could be seen to have supported the decision made in Korogluyan.
As such, there are a number of justifications, in a theoretical and practical sense, for
supporting the decision in Topfell over previous judgments and thus providing certainty
for the parties in cases where the contract contains an express special condition for
vacant possession. It can therefore be understood that, subject to contrary indication, an
express special condition for vacant possession will take precedence over other
competing contractual conditions (special or general).
Vacant Possession: Express General Conditions
Whilst clarifying the precedence of an express special condition for vacant possession,
it is important to note that the decision in Topfell did not provide authority for all types
of vacant possession obligations. This is because, in Topfell the vacant possession term
appeared expressly as a special condition. Indeed, all of the cases referred to above have
') 64 The factthat a special condition for vacant possession should even override another conflicting special condition,
can be seen to embody Templeman L's regard to the vacant possession clause as having precedence overall other'
terms of the contract, giventheintegral placeof vacantpossession inthe contract. .
65 See Secretary OfState For The Environment, Transport And The Regions 'V Baylis (Gloucester) Ltd and Another
[20001 3 PLR 61 and E. Johnson & Co. (Barbados) Ltd Appellants v N.S.R Ltd Respondents (Appeal from the Court
Of Appeal Of Barbados [19971 A.C. 400). These decisions acediscussed in more detail in chapter 6.
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in common the fact that the obligation to give vacant possession in each case was
expressly incorporated as a special condition. As chapter 4 will show, over time an
express obligation to give vacant possession has sometimes appeared cas a general
condition.66 It is also important to consider whether, and if so how, Templeman J.'s
decision would have changed in such circumstances.
In Topfell the court held that an express special condition for vacant possession should
take precedence over other inconsistent conditions. This is logical because, as noted
previously, in the conveyancing process a special condition (or express statement in the
particulars of sale) that required vacant possession to be given on completion, was
obviously something that the parties would have specifically considered before
recording expressly in their agreement. The parties should therefore be held to that
promise over other (general) conditions incorporated by reference. Indeed, it is often the
case that a similar amount of consideration is not given to the general conditions of the
sale and purchase contract, which have been incorporated without special attention to
detail as a set of generic printed conditions.67 One must therefore question whether a
different approach must be taken where a general (and not special) condition for vacant
possession contradicts with another general condition (such as a 'no annulment, no
compensation' or 'subject to local authorities' requirements' clause); that is, the conflict
is between terms incorporated with the same status.
For example, the 1970 edition of the Law Society's Conditions of Sale included a
general condition as to vacant possession at condition 3(1):
"Unless the Special Conditions otherwise provide the property is sold with
. leti ,,68vacant possession on comp etion.
And a 'subject to local authorities' requirements' clause as condition 2(1):
66 See the LawSociety's General Conditionsof Sale (1970 Edition); The Law Society's Contract for Sale (1973
Revision) and The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition), all above n4. . '
_ 67 The factthat a special condition for vacant possession should even override another conflicting 'special condition
can be seen to embody Templeman L's regard to the vacant possession clause as having precedence overall other
terms of the contract, given the integral place of vacantpossession inthe contract. See the Appendix at page 301 for
, an example of the general conditionsthatareincorporated into a sale andpurchase contract by reference.
68 The Law Society'sGeneral Conditions of Sale (1970 Edition),aboven4.
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I '
"...the property is sold subject-
(c) to all requirements, proposals or requests (whether or not subject to any
confirmation) of any such authority.,,69
One can question which general condition would have prevailed in a case where, for
example, a compulsory purchase order was made over the property between exchange
and completion. One view would be that the reference to "unless the Special Conditions
otherwise provide the property is sold with vacant possession... " implies that other
general conditions cannot modify the general condition as to vacant possession (and
only special conditions would be so able to). On this basis, the general condition for
vacant possession would take precedence over other general conditions of the contract.
However, this interpretation would not be possible in the 1990 edition of the Standard
Conditions of Sale, in which the general condition as to vacant possession simply
provided that:
"The buyer is to be given vacant possession of all the property on completion;
this does not apply to any part of it included in a lease or tenancy ("tenancy")
subject to which the agreement states the property is sold.,,70
Here, there was no intimation that other general conditions of sale could not take
precedence over the general condition for vacant possession, with each apparently
having the same status. As such, Templeman J.'s statement, that an express undertaking
to give vacant possession (appearing as a special condition) constitutes an overriding
guarantee by the seller, and should take precedence over all other conditions of the
contract (special and general), is not applicable where the obligation to give vacant
possession appears as a general condition (with, one would assume, the same status as
other general conditions).
Templeman J. held that a special condition for vacant possession should even override
another conflicting special condition, on the basis that the vacant possession clause
should have precedence over all other terms, given its integral place in the contract. By
analogy, it could be argued that a general condition for vacant possession should take
69 Ibid, condition 2(1).
70 The Standard Conditions of Sale(First Edition), aboven4, condition 3(1).
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precedence over another conflicting general condition on the same basis (i.e. that the
vacant possession condition is integral and, by default, should be given precedence over
other incorporated terms of the same statns). Whilst there is no authority on such a
position, this analysis is in the mischief of the decision of Templeman J. This does
however cause the position for parties to remain unclear and this uncertainty creates
greater risk for contracting parties who cannot rely on the law to assist them in seeking
to interpret their rights and responsibilities in an instance of this kind.
It can also be questioned what the position would be if a 'no annuhnent, no
compensation' or 'subject to local authorities' requirements' clause was a special
condition (with vacant possession only a general conditionj." Whilst the lack ofexpress
consideration does not detract from the contractual status of general conditions in a
legal contract for the sale and purchase ofland, it can legitimately be taken into account
when determining the relative weight that may be attached to such a term of the contract
by the parties, as compared to other conditions which may have been more particularly
considered (i.e. the special conditionsj.F According to established principles previously
referred to, in such a case as this, the special condition should logically prevail on the
basis that the general condition for vacant possession can only apply so far as it is 'not
inconsistent' with any special conditions.f A general condition for vacant possession
would therefore only be permitted to have effect in so far as it did not qualify the
conflicting special condition, which would be treated as the 'dominant provision'
(contrary to an intuitive view) of vacant possession. Given the precedence that
Templeman J. gave to a condition for vacant possession, one may try and construct an
argument that the vacant possession condition should be treated differently to other
general conditions of the contract, and be an exception to the established rule that
special conditions must take precedence. There is, however, no authority indicating such
a position and this would both defy the established hierarchy of terms referred to
previously, and be contrary to the terms of a contract that have been freely negotiated
between the parties. If the parties complete a document which provides for vacant
71 See the 1970 edition or 1973 revision of the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale, or the Law Society's
Standard Conditions of Sale 1990, wherevacantpossessionwas a general condition (all above04). Chapter 4 reviews
the changes in standard form conditions of sale as to the incorporation of the term for vacantpossession, and it is
documented how the term moves backandforth, froma general to a specialcondition.
72 See Harpum, above014.
73 As notedpreviously, the specialconditions provide thatthe genera! conditions apply"so far as they are not varied
by orinconsistent with these specialconditions". See 034.
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possession only as a general condition, with other (potentially conflicting) terms being
afforded greater status, it would be:potentially unjust for the law to look behind such a
bargain and assign the terms different status to that afforded by the actual contract.
Implied Vacant Possession clauses
The above discussion was set in the context of express vacant possession clauses, which
have historically been included in a contract for the sale or lease of land as general or
special conditions. However, there is a further permutation to consider if a term for
vacant possession is not included in the contract as a general or special condition. In
.such a case it has been established in case law that the term that vacant possession will
be given is implied.
In Cook v Taylor'" it was held that where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and
silent as to any tenancy to which the property is subject, it is implied that vacant
possession will be given on completion. Similarly in Midland Bank Ltd v Farmpride
Hatcheries Ltd it was said that:
"prima facie a prospective vendor of property offers the property with vacant
possession unless he otherwise states and that would ordinarily be implied in
the contract of sale in the absence of stipulation to the contrary. ,,75
In Edgewater Developments Co v Bailey it was said that "where nothing was said about
possession it was often said that there was an implication that property was to be sold
with vacant possession't.i" In Farrell v Green'' it was held that the term is implied by
I 78aw.
However, it has also been established that the implied obligation will not arise if that
would be inconsistent with an express provision of the contract. In Rignall
74 [1942] Ch. 349 at 352.
ts [t981]2 EGLR 147,per Shaw L.J. at 148.
76 [1974]118 SolJol3rZ,per Lord Denning M.R. at 313.
71 [1974] 232 EG587. Thecasewas decided per incuriam on thepoint that knowledge of irremovable impediments is
irrelevant to thescopeof the implied obligation. It remains anauthority fortheproposition that vacant possession can
be animplied termhowever.
78 Walford, above n32, 169 also discussed the implied term asto vacant possession.
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Developments Ltd. v Halil,79 Millett J. spoke of "the obvious impossibility ... of
implying a term inconsistent with an express term of the contract." Indeed, it has been
held in Australia that "[ajpart from any special 80 conditions of sale it is the duty of the
vendor to give vacant possession't." That is, the obligation will be implied by law
subject to a special condition to the contrary. However, an implied obligation to give
vacant possession may also be modified or need to be properly interpreted with regard
to general conditions of the contract as well (i.e. not just special conditions, as
suggested by Harvey J. in Reynolds v Doyle). Indeed, Oliver L.J. in Squarey v Harris-
Smith82 said that any general condition having been incorporated:
"must be given its full status as a contractual term and cannot just be ignored
because it is one of a number of printed conditions which the parties may well
not actually have read. ,,83
Therefore, if any impediment to vacant possession is latent and irremovable, and at the
time of contracting the obstacle was not known of (and could not reasonably be deemed
to have been known) to the seller,84 or if the impediment is removable (thus caught by
the implied obligation to give vacant possession), both general and special conditions of
the contract may properly affect the nature, scope and extent of the implied obligation to
give vacant possession (which will encompass such an obstacle). 8S As such, an implied
obligation to give vacant possession must be understood as potentially being capable of
qualification by both general and special conditions of the contract, both of which are
capable ofmodifying the implied obligation.
79 Above, n24,per Millett 1. at200. This was in an alternative contextbutthe statement is of general application.
80 Emphasis added.
'1 Reynolds v Doyle [1919] 19 S.R. (N.S.W.) 108,per Harvey J. at 110.
"Squareyv Harris-Smith [1981]42 P. & C.R. 118,per Oliver L.J. at 128.
83 Wilkinson, H.W. 'Conveyancer's Notebook! (1985) Conv 243 provides a critical appraisal of such reasoning and
why such general conditions are as enforceable as other conditions in the contract, even though they will have been
incorporated by reference and probably not considered in greatdetail. It is correct to state thatthis approach has not
been consistently applied however. In Lyme Valley Squash Club Ltd v Newcastle under Lyme Borough Council
[1985] 2 All E.R. 405 at 410-412 Blackett-Ord V-C. described a general condition as "very mnch part of the small
print", and added that "no one gave it a-thought ... therefore it is right to go behind it".
&4 lfthe sellerknew(or ought to haveknown) of the impediment and hadfailed to make full and frank disclosure of it
to the purchaser, thenthe sellerwill not be ableto rely on any condition of sale in general terms which excludes or
modifies their obligation to give vacant possession. The implied obligation to gi.ve vacant possession will notreadily
be excluded or modified in such a circumstance (see Re Crosby's Contract [1949] 1 All E.R. 830). This is an
application of therulethat if there is any ambiguity, a condition of sale willbe construed against thevendor because
it restricts the rights of the purchaser (see Leominster Properties Ltd v Broadway Finance Ltd [1981] 42 P. & C.R.
372,per Slade J. at 387).
85 Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd [1958] Ch 110.
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It is currently not clear how other conditions (for example, 'no annulment, no
compensation' or 'subject to local authorities' requirements' clauses), which normally
appear as general conditions, would· be construed when there is only an implied'
obligation to give vacant possession. Whilst an express special condition for vacant
possession has been held to override other conflicting (special and general) conditions,
it does not follow that this should be the case where the vacant possession obligation is
implied. In such a case, on the basis of established principles of the construction of
documents, and in line with established case law,86 it would be appropriate to give the
conflicting express (special or general) condition(s) precedence over the implied vacant
possession obligation on the basis that such a condition would constitute a 'contrary
indication' or 'stipulation to the contrary'.87 If this is correct, then any other condition
having an effect on vacant possession would have to be given its full meaning before
the implied obligation could be interpreted. Whilst there is currently no authority on this
point, and the decision in Top/ell does not have direct application to implied vacant
possession terms, the decision in Topftll does reinforce the importance of a hierarchy of
terms, and consistent with this would be to claim that expressly agreed terms are to be
afforded greater weight than terms that are only implied, when a conflict arises. Again,
the uncertainty surrounding this issue will cause difficulties for the parties to a contract
who will be unsure of their legal rights and responsibilities. It is suggested that it is
more likely that 'other conditions' of the contract (expressly incorporated), and which
may have an effect on vacant possession, would have to be given their full meaning
above any contrary implied obligations (but there remains a lack of a specific authority
on this point). As such, there is a very strong argument for always making vacant
possession an express term of the contract (and particularly, an express special
condition) if it is desired that the seller should unconditionally be under an obligation to
give vacant possession on completion (regardless of any other competing or conflicting
contractual terms).
86 For example, Rignall, above n24, where Millett J. at200 spoke of lithe obvious impossibility ... of implyinga term
inconsistentwith an expresstermofthe contractu.
87 InMidland BankLtd v Farmpride Hatcheries Ltd, above n75, it was saidthat"prima facie a prospective vendor of
property offerstheproperty with vacant possession unless he otherwise states and that wouldordinarily be implied in
the contract of sale inthe absence of stipulation to thecontrary".
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·Conclusion
The; precedence of an express special condition for vacant possession over other
conflicting terms was suggested by the decision in Topfell in 1979. This decision was
:clear that the special and general conditions could not be allowed to contradict the
seller's contractual obligation to give vacant possession (when appearing as a special
conditionj.f" This decision supports the established hierarchy of special and general
conditions and also makes sense in a practical context with respect to an express special
condition providing that vacant possession will be given on completion. The decision
has also been approved of, and followed, in subsequent decisions, adding weight to the
claim that it should be viewed as preferred. This assists parties to a transaction by
enabling them to assert their respective positions with reference to the understood and
acknowledged precedence of an express special condition for vacant possession.
Accordingly, it can be seen as best practice to always deal with the issue of vacant
possession expressly as a special condition.
It was, however, noted that the interaction between a term for vacant possession and
other contractual terms, when appearing as an express general condition was not as
clear, and that Topfell could not be treated as an authority for all types of express
condition for vacant possession. Where the term for vacant possession is only
incorporated as a general condition, conflicting special conditions would logically take
precedence over the general condition for vacant possession given the established
hierarchy of terms. Where the vacant possession condition, and conflicting term, were
both general conditions, the position would be less clear, and there is no authority for
the proposition that the general condition for vacant possession would take precedence
over other terms incorporated with the same status (and the express terms ofthe contract
would have to be considered in detail for any indications).
Further, the full nature and effect of an obligation to give vacant possession, when
merely implied into the contract, remains even more unclear. There is no authority on
whether and if so, to what extent, special and general conditions of the contract should
talce precedence over an implied term for vacant possession and rebut the implication
88 Topfell Ltd, above n16,per Templeman J. at 450.
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established by case law, but logically 'other' express terms of the contract (even if not
directly relating to vacant possession) should take precedence over implied terms,
including those for. vacant possession. This is the case. even if the contract is of a-
'defined type' where vacant possession was assumed, by the parties, to have been a
requirement. This demonstrates how fundamental questions with the term, and its
incorporation into standard contracts, remain unanswered at the present time, thus
creating risk and uncertainty for the parties in any given instance, who carmot rely on
established case law to provide clarify as to their liabilities and responsibilities in many
respects.
The current uncertainty that exists causes difficulties to practitioners, and those who are
faced with the task of seeking to determine whether the obligation to give vacant
possession is engaged in any particular instance. It causes problems in ascertaining the
full nature and effect of any given contractual term in the context of the transaction
more generally. As discussed in chapter I, whether an obligation has even arisen is one
of the first questions that needs to be addressed and this can be difficult to ascertain if
the obligation may be qualified by other conditions, or not arise at all if other conditions
rebut an implied obligation from even arising. The fact that uncertainties still exist
suggests that there has not been and currently is no structured theoretical and coherent
concept of vacant possession. This may, at least in part, be the reason behind the
problems with vacant possession (as outlined in chapter 2), and the misunderstandings
that have taken place in case law over the years, as evidenced earlier in that chapter.
Clearly, uncertainty continues to surround various aspects of the obligation to give
vacant possession, as a term of the contract, and the need for greater clarity in the future
is evident. This can be seen to underlie the history of the emergence of the term in
respect of the confused and incoherent conceptual development that case law exhibits.
Chapter 7 explores in detail the concept of parties 'negotiating in the shadow of the law'
and how this can be argued to be apparent with respect to the obligation to give vacant
possession, given the issues expounded by this chapter.
To further elucidate the apparent lack of appreciation and understanding of the vacant
possession term over time, the next chapter reviews the term's treatment in the various
editions and revisions of the so-called 'standard conditions of sale'. This reveals more
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about how the obligation has been interpreted and understood at various intervals during
its development, thus supporting the claim that the obligation to give vacant possession
was not clearly articulated or coherently conceptualised throughout the twentieth
century.
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Chapter 4
Vacant Possession and Conditions of Sale
In chapter 3, the court's interpretation of terms for vacant possession, and their
interaction with other contractual conditions, was considered. The priority given to an
express clause for vacant possession (when appearing as a special condition) over other
conflicting terms was evaluated. This was also contrasted with an analysis of an express
general condition for vacant possession, or an implied obligation for vacant possession,
where the full nature and effect of interactions with other contractual terms remains less
clear, currently creating confusion for conveyancers and parties to standard form sale
and purchase contracts.
This chapter develops an understanding of vacant possession as an express or implied
term by proceeding on a chronological journey through the various editions and
versions of the standardised conditions of sale, first published in 1902, and since then
routinely incorporated into the majority of contracts for the sale and purchase of
freehold land (and leasehold estates and interests). By documenting how the obligation
has been incorporated through the history of the conditions of sale, much is revealed
about the profession's understanding at various intervals since the first set of
standardised conditions of sale was published. It is intended that this analysis, providing
contemporaneous evidence of the development of the concept, will be insightful in
shedding light on the understanding and recognition by practitioners and other
professionals, of the true nature, scope and extent of the obligation to give vacant
possession, and its implications to sale and purchase transactions over the history of the
conditions of sale.
The chapter starts by providing the context of the emergence of standard conveyancing
provisions and how they developed into a universal set of standard conditions of sale
(and for commercial transactions, standard commercial property conditions). The
evolving development of the vacant possession obligation in conditions of sale is then
evaluated over the course of their history. Although the reasons for some of these
developments were not documented or explained contemporaneously, where possible
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documentary evidence in the form of committee minutes, journal articles and
commentaries are cited to support the analysis undertaken and justify the assertions
made.
Origin of conditions of sale
Historically, precedent books published by eminent draftsmen have been a source of
standard conveyancing provisions for use by practitioners across England and Wales.
Thomas Martin and Charles Davidson, in Practice of Conveyancing, first published in
1837/ gave examples of such books from as far back as The Chartuary of 1534 and Dr.
Phayer's Bake of Instruments in 1543. They also listed a number of other authors,
including Sir Orland Bridgman's work, published in 1682, Nathaniel Pigot in 1739,
Booth, Fearne, Butler and Sanders in the eighteenth century and Humphreys in the early
nineteenth century." Modern counterparts to these texts include Key and Elphinstone's
Precedents in Conveyancing.t and Prideaux, Wigan and Phillips' The Encyclopaedia of
Forms and Precedents.' and such sources remain of central use to practitioners in their
day-to-day work in conveyancing and other aspects of transactional land law.
Whilst early works dealt predominantly with techniques for the drafting of deeds,
authors in time began to suggest standard contractual provisions. In 1790 in his Original
Precedents in Conveyancing.' Williams included an agreement for the sale of a freehold
estate where the purchaser was to be 'at the charge of the deeds' for conveying the
property and 'all attested copies of the title deeds and covenants to produce the same'.6
Powell, Barton and Bird in their various Precedents in Conveyancing published in the
early l800s7 gave forms of agreement for the sale of land containing several clauses,
1 Martin, T. Practice of conveyancing, with/arms of assurances (Saunders and Denning, London 1837). See also,
Martin, T. and Davidson C. Practice of conveyancing, with forms of assurances (Saunders and Denning, London
1837-1844); Stuart, J. Practice ofconveyancing (Saunders and Denning, London 1827-1831) and Stuart, J. Practice
ofconveyancing (2nd edn Saunders and Denning, London 1832).
2 Martin did not provide explicit references to these texts even though he referred to them at various points in his
work.
3 Key, T. and Elphinstone, H.W. Precedents in conveyancing (15th edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 1953).
4 Prideaux, F. Wigan, T.K. and Phillips LM. Forms andprecedents in conveyancing (25th edn Stevens and Sons and
The Solicitors Law Stationery Society.Limited, London 1958-1959).
5 Williams, T.W. Original precedents tn conveyancing (Zachariah Jackson, Dublin 1790).
'Ibid, 3.
7 Powell, J.J. and Barton C. Original precedents in conveyancing, selectedfrom the manuscript collection ofthe late
John Joseph Powell (W. Clarke and Sons, London 1802); Barton, C. Series oforiginal precedents in conveyancing
(W. Clarke and Sons, London 1807-1808); Barton, C. Modernprecedents in conveyancing. Volume 1 (W. Clarke and
Sons. London 1811); Barton. C and Bird I.B. Modern precedents in conveyancing (2nd edn W. Clarke and Sons,
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some of which are recognisable to conveyancers today.' Similarly, William Hughes'
Concise Precedents in Modern Conveyancing' gave precedents for some auction
conditions which are close to those originally incorporated into early editions of:
conditions of sale.10 In the second half of the nineteenth century, more complete sets of
conditions were drafted in order to assist conveyancers in covering every aspect of the
property transaction. Auction room conditions of the Liverpool Law Society, issued in
1865, are the earliest which texts have traced,'! whilst Birmingham Law Society in
1871 and Bristol Law Society in 1884 are known to have issued their own common
form conditions. 12
Up to the early 1900s it was common practice for solicitors to prepare their own form of
sale and purchase contract, including particulars and conditions. Indeed various texts,
including Farrer in 1902, set out general rules to be considered in "framing conditions of
sale and particulars't.P The emphasis in such texts was on how the individual solicitor
should go about the be-spoke drafting of the relevant particulars and sale contract
unique to the specific transaction.
Williams took the view that such bespoke conditions (drafted, by convention, by the
seller's solicitor) were used to curtail the benefits that the purchaser would otherwise
gain under open contract rules:
"It is usually desired, on the vendor's part at least, not to enter into an open
contract...but to modify by express stipulation the legal incidents of the
bargain."14
London 1811-1814 and 2 supplements 1815 and 1817) and Barton, C. and BIrd J.B. Modern precedents in
conveyancing (3rd edn Charles Hunter, London 1821).
8 For example, thatthe conveyance shall be prepared bythe purchaser at his own expense; that interest shall be paid
onthepurchase money fordelaycaused bythepurchaser and that thevendor shalldeduce a clear andmarketable title
within a stipulated time.
9 Hughes,W. Concise precedents in modern conveyancing (LawTimes Office, London 1855-1857).
10 See for example, the original conditions in the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925 (The Law Society.
London 1925).
II Wilkinson, H.W. Standard conditions of sale of land: a commentary on the Law Society and National general
conditions ofsale ofland (4th edn Longman, London 1989) 1.
121bid.
13 Farrer, F.E. Precedents of conditions 0/ sale of refill estate, revisions, policies etc (Stevens and Sons Limited,
London 1902).
14 Williams, T.e. Treatise on the law a/vendor and purchaser ofreal estate and chattels real (Sweet and Maxwell,
London 1904-1906).
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Farrand notes that it was not until the early 1900s that:
"practitioners apparently became more appreciative of their responsibilities
when acting for the purchasers and began to contest any conditions [proposed
by the seller's solicitors] going too far. As a result, sets of conditions of sale
were drafted which could be applied to any sale and which endeavoured to
adjust the balance more fairly between the vendor and the purchaser."15
It was also noted that the increasing professionalism of conveyancing and growth in the
munber of land transactions in the early 1900s caused there to be a demand for a means
by which transactions could be effected more smoothly and with greater speed."
Conditions ofsale
It was in 1902 that a solicitor's managing clerk from Norwich, Mr Alfred Kendall,
suggested to the Solicitors' Law Stationery Society that a form of conditions of sale
which he had prepared should be published. The draft was settled by Mr E.P.
Wolstensholme and the first edition of the National Conditions of Sale was published
around 1902.17 Six editions were published under the pre-1926 law and fourteen since
commencement ofthe Law of Property Act 1925.18
In addition to the National Conditions of Sale, an alternative set of conveyancing
precedents were published by the Law Society from 1926. Wilkinsonl 9 reported that the
Law Society's Conditions were first published "to facilitate conveyancing under the
1925 property legislation" and were used from 1 January 1926. They were intended to
complement the Lord Chancellor's statutory conditions (which applied to contracts by
correspondence)20 and to relate to sales by public auction or by private agreement, other
15 Farrand, JT. Contract and conveyance (4th ednOyezPublications, London 1983).
16 See (1926) 23 Law Society's Gazette 64 where facilitation oftransactions, especiallyin light of the Law of Property
Act 1925 taking effect on 1 Janoary 1926, is discussed and Walford, E.O. Conditions ofSale ofLand (Sweet and
MaxwellLimited, London 1940)2-3 with reference to the increase in conveyancing transactions.
17 National Conditions of Sale, First Edition (The Solicitors' LawSocietyStationery SocietyLimited, London 1902).
18 Amongst the draftsmen have been Mr T. Cyprian Williams and Sir Benjamin Cheny (according to early versions
ofthe National Conditions of Sale) and Walford, above n16.
19 Wilkinson, abovenl I.
20 The Statutory Fonn of Conditions of Sale, 1925 (better known as the Lord Chancellor's Conditions) applied to
contracts forthe sale ofland madeby correspondence. See Prideaux, F., Cherry, RL. andMaxwell J.R.P. Forms and
Precedents in Conveyancing (22nd edn Stevens and Sons Limited, London 1926) 326. The Conditions were
promulgated under section46 of the Law of Property Act 1925 but applied only where no contrary intention was
expressed. Theyare rudimentary and seemto havebeen littleused(e.g. see Stearn v Twitchell [1985] 1 All ER 631).
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than by correspondence." They were first drafted by Sir Benjamin Cherry, who was
previously involved in drafting the National Conditions of Sale.21
The use of standard form conditions was formalised by clause 46 of the Law of Property
(Consolidation) Bill 192523 which became section 46 of the Law of Property Act
1925,24 and which stated that:
"the Lord Chancellor may from time to time prescribe and publish forms of
contract and conditions of sale. ,,25
The Lord Chancellor sent draft copies of certain forms and conditions to the Law
Society for comment." and the Council then referred the matter to the Land Transfer
Committee, who sent copies of the draft to Provincial Law Societies for comment in
early 1925.
The Law Society's Land Transfer Committee minutes of 30 June 192527 record that the
Council was urged to issue a general form of condition of sale in view of the fact that
the Lord Chancellor had found that the statute did not, in his opinion, empower him to
do so. A resolution of the Associated Provincial Law Societies had been received,
which urged that the forms of General Condition as now amended be adopted and the
Law Society was invited to deal with this matter. The Land Transfer Committee agreed
that the Law Society should secure the copyright of the General Conditions of 1925.
The Council of The Law Society hoped that these conditions would secure some
'uniformity of practice' with respect to the use of these conditions (as opposed to
bespoke conditions drafted by each solicitor's office) for conveyancing transactions:
"The Council of The Law Society, with the assistance of Sir Benjamin Cherry
and the approval and co-operation of the Provincial Law Societies have
prepared a form of Conditions of Sale, for use in London and the Provinces on
21 See the notes in (1925).22 Law Society's Gazette 156.
22 Wilkinson, abovenl I.
23 The Law of Property (Consolidation) Bill 1925.
24 Law of Property Act .1925.
25 Also referred to in the Law Society Anonal Reports 1924-1931 (The Law Society, London 1932) 34.
26 Private and Confidential Minutes of the Law Society Council meeting of 16 January 1925 (accessed through the
Law SocietyLibrary- copies available on request).
27 Private and Confidential Minutes of the Law SocietyLand Transfer Committeeof30 June 1925 (accessedthrough
the Law Society Library - copies available on request).
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sales of land by auction and private contract. The Conditions, which are the
copyright of the Law Society, have been prepared with the object of securing
uniformity of practice and of facilitating conveyancing transactions under the
new Law of Property Legislation which came into operation on the 1st January
1926.,,28
Two sets ofconditions
From 1925 there therefore existed two effectively 'competing' sets of conditions that
could be incorporated into contracts for the sale and purchase of land: Oyez's National
Conditions of Sale and the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale. Various editions
and revisions of these competing sets of conditions were published up to 1990.29It was
clear from the 1930s that the alternative versions of the conditions of sale were being
used by solicitors across the board:
"Owing to the exigencies of modem affairs it has become a very usual practice
to incorporate by reference certain standard Conditions of Sale, and those most
commonly employed are the Law Society's Conditions of Sale...and the (so-
called) National Conditions of Sale issued by the Solicitor's Law Stationery
Society....The practice referred to has grown notwithstanding considerable
resistance upon the ground that such forms include in the majority of cases
many clauses which are unsuitable or have no relation whatsoever to the
subject-matter of the particular contract. These forms do, however, involve a
considerable saving of time for the vendor's solicitors, and also assist, to some
extent, in the elimination of mistakes in the draft contract, since the material to
be written or typed is reduced to a minimum. They also save the purchaser's
solicitor some little time in connection with the reading and examination of the
engrossments on exchange.,,30
In many respects, having two alternative sets of standard form conditions was not ideal,
indeed Silverman claimed that:
"A particular problem confronting a solicitor who is faced with sale and
purchase contracts drawn on different sets of conditions is that the two sets are
not compatible when used together. .. ,,31
28 (1926) 23 Law Society's Gazette 64. ,
29 As discussed below, from 1990 the 1 aw Society Standard Conditions of Salewerepublished and these superseded
theprevious pre-fusion conditions. TheLaw SocietyStandard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) 1990wereexpressed
to also be known and referred to as The National Conditions of Sale 21st Edition and the Law Society's General
Conditions of Sale 1990(i.e. thenext editions of the respective pre-fusion conditions).
30 Walford, aboven16.
31 Silverman, F. Conditions a/Sale, a Conveyancers Guide (Butterworth & Co (publishers) Ltd, London 1983)v.
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Further, Wilkinson noted that:
\ ,
"The two sets of conditions sometimes take different approaches to the same
problem, however, and the practitioner [should] be aware of the differences
between them." 32
It does not seem that any protocol was developed to govern which set of conditions
should be used in any particular transaction and that the forms of conditions could
largely be selected on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, one commentator observed that:
"Most solicitors habitually use one set of conditions in preference to the other,
therefore some problems inevitably arise when a solicitor receives a purchase
contract drafted on the set of conditions with which he is not familiar. Most
problems arise quite simply from the fact that the solicitor is not fully aware of
the differences between the two sets of conditions and therefore proceeds with
the transaction on the assumption that the two sets contain more or less the
•. 1133
same prOVISIOns.
It was therefore apparent that two competing sets of conditions, drafted differently with
inconsistent provisions, actually created the confusion and the very need for attention to
detail in each particular case that these conditions, by replacing the previous be-spoke
drafting on a transaction specific basis, had sought to avoid." The assumptions that
some practitioners were making, that both sets of conditions were identical, were
dangerous and problematic and a sufficient awareness of the material differences was
not commonplace. It was clear that this state of affairs was not ideal and that a universal
set of conditions was required.
'Standard Conditions a/Sale'
In 1990 a fused set of conditions came into existence. It was noted in 1989 that:
32 Wilkinson, above n l L
33 Silverman, aboven3I, 245.
34 See Walford, above 016.
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"The Law Society and National conditions [had] undergone a long process of
development and refinement and [were] now a sophisticated set of rules
designed to govern the contract of sale of land both in sickness and in health. ,,35
However, to facilitate everyday property transactions, and to prevent lawyers having to
negotiate contracts on alternative sets of standard conditions, the first edition of the
Standard Conditions of Sale was published by the Law Society in 1990. This was in
conjunction with the launch, by the Law Society, of a Protocol for Domestic
Conveyancing which was an initiative which sought "... to bring about the
standardization and simplification of conveyancing procedures for the benefit of the
c1ient".36
The fused Law Society's Standard Conditions of Sale were:
"...intended to hold the balance evenly between the seller and the buyer and be
entirely general in scope. They were radically different from their predecessors
in arrangement and style and also make some significant changes in
substance. ,,37
These conditions superseded the two (previously separate) sets of conditions?8
Aldridge's Companion to the standard conditions ofsale stated that:
"For many years conveyancers have based their contracts for the sale of land
either on the National Conditions of Sale (first published 1902) or on the Law
Society's General Conditions of Sale (of which the first edition came into use
in 1926). With the rise in recent years of chains of linked transactions,
particularly for the sale and purchase of domestic property, the inconvenience
of employing two sets of conditions, with slight but significant variation in
their terms, have become obvious.- The Standard Conditions ofSale resulted
from an initiative by the publishers of the two established sets of conditions to
offer a single unified set. ,,39
35 Wilkinson, abovenIl, 4. It was reported thatchanging market conditions relating to the sale of landwerereflected
in the changes made in successive editions of the conditions overtime. See also Mills, 1. (QC) Conditions ofSale
(1961) 105 Sol Jo1497.
36 Silverman, F. Standard Conditions a/Sale: a conveyancers guide (3rd ednFourmatPublishing, London 1990)v.
37 Silve.rman, F. TheLaw SOCiety's Conveyancing Handbook1993 (TheLawSociety,London 1993).
38 The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) 1990 were expressed to also be known and referred to as The
National Conditions of Sale21stEditionand theLawSociety's General Conditions of Sale 1990,aboven29.
39 Aldridge, T.M. (1990) Companion to the standard conditions of sale. Pamphlet volume 98 (Longman, London
1990) iii.
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Commentators at the time emphasised the regularisation in practice that these new fused ,
conditions achieved:
"The two sets of conditions have run in rivalry ever since, with 20 editions of .
the [National Conditions of Sale] and many editions and revisions of the [Law .
Society's Conditions of Sale]... [C]ommon cause has now been made and there
will be no more danger of chain transactions where on contract A the notice to
complete gives a period "within 15 working days" (Law Society, 1984
revision, condition 23(3)) and contract B gives "within sixteen working days"
(National, 20 edition, condition 22(2)) [now] the Standard Conditions are
uniformly accepted.,,40
The 1990 conditions were broadly welcomed in the profession given that" ...for the first
time in living memory, practitioners may all be using one single set of conditions of sale
in property transactions" .41 In many respects, these fused conditions sought to achieve a
situation originally contemplated in the early 1900s where any sale could proceed on the
basis of an established, and understood, set of conditions which ensured a fair balance
between the vendor and the purchaser, rather than alternative sets of standardised
conditions, or be-spoke conditions drafted on an ad hoc and transaction specific basis by
individual practitioners.f
Whilst originally the 1990 conditions were not expressed to be confined to domestic
conveyancing, but to be a 'total replacement'" to previous pre-fusion sets of conditions,
from 1999 the Law Society's Standard Commercial Property Conditions44 (based on the
third edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale) were devised and these, co-existing
with the Standard Conditions of Sale, are for use in specifically 'commercial' property
transactions. The Standard Conditions of Sale (retained for residential transactions) are
currently in their fourth edition, whilst the Standard Commercial Property Conditions
are now in their second edition.
40 Wilkinson, H.W. 'The new conditions ofsale~-(1990) 140New LawJournal 487.
41 Silverman, above n36.
42 As reported by Farrand, above n15, 263.
43 Silverman, above n36,v.
44 Standard Connnercial Property CondItions (FIrst Edition) (Tbe Law Society, London 1999); Standard Connnercial
Property Conditions (Second Edition) (The Law Society, London 2003).
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Content of the conditions of sale
Contracts for the saie of land have incorporated standard conditions of Bale by
referencel'' (effectively as an appendix to the contract) since 1902; these conditions
ultimately determine the parties' rights and obligations under the contract, and remedies
in the event of a breach by either party. In terms of referring to the standard provisions
as 'conditions', Cheshire discussed the status of these conditions, and referred to
Danckwerts 1.J. who commented on:
"...the longstanding practice which has arisen among conveyancers of referring
to the provisions in a contract for the sale of land as "conditions of sale"
whether special or general (such as those provided by the common forms
produced under the name of the National Conditions of Sale, or those produced
by the Law Society) ... ,,46
Danckwerts 1.J. explained what was meant by the word 'condition' in this context:
"The word "condition" is traditional rather than appropriate, and these
provisions are not so much concerned with the validity of the contract of sale
as with the production of the title and the performance of the vendor's and
purchaser's obligations leading up to completion by conveyance. Shortly they
are no more than terms of the contact. ,,47
The various editions and versions of the conditions of sale over time each included
'general' and 'special' conditions (or terms). In 1926, Davidson and Murray's guidance
on conveyancing precedents noted that:
".. .it has become the practice...toembody in the contract a form of general
conditions, which can be adapted or varied by special conditions applicable to
the particular circumstances affecting the property to be sold.,,48
As the discussion in chapter 3 has noted, the general conditions deal with various issues
relevant to the sale and purchase ofproperty including, for example, insurance, deposits,
requisitions and matters relevant to completion. They comprise a set of pervasive
45 It is Dot obligatory to incorporate theconditions, butit is standard practice.
46 Cheshire, G.C. andBum E.H. Modern law ofreal property (lZth ednButterworths, London 1976) 74.
47 Property and Bloodstock Ltd v Emerton [1968] Ch 94, per Danckwerts L.J. at 118.
48 Davidson, C. and Murray A.T. Concise precedents in conveyancing: with practical notes (21st edn Sweet and
Maxwell Limited, London 1926).
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conditions that cover a variety of issues that may arise on a sale and purchase
transaction, even though a great many of the conditions will never be relied upon in the .
majority of transactions. Special conditions, on the other hand, highlight specific aspects.
of the transaction especially of importance to the parties including, for example, interest
rates and incumbrances on the property. These also provide an opportunity to address
any unique factors relevant to the transaction that the general conditions do not
adequately cater for. Cheshire49 reported that a 'professionally drawn contract' will
incorporate either set of standard conditions 'with variations to meet the particular case'.
Matters which are commonly the subject of special conditions were, according to
Cheshire, the root and length of title, the date on which possession was to be given,
interest due (for example in the event that payment of the completion monies was
delayed), mis-descriptions and relevant planning matters.
By agreement between the parties to the contract, the conditions of sale could be
accepted in whole or in part and varied as required. Cheshire and Burn noted that:
"The Law Society General Conditions of Sale and the National Conditions of
Sale contain standard forms of conditions and these are usually employed with
such alterations as the parties may make to fit the particular transaction. ,,50
The conditions were designed to facilitate common everyday property transactions by
providing a universally recognised set of relevant conditions "intended to hold the
balance evenly between the seller and the buyer... ".51 The general intention was
therefore that they should not be changed as this could make them more biased towards
a seller or a buyer, subject to the specific circumstances of any transaction requiring
"- . 52otnerwise,
49 Cheshire, G.C. and-Burn, E.H., above n46, 741.
50 Chesbire, G.C. and BUl1l,E.H. Modern law ofrealproperty (13" edn Butterworths, London 1982) 110.
5! Above n37, 665.
52 Cheshire, G.C. and Bum, RH., above n50, 110.
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Vacant Possession in conditions of sale
Vacant possession will often be an express term bf a contract for the sale of land. The
decision in Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltct1 established that an express provision
(appearing as a special condition) that vacant possession will be given on completion
will be the 'dominant' provision, given that such a special conditiorr" is something that
the parties will have specifically considered before recording expressly. General
provisions of the contract should therefore be qualified by an express vacant possession
clause (when appearing as a special condition) and not restrict the nature and effect of
that clause in any way. Otherwise, a proper interpretation of the document's
construction would derogate from the character of the express special condition for
vacant possession, which amounts to a promise or guarantee that vacant possession will
be given on completion. 55
Chapter 3 explained that where the conditions of sale do not expressly cater for vacant
possession, the obligation will (according to case law) be implied into the contract. This
is evidenced in the following review of the conditions of sale, and arose from case law
over time including, most notably, the decision in Cook v Taylor.56 Here, as previously
noted, it was held that where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and silent as to
any tenancy to which the property is subject, there is impliedly a contract that vacant
possession will be given on completion.
Chapter 3 also made clear that the implied obligation will not arise if that would be
inconsistent with an express provision of the contract.57 Further, the implied
assumption, that vacant possession is to be given, will be subject to specific
circumstances and actual knowledge of the parties. For example, and as discussed in
chapter 2, where one party is aware, when entering into a contract, that the interest is
subject to some impediment to vacant possession, case law suggests that if the purchaser
knows that the obstacle to the receipt of vacant possession is irremovable, then the
53 Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] 1 W.L.R. 446, per Templeman J.'s decision.
54 Specialconditions are deemed to include the termsofthe particulars of sale as well.
55 per Templeman L's decisionin Topfell, aboven53. When the condition for vacant possessionwasgeneral andnot
special, different considerations were found to apply and the position remains uncertain as to whether a conflicting
provision willtake precedence. Thiswill be a matter of construction of the document.
56 Cook v Taylor [1942] Ch 349.
57 Rignall Developments Ltd v Halil [1988] Ch. 190.This was in an alternative contextbutthe statement is of general
application.
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implied obligation to give vacant possession will not extend so as to include that
obstacle.58 If at the time the contract was made, the purchaser knew of only a removable
obstacle, then the implied obligation to give vacant possession will not be deemed to
exclude such an obstacle, and if the removable obstacle is still on the premises on
completion the obligation to procure vacant possession will have been breached.59 As
will be shown below, these principles are relevant to the incorporation of conditions for
vacant possession in standard conditions of sale.
Chronology of conditions of sale
An understanding of vacant possession can be documented by reviewing its position
within the standard form conditions of sale, from the first edition of the (then) Law
Society's General Conditions of Sale in 1925,60 and the (then) lith Edition of Oyez's
National Conditions of Sale in 1930.61
Conditions ofsale prior to 1953
In the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale from 1925 to 1949 there was no
specific mention of vacant possession. In the first edition under condition 5 of the
general conditions, referred to as 'Completion Possession and Apportionment',
subparagraph 3 stated that:
"A purchaser paying his purchase money, or, where a deposit is paid, the
balance thereof, shall (but subject to the execution of any conveyance which
ought to be executed by him), as from the date fixed for completion, be let into
possession or receipts ofrents and profits. ,,62
58 See Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd [1958] Ch 110.
59 See Norwich Union Lift Insurance Society v Preston [1957] 1 WLR 813.
60 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925, above niD.
61 The National Conditions of Sale, 11th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London January
1930). In a personal communication with Richard Strong, Executive Manager of Oyez Forms Publishing on 5
November 2008 it was noted that the Solicitors' Law Stationery Society Limited was founded in 1888 and over the .
course of 120 years it has undergone many changes of ownership which has resulted in loss of historical data,
including old records being either lost or destroyed (due to the aerial bombing of London in the Second World War).
As such, copies of pre-11th edition National Conditions of Sale are no longer available and the Law Society Library
does not have such copies either.
62 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925, above nl0, condition 5(3), emphasis added.
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Being the only term purporting to deal with the delivery of the property from the seller
to the purchaser on completion, this condition seemed to suggest that a purchaser had
the entitlement to enter into possession of the property on completion when, having paid
the purchase monies, the property was legally transferred to him. This would, however,
have to be interpreted with respect to a standard provision on tenancies. Indeed, in
condition 22, dealing with 'Tenancies and apportionment of rents for purposes of the
sale', subparagraph 1 stated that:
"The property is sold, and, except where the title is registered, will if the
vendor so requires, be conveyed, subject, so far as the same may be subsisting,
to any leases or tenancies referred to in the contract and affecting the same,
and to any tenant right annexed thereto, but not so as to confirm any lease or
tenancy liable to be determined.,,63
Condition 22(1) modified condition 5(3) and provided that possession for the purchaser
was subject to tenancies that would still be in force on completion and referred to in the
contract. Subparagraph 2 of condition 22 contained a provision providing for inspection
of such tenancies in order for a purchaser to become aware of the tenancies or leases
that the sale would be subject to. It provided:
"The leases or agreements (if in writing) under which the tenants hold or
abstracts or copies thereof:-
(a) in a sale by private treaty, may be inspected by a purchaser and, if so
required by him, shall be produced at the office of the vendor's solicitors before
the contract is signed... ,,6
Obviously if the sale was subject to a continuing tenancy, then the 'possession' that
would be transferred would be the right to receive rents and profits from the estate as
per the final clause of the final sentence to condition 5(3).65
6] Ibid, emphasis added.
64 Ibid, condition 22(2).
65 Section205 (1) (xix) Law of Property Act 1925 provides that"Possession includes receipt of rents andprofits or
the right to receive the same, if any". According to Farrand, J.T. Contract and conveyance (Oyez Publications,
London 1964) 259, this amounts to beingpassed 'constructive possession'. See also chapter 5 for a discussion of the
various meanings of possession.
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None of the special conditions in the 1925 edition referred to 'vacant possession'. This
position was replicated in the second edition of the conditions in 1928,66 the 1934
conditions'" and the 1949 revision of the 1934 conditions.68 In fact, up to and including
the 1949 revision of the 1934 edition, the term 'vacant possession' was not used in
General Conditions of Sale prepared by the Law Society. The default position under
these conditions therefore was that 'possession' was to be given as a matter of course
(subject to any subsisting tenancies disclosed to the purchaser in the contract) by virtue
of the general conditions referred to above. In this regard, vacant possession did not
appear to be a recognised legal term in and of itself at this time (given its explicit
absence from these conditions), even though some early texts made use of the undefined
expression 'vacant possession'.t" In addition, the obligation to give 'vacant possession' as
an implied term was not authoritatively established until the decision in Cook v Taylor'"
in 1942.
Whilst a full discussion of the differing meamngs of 'possession' is undertaken in
chapter 5, it is useful to note at this stage the distinction between legal and de-facto
possession. Legal possession is concerned with the 'right' to possession;71 a person has a
right to possess an estate if they have acquired a title to it which is 'vested in
possession',n giving them an immediate fixed right to the estate in land. By contrast, the
vernacular meaning of 'possession' is the physical occupation of tangible land, also
referred to in case law as 'actual' possession." 'Actual possession' or de-facto possession
is normally used to denote the state of being 'in' possession of the estate, rather than
merely having the 'right' to possess it (or having constructive possession of it) in a
66 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925, Second Edition issued 1928 (The Law Society, London 1928).
67 The Law Society's General Conditions ofSa1e 1934 (The Law Society, London 1934).
68 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1934 (1949 Revision) (The Law Society, London 1949).
69 See, for example, Webster, F.W. Law relating to particulars and conditions ofsale on sale ofland (3rd edn Stevens
and Sons Limited, London 1907) 334. It is entirely possible that this term was carried over from use of the expression
'vacant possession' in the 18008 in a different context to its conventional usage.
70 [1942] Ch. 349 at 352. Here is held that where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and silent as to any
tenancy to which the property is subject, there is impliedly a contract that vacant possession will be given on
completion. Note that Simmonds J. treated the contract (incorporating the 1934 Law Society Conditions of Sale) as
'silent' as to vacant possession in this case, confirming the above analysis that no express vacant possession clause
was incorporated, .
71 As discussed in chapter 5, there is also a factual element to possession given that possession has been held to
comprise a relationship of right and fact. See Wonnacott, M. Possession of Land (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge 2006) 114.
72 Fearne's Contingent Remainders (4th edn Stahan & Woodhfall, London 1844) vol 1,2, cited with approval in
Pearson v IRC [1981] AC 753, 772.
7J Prasad v Wolverhampton BC [1983]2 All ER 140, 153.
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strictly legal sense.74 Legal possession is a matter of law, de-facto possession is a matter
of fact. As such, someone can be in de-facto possession of an estate in land which they
have no legal right to occupy or be in possession of (for example, a· squatter or
trespasser).
It is arguable whether the reference to 'possession or the receipt of rents and profits' in
the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale during the period from 1925 to 1949 was
simply a reference to the legal transfer of the estate pursuant to the contract, or a
condition relating to factual possession of the estate in a physical sense in respect of
actual occupation. Indeed, it was noted by Farrand that this provision in the conditions
of sale was "somewhat ambigious".75 Contemporaneous texts interpreted the references
to possession as being to 'vacant possession' and interpreted this meaning in the sense of
de-facto possession. Walford, in 1940, discussed condition 21(1) of the Standard
Conditions of Sale 1934 (the old condition 22(1) from previous editions) and noted that:
"Apart from the express particulars of tenancies the purchaser may be unable to
insist on vacantpossession ifhe has notice in the particulars that the property is
"in the occupation of" a third party... ,,76
Walford clearly defined 'possession' as 'vacant possession' with the reference to third
party occupation focusing attention on the physical ability to enter into possession in a
factual sense. This is supported by earlier texts, including Webster in 1907 which stated:
"In a condition of sale 'possession' means, primarily, vacant possession. ,077
Walford did, however, go on to clarify that particulars or conditions may show a
contrary intention, citing the example of Lake v Dean78 in which 'possession subject to
the tenancy' was held to be the correct meaning of possession in that context. However,
74 A relationship of fact (that is, being 'in' possessionor 'having' or 'entering into' possession) exists whena person is,
-as a matter of observable fact, actually enjoyingthe rights and incidents of an estate in land, according to Howe,M.
(eds) The Common Law (Little Brown & Co, Boston 1963) 170.
15Farrand, above n65, 263.
l' Walford, above nI6,189. Emphasis added.
~17Webster, aboven69, 334. Whilstthe term was used in 1907, it didnot appear to have a specific'or agreedmeaning
at this stage and no definition was provided in thistext. It is arguable thatthe traditional term 'vacant possession' was
meantby suchexpressions.
78 (1860) 28 Beav 607. See also North v Loomes [1919] 1 Ch 378 in which a presumption was rebutted by implication
(withreference to an implied vacantpossession term),
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in that case, 'possession' did still refer to factual enjoyment of the land (as opposed to
legal possession), albeit the receipt of rents and profits with respect to the area of land
subject to the tenancy.I" Further, the wording in the Law Society's Conditions of Sale
from 1925 to 1949 referred to "being let into possession or receipts of rents and
profits"." The words 'let into' appeared to suggest (in line with the interpretation of
Walford and Webster) that de-facto possession should be attributed to the term
'possession' in this context (as opposed to legal possession) even though the term 'vacant
possession' itselfwas not used.
An alternative interpretation of the use of "let into possession or receipt of rents and
profits" is that the condition referred to possession in a legal sense (i.e. the right to
possession) and not de-facto possession (the fact of 'being' in possession). This view,
whilst not supported by contemporaneous authority, gains some support in light of the
retention of these general conditions in the later 1953 edition." It is logical that, if the
general conditions were intended to have dealt with de-facto possession (as suggested
by Walford and Webster), they would have been meaningfully amended in some way
when vacant possession appeared expressly as a special condition in the 1953 edition
(as is discussed later). As there was no material change to these general conditions in
1953,82 it could be inferred that they had no direct relevance to the de-facto sense of
factual possession, and only referred to possession or the receipt of rents and profits in a
strictly legal sense (explaining why no change to them was made). This view is contrary
to definitions of possession in literature around the time howcvcr'r' and not supported by
any authority.
Given that neither set of conditions provided expressly that the seller would deliver
'vacant possession' to the buyer as a condition of the contract.t" in this period vacant
79 See also Barnsley, D.G. 'Completion ofa contract for the sale and purchase of land: Part 3' (1991) Conv 185 at 188.
RO The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925, above 010, condition 5(3).
81 Albeit with a slight amendment as to only referring to 'rents and profits' and not 'possession'. As noted before, it is
difficult to understand why the expression 'let into possession' was removed from subparagraph 3 of condition 5 when
the entitlement to take possession or receive the rents and profits (as the case may be) was referred to in condition
5(4). It is submitted that this has no significance in the context of vacant possession being introduced as a special
condition at the time. If the introduction of vacant possession was intended to replace these references, then 'receipt
of rents and profits' as well as 'possession' should both have been removed.
82 i.e. both 'let into possession' and 'receipt of rents and profits' were still used in the general conditions.
83 For example, the explicit definition ofpossession in conditions of sale given by Webster, above n69, 334.
84 Even though there were references to 'possession' in Law Society General Conditions of Sale (which arguably
meant 'vacant possession' on a proper construction), these were references and not embodied in an express clause
stating that the seller was obligated to give vacant possession. There was therefore no express vacant possession
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possession would have been an implied term of the contract. This claim is supported by
the decision in Cook v Taylor in 194285 where Simmonds J. observed that under the
. Law Society Conditions of Sale 1934 (as they were then drawn) it was implied that the
purchaser was entitled to vacant possession where no tenancy was disclosed.86 That is,
the obligation was implied in these conditions. Subsequent authorities have also
commented upon how standard sale contracts, of a defined type, encompassing "those
relationships which are of common occurrence, such as... seller and buyer... ",87 will
include an implied assumption as to vacant possession.88
As previously noted, Oyez's National Conditions of Sale originated in 1902. The 11th
edition of these conditions was published in 1930, and earlier versions are no longer
available.89 In the 11th edition of the National Conditions of Sale90 there was no
reference to the term 'possession'. The only clause that could be construed as having any
relevance to possession was general condition 10. General condition 10(1) under the
heading 'Property sold subject to all rents, easements, and tenancies ... ' read:
"The Property is sold subject to ... tenancies, whether mentioned in the
particulars of sale or not, and to the rights and claims of tenants. No error,
misstatement or omission in the particulars, sale plan or conditions shall annul
the sale, nor (save where the error, statement or omission relates to a matter
materially affecting the value of the property) shall any compensation be
allowed by the vendor or purchaser on respect thereof.,,91
clause. The decision in Cook v Taylor justifies this analysis as Simmonds 1. would have not treated the contract
(incorporating the 1934 Law Society Conditions of Sale) as silent as to vacant possession if any of the references to
fossession constituted an express provision as to vacant possession.
s [1942] Ch 349.
86 See also Walford, E.O. Contracts and Conditions a/Sale a/Land (Sweet and Maxwell Limited. London 1957) 25.
87 Shell UK v Lostock Garages [1977]1 All ER 481, Lord Denning M.R. at 487; El Awdi v BCCf [1989] 1 All ER
242, per Hutchinson 1. at 253; Bank a/Nova Scotia v Hellenic Mutual WarRisk Association (Bermuda) Ltd [1989] 3
All ER 628 at 665.
88 For example, in Midland Bank Ltd v Farmpride Hatcheries Ltd [1981] 2 EGLR 147, per Shaw LJ. at 148 it was
said that "prima facie a prospective vendor ofproperty offers the property with vacant possession unless he otherwise
states and that would ordinarily be implied in the contract of sale in the absence of stipulation to the contrary". In
Edgewater Developments Co v Bailey [1974] 118 Sol Jol312,per Lord Denning M.R. at 313 it was said that "where
nothing was said about possession it was often said that there was an implication that property was to be sold with
vacant possession". In Farrell v Green [1974] 232 EO 587 it was held that the term is implied by law. Walford, above
n86, also discussed the implied term as to vacant possession'!
89 As noted above, it is not possible to obtain earlier editions but it is understood that none of the earlier versions
make any reference to vacant possession.
90 The National Conditions of Sale, 11th Edition, above 061.
" Ibid, condition 10(1). Emphasis added.
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This clearly made the possession that was passed to the purchaser subject to tenancies,
thus qualifying what was being transferred. It also contained a standard 'no annulment,
no compensation' clause, with reference to mis-descriptions which, as was discussed in
chapter 3, purported to exclude liability for omissions or errors in the particulars of sale
of the contract.
The position under the l lth edition (1930) of the National Conditions of Sale was
replicated in the 12th Edition (1932),92 the 13th Edition (1935),93 the 14th Edition
(1948)94 and the 15th Edition (1948).95 The position on vacant possession in the
National Conditions of Sale from 1930 - 1948 was therefore materially similar to that
for the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale from 1925 - 1949; neither set of pre-
fusion conditions specifically referred to the term 'vacant possession'. In that respect,
vacant possession was not a concept which could be used in its own right as a term in
standard conditions of sale prior to 1953, even though the courts had made use of the
term (without properly defining the obligation) during this pcriod'" and, as noted
previously, some early texts made use of the undefined expression 'vacant posscssion'r"
The expression, whilst in the vocabulary of the courts and third parties, had not acquired
a specific or defined meaning at this point in time, and was thus only an implied term of
contracts for the sale and purchase of land, during this period, in either set of conditions.
An interesting feature during this period is the exact wording relating to sales subject to
tenancies. This is because the sale being subject to tenancies (or other leases) affected
the 'possession' that was being transferred, and was therefore a qualification to the
possession that the buyer was contracting to enjoy from completion. In both sets of
conditions, the standard form provided that the property was sold subject to tenancies,
but the conditions relating to disclosure favoured the seller (rather than the purchaser) in
the National Conditions of Sale. This is because, in the National Conditions of Sale,
92 The National Conditions of Sale, 12th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London August
1932) condition 12(1).
93 The National Conditions of Sale, 13th Edition (TIle Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London March
1935).
94 The National Conditions of Sale, 14th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London May
1W~ , .
95 The National Conditions of Sale, 15th Edition (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London November
1948).
96 For example, Curtis v French [1929] I Ch. 253, as discussed in chapter 3.
97 See, for example, Webster, above n69, 334. It is entirely possible that this term was carried over from use of the
expression 'vacant possession' in the 1800s in a different context to its conventional usage.
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under general condition 10(1) the buyer had deemed notice of all tenancies even in the
event of partial or incomplete statement in the particulars with reference to the
tenancies:
"The Property is sold subject to ... tenancies, whether mentioned in the
particulars of sale or not, and to the rights and claims of tenants. No error,
misstatement or omission in the particulars, sale plan or conditions shall annul
the sale, nor (save where the error, statement or omission relates to a matter
materially affecting the value of the property) shall any compensation be
allowed by the vendor or purchaser on respect thereof. ,,98
In the Law Society's Conditions of Sale during this period, the sale was subject only to
tenancies that were disclosed in the sale and purchase agreement. The relevant condition
at this time provided that the sale was subject:
"so far as the same may be sUbsistin~, to any leases or tenancies referred to in
the contract and affecting the same." 9
The National Conditions of Sale therefore posed a potential danger to unsuspecting
purchasers who were deemed to have notice of 'all tenancies', even if they did not and
could not know about them. Walford highlighted the unsatisfactory consequences of this
state of affairs and explained that in order not to be caught out by the general condition
relating to tenancies:
"it is ... essential that a purchaser who is to be given vacant possession should
insert a Special Condition to that effect, if the National Conditions of Sale are
applicable."100
98 Ibid, condition 10(1). Emphasis added.
99 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925, above nlO, condition 22(1) emphasis added, and the Law
Society's General Conditions of Sale 1925, Second Edition issued 1928, above 066, condition 22(1). In the Law
Society's General Conditions of Sale 1934, condition 21(1), andthe Law Society'sGeneral Conditions of Sale 1934
(1949 Revision),condition 21(1), the wording changed slightlybutthe sale was still subject to disclosedtenancies as
confirmed by Walford, above 086, 169 (when commenting on the identical provision which appears in the 1953
Conditions of Sale). Emphasis added.
100 Walford, above n86, 25.
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This was particularly important since, as discussed previously, an express obligation (as
a special condition) to give vacant possession would override the inconsistent general
condition of sale that the purchaser had deemed notice of any and all tenancies. 101
If such a special condition was not used, the wording of the National Conditions of Sale
would modify the implied obligation to give vacant possession in such instances. This is
because, as discussed in chapter 2 and earlier in this chapter, such an implied obligation
would not include an irremovable obstacle to the receipt of vacant possession (the
tenancy or tenancies)102 which the purchaser had knowledge of at the time of contract.
In such a case, the purchaser would have had 'deemed' knowledge of the tenancy by
virtue of the wording of the condition'Y' and would therefore be required to take the
property subject to that tenancy, given that it would fall outside of the scope of the
implied obligation to give vacant possession.
In contrast, under the Law Society's Conditions of Sale, a lack of actual knowledge of
the tenancy at the time of contracts would not adversely affect the purchaser and would
cause the seller's implied obligation to give vacant possession to extend to, and include,
the lease or tenancy. This is because the wording under these conditions required the
tenancy to have been 'disclosed' in the contract. Walford notes that:
"The Law Society's Condition...which fixes the purchaser with notice of leases
or tenancies affecting the property applies only where the property is sold
subject to such leases or tenancies, and therefore does not apply where the
particulars and special conditions are silent."lo4
This significant difference between the respective pre-fusion conditions underlied the
particular problem that faced solicitors with sale and purchase contracts drawn on
different sets of conditions.l'" and highlighted on a practical level the implications for
purchasers who could unwittingly be required to take a property subject to a subsisting
WI The various versions of the conditions of sale which themselves confirm thatspecial conditions (of which vacant
possession will normally be one) have priority over any inconsistent general provisions. The special conditions
provide thatthe general conditions applyso far as they are not varied by or inconsistent with these specialconditions.
See also Templeman J.'s decision in Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] 1 W.L.R..446 and chapter 3.
102 A lease that will continue after completion has been held to he an'immovable obstacle' in Hughes v Jones (1861)
3 De GF & T 307. Also Re Englefield Holdings. Ltd v Sinclair's Contract [1962] 1 WLR 1119. This is obviously
subject to contra-indications or other intentions of the parties as shownby the contract.
103 It is arguable however as to whether specific performance wouldbe ordered in sucha case.
104 Walford, above n86, 169.
105 Silverman, aboven3I, 245.
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, lease that they did not have 'actual' knowledge of. The lack of express reference to the
. obligation to give vacant possession clearly compounded the risks and therefore left the
position largely unsatisfactory for all involved during this period. lOG
The 1953 conditions
Under the Law Society General Conditions of Sale in 1953, the wording of the general
conditions relating to possession slightly changed.l'" Here condition 5(3) read:
"Subject to his having paid the purchase money or the balance thereof and
having executed any conveyance requiring execution by him, the purchaser
shall, from the date fixed for completion (excluding that day), be entitled to
[possession not included here] the rents and profits, and be liable for all
outgoings... ,,108
This condition omitted the earlier reference to 'possession' and only retained 'rents and
profits'. Condition 5(4) continued:
"In the absence of express stipulation and of such authorisation as is mentioned
in Condition 6 [dealing with possession before completion] the purchaser shall
not be entitled to take possession of the property or to receive the rents and
profits thereof (as the case may be) except upon payment of the purchase-
money and any balance of apportionments, and subject to his executing any
such conveyance as is aforesaid. ,,109
It is difficult to understand why the expression 'let into possession' was removed from
subparagraph 3 of condition 5 in 1953 when the entitlement to take possession or
receive the rents and profits (as the case may be) was referred to in condition 5(4).
These amended general conditions could nevertheless be interpreted as seeking to
replicate the previous position with respect to the purchaser taking possession (or being
1~6 The doctrine of constructive notice deems a party withhaving knowledge which they did not in fact have. See
chapter 1, nl0.
107 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1953 (The Law Society, London 1953).
108 Ibid, condition 5(3). TheNationalConditions of Sale (prior to 1953) effectivelyput the purchaser on constructive
notice as to anytenancies affectingthe property.
109 TheLawSociety's General Conditions of Sale 1953, above nID?, condition 5(4). Emphasis added.
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entitled to the receipt of rents and profits) on completion.l'" Tills position is supported
by Walford's analysis of the 1953 conditions where he wrote:
"Although the wording of the relevant General Condition 5(3) now omits any
reference to ... possession it is thought that when the new condition 5(3) is read
with Condition 23 the position remains as it was under the previous General
Conditions in that respect.v'!'
Moreover, this view is further strengthened by the fact that the 1953 conditions included
only a slightly modified version of condition 21(1) from the previous editions relating to
tenancies. Appearing as condition 23(1) it replicated the position with respect to the sale
being subject to disclosed tenancies,112 and read:
"Where the property is stated to be sold subject to any lease or tenancy the
purchaser, whether or not he inspects the counterpart of the lease or tenancy
agreement (if in writing) or a copy or abstract thereof, shall be deemed to have
notice of, and shall take subject to the terms of such lease or tenancy, and the
sale shall not be affected by any partial, incomplete or inaccurate statement in
the contract with reference thereto... ,,113
This was consistent with the same position (as in the previous version) being
maintained, namely that possession was being transferred on completion to the buyer. It
would have been rather strange for a sale and purchase contract to only pass to the buyer
the right to receive rents and profits so this conclusion is also a matter of common sense
as well as logic. As such, despite the apparent infelicity with respect to the reference to
possession being omitted from condition 5(3), on an interpretation of these conditions in
context the default position appeared to have been maintained in the 1953 edition of the
Law Society Conditions of Sale, namely that the purchaser was to be 'let into
possession' on completion or be entitled to rents and profits if the sale is subject to a
tenancy (expressly referred to in the contract) that would subsist after completion.
110 Farrand, aboventiS, 263 alsonotes that there hadbeen"some changeof mind" here.
1ll Walford, aboven86, 25.
112 It is possiblethatthe changein the wording from 'referred to in the contract' to 'stated to be sold subject to'was to
reflect the specific wording of the new special condition introduced in that edition (and discussed below) which
required the position on vacant possessionto be 'stated'.
113 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1953, above n107, condition 23(1). Emphasis added.
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The 1953 conditions went on, however, to include an additional special condition to
those stated in previous editions and revisions: Under the special conditions to the 1953
edition, special condition 4 (with the relevant footnote) stated:
"The property is sold... (b)
(b) State whether the property is sold with vacant possession. If not, give
particulars. ,,114
The 1953 conditions therefore saw the first use of the term 'vacant possession' in the
context of an additional special condition. Interestingly, the explanatory note to the
1953 conditions did not see it as necessary to explain to conveyancers why vacant
possession was, for first time, being used as a term in this way, and why it appeared for
the first time as a special (as opposed to general) condition.
In the section of the explanatory note dealing with 'Other Changes' in the special
conditions, it was stated that:
"The revisions contained in Form 'B' [the special conditions section] are mainly
self-explanatory but attention is drawn to the following points ... ,,115
Vacant possession was not referred to as one of the highlighted points. Its emergence
therefore appears to have been treated as 'self explanatory' - something supposedly
understood and obvious to all parties. Given that the term had never appeared
previously in any of the Law Society Conditions of Sale, this would seem to suggest
that it was something that was known about amongst conveyancers, but not considered
sufficiently important to explicitly refer to or explain in the accompanying notes. There
was also no mention of the change in any of the reports of the Scale Committee, a
committee of the Law Society which sat at the time, which decided that a new edition
was required:
114TheLawSociety's General Conditionsof Sale 1953, above nlO?,specialcondition 4.
lIS Explanatory note to the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1953 (The Law Society, London 1953).
Emphasis added.
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"The Committee have for some time been engaged in the preparation of a new
edition, having regard to the changes in the law and conveyancing practice
since 1934. To that end they have undertaken a full revision both of General
Conditions of Sale (Forni A) and of the Particulars, Special Conditions of Sale
and Contract (Form B). ,,116
Journal articles also neglected to point out the emergence of the special condition as to
vacant possession.P" Contemporary periodical literature, such as the Solicitors Journal
did, however, discuss other changes (including changes in special conditions):
"There are two major changes which require immediate consideration; first, the
new condition designed to expedite the signing of contracts by avoiding the
necessity for making searches and local authority inquiries before contract, and
secondly, the provisions now in the General Conditions for dealing with town
and country planning matters (which take the place of the Special Condition
inserted in the 1949 Revision). Other changes of importance arise out of
conditions relating to (l) misdescription and compensation, (ii) the vendor's
right to resell on default by the purchaser, and (iii) the extent of the liability of
a defaulting purchaser on resale or attempted resale. There are a considerable
number of other alterations but they deal with points not arising as often, and
many ofthem can be described as matters of drafting." 118
The inclusion of a special condition as to vacant possession therefore appeared not to
have justified comment. The profession therefore did not appear surprised by formal
introduction of the special condition for 'vacant possession' as a legal term (with a
supposedly 'understood' meaning) in 1953.
In the 16th Edition of Oyez's National Conditions of Sale, also published in 1953,119 the
term vacant possession also made a first appearance as a special condition which stated:
116 Private and Confidential Report of the Scale Committee on the Law Society's Conditions of Sale New Edition,
Friday 14th November 1952 (The Law Society, Reports London 1951-1956) 287. See also (1953) 50 Law Society
Gazette 341 andPrivate andConfidential Minutes ofthe m-eeting of the subcommittee ofthe Scale Committee on the
Law Society's Conditions of Sale New Edition, 19 January 1952.
111 For example see (1953) 97 Solicitors Journa/409, 429, 445, 497, 551, 669. All these articles discussed the 1953
conditions butfailed to discussvacantpossession.
lIS (1953) 97 Solicitors Journa/395.
1I9 The National Conditions of Sale, 16th Edition, August 1953 (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited,
1953).
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"G The property is sold
State whether \the property is sold with vacant possession or subject to
tenancies (giving particnlars of them)."120
Yet, notwithstanding the emergence of this special condition, a modified version of the
general condition which had appeared in editions 11-15 of the National Conditions of
Sale, under the heading 'Property sold subject to all rents, easements, and tenancies ... ',
also remained incorporated. The general condition (appearing as condition 14(1)) was
identical save for an additional proviso clause and still made the sale subject to all
tenancies affecting the property, whether expressly mentioned or not. It read:
"Without prejudice to the duty of the vendor to disclose all latent easements
and other liabilities known to the vendor to affect the property, the property is
sold subject to ...tenancies, whether mentioned in the particulars a/sale or not,
and to the rights and claims of tenants. Without prejudice to any express right
of either party to rescind the contract, [n]o error, misstatement or omission in
the particulars, sale plan or conditions shall annul the sale, nor (save where the
error, statement or omission relates to a matter materially affecting the value of
the property) shall any compensation be allowed by the vendor or purchaser on
respect thereof." 12l
It is difficult to explain why this condition remained necessary in the 16th edition when
the new special condition dealt explicitly with vacant possession and tenancies. The
standard clause relating to the disclosure of tenancies (with minor amendment) also
remained in the general conditions. Under condition 18(1) it read:
"Abstracts or copies of the leases or agreements (if in writing) under which the
tenants hold having been made available, the purchaser (whether he inspects
the same or not) shall be deemed to have notice of and shall take subject to the
terms of all the existing tenancies, whether arising during the continuance of or
after the expiration thereof, and such notice shall not be affected by any partial
or incomplete statement in the particulars with reference to the tenancies, and
no obligation shall be made on account of there not being an agreement in
. inz with ,,122writing WI any tenant.
120TheNational Conditions of Sale, 16thEdition, August 1953,specialconditions, aboven119.
121Emphasis added.
122 The National Conditions of Sale, 16th Edition, August 1953, above n119, condition 18(1). Emphasis added.
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The amendment had changed from the previous version which referred to the process by
which copy documents could be inspected rather than being made available. It stated:
"Abstracts or copies of the leases or agreements (if in writing) under which the
tenants hold may be inspected at the office of the vendor's solicitors during a
period of five days next preceding the day of sale, or in the same-room at the
time of sale... ,,123 .
It would seem that the seller's obligation to make available copies of all tenancies to the
purchaser (rather than the purchaser just having the right to inspect them) was
incorporated to make this consistent with the special condition where tenancies were
listed, yet this was inconsistent with the general condition in clause 14(1) whereby the
sale was nevertheless subject to tenancies, whether mentioned in the particulars of sale
or not. It seems perverse for the National Conditions of Sale to have incorporated a
special condition addressing vacant possession and the specific disclosure of tenancies
by the seller (itself reinforced by the amended general condition 18(1) which required
copies to have been 'made available') to then retain the previous provision in 14(1)
dealing with the sale being deemed to be subject to all tenancies in any event, and
whether disclosed or not, as this was internally inconsistent. Indeed, Walford noted that:
"It is true that a statement in the particulars that vacant possession will be given
is inconsistent with a general condition that the property is sold subject to all
tenancies."124
Whilst practitioners' articles and commentaries in publications such as Solicitors
Journal at the time made little of the invocation of the new special condition (in both
sets of pre-fusion conditions), the inconsistency created by the National Conditions of
Sale was identified in a later academic account of the conditions of sale by Walford,
who wrote:
"General Condition 14 [of the National Conditions of Sale, 1953] states that the
sale is subject to tenancies "whether mentioned in the Special Conditions or
not"...It is submitted that that Condition amounts to all unjustifiable trap, e.g.,
123 National Conditions of Sale, 15th Edition, above n95, condition 17(1). Emphasis added.
124 Walford, aboven16, 91.
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where the property is vacant, but the vendor has granted, but not disclosed [as
required by the conditions], a tenancy ofthe property. ,,125
Walford highlighted the need for the special condition to be used when incorporating
the National Conditions of Sale 1953 in order for the contract between the parties to
cater expressly for the position on vacant possession and tenancies to which the sale was
subject. This would have the effect of expressly overriding the inconsistent general
condition, which would thus be subordinate to the special condition.126
Vacant possession made its first appearance, as a term in its own right, in the form of a
special condition in the Law Society's Conditions of Sale 1953 and the National
Condition of Sale (16th Edition) 1953. Texts at the time failed to discuss invocation of
the new special condition for vacant possession and its appearance appears to have been
greeted with 'silence' across the profession. This could be interpreted as reflecting a
general lack of attention paid to the obligation, which may explain why the term
developed in the confused and unclear manner, thus causing the problems associated
with the term that were outlined in chapter 2. This is perhaps because the expression
was not, itself, new in the profession but rather that specific use of the term in standard
form conditions of sale had finally been recognised as important. The fact that the 1953
National Conditions of Sale failed to amend the general condition, which provided that
the sale was deemed to be subject to all tenancies in any event, itself was a notable
example of what appeared a lack of understanding of, and appreciation as to, the true
nature, scope and extent of the vacant possession obligation and its ability to interact
and therefore modify, qualify and contradict other contractual terms. The fact that
practitioner's commentaries at the time also failed to discuss this infelicity (leaving it to
the academic reviews of the conditions of sale) also reflects a lack of attention to the
obligation among the profession at that time, even though it would seem that vacant
possession was known to practitioners as being an element of the sale and purchase
contract. As discussed further in chapter 7, when case law relating to breaches of the
obligation to give vacant possession are discussed, it is likely that first appearance of the
term in 1953 was connected to decisions in case law from the 1940s in which vacant
125 Walford, above n86, 25.
126 The special conditionsprovide that the general conditions apply so far as they are not varied by or inconsistent
with these special conditions. See also Templeman L's decision in Top/ell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] 1
W.L.R. 446 and chapter 3, which established theprecedence of an expressspecial conditionfor vacantpossession.
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possession was, for the first time, properly discussed and debated. It thus at this time
can be seen to have entered the courts lexicography as a legal term with a contemporary
property law meaning, opposed to an old understanding of the term attributable to case
law in the 1800s.127 Whatever the reason, its silent entry into conditions of sale is
especially noteworthy given that texts and explanatory notes did discuss other changes
to conditions of sale at that time.
The National Conditions ofSale between 1959 and 1981
The 17th edition of the National Conditions of Sale in 1959128 recognised the internal
inconsistency between the special condition for vacant possession and general condition
14(1). The same special condition for vacant possession was used but the general
condition relating to what the property was sold subject to was modified to exclude
tenancies. Condition 14(1) headed 'Property subject to land tax, easements etc' read:
"Without prejudice to the duty of the vendor to disclose all latent easements
and other liabilities known to the vendor to affect the property, the property is
sold subject to ... [tenancies omitted from the list], whether mentioned in the
particulars of sale or not, and to the rights and claims of tenants. Without
prejudice to any express right of either party to rescind the contract, [n]o error,
misstatement or omission in the particulars, sale plan or conditions shall annul
the sale, nor (save where the error, statement or omission relates to a matter
materially affecting the value of the property) shall any compensation be
allowed by the vendor or purchaser on respect thereof." 129
This amended condition did not now contradict the special condition for vacant
possession which required tenancies to be listed, itself reinforced by general condition
18(1) providing for abstracts or copies of the disclosed leases or tenancies to be made
available to the purchaser. This no longer contradicted the express reference to the
vacant possession term as a special condition of the contract therefore, and for the first
time saw the term accommodated into the National Conditions of Sale in a meaningful
and logical manner. Farrand, referring to Walford, noted that:
127 For example, the decisionin Cumberland Consolidated Holdings v Ireland [1946] KB 264.
128 The National Conditions of Sale, 17th Edition, 1959 (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London
1959).
129 Ibid.
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"...the National Conditions, whilst having nothing about vacant possession,
used to make the sale subject, inter alia, "to tenancies, whether mentioned in
the special conditions or not"... Now this has been dropped from tie present
seventeenth edition, 'perhaps because it has been stigmatised as an 'unjustifiable
trap,."l30 '
Similar provisions maintaining this position as to vacant possession and tenancies were
replicated in the 18th edition (l969),l3l 19th edition (1976)132 and 20th edition (1981)133
of the National Conditions of Sale. As such, the position after 1953 continued to be that
vacant possession was a special condition. A buyer could expect to receive vacant
possession subject to any tenancies that were explicitly listed in the special conditions.
Further, a general condition in the contract provided the seller with a duty of disclosure
of copies of such tenancies; this complemented and supported the nature and form ofthe
special condition requiring tenancies which the property was to be sold subject, to be
disclosed.
The National Conditions of Sale, between 1959 and 1981, therefore worked as one
coherent document, providing the parties with certainty on the issue of vacant
possession (by way of special condition), something that had not been achieved in
previous editions where vacant possession was either not referred to at all or expressly
contradicted other conditions of sale (with the sale purportedly subject to all tenancies
in any event thus undermining the whole purpose of the use of the special condition for
vacant possession).
The 1970 edition and 1973 revision ofthe Law Society's General Conditions
Unlike the National Conditions of Sale, the Law Society General Conditions of Sale
made further changes to the treatment of vacant possession in 1970 and 1973.
130 Farrand, aboven65, 259. .
131 The National Conditions of Sale, 18th Edition, 1969 (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London
1969).
In The National Conditions of Sale, 19th Edition, 1976 (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London
1976).
133 The National Conditions of Sale, 20th Edition, 1981 (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited, London
1981).
107
The explanatory note to the 1970 edition of the Law Society's General Conditions of
Sale stated that:
"So far as possible, the need for special conditions has been kept to a minimum
by the inclusion in the General Conditions of the most common matters
previously dealt with in special conditions, the salient points being noted
below:
(ii) Condition 3(1) provides that the property is sold with vacant possession
unless otherwise specified in special conditions." 134
Indeed, this was the wording of condition 3(1) which appeared under the heading
'Vacant Possession and Tenancies':
"Unless the Special Conditions otherwise provide the property is sold with
vacant possession on completion."135
The condition went on to deal with tenancies in the following way in 3(2):
"Where the property is sold subject to any lease or tenancy the vendor shall
furnish to the purchaser or his solicitors a copy or abstract containing full
particulars of any lease or agreement in writing, or where not in writing such
evidence of the nature and terms of the tenancy as the vendor may be able to
supply, together with copies of any notices, in the vendor's possession served
by or upon the lessee or tenant. "136
This was a provision to ensure that disclosure of any tenancies referred to could take
effect. This would be in order for the buyer to ascertain the nature and terms of the
tenancies.
The explanatory note provided further clarity as to why vacant possession was
appearing as a general condition and explained that the invocation of the general
134 Guide to the Law Society's Form of Cootract for Sale and General Conditions of Sale (1970 Edition) (The Law
Society on TheLaw Society'sGeneral Conditions of Sale, London 1970).
135 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale (1970 Edition) (The Law Society, London 1970) condition 3(1).
136 Ibid, condition 3(2).
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condition for vacant possession was to avoid doubt and the need for a special condition
in each case:
"Again it is common practice of a purchaser buying a property which is subject
to a tenancy to satisfy himself as to the terms of the tenancy before contracts
are exchanged and for [the] vendor to provide all information reasonably
available to him for the purpose... For the removal of doubt and to save
insertion of [a] Special Condition it is provided that the property is sold with
vacant possession unless otherwise stated."137
In the context of the revised conditions, this reflected an intention manifest in the
explanatory note to the 1970 conditions'r" for the general conditions to deal with as
many aspects of the transaction as possible, and to keep special conditions to a
minimum. This embodied the underlying motivation of the General Conditions of Sale
to facilitate everyday property transactions and leave as little as possible to be
specifically dealt with by the parties, as Walford had noted, in order to ensure:
"... considerable saving of time for the vendor's solicitors, and also assist, to
some extent, in the elimination of mistakes in the draft contract, since the
material to be written or typed is reduced to a minimum. They also save the
purchaser's solicitor some little time in connection with the reading and
examination of the engrossments on exchange."139
Further, specifically discussing the term 'vacant possession' for the first time in the
explanatory notes, this edition of the standard conditions clearly can be seen to have
considered and categorised the obligation to give vacant possession, along with other
standard contractual terms, as a 'common matter' that could not justify the continued
invocation of the special condition which was introduced in 1953.140 A special condition
would only be appropriate ifit was necessary to spell out anything that the property was
explicitly being sold subject to. Indeed, in the event that the property was to be sold
subject to a tenancy or other incumbrance, this was to be provided for by a specific
reference in special condition 5 to the 1970 conditions (and the 1973 rcvisionj" which
stated "The property is sold and will be conveyed subject to ... ", In the event that vacant
137 Guide to theLawSociety's Formof ContractForSaleandGeneral Conditions of Sale (1970 Edition), abovenBS.
138 "So far as possible, the need for special conditionshas been kept to a minimumby the inclusion in the General
Conditions ofthe mostcommonmatters previously dealt with in special conditions", aboven135.
139 Walford, aboven16, 2-3 commenting generallyon thepurpose of both sets of pre-fusion conditions.
140 Guide to theLaw Society's Form ofContract For Sale andGeneral Conditions of Sale (1970 Edition), above n135.
141 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale (1970 Edition), above n135, special condItion 5 aod The Law
Society's Contract for Sale (1973 Revision) (The Law Society, London 1973) special condition 5.
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possession was being given (the default position) this clause would be struck out of the
special conditions or simply left blank, meaning that it had no effect, maintaining the
default position provided by the general conditions of sale that the property is sold with
vacant possession.on completion, subject to any express alternative stipulation.
In some respects, both the 1953 and 1970 Law Society Conditions concurred in treating
vacant possession as an 'obvious' point with the sets of conditions differing only in
respect of how this apparently common and everyday issue should best be dealt with in
the context of standard agreements for the sale and purchase of land. The 1953
conditions saw vacant possession as an obvious point that should be specifically dealt
with by special condition, whereas the 1970 edition preferred vacant possession to be
one of the many general conditions of the contract, unless there was a specific reason to
deal with it as a special condition (which would state how that obligation was qualified).
The 1973 revision142 carried forward the 1970 position with respect to the treatment of
vacant possession as a general condition in identical terms. The revision continued to
prefer the default position (under the general conditions) that vacant possession would
be given unless explicitly indicated otherwise by use of a special condition, in which
case, tenancies would be listed. The 1973 edition also sought to reduce the mnnber of
special conditions, making the conditions of sale as standard and generic as possible.
Vacant possession therefore remained one of a number of general conditions that were
printed in standard form and would, most likely, not be specifically considered or even
read by the contracting parties. In some respects, following the explicit introduction of
vacant possession as a special condition in 1953, the 1970 edition and 1973 revision
could be seen to have 'demoted' the importance of the term by changing it to a general
condition, along with the majority of other terms of the contract that were not
particularly considered, and were subject to special conditions (which obviously had
priority over them).142a
142 The Law Society'sContract for Sale (1973 Revision), above n141.
H2a A contrary view is that, by making vacant possession a general condition, this had the effect of ensuring thatthe
condition was always included by default, albeit as one of many general conditions, but nevertheless actually
improving theprospects of the term beingincorporated intothecontract expressly..
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The 1980 edition and the 1984 revision ofthe Law Society's General Conditions f
The 1980 edition of the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale143 marked a further
change in the treatment of vacant possession, and a shift back to the 1953 position
where vacant possession was included as a special condition. This was suggestive of a
further development in thinking by the relevant Law Society Committee with respect to
the approach that should be taken by the standard conditions of sale and their place in
standard form contracts, which was not paralleled in the National Conditions of Sale.
In the special conditions to the 1980 Edition of the Law Society's General Conditions of
Sale, special condition F stated:
"The property is sold with vacant possession on completion
OR
The property is sold subject to the following leases or tenancies. ,,144
In practical terms, the conveyancer would strike out the inappropriate term, and if the
latter term remained, would list the leases and tenancies to which the sale was subject.
The explanatory notes to the 1980 Edition do not specifically deal with vacant
possession at any point, but the introduction to the note did reflect a general mood that a
new set of conditions was necessary following comments and observations made:
"The Council, in 1978, set up a Sub-Committee to look into the need for any
changes since the Contract and Conditions of Sale had last been revised in
April 1973. The Sub-Committee, after having invited representations from the
profession and having taken into account the replies that were received from
local Law Societies and Associations, and many individual members of the
profession, and the many developments in conveyancing law and practice since
1973, recommend that there should be a completely new edition, the better to
meet current needs.
143 The Law Society's Contract for Sale (1980 Edition) (The Law Society, London 1980).
WI TheLawSociety's Contract for Sale (1980 Edition), aboven143, specialcondition F.
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:\
The new conditions, which are known as the 1980 Edition, differ markedly in
content and order from the 1973 Revision, and it has therefore been decided
that some explanatory notes should be published ... ,,145
The issue of tenancies remained part of the general conditions. General condition 6(1)
stated that:
"This condition applies if the property is sold subject to any lease or tenancy
and shall have effect notwithstanding any partial, incomplete or inaccurate
reference to any lease or tenancy in the special conditions or the particulars of
the property." 145(a)
General condition 6 then went on to deal with disclosure of tenancies and, in addition to
the obligation to disclose tenancies or leases which the property was being sold subject
to, the seller also was given the express duty, between exchange and completion, to
notify the purchaser of any alteration in the terms or any termination of such a tenancy.
General condition 6 continued:
" (2) Copies or full particulars of all leases or tenancies not vested in the
purchaser having been furnished to him, he shall be deemed to purchase with
full knowledge thereof and shall take the property subject to the rights of the
tenants thereunder or by reason thereof
(4) The vendor shall inform the purchaser of any change in the disclosed terms
and conditions of any lease or tenancy."146
The explanatory note did address this issue and explain why greater disclosure was
being sought, although it failed to go further and incorporate this into a discussion about
the implications to the concept of vacant possession in respect of how that obligation
(appearing as a special condition) would be qualified by disclosed tcnancies.I'"
145 The Law Society's Contract and Conditions of Sale (1980 Edition)Explanatory Notes (The Law Society, London
1980). Emphasis added.
14S(D.)The Law Society's Contract for Sale (1980 Edition), aboven143, condition6(1). Emphasis added. The condition
was clearthatit only appliedif the sale was subjectto tenancies, thatwould be listed in the special condition.
146 Ibid, condition 6.
147 The Law Society'sContract andConditionsof Sale (1980 Edition)Explanatory Notes, above n145, 3.
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Clearly, the issue of what the property was being sold subject to, and therefore whether
vacant possession was to be given, was changed. Somewhat surprising is that the
explanatory note, prepared by those who drafted the amended conditions at the Law
Society, saw no need to explain why this wasthe case or why the vacant possession
condition (unlike the increased disclosure of tenancies which remained part of the
general conditions) went back to being a special condition. One possibility is that, with
the seller's duty of disclosure with respect to tenancies increasing in the context of the
general conditions, it was considered necessary for the issue of vacant possession and
subsisting tenancies to be expressly stated for each transaction by special condition
(which therefore warranted particular attention to detail). Indeed, conveyancing guides
commenting on the 1980 conditions were keen to point out that:
"If the contract is silent, it is implied that vacant possession will be given, thus
details of relevant tenancies must be disclosed, if only to prevent the purchaser
from being able to withdraw from the contract at a later stage...[Special
condition C] is used to state that vacant possession will be given or to give
details of the tenancies to which the property is subject ...The vendor should
also supply the purchaser with copies of the tenancy agreements and details of
the current rents ...,,148
Again though, it would seem that the matter was so common and obvious that there was
no need to discuss or flag up this change in the explanatory note. This was moreover
significant given that the 1980 Edition was referred to as: "... a completely new edition,
the better to meet current needs".149 The 1984 revision'P" went on to replicate the 1980
edition in respect of the disclosure of tenancies and continued to require that vacant
possession, and any applicable tenancies, should be included as a special condition of
sale.
A Summary ofConditions ofSale from 1953
From the first specific reference to the vacant possession term in 1953, various changes
in the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale with respect to the treatment of vacant
possession can therefore be seen to have taken place. From explanatory notes and other
148 Silverman, above n3I, 16.Emphasis added.
/49 The Law Society's Contract and Conditions of Sale (1980 Edition) Explanatory Notes, above n145, 1.
150 The Law Society's Contract for Sale (1984 Revision) (The Law Society, London 1984).
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contemporaneous evidence it would appear that the respective committees made
decisions taking into account the current legal climatel 51 and views that practitioners
had expressed in respect of the use and ,operation of the Law Society's General
Conditions of Sale in the practical context.152 Along with amendments to reflect
comments from third parties/53 and changes in light of changing market conditions/54
the issue of subsisting tenancies, and how these could be seen as a trap to purchasers,
was instrumental to changing decisions as to the term's incorporation over time as either
a general or special condition.P'' As such, the Law Society Conditions of Sale exhibited
no overall consensus or consistent position as to how vacant possession should be dealt
with in the conditions of sale between 1953 and 1984; rather they changed and evolved
in seeking at various intervals to create a fair and balanced platform for agreement
between contracting parties, which was the original purpose of the conditions of sale.156
It was apparent that 'vacant possession', as a legal term, whilst conceived into the
conditions of sale in 1953, still lacked coherence over its evolution during this period in
respect of its place in standard form contracts for the sale and purchase of land as either
a special or general condition.
It is notable, by contrast, that the National Conditions of Sale did not exhibit similar
changes between 1953 and 1990, leaving vacant possession as a special condition
throughout this period. In 1953, however, the National Conditions of Sale did exhibit an
apparent internal inconsistency whereby the special condition (requiring tenancies to be
disclosed) contradicted a general condition carried over from the previous version (that
the sale was deemed to be subject to all tenancies whether disclosed in the contract or
15I For example, see Mills, J. 'The National Conditions of Sale Editions 1-17 and beyond' (1961) 105 SJ 497 which
discusses how changing market conditions relating to the sale of land were reflected in the changes made in
successiveeditions of theConditions overtime.
152 For example, the explanatory notes to the 1980 Edition of rhe Law Society's Contract and Conditions of Sale note
that "The Sub-Committee, after havinginvited representations from the profession and having taken into account the
replies that were received from local Law Societies and Associations, and many individual members of the
profession, and the many developments in conveyancing law and practice since 1973, recommend that there should
be a completely new edition, the better to meet current needs". Clearly, the conditions reflected changes in law,
r:ractice and comments on their use and application. ;
53 See the Law Society's Conveyancing Handbook 1993, above n37, 665 on The Standard Conditions of Sale
(Second Edition) 1992 and Aldridge, T.M. Companion to the standard conditions ofsale. Pamphlet volume 115 (20 '
edn, Longman, London 1992).
154 Changing marketconditions relating to the sale of land were reflected in the changes made in successive editions
ofthe conditions according to John Mills QC in his article in (1961) 105 Sol Jo1497.
155 See Silverman, above n36; Standard Conditions of Sale (first edition): a guide for clients (Miscellaneous
publications of the Law Society) (Law Society Stationery Society, London 1990); The Law Society's Conveyancing
Handbook 1993, above n37 on The Standard Conditions of Sale (Second Edition) 1992; and Aldridge, above n153.
156 See Walford, above n16, 2-3. Farrand, above n65, 259 also notes the 'change of mind' over this period in the
conditions of sale.
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not). Whilst this was identified and corrected six years later in the 17th edition, at the
conception of the term 'vacant possession' into the National Conditions of Sale as a
special condition, its effect' was clearly not sufficiently appreciated or acknowledged,
with the later editions indicating the desire to avoid the inconsistencies and ambiguities
by appropriately amending the conditions by hand (contrary to their intended use as a
set of pre-prepared standard conditions). The effect of the invocation of the special
condition on vacant possession was not cross-checked with the existing general
conditions at that time, as otherwise the 'trap' created by those conditions'V would not
have come into existence and later required amendment in the subsequent edition. This
again compounded a failure to properly appreciate how the obligation to give vacant
possession might interact with other conditions, which was manifest in decisions in case
law during this period (as discussed in chapter 3) where the interaction between express
terms for vacant possession and other conflicting contractual terms were wrongly
interpreted and understood.158
The 'Standard Conditions ofSale'
The Standard Conditions of Sale were first produced by the Law Society and The
Solicitors' Law Stationery Society Ltd in 1990, and they superceded and replaced both
the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale and Oyez's National Conditions of Sale.159
They were described as "radically different from their predecessors in arrangement and
style and also [to make] some significant changes in substance" .160 Publication of the
Standard Conditions of Sale in 1990 meant, for the first time in the history of conditions
of sale, that practitioners would all use one single (or 'fused') set of conditions of sale in
property transactions.l'"
The frrst edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale in 1990162 altered the position on
vacant possession compared to the previous respective sets of pre-fusion conditions.
157 As described by Walford, aboven86, 25. .
158 See Templeman 1. in Top/ell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] 1 W.L.R. 446 as compared to decisionsin Curtis
v French [1929]1 Ch. 253,per Eve J. and Korogluyan v Matheau Ug75j 30 P. & C.R. 309, per Whitford J.
159 The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) 1990 werealso knownandreferred to as TheNational Conditions
of Sale 21st Edition andthe Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1990, aboven29. See Silverman, above036, v
in whichtheyaredescribed as a 'total replacement'.
160 TheLawSociety's Conveyancing Handbook, aboven37, 665.
]61 Silverman, above n36, v.
162 The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) (The Law Society, London March 1990).
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Here, vacant possession was specifically dealt with as a general condition, but under
condition 3 marked 'Tenancies', condition 3.3.1 stated:
"The buyer is to be given vacant possession of all the property on completion;
this does not apply to any part of it included in a lease or tenancy ("tenancy")
subject to which the agreement states the property is sold.,,163
This provision could be given a restricted construction in its context as applying only to
tenancies and not more generally to the sale. On this construction the 1990 conditions
would be entirely silent as to 'vacant possession'. It would have been peculiar for the
Standard Conditions of Sale to change the position that had been manifest in one form
or another in the respective sets of pre-fusion conditions of sale since 1953, and revert
to the pre-1953 position where no explicit reference to vacant possession could be
found. It was therefore more likely that this clause should be interpreted as a general
condition that vacant possession was to be given subject to any disclosed tenancies, a
view supported by commentaries on the conditions where the condition is seen as a
general rule:
"Condition 3.3.1 introduces a general rule that the property is sold with vacant
possession, save to the extent that it is tenanted and the sale is subject to a
tenancy. This is a departure from the previous editions of both the Law Society
Conditions and the National Conditions, in which the auestion of vacant
possession was left to be dealt with by Special Conditions.,,1 4
Other texts also interpreted the general condition to have application to the entire
contract, thus supporting this position:
"Where the property is sold subject to a tenancy this fact must be disclosed by
special condition, otherwise Condition 3.3.1 will apply, which states that unless
tenancies are disclosed, vacant possession will be given on completion."165
The form of special conditions to the 1990 Edition did not, however, specifically
include a special condition where any tenancies could be explicitly stated (unlike in the
pre-fusion conditions). It is likely that if the property was to he sold subject to a tenancy
. , ,
163 Ibid, condition 3.3.1.
164 Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition): a guidefor clients, above 0155. Emphasis added.
165 Silverman, aboven36. 149.
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or lease then an additional special condition would need to be included, as suggested by
Silvcrman.l'" unless the tenancy could be described as a 'burden' on the property.
, Indeed, it was unclear what was the purpose or effect of special condition 2: :
"The Property is sold subject to the Burdens on the Property [as explicitly
listed under the heading "Burdens on the standard form contract] and the Buyer
will raise no requisitions on them.,,167
It was also not clear how this special condition sat with general condition 3.3.2 which
imposed an obligation on the seller to disclose tenancies before contract in any event:
"Before the contract is made, the seller is to provide the buyer with full details
of each tenancy or copies of the documents creating it. The buyer is treated as
entering into the contract knowing and fully accepting the terms of the
tenancy." 168
Nor was it clear whether that would be expressly qualified by the disclosure of some
burdens (as a special condition) which did not make reference to tenancies. Burdens are
normally concerned with title 169 but it seemed that vacant possession could be included
as a burden on title under the drafting of the 1990 Standard Conditions of Sale which
raised questions with respect to the disclosure of burdens on title and how, if at all, that
was connected to the disclosure of obstacles or qualifications to the receipt of vacant
posscssron.
The lack of provision of a specific special condition to modify general condition 3.3.1
(if required in a given case) was not a satisfactory position and this manifested an
internally inconsistent and unclear set of conditions, where it was not clear how
obstacles to the receipt of vacant possession should be disclosed. The removal of the
standard form special condition (under the pre-fusion Law Society Conditions of Sale
1984 and National Conditions of Sale 1981), where tenancies and other obstacles
specifically to the receipt of vacant possession were listed, clearly compounded further
166 Ibid.
167 The Standard Conditions of Sale(First Edition), aboven162, special condition 2.
168 The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition), above n162, condition 3.3.2. .
169 Various texts refer to burdens on title. The interaction between title andvacant possession is discussed in more
detail in chapter 9, but if vacant possession could be described as an issue affecting title, rather thana contractual
obligation which is not proprietary in nature, then the remedies for a breach would alter, thus changing the whole
nature and formof the obligation.
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the possibility that qualification to vacant possession could actually be disclosed as
burdens on title. The internal inconsistency that was created appears to have been
something 'that was known of at the time, indeed comments from one of the authors of:
the first edition reflected on how the new conditions had been drafted very quickly,
which may explain why greater thought was not given to the form of special conditions:
"The publication of the Standard Conditions of Sale followed very quickly on
the announcement by the Law Society of its intention to revise the conditions
and, as an author, I was faced with the choice of either trying to prepare a new
edition quickly, or of taking more time and re-writing large areas of text, some
of which felt stylistically old fashioned, not having been substantially altered
since the publication of the first edition. I chose the former option - that of
preparing the book quickly... ,,170
Further, commentary on the 1992 revision of the 1990 Standard Conditions of Sale also
reflected an awareness of the need to revise the first edition which was prepared in
haste. The explanatory note to the 1992 Revision (the second edition) stated that:
"At the time of their [the first edition] publication, it was foreseen that a second
edition would be required at an early stage ... It maintains the principles on
which the first edition was based, but makes some significant changes, often in
response to comments from practicing conveyancers ... ,,17l
The commentary on the second edition itself showed an appreciation of some of the
confusion and inconsistencies that the first edition contained and a desire to 'smooth out
difficulties'. It explained that:
"It had always been expected that, following replacement of the National
Conditions of Sale and the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale by the
Standard Conditions of Sale in 1990, a second edition of the new conditions
would be required relatively soon. This would allow the publisher to take
account of users' reactions, smooth out difficulties and take account of further
developments in law and practice. The second edition has now been published,
and this companion has been fully revised to take account of the changes." 172
170 Silverman, above036, vi. Emphasis added.
171 The Law Society's Conveyancing Handbook 1993, above 037, 665 on The Standard Conditions of Sale (Second
Edition) 1992.
112 Aldridge, above0153. Emphasis added.
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In the explanatory note to the Second Edition it is noteworthy that the first point to be
addressed was vacant possession. The note read:
"Under the first edition, vacant possession' was dealt with by the general
conditions (the old condition 3.3.1). The current edition contains no provision
relating to vacant possession [in the general conditions], and accordingly the
position must be dealt with by a special condition (see the alternative versions
of the printed special condition 4).,,173
The companion to the second condition was also clear in pointing out that invocation of
a special condition (as was provided by the final respective versions of the pre-fusion
conditions of sale) was now restored:
"The conditions now contain no obligation on the seller to give vacant
possession on completion (formerly condition 3.3.1). This can be dealt with by
special condition, and the published form provides for this." 174
In respect of the special condition provided for by the second edition, the alternatives to
special condition 4 stated:
"The property is sold with vacant possession on completion
OR
The property is sold subject to the following leases or tenancies. ,,175
This replicated special condition 4 from the 1980 Edition of the General Conditions of
Sale and like the 1980 edition it was for the conveyancer to strike out the inappropriate
alternative and, if the latter of the two remained, to list the leases and tenancies to which
the property was sold subject.
The comment in the explanatory note appeared to reflect an awareness of the confusion
that the 1990 Edition had caused. The second edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale
·thus clearly demarcated qualifications to vacant possession from burdens on title,
173 Aldridge, abovenI53.
174 Aldridge, above n153. 16.
175 Slandard Conditions of Sale (Second Edition) (The Law Society, London 1992).
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following the previous inconsistencies and uncertainty caused by the 1990 edition in
which there was nothing to prevent tenancies and other obstacles to vacant possession
potentially being disclosed as burdens on title. This was achieved by providing a form
of special condition relating solely to vacantpossession which could be used to disclose
tenancies, as had previously been used in earlier editions of Law Society's General
Conditions of Sale (and National Conditions of Sale).176 There was therefore no
opportunity for confusion between incumbrances on title and obstacles to vacant
possession under the second edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale. The third
edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale177 was published in 1995 and this replicated
the second edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale with respect to the treatment of
vacant possession. The fourth edition178 also replicated the second edition and remains
the current edition used by conveyancers. As such, the position under the Standard
Conditions of Sale at the present time is that vacant possession is a special condition in
the form outlined above.
The universal and fused Standard Conditions of Sale, brought in to create uniformity of
practice, therefore themselves exhibited early change in their position on how to
incorporate the vacant possession term, with it originally appearing as a general
condition (in 1990) but thereafter being a special condition. The change in 1992 can be
seen as a further (and to date, final) change in a long line of shifting thinking (by the
respective Law Society Committees who sat over time and discussed and debated
changes to the evolving editions and versions of the conditions of sale) as to the most
appropriate means, for conveyancers and the parties subject to the contract, to cater for
the obligation to give vacant possession (i.e. as either a general or special condition). It
is possible, although there is no authority to confirm, that the return to a special
176 In personal communications with Philip Freeman, former member of the Law Society Working Party, 29 July
2008 (a member of the editorial board of the Law Society's Conveyancing Handbook 1993, above n37, which
provided theexplanatory note to the 1992revision) he said that thereason that vacant possession was made a special
condition was to restore the position before the fusion of previous versions of conditions. There, the Law Society
Conditions of Sale had dealt with vacant possession as a special condition. It was noted that given that a lot of
properties were being sold subject to a lease or tenancy, a general condition as to vacant possession was not
appropriate and the matter was more properly dealt with by a special condition in the contract. This provided the
seller with the- opportunity to expressly warrant that vacant possession was to be given, or list any subsisting
tenancies or leases to which the property was subject It therefore prevented the parties being unwittingly 'caught out'
by the effect of the general vacant possession condition which was "nested along with various other general
conditions often not properly considered or understood". This clearly overcame the problems with the 1990 edition
which did not adequately provide a means by which qualification to the (otherwise) express obligation to give vacant
possession (as a general condition) could be incorporated into the contract.
111 Standard Conditions of Sale (Third Edition) (The Law Society, London 1995).
178 Standard Conditions of Sale (Fourth Edition) (The Law Society, London 2003).
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condition in 1992 was to prevent the potential interaction that had been created in the
first edition between vacant possession and title. It is also possible that the shift to
special condition was to prevent further interactions between vacant possession and
other conflicting general conditions that had previously been exhibited. Indeed, support
for this claim comes from comments in the explanatory note to the Second Edition
which went on to say that:
"... It should be noted that any such special condition will override any
inconsistent provision in the general conditions.,,179
In making vacant possession a special condition, the explanatory note highlighted how
that would override any inconsistent general condition that was at odds with what the
special condition now provided for. This reflected some awareness, for the first time, of
the significance of the interactions between the obligation to give vacant possession and
other contractual conditions and was the first reference in practitioners' texts to this
issue.
Whilst the nature and form of the vacant possession term in conditions of sale has
exhibited much change and amendment, it is pertinent to note how the various changes
in the manner of incorporation of vacant possession in the conditions of sale over time
can be contrasted to other general and special conditions, none of which move from
general conditions to special conditions in the same way that vacant possession did. In
fact, whilst general and special conditions may have been re-drafted over time, vacant
possession is the only example of a condition which moved back and forth from a
general to special condition. When one takes into account the many conditions that are
contained in the various editions and versions of respective standard conditions, this is
perhaps the most telling sign of an apparent difficulty in determining the nature and
scope of the condition. A review of the conditions of sale over time most notably
reveals that the obligation to give vacant possession, and associated issues, are certainly
not as clear and easy to reconcile as other general or special conditions of standard form
sale and purchase contracts. This in many respects supports the argument/proposition
that there has been a struggle throughout the evolution and development of the term to
179 Aldridge, aboven153.
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fully appreciate its nature and place in transactions in the context of sale and purchase
contracts, in which it is a fundamental term.180
Standard Commercial Property Conditions
In 1999 the Law Society published a set of Standard Connnercial Property
Conditionsl 81 which were specifically intended to be used for medium - large
commercial transactions (even though no definition of this was provided). These were
based on the third edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale and were intended to
replace these in relation to connnercial property transactions. From that point on, the
Standard Conditions of Sale were primarily intended for use in residential sales:
"The SCPC [Standard Commercial Property Conditions] are intended primarily
for use in more complex connnercial transactions. Conveyancers are likely to
find that, for residential sales and the sale of small business premises, the
Standard Conditions of Sale (the "SCS") are better suited to their needs."182
It is important to review the treatment of vacant possession in the specially developed
connnercial conditions because it provides a further point of comparison and analysis
which elucidates the treatment of the vacant possession obligation by connnittees of the
Law Society.
Both the first edition (1999) and the second edition (2003)183 of the Standard
Connnercial Property Conditions dealt with vacant possession as a special condition. In
the first edition special condition 3 replicated the special condition for vacant possession
in the third edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale, namely:
180 See Williams, T.e. 'Sale of Land with VacantPossession' (1928) 114 The Law Jqur~a1339 in whichhe described
vacant possession as "an integral part ofthe contractu.
181 Standard Commercial Property Conditions (First Edition), above n44.
]82 Explanatory Notes on the Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition)(The Law Society, London
2004) 1.
183 Standard Commercial Property Conditions (SecondEdition), aboven44.
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"The property is sold with vacant possession on completion
OR
The property is sold subject to the following leases or tenancies ...,,184
The Second Edition made a small change to the wording of the special condition,
namely:
"The property is sold with vacant possession
OR
The property is sold subject to the leases or tenancies set out on the attached
list but otherwise with vacant possession on completion. ,,185
The issue of properties which are subject to tenancies was discussed and debated at
various points in the history of the Law Society's General Conditions of Sale and
Standard Conditions of Sale/86and was a consideration in decisions made as to whether
the vacant possession condition should be general or special, or should appear part of a
section on tenancies'V as opposed to a free standing term in its own right.
Whilst an estate being sold subject to a single lease or tenancy, or other such interest, is
the most common obstacle that would prevent the procurement of vacant possession on
completion,188 it is important to acknowledge that selling a property subject to a tenancy
may, depending on construction of the document, give no guarantee of vacant
possession outside the scope of that disclosure. This was something that appears to have
184 Standard Commercial Property Conditions (First Edition), above 044, special condition 3.
185 Emphasis added. Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition), abovenM, special condition 2. See
also Abbey, R. and Richards, M. A practical approach to conveyancing (9th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford
2007) 94.
186 Forexample. there is discussion of the position ontenancies in Silverman, above n36; Standard Conditions of Sale
(FirstEdition): a guide for clients. above n155; TheLaw Society'sConveyancingHandbook 1993, above 037, on The
Standard Conditions of Sale (Second Edition) 1992; and Aldridge, above n1S3.
187 As in the 1990 fused edition ofthe Law Society's Standard Conditions of Sale.
188 Themajority of case law deals with leases andtenancies, as discussedin chapter 5.
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been picked up by the second edition of the Standard Commercial Conditions of Sale
which amended the special condition from the first edition to read:
"The property is sold subject to the leases or tenancies set out on the attached
list but otherwise with vacantpossession on completion. ,,189
This changed from the first edition, which read:
"The property is sold subject to the following leases or tenancies...,,190
The wording of the special condition to the second edition clearly puts the seller under
an obligation to give vacant possession of the property other than with respect to the
part that is subject to the disclosed tenancy. No explanation is given in the explanatory
note to the second edition as to why this change was made191 but a possible reason for
this subtle amendment, especially in the commercial context, is that a commercial or
industrial property can often be a large premises and a tenancy or lease can commonly
exist with respect to only part ofthe premises. In the second version of the condition, an
obligation to give vacant possession would arise expressly with respect to the rest of the
premises not affected or subject to the lease, whereas in the old version no express
obligation with respect to the rest of the premises would have arisen. Whilst an implied
obligation with respect to the rest of the premises may have nevertheless arisen, subject
to the intention of the parties and general construction of the document, the second
version of the conditions expressly caters for vacant possession in this way (thus
avoiding the need to rely on implied terms and knowledge of the parties at a given
time).
A comparison of the wording of the special condition for vacant possession in the
Standard Conditions of Sale and Standard Commercial Property Conditions reveals that
the second, third and currently fourth edition of the fused Standard Conditions of Sale
(now used primarily for residential transactions) retain the original special condition
189 Emphasis added. Standard Commercial Property Conditions (SecondEdition), aboven44, specialcondition 2.
190 Standard Commercial Property Conditions (First Edition), aboven44, specialcondition 3.
I9l The explanatory notes on the Standard Commercial Property Conditions (2nd ednTheLaw Society,London 2004)
4 deals withthe special conditions and discusses conditions 1-3 only; no mention of the change of wording in the
vacantpossessionspecialcondition is made.
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from the first edition. This is potentially an issue for sales of a partly tenanted
residential dwelling because vacant possession will not be given expressly with respect
to the rest ofthe property (that is not subject to the disclosed tenancy) under this form of
the special condition. This is perplexing in and of itself given that the general condition
included in the first edition of the Standard Conditions of Sale in 1990 (that the buyer is
to be given vacant possession of all the property on completion, but that this does not
apply to any part of it included in a lease or tenancy subject to which the agreement
states the property is sold) would have been the most appropriate wording for the
special condition in the second edition. Instead the wording of the special condition
from the 1980 edition (and 1984 revision) of the pre-fusion Law Society's General
Conditions of Sale was invoked for the second edition of the Standard Conditions of
Sale. This was rather than adopting (and amending as appropriate) the wording of the
first edition (1990) general condition which had been drafted following the
comprehensive review of the conditions and their appropriateness with respect to that
new edition in 1990. No explanation has been found as to why this took place in any
relevant texts commenting on the second edition but this arguably further reflects the ad
hoc nature of decisions that took place in amendments to drafting of terms for vacant
possession in the conditions of sale, and supports the argument that the understanding of
those involved was somewhat inconsistent, ifnot confused.
As such, even when the status of a term for vacant possession as a special condition
appears to have been settled in the Standard Conditions of Sale and Standard
Commercial Property Conditions (whereby the seller expressly promises to the buyer
that it will receive vacant possession on completion) a comparison of the two reveals
that the second version of the Standard Commercial Property Conditions has subtly
amended the wording of the special condition in order to ensure that the obligation will
still be engaged with respect to the rest of a premises not included in a disclosed
tenancy, to which the sale will thus be subject. Again, this change was not fully
explained upon implementation, and represents a nuance between the Standard
Conditions of Sale and Standard Commercial Property Conditions which practitioners
may not be aware of, and therefore may not appreciate the full implications thereto, and
which remains apparent at this time.
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Conclusion
The review of the various editions ami revisions of the conditions of sale over time has
revealed a great deal about the treatment and understanding of vacant possession. Prior
to 1953 the term in and of itself was not recognised in the conditions of sale, even
though commentaries associated the use of the term 'possession' with the meaning
'vacant possession'. The Law Society's Conditions of Sale 1953 and the National
Conditions of Sale 16th Edition saw vacant possession making its first appearance in the
form of a special condition in 1953. Texts at the time did not discuss the invocation of
the new special condition for vacant possession, however, and its appearance appears to
have been broadly 'silent' across the profession.
From 1953 the term was dealt with entirely differently in the respective sets of pre-
fusion conditions of sale up to 1990. An internally inconsistent position on how to
address vacant possession, as either a general or special condition, was manifest in the
various changes in how it was incorporated into the Law Society's General Conditions
of Sale between 1953 and 1990. Whilst the National Conditions of Sale maintained its
position from 1953 in making vacant possession a special condition, the 1953 edition
disregarded the effect of the invocation of vacant possession as a special condition on
other general conditions relating to tenancies; this was only remedied six years later in
the 1959 edition.192
The 'fused' Standard Conditions of Sale, originally published in 1990, changed the first
edition position on the incorporation of the vacant possession term as a general
condition in 1992, with a shift back to vacant possession being a special condition in the
second edition published that year. This reflected a further change in a long line of
shifting Law Society committee thinking as to how best to deal with vacant possession
(as either a general or special condition). Further, there remains a nuance in the differing
wording of the special condition for vacant possession in the Standard Conditions of
Sale as compared to the Standard Commercial Property Conditions at this time.
192 Walford, above n86, 25.
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By virtue of the frequency of changes, and infelicities over time in the incorporation of
those changes into the relevant editions and versions of the conditions of sale
(especially when compared to other conditions which did not exhibit such changes), it is
clear that no consistent line was taken, across the board, on how best to cater for the
obligation to give vacant possession. Commentaries on the conditions of sale,
explanatory notes and other texts and articles highlight a lack of awareness and
appreciation as to the nature and effect of the term in and of itself (i.e. as a stand alone
obligation), with respect to other conditions of sale (i.e. in terms of its interaction with
other conditions of sale) or with issues affecting the transaction more generally. This
treatment is consistent and can be compared with decisions in case law over similar
periods (as was discussed in chapter 3), which also failed to cater for the interaction
between vacant possession and other conditions of sale, by manifesting a lack of
appreciation, or (at that time) exhibiting a lack of coherent development of the concept
for vacant possession in terms of recognising its status in a sale and purchase contract
with respect to other incorporated terms. This struggle over the evolution and
development of the term to fully appreciate its nature and relevance in transactions,
especially when one takes account of how it is one of, if not, the most fundamental part
of a sale and purchase contract.i'" is perhaps the most salient indicator of the lack of a
coherent concept ofvacant possession, and lack of understanding and appreciation of its
place in standard contracts since the first use of the term in 1953.
193 See Williams, aboven180.
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ChapterS
The Nature of the Obligation - Persons in Occupation
As the discussion in chapters 3 and 4 has demonstrated, there has been no consistent
interpretation of the obligation to give vacant possession. In chapter 3 a review of case
law, in which judges ruled on the interaction between vacant possession and other
conditions of sale, showed how the courts were prepared to subordinate an express
special condition for vacant possession in favour of other general conditions of the
contract. In chapter 4, a review of the incorporation of the obligation to give vacant
possession into standard conditions of sale, since their evolution in the early 1900s,
highlighted an inconsistent approach to incorporation of the term by Law Society
working party committees and other practitioners and draftsmen, as either a general or
special condition. When the term for vacant possession interacted with other related
conditions of sale of the contract (such as provisions relating to the disclosure of
tenancies), or with issues affecting the transaction more generally, it was further
highlighted how the full implications of this interaction were not properly appreciated or
considered, in a similar manner to the court's misinterpretation of terms for vacant
possession, as discussed in chapter 3.
This chapter seeks to develop a more coherent and informed understanding of the nature
and form of the obligation to give vacant possession, with reference to persons in
occupation of a property on completion. Inconsistencies in case law as to whether the
obligation can be breached by unlawful as well as legal occupiers being present in the
property on completion raises questions as to the content of this commonly undertaken
obligation, as a matter of fact and law. What is particularly noteworthy from these
decisions (nearly all of which were at first instance) is that the actual meaning of 'vacant
possession' was never discussed or debated, and was a term that was rather 'assumed' to
have a recognised meaning by the respective judges in the cases. This, it will be seen, is
one explanation for the lack of consistency in decisions relating to the same issues or
statutory provisions.
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An analysis of the obligation to give vacant possession, as comprising both a legal and
factual dimension, helps to gain a greater insight into the nature of the concept. Scholarly
Iiterature surrounding the development and evolution of the concept ofpossession ~is also
analysed to further justify the binary nature of possession, in the context of 'vacant
possession, that is proposed in .this chapter. Vacant possession, which .necessarily
concerns actual (de facto) possession on completion, in exercise of the right to possession
which is transferred with the legal estate in land (dejure), is contrasted with the notion of
constructive possession (i.e. possession otherwise than by actual occupation) in order to
demonstrate why the legal and factual elements are intrinsic to the obligation.
This chapter demonstrates that only a proper understanding of both the legal and factual
dimensions of vacant possession can assist in interpreting the essential nature of the
obligation as manifest in the case law which has emerged on this subject. Such an
analysis also helps to explain what otherwise may seem to be contradictory decisions in
case law. It is suggested that these inconsistencies are a consequence of insufficient
conceptual infrastructure to support the vacant possession obligation.
Lawful and unlawful occupation
There is a wealth of case law confirming that the presence of an existing tenant or other
legal occupier at the premises on completion will prevent the giving of vacant
possession.1 This is commonly because the lease is still continuing (for example, the
occupier has contractual or statutory rights to remain in occupation of the property) or
because other persons with a lawful right to occupation prevent the delivery of vacant
possession on completion (such as, licensees who are in the propertyj.' A number of
cases discussed in this section illustrate this scenario. As noted below, the decisions in
these cases did not centre on the meaning of vacant possession but rather merely
confirmed (somewhat crudely) that the obligation had been breached because of the
lawful occupier.
1 For example, Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge [1987] Ch 305; Cleadon Trust Ltd v Davis [19401 Ch. 940; Leek and
Moorland Building Society v Clark [195212 QB 788 and Beard v Porter [194811 KB 321.
2 For a discussion of the problems of so-called'sitting tenants' see Stocker, J. 'The Problem of the Protected Sitting
Tenant (1988) 85 Law Society Gazette 14.
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An example is the case of Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge3 where the plaintiff
purchased land from the defendant nnder a contract that expressly provided for vacant
possession on completion. The occupants refused to vacate the land and claimed the
benefit of a business tenancy within the statutory provisions laid down in the Landlord
and Tenant Act 1954. It was held that the occupants had a legal right to remain in
occupation and accordingly the defendant was liable for failing to give vacant possession
at the material time, and the claimant was entitled to damages. The judgment did not
discuss the meaning of the term 'vacant possession' but simply assumed that the
obligation was breached due to the presence of a lawful third party in the premises at the
material date. Instead, the decision focused on the quantum of damages recoverable by
the plaintiff, as a result of the defendant's breach of the obligation to give vacant
possession, and whether these could be limited in accordance with the rule in Bain v
Fothergill' (it was ultimately held that they could not be). As summarised by counsel in
submissions:
"The Court of Appeal is bonnd by the interpretation of Bain v. Fothergill ...in
order to obtain the benefit of the application of the rule... the vendor must satisfy
the court, the onus resting upon him, that he did all that he reasonably could to
fulfil his contract by completing the sale with vacant possession. But he falls far
short of what is required of him because he failed to take any steps to obtain
possession of the farm prior to contract or completion, or after those dates... ,,5
A further illustration is provided by Cleadon Trust Ltd v Davis.6 Here, the parties agreed
to the sale and purchase of certain land. The land in question was, at the material date,
occupied by persons who had formerly been tenants, but whose tenancies had expired.
The tenants had, however, stayed on with the consent of the landlords and so were
licensees. Accordingly it was held that it was not possible for the vendor to give vacant
possession in accordance with the contract at the relevant time because of the continued
presence of these persons, and damages were awarded. In a terse judgment, no discussion
about the concept of vacant possession was nndertaken, rather it was simply assumed that
a breach had arisen on the facts of the case.
3 [19871 Ch 305.
4 (1874) L.R. 7 H.L. 158.
s [1987] Ch 305, per Eben Hamilton Q.C. and Terence Mowschenson (for the plaintiff) at 30~. The rule has been
subsequently abolished by the Law of Property Act 1989.
6 Above, nl.
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In keeping with these decisions is the judgment in Leek and Moorland Building Society v
Clark 7 Here, a joint tenancy was purportedly surrendered but this was undertaken by
only one of the joint tenants. The court held that the purported surrender was insufficient
to terminate the joint tenancy" and the joint tenants' continuing rights to remain in
occupation therefore prevented the delivery ofvacantpossession on completion:
"By agreeing to sell ... with vacant possession Mr Ellison was, it seems to us,
agreeing that the tenancy would be surrendered on completion. If he had been
the sole tenant, completion would itself presumably have effected a
surrender.. .In fact, the tenancy was one in which he and his wife were joint
lessees, and, as will be seen, he never had any authority from her to surrender or
terminate that tenancy. Though he is, of course, bound by the agreement which
he signed, he may not have realised its effect. The question is whether in these
circumstances the joint tenancy has been surrendered or otherwise terminated.,,9
The case did not discuss or debate what was meant by the expression 'vacant possession'
and took for granted that the sellers, who had contracted to give vacant possession on a
sale of the property subject to the joint tenancy, were unable to deliver vacant possession
in accordance with the contract because of the continued presence of the wife, as a lawful
occupier,
Other cases also manifest the court's assumption that the obligation to give vacant
possession was understood by all parties from the outset. The case of Beard v PorterlO
was another case concerning residential occupation. Here, the vendor had agreed to sell
to the purchaser a dwelling-house which was occupied by a sitting tenant with rights to
remain in occupation pursuant to the Rent Restriction Acts.'! In reliance on a
representation from the tenant that he intended to leave, the vendor expressly agreed that
the purchaser was to be given vacant possession on completion. The purchase was
completed, but the tenant then refused to quit the house. Given the tenant's statutory
protection the vendor had no means of compelling the tenant to adhere to his expressed
7 Above, nl.
8 ThedecisioninRe Viola's Indenture ofLease [1909] 1 Ch244 was approved of and followed. Thecase of Re Viola
concerned the right of determination conferred on husband and wife as joint lessees at the end of three years in a
lease. The notice given pursuant to.the lease was given by the husband only, and its validity was disputed on this
ground. It was held that where a Iease contains a proviso enabling the 'lessees' to determine the lease by notice, a
noticegivenbyone of two lessees will not, in the absence of evidence of author Ity from the other lessee to give it or
of circumstances from which the Court caninfer suchauthority, be effectualto determine the lease.
9 [195212 QB 788,per Somervell L.J. at 792.
]0 [194811 KB 321.
11 Thespecificactswere not referred to inthejudgment.
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intention to vacate; he therefore remained .a [awful occupier at all material times. The
purchaser sued and was awarded damages for breach of the vendor's undertaking to give
vacant possession on the relevant date. No cencern was expressed as to the meaning of
vacant possession in the judgment and Evershed L.J., sitting as a Court of Appeal judge,
seemed to assume that the meaning of the term 'vacant possession' was commonly
understood and obvious:
"Since it was of the essence of the matter that vacant possession should be
given, and the plaintiff only entered into the transaction on that footing, one
would have expected the contract to take the form, usual in such cases, that
completion would take place when vacant possession was given, so that, should
the defendant fail to implement this vital part of his promise, the plaintiff would
be entitled to treat the contract as at an end and abandon a transaction which had
ceased to be of use to him." 12
No party sought to debate or discuss why vacant possession was not being given in the
circumstances, assuming (it would seem) that the presence of the sitting tenant was a
clear breach of the obligation.i' This was especially disappointing given that this is one
of a very small number of decisions that went beyond first instance and was specifically
12 [1948]1 KB 321,per Evershed L.J. at 322. Emphasis added.
13 See also Appleton v Aspin [1988] 4 EG 123 where the seller's mother lived in the house under an occupation
agreement within the Rent Act 1977, butjoined in the contract (even though not paid to do so) promising not to
exercise any right of possession against the purchaser. The seller's mother later refused to vacate and the purchaser
claimed specific performance of the contract which provided for vacant possession. It was held that the seller's
mother was not required to leave pursuant to section 98(1) of the Rents Act 1977 andtherefore the sellerwouldnot
deliver vacant possessionon completion. Wilkinson, H.W. Standard conditions ofsale ofland: a commentary on the
Law Society and National general conditions ofsale of land (4th edn Longman, London 1989) 4 suggests that this
principle is also applicable to business leases where a statutory protected tenant mayhavepurported to agree to move
outon the completion of a sale of the freehold interest butthenlater reneges. See also Reynolds v Bannerman [1922]
I KB 719; Watson v Saunders-Roe [1947] KB 437 CA and Carter v Green [1950] 2 KB 76 CA in relation to
protected rights oftenants, along with The Rent Act 1977 and The Honsing Act 1988.
Allowing the purchaser into possession before completion may also have an affect on the procurement of vacant
possession. InSophisticated Developments v Steladean and Moschi [1978] CLYB 347 C.A a contract forthe sale of
land contained a clause that the purchaser would, from the date of contract, "be responsible for the day to day
management of the property and would take the rents and profits". Delay in completion occurred and the vendor
served noticeto complete but the purchaser argued that the vendor had repudiated the contract because there were
trespassers in occupation of part of the property when the notice to complete expired. It was held that it was an
arguable point as to whether the vendor was unable to complete even though the purchaser had had day to day
management of the property since exchange. That is, the purchaser's neglect (in allowing trespassers to take
possession) didnotprevent himarguing that thevendor was in breach of his obligation to give vacant possession.
It has alsobeenheld that a third party taking possession before completion canresult in rights beingestablished. See
Abbey National Building Society v Cann [1989] (The Times 15 March) where Mrs Cann's son secretly obtained a
mortgage on the purchase of her house butkeptmost of the money and defaulted. Mr Coonhadbeen allowed into
occupation just before completion andit was argued thatthis created an overriding interest which had priority over
the mortgage company, The claim failed on theground offraud butDillon LJ considered that the occupation would
otherwise haveconstituted an overriding interest whichwould haveprevented the delivery of vacant possession to a
third party. In Lloyds Bank v Rossett [1988] 3 WRL 1301 builders were allowed into a house to renovate it before
completion (supervised regularly by the purchaser's wife) andthis was held to give the wife an overriding interest
against the lenders of whom the wife hadnot known. At the date of completion, which was also the date of the loan,
the wife's interest hadbecome established and hadpriority; this would prevent the passingof vacant possession to a
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relevant to vacant possession. The lack of debate and discussion of what was meant by
the term echoes the treatment of the term in standard conditions of sale. In chapter 4 it
was noted, at various points; that respective Law Society Committees did not appear to
have due regard to the natureand effect of the term, and to which other parts of the
contract could be affected by incorporation of the term (for example, when vacant
possession moved from a general to special condition). Accompanying explanatory notes
to the new conditions also omitted to refer to any of the changes manifest in the
conditions of sale to which the notes related. In similar terms, it was suggested in chapter
4 that the obligation to give vacant possession was treated as 'obvious and self
explanatory'. These judgments suggest that the courts have taken a similar approach to
the Law Society Committees who drafted and amended respective editions and versions
of standard conditions of sale. In fact, the legal and factual dimensions to the obligation
are far from self explanatory, and rather complex in nature given the hybrid of objective
and fact specific factors in play.
What is apparent from the decisions referred to above is that they dealt with purportedly
'lawful' claims to remain in occupation of the property (i.e. because of a statutory or
common law tenancy or licence). The courts have questioned whether this remains the
case with respect to persons who may be in occupation with no lawful claim or right (for
example, squatters or trespassers). Indeed, there has been conflicting obiter dicta with
regard to whether the presence of people in unlawful occupation at the point of
completion breaches the obligation to provide vacant possession.!" Some statements
suggest that the obligation would be breached in this situation, apparently on the basis
that it is the duty of the seller (as the person responsible for providing vacant possession)
to ensure that trespassers are evicted. For example, in Cumberland Holdings Ltd v
Ireland15 it was noted that a seller's duty extends to removing unlawful occupants on
completion. The case itself concerned left over goods at the premises but the judge
considered (obiter) that the existence of a trespasser could be equated with a physical
impediment preventing the delivery ofvacant possession:
third party. These all demonstrate, as further 'illustrations, how unintended third parties can also become (legal)
barriers to the procurement ofvacant possessionon completion.
14 For a discussion of the problems caused by unlawful third parties being in occupation on completion, and
preventing the delivery of vacant possession, see Jones, P.V. 'Squatting and Squatting' (1991) 141 New Law Journal
1543.
15 [1946] KB 264.
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"We cannot see why the existence of a physical impediment to such enjoyment
to which a purchaser does not expressly or impliedly consent to submit should
stand in a different position to an impediment caused by the presence of a
trespasser."16 '. .
This decision clearly treated physical/tangible impediments in similar terms to persons in
unlawful occupation with respect to a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession.
It therefore made no distinction on the grounds of the lawfulness (or otherwise) of the
persons in occupation.
Other dicta, however, suggests that a seller would not be in breach by virtue of there
being a person in unlawful occupation of the property at completion. In Sheikh v
O'Connor17 the vendor contracted to sell a property to the plaintiff. Most of the property
was tenanted but the vendor expressly contracted to sell one of the rooms with vacant
possession. After completion, the purchaser complained that the room which should have
been vacant was in fact occupied by one of the tenants as a trespasser. The purchaser
sued the vendor for damages for his failure to give vacant possession. One of the issues
was purely factual and concerned whether the trespasser had taken possession of the
room before, or after, the completion date. Deputy Judge Wheeler concluded that it had
been after completion, which was sufficient to dispose of the case in the defendant's
favour, so that the action was dismissed. However, the judge went on to consider (obiter)
the position in the event that his finding of fact was incorrect and the trespasser had been
in unlawful occupation of the premises at the material time.
The judge accepted that a vendor who had contracted to give vacant possession did not
fulfill his contractual obligation if, at the date fixed for completion, there was a third
party who had a legal claim to possession, but he considered the position to be different
in relation to a trespasser. In such a case he considered that it was for the purchaser to
seek his remedy in the county court against the trespasser, given that the legal right to
possession had passed to the purchaser on completion. The judge posed the following
scenario:
16 [1946] KB 264 a1268, per Lord Greene a1270.
17 [1987] 2 EGLR 269.
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"Suppose that a vendor (V) contracts to sell property to a purchaser (P) with
completion fixed for say, March 1, that at some time prior to completion
squatters break in, unknown to V or P, that on March 1, without visiting the
property, the parties complete, the balance ofthe purchase price is paid and keys
are handed over, and then on the following day P visits the property and
discovers that the squatters have been there for several days. Is P then entitled to
claim rescission or damages on the ground that V has failed to give vacant
possession'L'v"
The learned judge took the view that the answer should be in the negative. He continued:
"Does it make any difference, then, if V had at least constructive notice prior to
completion that squatters were on the property or were threatening to go into it?
And if so, is the position any different according to the length of time prior to
completion that V learnt about the squatters? I suggest not ... At most, I am
inclined to think, V's knowledge puts him under an obligation to act reasonably
as circumstances permit in the light of that knowledge. But this would not ...
extend to requiring him to take legal action to evict the squatters, though he
might at least be wise to put P in the picture."19
These comments manifest an awareness of having to consider the equity of the situation,
and what steps an innocent party may have to go to in order to seek to discharge their
duty to deliver vacant possession. They highlight the issues of risk and responsibility
relevant to both parties when an obligation to give vacant possession is operative. With
that said, the problem with the judge's obiter comments in this decision for the purposes
of an analysis of unlawful occupation is that, if correct, they take all substance from the
vendor's contractual undertaking to give vacant possession. The obiter comments suggest
that a vendor will not be liable, even if he expressly contracts to give vacant possession,
in the event that persons with no lawful claim prevent the delivery of vacant possession
on completion. This will leave a purchaser with no remedy against the seller and no legal
right to sue or seek specific performance of obligations under the conditions of sale. It
therefore negates the obligation being operative in the sale and purchase contract
between the parties. As was noted in chapter 3, in a sale and purchase contract, where an
immediate right to possession is being passed, the obligation to give vacant possession is
fundamental and it is an essential element of such a contract that the buyer will want to
-be able to take possession of the property.i" Such a determination in Sheikh is therefore
18 Ibid, per Deputy Judge Wheeler at 271.
19 Ibid.
20 Williams, T.e. 'Sale of Land with Vacant Possession' (1928) 114 The Law Journal 339 in which he described
vacant possession as "an integral part ofthe contract".
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entirely inconsistent with the nature and effect of the obligation to give vacant possession
as being, perhaps, the most crucial part of the contract and the very reason for which the
contractual relationship between the parties was formed.
The obiter connnents in Sheikh, suggesting that the presence of trespassers would not
cause a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession in such cases, conflict with
earlier established authority on the point. In Royal Bristol Permanent Building Society v
Bomash21 the purchaser agreed to buy two houses, vacant possession of which was to be
given on completion. When the day fixed for completion arrived, the houses were
occupied by someone who was holding over unlawfully. It was held that the vendor was
in breach of his obligation to give vacant possession on completion notwithstanding that
the person in occupation had no right to be in the premises:
"I think the vendors were in fault, that they had contracted to give vacant
possession, that they were not prepared to give vacant possession at the time
when the contract ought to have been completed, and that in fact the purchaser
could not have got within a reasonable time that vacant possession for which he
had contracted; and to that extent he has obtained something less than that which
he contracted to buy. ,,22
Damages to compensate were awarded by the court. Again, however, no concern as to
the meaning of the expression 'vacant possession' was expressed or discussed. The
reference to "obtain[ing] something less than that which [the purchaser had] contracted to
buy" appeared to manifest a pre-disposed understanding as to what giving vacant
possession involved, but the judge did not elaborate on that in any detail. Again it is
arguable that this was because it was thought that there was no need to do so, given that
the meaning of the term was assumed to be understood by all in the context of there
being persons in occupation of the property on completion.
Similarly, in Engel! v Finch23 the defendants, mortgagees of a house with a power of
sale, sold it by auction to the plaintiff, the particulars of sale stating that possession
would be given on completion of the purchase:
21 [1886-90] All ER Rep 283.
221bid,per Kekewich 1. at 291.
23 (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 659.
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"The defendants contracted to sell and deliver possession on the completion of
the purchase...,,24 .
The plaintiff soon afterwards contracted for a resale. On investigation the title' was
satisfactory, but on the plaintiff requiring possession before completing the purchase, it
appeared that the mortgagor was in possession and refused to give it up. The defendants
were in a position to have ousted him by ejectment, but failed to do so and subsequently
refused to complete the sale.1s On this basis, the plaintiff brought an action for a breach
of the contract of sale and it was held that a breach of contract arose: that is, the
mortgagor's continued unlawful presence on the property constituted a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession on completion pursuant to the contractual terms.
What is particularly noteworthy about this decision is that the judgment did not make a
single reference to the term 'vacant possession', referring only to the breach of contract
(which was the breach of the contractual term providing for vacant possession) and
simply noting that 'possession' was required:
"What we have then to consider is, when a vendor, not by reason of any want of
title, but by reason of not choosing to oust the mortgagor, refuses to complete,
and the action is really a breach of contract to deliver possession, whether under
such circumstances the vendee is entitled to recover the difference between the
contract price and the market value at this time of breach. ,,26
This is perhaps reflective of how, in the 1800s, the concept of vacant possession had not
emerged as a term in it own right, as was discussed in chapter 4. However, as noted
above, in Royal Bristol Permanent Building Society v Bomash27 (a decision just some 20
years later) vacant possession was used as a term in its own right, albeit without any clear
defmition of its meaning. In Engel! v Finch the judge used the expression 'possession' to
mean what we now understand as 'vacant possession'. Indeed, as noted in chapter 4, by
the early 1900s (and most likely before then) it was established that in respect of
contractual conditions of sale '''possession' mean[t], primarily, vacant possession"."
24 Ibid, per Kelly C.B. at 663. Emphasis added.
25 Ibid at 663. On the 31st of January 1866, the defendants had commenced an action of ejectment to recover
possession of the house, and on the 24th of the following April, they got judgment that they were entitled to
possession from the 31st of January, They were perfectly at liberty to enforce the order therefore, but chose not to do
so.
26 (1869) L.R. 4 Q.B. 659, per Kelly C.B. at 663. Emphasis added.
27 Above,nll.
28 Webster, F.W. Law relating to particulars and conditions of sale on sale of land (3rt! edn Stevens and Sons
Limited, London 1907) 334.
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There is no evidence that the position in law with respect to unlawful occupiers, as
established in the 1800s, was changed over time. Indeed, the position remains the same
as shown in recent case law such as the decision in Herkanaidu v Lambeth London
I ,
Borough Council 29 where the defendant council sold one of its properties at an auction
with vacant possession. The claimant was the successful bidder for the property. There
was no completion on the due date and four days later the claimant's solicitors raised for
the first time the question of squatters. The defendant's officers inspected the property,
found no squatters and considered that the allegation was a device to avoid completion.
Accordingly, a notice to complete was served thereafter. As completion had not taken
place, the defendant rescinded the contract and informed the claimant that the deposit
was forfeited. The claimant brought an action against the defendant reclaiming the
deposit, valuers' fees and legal costs of the abortive purchase on the grounds (inter alia)
that the defendant had been unable to provide vacant possession of the property. The
Master rejected the claim. It was noted that where a potential physical impediment was
discovered pre-completion, a breach of the obligation to provide vacant possession would
occur if it was not remedied before completion. That is, the presence of squatters would
breach an obligation to give vacant possession at the relevant time. No specific analysis
of the obligation was provided however, with the only explanatory comment from the
judge amounting to a generic description ofvacant possession:
"...where there is a potential physical impediment discovered before completion
(as here) a breach of the obligation to provide vacant possession would only
occur if it is not remedied before completion. This would be the case if a vendor
remained living in the property or had furniture there prior to completion. The
obligation would be to give vacant possession on completion...Breach would
only occur when the vendor failed to do so.,,30
This is the most simple description that could be afforded to the concept, referring to left
over chattels in the property. This reiterated the point that the obligation was treated as
something common and obvious to the parties, for which further debate or elaboration
was not required.
29 [19991 All ER (D) 1420.
30 Ibid, per Mr. David Vaughan QC at 1429.
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Commentaries have also confirmed the position with regard to unlawful occupiers
breaching the obligation to give vacant possession. In Williams on Vendor and Purchaser
it is suggested that "where property is sold with vacant possession, the vendor has to
satisfy a purchaser that there is no adverse claimant and no occupier of the
premises... ",31 and the context of this paragraph suggests that the reference to 'adverse
claimant' should be understood as relating to an unlawful occupier. Megarry and Wade,
when referring to the Sheikh decision, also state that "the better view is that it is the duty
of the vendor to evict trespassers".32 In the following section the specific nature of the
obligation to give vacant possession is analysed and found to consist of both a legal and
factual dimension. The fact of a third party being in occupation on completion is shown
to be one element in causing a breach of the obligation. As such, it will be argued that it
is immaterial whether the third party occupier is lawful or unlawful as that does not
change their factual presence in the premises on completion.
These decisions show the comments of Deputy Judge Wheeler in Sheikh to conflict with
established authority. Whilst the decision in Sheikh has been widely criticised and
discredited.P the issues raised by the judge in that case do, however, relate to important
questions about the content of the obligation to give vacant possession, in terms of its
constituent parts. As noted, in Sheikh only a strictly legal dimension to the obligation was
considered, with the obligation being treated as a right which, in the absence of any
competing legal claim, passes to the purchaser on completion. As explained below,
however, an analysis of the constituent elements of the obligation to give vacant
possession reveals a factual element as well. It will be shown that it was a lack of
appreciation of this factual element to the obligation in Sheikh which led the learned
judge to conclude that a distinction between lawful and unlawful occupiers could be
made, and that the presence of unlawful occupiers did not breach the obligation to give
vacant possession. A closer examination of the constituent elements is therefore essential
to elucidate why the obligation is both legal and factual in nature, and why the factual
presence of an unlawful occupier causes a breach of the obligation in sinri1ar terms to
lawful occupiers.
31 Williams on Vendor andPurchaser 4th edition, 201.
32 Megarry, W. and Wade W. The law ofreal property (7" edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008) 672.
33 See for example Harpum, C. 'Vacant possession - chameleon or chimaera?' (1998) Conveyancer and Property
Lawyer 324, 400, and Bamsley, D.G. 'Completion of a contract for the sale and purchase of iand: Part 3' (1991) Conv
185 at 188.
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Interpreting the obligation
It has been noted that the phrase 'vacant possession' has never been authoritatively
defmed, with the area lacking judicial comment and debate: "[t]his [is] an area deficient
in legal authority ... '', 34 Various leading counsel have struggled, in vain, to cite relevant
case law to support the legal positions that they advance. In Cumberland, Counsel for the
claimant indicated that there was a lack of authority on which to base their submissions:
"[t]hat does not assist in determining the meaning of "vacant possession" as between
vendor and purchaser, a matter not decided by any authorny'v" Judges have also made
similar observations. In the context of the meaning of the obligation to give vacant
possession, Deputy Judge Wheeler noted: "I should add that neither counsel was able to
refer me to any authority which threw light on this problem". 36
It is not surprising therefore that judges have struggled to explain exactly what is meant
by the term 'vacant possession'r'" This has especially been the case given that the
meaning of the words 'vacant possession' have been said to vary according to the context
in which they are used: "[the] meaning of the words 'vacant possession' can, I think, vary
from context to context". 38 In practice, the intention of the parties as shown by the
contract will be of importance.l" Further, the equity of the situation for the parties in
question may be something a judge wishes to consider as relevant. These all point to an
inherently fact specific aspect to the term 'vacant possession', making a universal
'definition' difficult to arrive at.
With that said, there would appear to be some fundamental legal principles associated
with the obligation that can be extracted from case law in previous years and which are
of universal application to the concept, in whatever context it may arise. The obligation
34 Sheikh v O'Connor [1987] 2 EGLR 269.
35 Submissions of Heilpem in Cwnberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264 at 268. See also
Higgs, R. 'Leave Your Keys on Your Way Out' (2005) 155 New Law Journal 149 in which the difficulties of
understanding what yielding-up at the end ofthe lease may involve are discussed with reference to the requirement to
give vacant possession. Higgs states "there has been very little guidance from case law as to what constitutes yielding
up ... [n]either has Parliament ever prescribed the meaning of the expression". See also Dowding, M.A., Morgan,
H.H.J., Rodger, M. and Peters E. (eds) Woodfall's Landlord and Tenant (Sweet and Maxwell, March 2010) 19:003
which states that "there is no clear authority which holds that a tenant is liable to.deliver up vacant possession in a
sense in which that expression is used in freehold conveyancing".
36 Sheikh, above n34,per Deputy Judge Wheeler at 274. See also Higgs, above n35.
37 See for example, the submissions in Cumberland, above n35.
38 Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979]1 EGLR 161,per Templeman J. at 162.
39 See Lake v Dean (1860) 28 Beav 607 and Re Crosby's Contract [1949] I ALL E.R. 830.
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to give vacant possession can be seen to have both a legal and factual dimension, and it is
appropriate to explore the content of these constituent elements in more detail.
The legal element
The first element of the obligation (the element highlighted in the decision in Sheikh) is
the legal dimension. Where a vendor expressly or impliedly contracts to convey an estate
in land free from incumbrances, it has been established that it is, in principle, a term of
the contract that the purchaser shall on completion obtain the legal right to actual (and
not constructive) possession of the estate in land transferred." It has been said that: "the
phrase "vacant possession" is no doubt generally used in order to make it clear that what
is being sold is not an interest in a reversion".41
This would seem to imply that vacant possession is a constituent element of the legal
transfer of the estate in land itself. This is the dimension of vacant possession which
Deputy Judge Wheeler in Sheikh highlighted when he said that:
"[vacant possession] is a right, and it is a right which, in the absence of some
competing legal claim, passes to the purchaser on completion [i.e. when the
estate in land is legally transferred]. ,,42
This clearly showed that vacant possession was treated solely as a right which follows
from the legal transfer of an estate in land. In practice, however, it is clear that vacant
possession is not confined to just a legal right to possession that follows from the transfer
of an estate in land, but that the obligation also comprises a factual element.
The factual element
The term vacant possession goes beyond the legal transfer of the estate in land and rights
consistent with the transfer, and also concerns possession in a factual sense of the
. property in question: "... the right to actual unimpeded physical enjoyment is comprised
4. See Hughes v Jones (1861) 3 De. G.F. & J.307, 314, c.f. Horton v Kurzke [1971] 1 WLR 769, pel' Goff J. at771-1.
41 Cumberland, aboven3S, per Lord Greene at 270.
42 Sheikh, above n34, per Deputy Judge Wheeler at 171.
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, , in the right to vacant possession".43 Indeed, in Cumberland, HeiIpern for the plaintiffs
argned that:
"... vacant possession is not limited in meaning to the absence of any adverse
claim. This limited meaning only applies to cases relating to substituted
service... That does not assist in determining the meaning of "vacant
possession" as between vendor and purchaser, a matter not decided by any
authority. The right to vacant possession must give a right to physical
enjoyment.. ..Vacant possession must mean possession without impediments.,,44
These comments show that vacant possession is not just concerned with the legal transfer
of the estate in land, and associated rights thereto, but that the obligation also concerns
the exercise (in a factual sense) of the purchaser's legal rights to occupy pursuant to the
transferred estate. Indeed, vacant possession has been held not to have been given if the
purchaser cannot actually enjoy the right of possession passed to them without first
having to take legal action themselves. This was a point specifically made by Counsel in
Sheikh:
".. .is 'vacant possession' given if the purchaser cannot enjoy the right of
possession without first taking legal action?,,4S
In Sheikh, the learned judge, whilst expressing sympathy with such a submission,
concluded that vacant possession was given if the only occupiers in the premises on
completion were unlawful. As noted earlier, in Sheikh, receiving a property free of
unlawful occupants on completion was treated solely as a legal right which (in the
absence of any competing legal claim) passed to the purchaser on completion, which the
purchaser could take county court action of their own accord to enforce if necessary,
rather than an obligation of the seller:
"I have sympathy with this approach, but I do not see, on the facts of this case,
what [the vendor] could reasonably have been expected to do in the light of
such actual or constructive knowledge as he had: and, as I have indicated, once
completion had taken place... the right to vacant possession had passed to the
;1-3 Cumberland, above n35,per Lord Greene at272. Emphasis added.
44 Ibid, at 272, per Lord Greene at 272. Emphasis added.
45 Sheikh, above n34 at 271. Submission ofMr Cogley.
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plaintiff and it was he, and he alone, who was entitl.ed to assert that right against
[the unlawful occupicrj.v'"
Other case law, however, confirmed that these obiter comments only refer to one element
(the legal element) of the obligation to give vacant possession; the obligation to give
vacant possession being more than just the legal transfer of the right to possession.
Indeed the conclusion in Sheikh is contrary to previous authority addressing the barrier to
vacant possession which unlawful occupiers pose. This specific issue was addressed in
Royal Bristol Permanent Building Society v Bomash,47 where Kekewich 1. made clear
that transfer of the legal right to vacant possession is not all the purchaser contracts for.
He said:
"I do not think that a purchaser having a contract to sell with vacant possession,
is bound to take possession from the sheriff when he knows, as he did know in
this case, that the man to be evicted, the man who had been holding over, was
still [physically] on the premises and would have to be turned out by force. I
think the purchaser is, under those circumstances, entitled to say, "Exercise your
rights; first turn the man out, and then give me vacant possession". Therefore I
think the vendors were in fault, that they had contracted to give vacant
possession, that they were not prepared to give vacant possession at the time
when the contract ought to have been completed... ,,48
Here it was quite clear that the vendor should exercise his rights first (i.e. ensure that
factual possession of the property can be given to a purchaser by, if necessary
conunencing its own legal proceedings to evict the man in occupation), before being able
to complete the purchase and give vacant possession (both legally and factually). The
judge did not accept that the vendor was giving vacant possession by simply purporting
to pass the legal right to possession to the purchaser on completion of the contract (when
the estate in land was transferred) and expecting the purchaser to use its legal right to
possession to obtain factual possession (by, for example, issuing proceedings for an order
for possession against the man who had remained in occupation); that was not enough.
The decision in Engell v Finch49 also supports this position. As noted previously, in this
case a breach of contract arose because the defendants had not taken the necessary steps
to secure possession pursuant to the agreement. Whether the defendants had taken all
46 Ibid, per Deputy Judge Wheeler at 274. Empbasis added.
41 (1887) 35 Cb.D. 390.
48 Ibid, per Kekewicb J. at 394. Emphasis added.
49 Above, n23.
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action open to them was held to be irrelevant if possession could not be given on
completion. Ibis confirmed the requirement, in a practical sense, that factual possession
(as well as legal possession) had to pass in order to give vacant possession and that only
when the occupier had been 'turned out' (to use the language of Kekewich J.) could
vacant possession be given. The judgment of the County Court judge at first instance in
Cumberland (affirmed by the Court of Appeal), also supports this position, where it was
said that:
"the words [vacant possession] were not limited to mean only that the
purchasers would be given immediate and actual possession without any adverse
claim to possession by any person rightfully claiming: they meant also that the
purchaser would be given such substantial, actual, physical and emgty
possession as would allow him to occupy and use the propertypurchased... "
All these decisions highlight the need for the party receiving vacant possession to be able
to occupy the said property in a factual sense (over and above having the legal right to
possession which follows from the transfer of the estate in land). Indeed, as discussed in
chapter 2, the tests that case law has developed to determine whether vacant possession
has been given are objective in nature and are concerned with whether the purchaser (or
party with the right to vacant possession on completion) can occupy without difficulty or
objection. The courts are required to determine whether the physical (or legal)
impediment substantially prevents or interferes with the enjoyment of a substantial part
of the property. These embody the practical dimension of vacant possession as a factual,
as well as legal, matter. The next section expands analysis of the factual element of the
obligation by focusing on the timing of this factual requirement.
Timing ofthe factual element
When understanding the factual dimension of the obligation to give vacant possession it
is important to note further that the tests referred to are applied on 'completion' (or the
operative date). The factual element of the obligation to give vacant possession therefore
concerns one's ability (on a practical level) to actually enjoy the right to vacant
possession immediately on completion.
50 Cumberland, above n35,per Lord Greene at266. Emphasis added.
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As noted above, case law confirms that the right to vacant possession also requires the
purchaser to be able (as a matter offact) to actually enjoy that legal right to possession: it
refers to the practical, physical arid factual sense of being able to immediately occupy the
property (as distinct from just the transfer of the legal right to enjoyment that follows
from the transfer of the estate in land). A number of judgements emphasise that this
factual right to possession is oil completion:
"I have come to the conclusion that [the sellers] were contractually bound, on
completion, to hand over the ground floor in a condition which would allow the
plaintiffs to occupy it. It is quite plain that at the date of the contract and at the
date fixed for completion, the vendors cannot do that ...The vendors cannot
occupy it themselves, they cannot sell it to somebody who wishes to purchase it
in order to go and live there himself and they cannot let it.,,51
Indeed, the fact of occupation on completion was also referred to in Cumberland:
"... a vendor who leaves property ofhis own on the premises cannot ... be said to
give vacant possession since [this is] inconsistent with the right which the
purchaser has on completion to undisturbed enjoyment... ,,52
Here, the Court of Appeal in a case which primarily dealt with left over chattels on the
premises on completion, held that a vendor who left goods of his own on property sold
by him to an extent which deprived the purchaser of physical enjoyment of the property
on completion, failed to give vacant possession. This reflected an awareness that the
operative time for enjoyment was completion, and a lack of enjoyment at that time would
cause the obligation to have been breached: that is, the purchaser having received only
the legal right to possession on completion would not be sufficient and would constitute
a breach of the obligation. This was also true in Herkanaidu v Lambeth London Borough
Council where it was stated:
51 TopJell, above n38,per Templeman J. at 162. Emphasis added.
52 Cumberland, above n35,per Lord Greene at272. Emphasis added.
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"...where there is a potential physical impediment discovered before completion
(as here) a breach of the obligation to provide vacant possession would only
occur if it is not remedied before completion. This would be the case if a vendor
remained living in the property or had furniture there prior to completion. The
obligation would be to give vacant possession on completion...Breach would
only occur when the vendor failed to do so." 52(a)
Commentaries support the view that the purchaser must be able to enjoy the right to
possession (i.e. obtain factual possession as well as legal possession) on completion:
"Vacant possession, express or implied, requires the vendor to assign the
property free from any claim of right to possession...and includes "the right to
actual un-impeached physical enjoyment" of the property....the premises should
be free at completion from any occupation by the vendor, a tenant, former
tenant, a squatter and even material quantities of rubbish or furniture. ,,53
This further supports the analysis of the constituent parts of the obligation undertaken in
this chapter, and in particular the timing of the factual element.
The elements ofthe obligation
With this in mind, it is apparent that the decision in Sheikh failed to appreciate both
dimensions to vacant possession (de jure and de facto) namely:
1. The obligation to give vacant possession arises from the transfer of a non-
reversionary estate in land (and amounts to a legal right to possession of the
transferred estate); but
2. Vacant possession is only given when the party with the legal right to possession
(of the estate in land that has been transferred) can:
(i) actually enjoy that right ofpossession in a factual and practical sense
(ii) immediately on completion (or at the operative date). 54
52(,) [1999] All ER (D) 1420,per Mr. David Vaughan QC at 1429. Emphasis added.
53 Bacon,N. 'Conveyancing-Vendor's Dutyof Disclosure' (1995) Law Lectures/or Practitioners 8.
54 Theteststhat establish whether vacant possession hasbeenprocured are discussed inmore detail in chapter 6.
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This analysis assists in gaining an appreciation of the obligation to grve vacant
possession as constituting both a legal and factual dimension.
If vacant possession was only about legal claims to possession then the lawfulness of
occupation, and how one determines that, would be relevant. However, as this is not the
case, Megarry and Wade55 are correct in asserting that "it is the better view" that
trespassers do cause a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession, as will be
further demonstrated in the next section.
In the next section the concept of possession is discussed in more detail to consider
further what these constituent elements actually require. A review of the literature
surrounding the concept of possession is helpful in elucidating the nature of the
constituent elements of the obligation, as both legal and factual manifestations of
possession. When applied, this can then be used to further explain how the decision in
Sheikh failed to properly appreciate the full nature of the obligation in respect of its
inherently factual, as well as legal, dimension.
Possession as a property law concept
The concept of 'possession' in English land law is fundamental and a number of sources
emphasise that it is almost impossible to understand modem English land law without
understanding the nature and significance of possession. It has been said that
"[t]hroughout the history of English land law the operative concept has been possession
rather than ownership".56 Some have likened the importance of the concept ofpossession
to other fundamental parts of the law of England and Wales, stating that" [p]ossession is
a conception which is only less important than contract".57 Others have highlighted the
predominant nature of possession in English land law. For example, Cheshire and Burn
have noted that "[i]t has been said, rightly, that there is no law of ownership of land in
England and Wales, only a law ofpossessionv.i"
ee Megarry, W. arrd WadeW. aboven32, 672.
56 Gray, K. and Gray S. 'The Idea of Property' in Bright, S. and Dewar J. (eds) Land Law Themes and Perspectives
(Oxford University Press, Oxford 1988) 21.
57 Howe, M. (eds) The Common Law (Little Brown & Co, Boston 1963) 163.
.58 Cheshire, G. and Bnm E. Modern Law oJReal Property (15th edo Bntterworths, London 1994) 26.
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· Historically, possession was explained through the concept of 'seisin' which lay in the
actual or de facto possession of land.59 It is for that reason that, unlike ownership, which
is seen as a de jure (legal) relationship between a person and a thing (and therefore a
question of law),60 possession is commonly viewed as a de facto (factual) relationship
between a person and an object. Salmond wrote that "whether a person has ownership
depends on rules of law; whether a person has possession is a question that could only be
answered as a matter of fact and without reference to law at all".61 It is true to say
however that 'possession' can be a question of law as well as just fact alone. Indeed, the
term possession can be used, and has been applied over time, in a number of
distinguishable respects. It is essential to define these differing uses given that they have
a direct bearing upon the differing meanings associated with the term. Exploring the
meanings of possession from the literature surrounding them helps to interpret the
obligation to give vacant possession more insightfully given that "[a]ny answer which
does not distinguish between the different meanings of "possession" is inevitably going
to be ruisleading at best, and simply wrong at worst".62
Legal possession
Commonly, the term 'possession' is used to describe a relationship between a person (or
legal entity) and an estate in land (for example, fee simple or a lease).63 Legal possession,
also referred to as de jure possession, signifies the 'right' to possession. Legal possession
has been said to be enforceable in rem (that is, against the whole world at large),
reflecting that such a proprietary right (to possession) is enforceable at law.
A person has a right to possess an estate if they have acquired a title to it which is 'vested
in possession'. For a right to be vested in possession, the person or legal entity must have
"a present fixed right to it now".64 An example of an interest vested in possession would
be the common scenario of the sale and purchase of a residential property where the
transferor normally covenants to transfer the estate in land with the immediate right to
" See Lightwood, J.M. Possession ofLand (Kessinger Publishing, London 1894) 114-121.
6C Wonnacott, M. Possession ofLand (Cambridge University Press,Cambridge 2006) 1.
61 Salmond, J.W. Jurisprudence (12ili edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1966) 265.
62__ Wonnacott, above060, 13.
63 Herepossession is not intended to describe the relationship betweena person andanytangibleproperty (such as a
specificplot ofland or a house).
148
possession for the purchaser/transferee on completion. This can be distinguished from a
right to enjoymentf at some point in the future. Here the right to possession is vested
only 'in interest'. An example of an estate vested only 'in interest' is a reversionary lease,
granted to begin at some time in the future, usually after the prior existing lease has
expired. A reversionary lease is 'vested' as soon as it is granted but until the term begins
it is vested only 'in interest' or 'reversion', and not 'in possession': it gives no present right
to enjoy any estate in land.66 The obligation to give vacant possession refers, in part, to
the legal right to possession of the estate that has been transferred, normally pursuant to
the sale and purchase contract and which is 'vested in possession'. This is the first
constituent element to vacant possession.
Factual possession
The vernacular meaning of 'possession' is physical occupation of tangible land, also
referred to in case law as 'actual' possession." To have actual possession, a person must
have a sufficient degree of control over the thing in question.68 Holmes wrote that "a man
must stand in a certain physical relation to the object and to the rest of the world, and
must have a certain intent".69 The term 'actual possession' is sometimes used to denote
the state of being 'in' possession of an estate, rather than merely having a right to possess
it or having constructive possession of it. It has been said that "in the modem law, de
facto or actual possession is the closest to the ordinary or lay meaning of the term".70 The
term 'natural possession' is also sometimes used along with occupation.I' 'Occupation'
itself is not a legal term of art with a single and uniform meaning; its meaning has been
held to vary according to the subject matter and context.f and the term 'occupier' has
been said to be an expression of varying meanings.P Furthermore it has been suggested
64 Fearne, C. Contingent Remainders (4th edn Stahan & Woodfal1, London 1844) volume 1,2, citedwithapproval in
Pearson v IRC [1981] AC 753, 772.
65 That is, the exerciseanduse ofthe right andhaving the full benefitof it- see Kenny v Preen [1963] 1 QB 499, per
PearsonLJ. a1511.
66 Long v Tower Hamlets LBC [';996] 2 All ER 683.
67 Prasad v Wolverhamplon PC [1983] 2 All ER 140.
68 Panesar, S. General Principles ofProperty Law (Longman, Essex 2001) 134.
69 Holmes, O.W. The CommonI.aw (Belknap, Cambridge, Mass: 1963) 216.
70 Wonnacott, above n60, 13.
71 Ibid 13
72 Grd;,si';' Holdings v P&O Property Holdings [1996]1 WLR 109,per Lord Nicolls al 110.
7J Hunter v Canary Whorl [199/] AC 655, per Lord Cooke at 712.
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that "[t]he difference between possession and occupation is rather technical and, even to
those experienced in property law, often rather,elusive and hard to grasp".74
A person who is physically present on land isin occupation of it. The presence might be
personal, or through goods and chattels or agents or employees. A person who does not
have a physical presence on land might, nonetheless, be treated as occupying it in certain
casea." As discussed above, "the right to actual unimpeded physical enjoyment has been
said to be comprised in the right to vacant possession";" a right that should be capable of
immediate enjoyment on completion (or the operative date under a contract). It is
therefore possible to identify this factual sense of possession as the second constituent
element of the obligation to give vacant possession. Indeed, it has been said that:
"... if an estate carries with it a right of occupation, then a person's possession of
the estate is frequently made manifest by occupation. ,,77
This would seem an appropriate means to explain the second constituent element of the
obligation to give vacant possession, and the obligation more generally. Deputy Judge
Wheeler in Sheikh seemed to have reduced the obligation to give vacant possession to the
legal right to possession that followed from the transfer of the estate in land. As noted
earlier, it was said that the right to vacant possession had been passed to the purchaser:
"...once completion had taken place on January 5 1984 the right to vacant
possession had passed to the plaintiff and it was he, and he alone, who was
entitled to assert that right against [the unlawful occupierj.t"
It is clear that the judge failed to appreciate the second dimension of vacant possession,
the ability to occupy the estate in a factual sense (i.e. the ability to enjoy the right to
14 Alici v LRButlin Ltd [2006] I WLR 201,per Neuberger L.J. at 207.
15 Bacchiochii v Academic Agency Ltd [1998] I WLR l3l3; c.f. Esselte v Pearl Assurance [1997] I WLR 981 and
Barnett v O'Sullivan [1994] I WLR 1667. A person in legal possession of an estate in landis also often in occupation
of it andit is forthisreason thatthe term 'possession' is oftenusedto refer to occupation andthetwo seenas largely
interchangeable. However a double dissociation can be drawn: a person in occupation of land is not necessarily in
possession ofanyestate in it, anda person in possession of anestate is notnecessarily occupying anytangible land in
which thatestate subsists. Wonnacott, above.n60, 13 gives four examples of the dissociationbetween possession of
an estate in-the land and occupation of the physical land. Wherepossession and occupation are confused, perverse
decisions have been laid down - see Bruton v Londonand QuadrantHousingTrust(1874) 2 EGLR59 andAllan v
Liverpool Overseers (1874) LR 9 QB 180.
76 Cumberland, aboven35,per LordGreene at 272.
77 Wonnacott, above n60, 114.
7BSheikh, above n34,per Deputy Judge Wheeler at 274.
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possession that was transferred). If the judge had taken into account the factual
dimension then he would not have described vacant possession merely as a right which,
in the absence of any competing legal claim, passes to the purchaser on completion and,
further held that in such cases, the seller would not be in breach of his obligation to give
vacant possession so long as the legal right to possession had passed. In fact, it is more
accurate and consistent with understandings of 'possession' in property law more widely
to say that vacant possession is only given if enjoyment (in the sense of actual
occupation) is achievable on completion (or at the relevant time) pursuant to the right to
possession which is received by the buyer upon legal transfer of the estate in land. This
on a practical level is also essential in the majority of cases (for example, where the
purchaser is moving house and will want to take up occupation of their new property that
day). As such, it reflects the inherently practical dimension to the procurement of vacant
possession.
Constructive possession
A third meaning associated with the term possession is that of 'constructive possession'.
This is commonly used in contrast to 'actual possession', to refer to possession of
something otherwise than by actual occupation. This is common in so called 'land tax'
cases where the taxation consequences sometimes depend upon whether a person in
possession of an estate is also in occupation of the land.79 'Constructive possession' is
also commonly used in a fictional sense to refer to the process by which the law deems a
person presently to be 'in' possession of an estate, when, in fact, he or she is not.80
A reversionary freehold gives no present right to enjoy any estate in land;81 the right to
enjoy the estate is postponed until some future date, as the tenant has the immediate right
to possession vested in them. As such, the reversioner is only entitled to the receipt of
rents and profits. The phrase 'rents and profits' was applied in the context of section
70(l)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925, which has since been repealed by the Land
79 Panesar, above 068, 134.
80 Ibid, 114.Theideaof constructive possession canbe compared to the doctrine of'constructive notice' which deems
a party with having knowledge which they did not in fact have. See also Howell, 1. 'Notice: A Broad View and a
Narrow View' (1996) Cony 34; Partington, M. 'Implied Covenants for Title in Registered Freehold Land' (1988) Cony
18 and Sheridan, L.A. 'Notice and Registration' (1950) NILQ 33.'
81 Long v Tower Hamlets, above 066.
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Registration Act 2002 and replaced with schedule 3,. paragraph 2, discussed further
below.81 (a) Under the Land Registration Act 1925, all third party rights in registered land
took effect in equity as minor interests, other than those registrable in their own right
(such as, registered charges) and overriding interests.82 The list of overriding interests
was set out in section 70 of the 1925 Act. An overriding interest would override any
registered disposition of the land, although the interest did not appear on the title register,
and even though a buyer may have had no notice of it. One of those overriding interests
was set out in section 70(1)(g) which conferred overriding status on:
"The rights of every person in actual occupation of the land or in receipt ofthe
rents and profits thereof, save where enquiry is made of such person and the
rights are not disclosed.,,83
The rights under section 70(1)(g) extended to cover the person who, although not in
actual occupation of the land, was in receipt of rents and profits from the land. A buyer
had, therefore, to enquire of every occupier to whom they paid rent.84 Commentators
have used constructive possession to refer to the receipt of an estate in land subject to
some prior interest (such as a lease or tenancy). Farrand explains that a sale subject to a
pre-existing lease or tenancy would cause only constructive possession to be passed:
"What the purchaser is entitled to get in the way of possession on completion
depends, of course, on what the contract says. Thus, if the sale were made
expressly subject to some tenancy or other, then the purchaser would only be
entitled to constructive possession (i.e. the receipt of rents and profits) ... n85
Yet, vacant possession is necessarily concerned with the entitlement to be put into 'actual
possession' on completion or at the relevant time, pursuant to the right to possession
which is passed with transfer ofthe estate in land. As Farrand continued:
81(.) Section 70(l)(g), Land RegistrationAct, 1925and schedule 3, paragraph 2, Land RegistrationAct 2002.
82 Section2, Land Registration Act, 1925. Chapter 7 includes a detailed analysis-of theseprovisions.
8J Section 70(1)(g),Land RegistrationAct, 1925.Emphasis added.
&4The personhadto actuallybe in receiptof rent. Protection was lost if no steps aretakento enforcepaymentor rent
is waived - see ES Schwab & Co v McCarthy [1975] 31 P & CR 196 and Strand Securities v Caswell [1965] 1 Ch
958. See also UCB Group Ltd v Hedworth [2002] 46 EG 200.
85 Farrand, JT. Contract and conveyance (OyezPublications, London 1964)259.
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".. .if the sale were made expressly with vacant possession on completion, then
the purchaser would be entitled to actual possession, i.e. in the sense of
ti ,,86occupa IOn...
Pollock and Wright8? suggested that constructive possession represents a third type of
possession distinct from legal and factual possession. They equate constructive
possession with 'the right to possession' which is seen "to vest in the true owner even
where the subject matter of the possession is vested in another person, albeit that the
other person is a wrongful possessor".88 Panesar89 stated that "a person will be deemed to
have constructive possession when he or she has a right to take actual possession". Be1l9o
also viewed constructive possession as a third distinct type of possession (after legal and
factual possession) and defined 'immediate constructive possession' as being where a
person has an immediate and unqualified right to take actual possession. In the event that
the party with the right to vacant possession is not so able to take actual possession
(perhaps because of an unlawful occupier in the premises at completion), but legally has
the estate vested in them, their right to immediate actual possession could be seen to
cause them to be in 'immediate constructive possession' on Bell's definition of the term."
Indeed, the obiter comments in Sheikh could be likened to this definition of constructive
possession. In Sheikh the judge considered that a vendor who had contracted to give
vacant possession did fulfill his contractual obligation if, at the date fixed for completion,
there was a third party who had no legal claim to possession. In such a case he
considered that it was for the purchaser to seek his remedy in the county court against the
trespasser, given that the "legal right to possession had passed to the purchaser on
completionv.f Where the purchaser has the right to possession even though the property
was occupied by another person, albeit that the other person was a wrongful possessor,
the purchaser can be seen to be in immediate constructive possession, on Bell's analysis.
86 Ibid.
81 Pollock, E. and Wright R. Possession in the Common Law (Clarendon Publishing. Oxford 1888) 17.
88 Ibid, 17.
89 Wonnacott, above .060, 13.
90 Beli, A.P. The Modern Law ofPersonal Property in England and Ireland (Butterworths, London 1989) 53.
91 As noted, this contrasts with the view expressed by Farrand, above nRS, 278, however,Jhat receiving an estate
_subject to a lease or some other incumbrance to enjoyment could constitute obtaining constructive possession by
virtue ofbeing entitled to the receipts ofrents and profits (section 205 (1) (xix) Law of Property Act 1925).
92 Sheikh, above n34, per Deputy Judge Wheeler at 271.
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This further underlies how the (obiter) comments in Sheikh failed to reflect both essential
elements of the obligation to give vacant possession, which necessarily concerns actual
possession: on completion pursuant to the right to vacant possession that had been
transferred. As discussed earlier in this chapter, other cases'" appreciated the factual
dimension to vacant possession (even though they did not show any explicit awareness of
this in the respective judgements), in addition to the legal aspect. As such, by focusing
only on the legal right to possession, the understanding of vacant possession proposed in
Sheikh was more analogous with a form of constructive possession, than vacant
possession (which includes the factual element of actual occupation) on completion. This
is inherently contradictory to the substance of the obligation to give vacant possession in
its practical context as referring to the immediate right to actual occupation of an estate
vested in possession.
As noted above, the rights under section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925
extended to cover a person who, although not in actual occupation of the land, was in
receipt of rents and profits from the land. Under the Land Registration Act 2002, the term
'overriding interests' is abandoned." rather the 2002 Act refers to unregistered interests
which override first registration, which are listed in schedule I, and unregistered interests
which override a registered disposition, which are listed in schedule 3. One such
unregistered interest which will override first registration are the interests of persons in
actual occupation:
"An interest belonging to a person in actual occupation so far as the interest
relates to the land of which the person is in occupation, except for an interest
under a settlement under the Settled Land Act 1925.,,95
This category of interest is, however, more restricted in that protection is limited to the
land that is actually occupied." Further, protection is no longer given to those who are in
receipt of rents and profits of the land. The subtle change to section 70(1)(g) of the Land
Registration Act 1925 in the Land Registration Act 2002 can be seen, perhaps
93 For example, Cumberland, above n35; Royal Bristol Permanent Building Society, above n21 aud Engel! v Finck,
above n23.
')4 Althoughthe term reappears in the Land Registration Rules 2003, perhaps inadvertently. Sec rules 28 anc 5/.
Theseseemto havebeencopiedoverfrom rules under the 1925Act.
95 Paragraph 2. schedule I, Land Registration 2002.
96 To the extent thatthe interest relatesto land that is not actuallyoccupied, the interest is not protected. The Land
Registration Act 2002 effectively reverses the effects ofFerrishurst Ltd v Wallcite Ltd [1999] Ch 355.
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inadvertently, to strengthen the analysis of the constituent dements of the obligation to
give vacant possession which has been undertaken in-this chapter. As noted above; the
2002 Act no longer affords protection to those in receipt of rents and profits (i.e, those in
constructive possession) but only to those in actual occupation of the specific extent of
the property in question. On a first registration of unregistered land, under schedule 1 to
the 2002 Act, those in receipts of rents and profits (i.e. those in constructive possession
on Farrand's definition of the term) will no longer pose a barrier to the receipt of vacant
possession by the purchaser (previously under the 1925 legislation they would have).
Only those in actual/factual occupation of an estate vested in possession will constitute a
barrier to vacant possession being given. This is consistent with the analysis of the
obligation undertalcen in this chapter and the focus on the legal and factual dimension to
the obligation. Those who would previously have been able to claim an overriding
interest by some form of constructive possession only will now fail under the 2002 Act
given that their interest would have to be vested in possession and be factually apparent
to constitute a barrier to vacant possession. This therefore supports the analysis in this
thesis of the essential elements ofvacant possession as a property law concept."
Conclusion
This chapter has developed a more coherent understanding of the obligation to give
vacant possession. A discussion of conflicting case law relating to unlawful occupation
assisted in identifying two aspects to the obligation to give vacant possession: the legal
right to possession (which follows from the transfer of a non-reversionary estate in land)
and the ability for the party with that right to actually possess the land (in a factual sense)
pursuant to that right. It was further shown that there is a timing element to the factual
part of the obligation, with occupation of the estate being judged at the point of
completion, This is fundamental to an understanding of the nature of the obligation and
resolves the previous uncertainty as to whether trespassers breached the vacant
possession obligation. Given that unlawful occupiers, like legal tenants or licensees,
prevent the receiving party from being able to immediately occupy the estate in land as a
matter of fact, the obligation will be breached just as when legal (or lawful) occupiers
remain in the property on completion. This becomes explicable by articulating vacant
97 A more detailed discussion of the issues connected to section 70(1)(g) is undertaken in chapter 7, including a
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· possession as involving both the .legal right 'to possession (which follows from the
transfer of the estate in land) and factual occupation of the estate. Some case law failed to
, recognise both elements of the vacant possession obligation, such as the decision in
Sheikh where only the legal element of the obligation was considered. Analysis of such a
decision, and competing authorities on the point, is valuable in identifying the nature of
the obligation in the practical context as involving a factual as well as a legal element. As
such, the obligation comprises two parts which must be understood together and not in
isolation of each other.
The decision in Sheikh, and other decisions relating to third party occupation, emphasised
the absence of a coherent concept of vacant possession. Some decisions did not even
refer to the term, whilst others used the term but did not go into detail on what the
expression actually meant. The decisions reflected a pre-disposed, but unarticulated,
understanding of what vacant possession meant, treating it as something assumed and
understood and therefore not needing proper comment, discussion or elaboration. There
was therefore. no consistent concept of vacant possession, but rather a lack of sufficient
infrastructure to interpret the obligation throughout the decisions. This further explains
why there has been a lack of coherent understanding as to the nature and effect of the
term. A lack of consideration of the constituent parts of the obligation explains why
judges and others have failed to articulate what giving vacant possession actually
involves.
A review of literature defining key concepts such as 'possession' and 'occupation' assisted
in interpreting the legal right to possession, and the factual ability to occupy, as two
distinct yet interrelated elements ofthe vacant possession obligation. Possession is a term
with varying meanings but, in the context of vacant possession, it has been shown to
refer to both legal (de jure) and factual (de facto) possession. The legal possession
manifest in the obligation relates to the passing of the right to occupy an estate in land
that is vested in possession (i.e. not in interest or reversion). The factual element has been
shown to relate to actual occupation of the estate transferred at the point of completion.
Vacant possession is therefore not concerned with notions of constructive possession or
deemed. possession, by virtue of the-receipt of rents and profits. The exclusion in the
reviewofthe development ofthe rights afforded to people in actual occupation overtime.
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Land Registration Act 2002, of a person in receipts of rents and profits from the
definition of persons who may be able to claim an overriding interest, reflects the
principle that only interests vested in possession, and which are factually apparent, are
relevant barriers to the procurement of vacant possession. This is consistent with the two
dimensional nature of the obligation to give vacant possession, proposed in this chapter.
It is also fundamental to an appreciation of the concept of vacant possession in the wider
context of scholarly literature on possession in English law, and its place in those legal
transactions where it is an essential element. This new definition of vacant possession
supplements existing understandings of 'possession' in other and alternative
manifestations of the term. Chapter 8 further develops this understanding of vacant
possession, in the wider theoretical framework of possession, with reference to other
possession-type concepts, those of actual occupation and adverse possession.
This understanding of the legal and factual dimensions to the obligation can now be
applied, in the following chapter, to cases concerning so-called 'legal obstacles' to the
receipt of vacant possession. As noted in chapter 1, so called legal obstacles do not relate
to physical items or persons, but impediments of a legal nature (such as the requisitioning
of a property for government purposes, or compulsory purchase orders).98 It is in this
context that the analysis can be applied to explain why the law appears inconsistent. This
further supports the proposition that the constituent elements of vacant possession
comprise both the right to possession (pursuant to the transfer of an estate vested in
possession) and the factual enjoyment of that estate on completion or at the operative
date, and how understanding of these is a prerequisite to an understanding of case law
pertaining to the obligation.
" See Topfell, above 038; Re Winslow Hall Estate Company v United Glass Bottle Manufacturers Ltd [1941] Ch 503;
Hillingdon Estates Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd [1952] Ch. 627; E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Ltd v NSR Ltd [1997]
AC 400; James Macara, Ltd v Barclay [1945] K. B. 148; Coote v Taylor [1942] Ch 349 aod Korogluyan v Matheau
[1975] 239 E.G. 649.
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Chapter 6
The Nature of the! Obligation - Legal Obstacles
Chapter 5 analysed the legal and factual elements of the obligation to give vacant
possession in order to provide further understanding of the nature of the obligation.
Possession is a term with varying meanings but, in the context of vacant possession, it
was shown to refer to both legal and factual possession. The legal possession manifest
in the obligation relates to the passing of an estate in land that is vested in possession
(i.e. not in 'interest' or in 'reversion'). The factual element was shown to relate to actual
occupation of the estate transferred at the point of completion.
This understanding of the legal and factual dimensions to the obligation can now be
applied to cases concerning so-called 'legal obstacles' to the receipt of vacant
possession. As noted in chapter l , so-called legal obstacles relate to impediments of a
legal nature (such as the requisitioning of a property for govermnent purposes, or
compulsory purchase orders).1 It is in this context that the model of vacant possession
expounded in the previous chapter can be used to explain why the relevant cases
otherwise appear inconsistent. Whilst the obligation is interpreted in the wider context
of the transaction more generally, it is suggested that this is another area in which case
law demonstrates that the concept has not been coherently developed. Analysis of these
cases, based on the model proposed in the previous chapter, further supports the
proposition that the constituent elements ofvacant possession comprise both the right to
possession (pursuant to the transfer of an estate vested in possession) and the factual
enjoyment of that estate on completion (or at the operative date). They also demonstrate
how invocation of such a model is essential in order to articulate the meaning of vacant
.. .possession III any given case.
I See Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] 1 W.L.R. 446; Re Winslow Hall Estate Company v United Glass
Bottle Manufacturers Ltd [1941] Ch 503; Hillingdon Estates Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd [1952] Ch. 627; E Johnson
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What an, legal obstacles?
Examples of legal obstacles which prevent the delivery of vacant possession on
completion include the transfer of a strip of land subject to dedication as a' public
highway.' on the basis that the highway authority has the right to possession of the
surface (although not owner of the sub-soil); or a property (with an existing first floor
tenancy) being sold with 'vacant possession of the ground floor', but with a Housing Act
notice limiting occupation of the whole house to one household?
In Weir v Area Estates Limited.' the claimant contracted to purchase freehold property
with vacant possession (having successfully bid for it at auction). The register of title to
the freehold estate included an entry of a nine year lease of the property granted in
2004. The lease had purportedly been surrendered by the tenant in 2006, but notice of
the lease had not been removed from the register. In the sale contract, the seller
expressly contracted to give vacant possession, and other terms stated that the lease,
whilst still referred to on the register, had been determined by operation oflaw, and that
the buyer would:
"accept the position and shall not be entitled to require any further proof of the
determination.,,5
At the time of the purported surrender of the lease, a petition in bankruptcy had been
presented against the tenant who was subsequently declared bankrupt. As such, the lease
was held not to have been validly surrendered pursuant to section 284 of the Insolvency
Act 1986, which renders void any disposition of property by a bankrupt in the period
beginning with the day upon which the bankruptcy petition is presented at court and
ending on the statutory vesting of the bankrupt's estate in the trustee in bankruptcy.
The court granted summary judgment to the purchaser to rescind the contract, and
dismissed the seller's counterclaim for damages (given it had subsequently sold the
& Co (Barbados) Ltd v NSR Ltd [1997] AC 400; James Macara, Ltd v Barclay [1945] K. B. 148; Cook v Taylor
[1942] Ch 349 and Koroglayan v Matheou [1975] 239 E.G. 649.
2 Secretary ofState for the Environment v Baylis and Bennett [2000]80P. &C.R. 324.
3 Topfell Ltd, above nl.
4 [2009] All ER (D) 189 (Dec).
'Ibid, 192.
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property to a third party for a lower price than had been bid by the purchaser at auction).
As the seller had contracted to sell with vacant possession, the seller could not convey
the property with vacant possession until the lease had been validly surrendered or
disclaimed by the tenant's trustee in bankruptcy. As this had not taken place, and the
lease was held to still be in existence at completion, the seller was accordingly in
breach.6
Whilst these cases provide clear examples of legal impediments to vacant possession,
other cases have provided an inconsistent picture as to whether vacant possession can
be, and is, given at the relevant time, with respect to orders to requisition a property or
the service of notices of compulsory purchase. Decisions which appear inherently
contradictory can, however, be explained when analysed on the basis of an
interpretation of the obligation to give vacant possession as involving a factual and legal
dimension, as proposed in the previous chapter.
The following discussion demonstrates that where the acquiring authority had actually
taken factual possession, or had the legal right to possession vested in them (legal
possession), at the date fixed by the parties for completion, the vendor was held to be
unable to give vacant possession; the legal right to possession and the factual ability to
occupy pursuant to that right (the elements of the obligation to give vacant possession)
no longer both being vested in the vendor, and therefore no longer capable of being
passed from the vendor to the purchaser. The decisions (such as those set in war time
and when the government required land for a specific public purpose), also show the
courts taking account of the wider context of the relevant circumstances when
interpreting the obligation to give vacant possession, confirming the inherently fact
specific nature of the obligation that was also highlighted in the previous chapter.
6 The decision appears to have turned on particular insolvency provisions and their interpretation, and may well be
appealed on thebasisthat a surrender of the leasehadbeenvalidly effected. Theeffect of the decision, however, is to
correctly confirm that a subsisting legal estate or interest willbe a legalharrier to the receipt of vacant possession, as
expressly contracted for, on completion.
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Requisitioning ofproperties
A small collection of cases concern the government requisitioning of properties under
provisions of the Defence (General) Regulations 1939; the common set of
circumstances to these cases being that the parties had entered into written agreements
for sale and purchase of a property that became subject to a requisitioning notice before
completion. In war time it was necessary for properties to be requisitioned for defence-
related purposes and obviously important that the government was given vacant
possession pursuant to the requisitioning notice. This was in order for the property to
immediately be put to official use. Some cases are clear that a requisitioning notice will
not create an encumbrance on the land so as to prevent a seller from giving vacant
possession to the purchaser. Conversely, other cases suggest that such requisitioning
will prevent the seller from delivering vacant possession to the purchaser at the material
time pursuant to the contract for sale,"
In Re Winslow Hall Estate Company v United Glass Bottle Manufacturers Ltd,8 a
contract for the sale of land had been entered into between the parties. Following the
contract, but before completion, notice was given on behalf of the government to the
purchasers that it intended to requisition the land under the Defence (General)
Regulations. Regulation 51, made under the provisions of the Emergency Powers
(Defence) Acts 1939 and 1940, provided that:
"A competent authority, if it appears to that authority to be necessary or
expedient so to do in the interests of the public safety, the defence ofthe realm
or the efficient prosecution of the war, or for maintaining supplies and services
essential to the life of the community, may take possession of any land, and
may give such directions as appear to the competent authority to be necessary
or expedient in connection with the taking ofpossession of that land.,,9
The purchasers took out a vendor and purchaser summons under section 49 of the Law
of Property Act 1925, seeking rescission of the contract. They asked for a declaration
that the vendors were tillable to show a good title to the premises or to perform their part
of the contract because they had impliedly contracted, or were estopped from denying
7 Theeffectof thisforthe requisitioning authority is expounded inthedetailed analysis that follows.
8 Above, 01.
9 Regulation 51, Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts 1939 and 1940.
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that they had contracted, to give vacant possession and could not do so as a result of the
notice. Alternatively, it was claimed that the sellers had impliedly contracted to convey
free from any incumbrance not mentioned in the contract and were now unable to do so.
The 'giving' of the requisition notice was held not to create an encumbrance on the land.
Bennett J. observed that, in the context of the regulation which he was considering,
there was no requirement for the giving of a notice. He explained:
"There is no provision in the Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts 1939 and
1940, and there is no provision in the regulations to which I have been referred
which makes it incumbent upon the Office of Works, or upon any other
competent authority, to exercise the powers which reg 51 gives them to give
notice of their intention so to do to persons whose property they propose to
take under the provisions of the regulation. It seems to me really a polite
intimation on the part of the government that they propose to act, and it does
not, in my judgment, create any greater incumbrance upon the land of the
purchasers which it is proposed to take under this regulation. Anybody's land in
Great Britain to-day is liable to be taken under the provisions of this regulation.
In my judgment, it is not possible to hold that the notice of 25 January created
an incumbrance so as to prevent the vendors from performing the contract into
which they had entered.,,10
Further, at the date that was set for completion, the government had not actually taken
possession of the land, and as such it was held that the vendors were able to give vacant
possession to the purchaser (who would then, themselves, lose the land when the
government later took possession pursuant to the notice that was binding on the
property). However, the court held that:
"I am not going to decide what the position of the parties would have been if
possession had been taken before the date fixed for completion or before the
vendors were in a position to complete, since it appears from the evidence that
on February 3, 1941, the vendors were in a position to hand to the purchasers a
properly executed conveyance and to give them vacant possession of the
property which they had contracted to sell.,,1l
10 [1941] 3 All ER 124, per Bennett 1. a1127.
11 Ibid, per Bennett 1. at 131. Emphasis added,
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Clearly, therefore, the judge did not consider that service of the notice itselfprevented
the sellers from giving vacant possession on completion, and the fact that the
government had not actually taken possession before completion seemed material in
providing that vacant possession could be given on completion as between vendor and
purchaser. However, the judge seemed to suggest that if possession had been taken by
the government before completion, then different considerations would have applied.
The case of Cook v Taylor12 dealt with the effect of a requisitioning notice under the
same defence regulations. Simonds J. reached the conclusion that, a notice having been
served, the appropriate government authority had in fact 'entered into possession',
because there had been what he described as the "symbolic handing over of the keys of
the property" in questionY He referred to the decision of Bennett J. in Re Winslow Hall
Estates, and drew a distinction between that case and the case before him, holding that
on the date fixed for completion in this case the vendor was not in a position to
complete because the parting with the keys of the property was, as he put it, equivalent
to symbolic delivery of the property to the requisitioning authority:
"In the first place it was said that the requisition notice and what took place
before...the date fixed for completion...did not preclude actual possession
from being given. I do not take that view. It seems to me that, from the moment
when the requisitioning authority served the notice and took the keys from the
vendor, the vendor was not in a position to give vacant possession and was not
in a position to allow the purchaser to enter on the property. It does not appear
to me to be material whether it was before or after February 25 that occupation
was actually taken by those persons who ultimately became the occupants."14
The judge distinguished between the similar case of Re Winslow Hall Estates with
respect to the taking ofpossession:
"On that part of the case I refer to the decision of Bennett J. in re Winslow Hall
Estates, the facts of which were not very dissimilar but differ in one vital
point.... the government had not taken possession of the land. In the report
there is no reference to any taking possession of the land until occupation was
taken by the persons concerned... The vital difference between that case and
this, as it appears to me, is that here, as I hold, on the date fixed for completion
the vendor was not in a position to do that which he had contracted to do and
12 Above nl
B Ibid 352 .
14 Ibid: 352:Emphasisadded.
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give vacant possession to the purchaser, for he had already, pursuant to a
proper requisition, parted with the keys ofthe property, which is equivalent to
symbolical delivery of the property to the requisitioning authority. From that
moment he could not give vacant possession to the purchaser." 15
Clearly, the service of the requisition notice under regulation 51(1), followed by the
handing over of the keys to the acquiring authority between the contract date and the
completion date, was held to have deprived the vendor of the ability to give vacant
possession on the latter date, given that possession was no longer vested in the vendor.
Other authorities, however, suggest that from the moment when the requisition notice
was served on the vendor it was not in a position to give vacant possession; that is, the
notice itselfprevented the giving ofvacant possession.
Indeed, a third case dealing with the same regulations is the Court of Appeal decision in
James Macara Ltd v Barclay,16 where the defendant agreed to sell certain property to
the plaintiffs. Vacant possession was to be given on completion. Following exchange,
but before completion, a government department, as the competent authority under the
same Defence (General) Regulations 1939, served the defendant with a notice
requisitioning the property. The defendant's solicitors sent a copy of the requisition
notice to the plaintiffs; and the plaintiffs subsequently gave notice to the defendant that
they rescinded the contract on the ground of the defendant's inability to give vacant
possession.l" The defendant disputed this and contended that the requisition notice did
not, upon its true construction, amount to an exercise of the power to enter into
possession under the regulations, and, in fact, no actual entry had been made. Uthwatt
J., giving the only judgment of the Court of Appeal, observed that actual entry on the
land was not necessary for the due exercise of the power to take possession under the
regulations, and stated:
"What is required is that the immediate interest-an interest in possession-
entitling the Crown to control of the land should be at the disposition of the
Crown...the power to take possession has been effectively exercised, although
de facto possession has not been obtained. If actual entry be not necessary,
there can, we think, be no doubt that the power is effectively exercised by
notice which fairly brings to the mind of the person:affected that the power is
t. ;
15 Ibid, 352. Emphasis added.
16 Above 01
17 Ibid 149 ., .
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being exercised. A present intention stated to be exercised and communicated
to the persons concerned is sufficient."18
Whilst the cases of Re Winslow Hall Estates and Cook v Taylor were referred to in
argument" they were not discussed in the single judgment delivered by Uthwatt J.
Clearly, on the construction of the regulation in question, the Court of Appeal came to
the conclusion that whilst actual entry (i.e. taking factual possession) would no doubt be
one way of establishing possession and effecting the right conveyed by the regulation,
such an actual entry on the land was not necessary for the exercise of the power. This
was because there was not any particular provision, so far as the regulation was
concerned, which would determine the way in which the power to take possession
might be exercised. The first instance decision was therefore affirmed. This clearly
established that the service of the notice itselfconferred the legal right of possession on
the Crown, meaning that vacant possession could not be given as between seller and
purchaser thereafter. On this basis, the decision in Re Winslow Hall Estates must be
seen as overruled because whilst the judge did not consider that he needed to decide
what the position of the parties would have been if possession had been taken before the
date fixed for completion in that case, on the basis that the right to possession was
transferred when the notice was served (and not when actual possession was later taken)
he should have considered that very question, and ruled that vacant possession could not
be given on completion, given that the government could be treated as having 'entered
into possession' pursuant to the prior service of the notice itself.
It is apparent that differing judges' interpretations of the defence regulations determined
the decisions that were arrived at, and further, that this was based on the effect of the
regulations in transferring possession to the acquiring authority (as is discussed in more
detail below). The judges in each of the three cases sought to address the issue of
whether the acquiring authority had actually taken factual possession, or had the legal
right to possession, at the date fixed by the parties for completion. All the decisions
clearly demonstrated that where the acquiring authority had actually taken factual
possession, or had the legal right to possession, at the date fixed by the parties for
completion, the vendor was held unable to give vacant possession; the, legal right to
possession and the factual ability to occupy pursuant to that right (the essential elements
18 Ibid, per Utbwatt 1. at 154.
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, , of the obligation) no longer being vested in the vendor. A clearer articulation of the
nature and form ofthe two constituent elements of vacant possession therefore assists in
understanding what otherwise appear to be irreconcilable decisions. Without
demarcating the legal and factual elements, the decisions prove incapable of
explanation.
A purposive interpretation of the regulations, reflecting the (then) war time situation,
and need for the govermnent's efforts not to be hindered, may also be inferred from the
cases. Whilst none of the decisions specifically dealt with the meaning of the term,
universal to all the decisions is the fact that the govermnent was at no time hindered in
achieving its objectives by any of the decisions reached. In Re Winslow Hall19 it was
held that the govermnent had not actually taken possession ofthe land at the completion
date, and as such it was held that the sellers were able to give vacant possession to the
purchaser: that is, the decision did not adversely affect the governments' objectives. In
Cook v Taylor 20 Simonds J. reached the conclusion that vacant possession could not be
given on completion. He drew an (arguably artificial) distinction between the case
before him and the decision of Bennett J. in Re Winslow Hall Estates, holding that on
the date fixed for completion in the case before him, the vendor was not in a position to
complete because the parting with the keys of the property was, as he put it, equivalent
to 'symbolic delivery' of the property to the requisitioning authority. This enabled the
govermnent to take up occupation as was required, notwithstanding that factual
possession had not actually been taken. In James Macara Ltd v Barclay,21 Uthwatt J.
observed that actual entry on the land was not necessary for the due exercise of the
power to take possession under the regularions.f It was held that a "present intention
stated to be exercised and communicated to the persons concerned" was sufficient.f and
that service of the notice itself (rather than later acts undertaken) achieved this, thus
reflecting the government's need for an immediate interest in possession,
notwithstanding that it hadn't actually undertaken any subsequent acts consistent with
the taking of possession. These observations perhaps reflect a contemporaneous
interpretation of the obligation in the context of the specific circumstances during the
19 Above nl
20 Above: nl:
21 Above nl
22 Ibid, p;'r Uthwalt J. at 154.
23 Ibid.
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war time period, and the overriding need for the government to have possession
pursuant to the regulations in these cases. This was reinforced when the decision of
Bennett J. in Re Winslow Hall Estates was overruled by the Court of Appeal decision in
James Macara Ltd v Barclay. It is arguable that Bennett J.'8 determination as to whether
possession had been taken up was more policy-driven than doctrinal, given the
circumstances of the case before him and specific government requirements at that time.
Compulsory purchase orders
Cases relating to compulsory purchase orders also appear, on the surface, to provide an
inconsistent account of the meaning and context of the obligation to give vacant
possession. When considered in detail, and with reference to the preceding analysis,
however, such cases can assist in understanding the obligation to give vacant possession
in its factual and legal senses.
A compulsory purchase order allows certain bodies which need to obtain land or
property to do so without the consent of the owner. It may be used, for example, when
developing infrastructure (e.g. new roads) where a land owner does not wish to dispose
of the affected land. In respect of such orders, the authority acquiring the land or
property may serve a 'notice to treat', which is an invitation (by the acquiring authority)
to negotiate with the owner of the land that the authority wishes to procure. Once the
acquiring authority has served the notice to treat, and if private negotiations are not
successful, it is entitled to serve a 'notice of entry' which enables the authority to take
possession of the land pursuant to the compulsory purchase order.
Where a compulsory purchase order is made over the property between exchange and
completion, one question that has arisen is whether the purchaser could claim that the
contract has been 'frustrated' and that, as a result, the purchaser is not obliged to
complete. In such cases, the obligation to give vacant possession will no longer arise as
parties will be discharged from obligations under the contract.
If a contract is made, and for whatever reason it later becomes impossible for one party
to perform their obligations, then the doctrine of frustration may apply. The particular
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situation in question may have been expressly provided for in the contract, in the
context .of a force majeure clause. Alternatively, an event may take place that was not
contemplated by the parties but which renders further performance impossible.
. Examples include the destruction of the subject matter of the contract/" the
unavailability of an employee in an employment contract." or a subsequent change in
the law or circumstances which makes performance illegal." Most appropriate in the
context of vacant possession is the unavailability of the subject matter of the contract (ie
the property or land). For example, in Re Shipton, Anderson & Co the owner of a
specific parcel of wheat in a warehouse contracted to sell it on the terms "payment cash
within seven days against transfer order".27 Before delivery and before the property
passed to the buyer the wheat was requisitioned by and delivered to His Majesty's
Government under the powers of an Act passed before the date of the contract. It was
held that delivery of the wheat by the seller to the buyer had been rendered impossible
by the lawful requisition of the product by the Government. As such, the seller was
excused from performance of the contract 28
When a frustrating event occurs the contract is automatically discharged and the parties
are excused from their future obligations. Because no one party is at fault, neither party
may claim damages for the other's non-performance.f It is for this reason that a party
may seek to claim that a contract has been 'frustrated' and that, as a result, the seller is
discharged from its obligation to give vacant possession on completion.
In Korogluyan v Matheou30 the question to be decided was whether notices served
pursuant to the provisions of section 11 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, stating
that the acquiring authority would be 'entering upon the land', meant that it was no
longer possible for the seller to give vacant possession. It was held that although still in
24 Taylor v Caldwell (1863) 3 B&S 826.
25 Condon The Barron Knights [1966]1 WLR 87 and Hare v Murphy Bros [1974] I.C.R 603.
26 Denny Matt & Dickson Ltd v James B Fraser & Co Ltd [1944] A.C. 265 and Ibrosa v Fairbairn [1943] AC 32.
27 [1915] 3 KB 676.
28 See also Bank Line Ltd v Arthur Capel & Co [1919] A.C. 435.
29 The general rule is that the 'loss lies whereit falls' so no claim can be made forthe valueof a partially completed
contract. See Appleby v Myers (1867) LR 2 QP 651.
30 [1975] 30 P. & C.R 309.
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possession, the seller was unable' to'give vacant possession on completion in accordance
with the contract.31 Whitford J said:
"... the word 'possession' should be considered in what might perhaps be
described as its popular rather than its technical sense, and that if one
considers the position of a person buying a property of this kind and buying it
upon this basis, that they are expecting to get vacant possession when the
purchase is completed, it would really be distorting language to suggest that if
it was being sold to them in circumstances where there had been a compulsory
purchase order and a notice to treat and a notice to enter, they were in fact
getting anything which could sensibly be described as vacant
possession...Were it not for the fact that I think the defendant's case fails on
special condition 9 and general condition 6, I would for my own part have
come to the conclusion that in fact at the relevant time the plaintiff was not in a
position to sell with vacant possession, in the sense in which I think those
words ought sensibly to be construed in the context ofthe whole transaction. ,,32
Whist these comments were obiter, this decision clearly suggested that the service of
the notice prevented the delivery of vacant possession as was contracted for. The
language of the judgment suggested that the judge was seeking to apply a common
sense analysis to the context of the case, to determine whether what 'could sensibly be
described as vacant possession' could be given in such a case (even though no actual
definition was provided).
These obiter comments can be shown to conflict with established authorities however,
such as Hillingdon Estates Co v Stonefield Estates Ltd 33 In this case the parties agreed
to the sale and purchase of certain land. The completion of the transaction was delayed,
inter alia, by the outbreak of war, and at a time when the contract was still
uncompleted, the local County Council made a compulsory purchase order affecting the
whole of the property. Notices to treat under the order were served on the vendors and
on the purchasers. The purchasers claimed that, on or before the date of the service of
the notices to treat, they were discharged from their contract to purchase the property
alleging that they had entered into the contract on the footing that they would be able to
develop the land after completion.l" This would not be possible if the property was
compulsorily purchased. They therefore claimed a declaration that they were discharged
31 Even thoughthe purchaser was deprived of damages by-certain conditionsof sale.
32 Above, n30,per Whitford J. at 31L Emphasis added,
33 Above 01
34 Ibid 627 ', ,
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from liability under the contract and entitled to the return of interest on the deposit paid.
Vaisey 1. did not regard the service of the notice to treat as a frustrating event. He said:
"I cannot hold that the contract here has been frustrated fundamentally, or
indeed, at all. The purchasers in this case are certainly no worse off than they
would have been if they had completed their contract in a period rather less
than 12 years from the time when they agreed to complete it. Had they
completed the contract without the delay of 12 years, quite clearly the
compulsory purchase order would have affected them. However that may be, I
have to consider the matter as I fmd it; and taking into consideration the long
delay which has taken place, I still think that the contract, so far from being
frustrated, can and should be carried out.,,35
The court held that the purchasers were treated as owners in equity as soon as a binding
contract was made. The service of a notice to treat did not affect the vendors given that
their interest was to receive the purchase money; it followed that the risk of compulsory
purchase properly fell on the purchasers, who were not entitled to rescind because of a
future incumbrance. The incumbrance was therefore not a frustrating event as far as the
contract was concerned. Vacant possession could be given in accordance with the
contract, even though this was not the substantive issue in the case which came before
the court.
The same decision was reached in E Johnson & Co (Barbados) Ltd v NSR Ltd,36 a
decision of the Privy Council, in which the court held that the publication of a notice
under section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act (Barbados),36(') warning that land under the
contract of sale was likely to be required for Crown purposes, did not frustrate the
contract. It was held that it was to be presumed, in the absence of specific provision to
the contrary, that the purchaser had agreed to accept the normal risks incidental to land
ownership as from the date of the contract, including the risk of interference with land-
owning rights by the Crown. Their Lordships referred to Re Hillington Estates where
Vaisey J., in the context of a notice to treat served by an acquiring authority after
exchange of contracts but before completion, had remarked:
35 Ibid,per VaiseyJ. at 631.
36 Above, n l.
36(a) Thespecificyear of theAct wasnot referred to in thejudgment orcasereports.
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"No doubt these departmental interferences and interventions do make a very
great difference to ordinary life in this country, but that does not mean that,
whenever such interference or intervention takes place, parties are discharged
from bargains solenmly entered into between them. In my judgment, it is fue
duty of the parties, in such a case as this, to carry out their obligations; and I
.cannot see that there is in this case any reason at all for supposing that there is
either an implied term of this contract that it should be frustrated in the event
which has happened, or that there has been such a destruction of the
fundamental and underlying circumstances on which the contract is based as to
justify my saying that the contract did not exist, or ceased to exist at the date
when the notice to treat was served...,,37
Their Lordships considered that these observations were equally applicable to the
position in this case after the publication of the section 3 notice. 38 They also referred to
the case ofAmalgamated Investment & Property Co. Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd,39
where a building was entered in the statutory list of buildings of special architectural or
historical interest a few days after the date of a contract for its sale. The listing had the
effect of dramatically reducing its market valuc.l'' The Court of Appeal held that the risk
of a building being listed was one that every owner and purchaser must recognise that
he is subject to with the result that the contract was not frustrated. The judges
considered that a section 3 notice could not amount to a frustrating event on the same
basis.4 1 What is most salient in the decision is that, in holding that the notice did not
amount to a frustrating event, it was held that the limited powers accruing to the Crown
pursuant to the issue of a section 3 notice did not extend to a right to immediate
possession:
"The crucial question was whether the possession which [the vendor] had been
in a position to give on the date for completion was something other than
vacant possession within the meaning of the contract. If the acquiring authority
had the right to immediate possession at completion date, then the vendor could
not then give vacant possession, but a section 3 notice did not give the Crown
37 Above, nl,per Vaisey J. at 634.
3S The abolition of the equitable doctrine of conversion by section 213 of the Property Act 1979 did not discredit the
reasoning in Hillingdon Estates Co. v Stonefield Estates Ltd [1952] Ch. 627. Land which is subject to a contract, at
: the time of the decision, devolved to those entitled to realty rather than to those entitled to personality. As between
; the parties to a contract the incidence of beneficial ownership and risk continued to be governed by the fundamental
principle flowing from the specifically enforceable nature of the contract which allocated equitable ownership and
risk to the purchaser on exchange of contracts.
39 [1977] 1 W.L.1l 164.
40 Ibid, 164.
4\ Ibid, 164.
171
any such right. Johnsons had been in a position to give vacant possession on
1 ti ,,42comp eon...
The effect of the notice, in terms of whether it took from the seller the right to
possession, was analysed and, because the notice did not give the Crown an 'inunediate
right' to possession, it did not prevent the owner of the land from being able to give
vacant possession on completion. Accordingly, the vendors were in a position to give
vacant possession on completion and the purchasers were in breach of contract for
refusing to complcte.t' Most saliently, the judgment clarified that the rights of entry and
inspection conferred by section 3 of the relevant statute fell well short of the right of
possession conferred by a requisition notice under regulation 51 of the Defence
(General) Regulations 1939 (such as was found in the decisions in Re Winslow Hall,
Cook v Taylor and James Macara v Barclay), or by notice of entry under section 11(1)
of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965. This was because both of these provisions
entitled the relevant authority to dispossess the owner of the land (i.e. take possession
from them). In this case it was held that the purchasers remained free to enter onto the
land and to use it for any purpose, that is, they retained the right to possession and
ability to occupy pursuant to that right. As such, the obligation to give vacant
possession was therefore held to be 'capable of being performed' (i.e. they could pass,
on completion, legal possession with the inunediate ability for the purchaser to factually
occupy - the essential elements of the obligation to give vacant possession, as set out in
chapter 5). Further, the effect of the notice did not render the procurement of vacant
possession something "radically different from that which was undertaken by the
contract".44 The possession that could be transferred was the possession that was
contracted for by the purchasers. The judge held that:
42 Above, nl per Vaisey 1. at 634.
43 Above, 039.
44 Davis Contractors Ltd v Fareham Urban District Council [1956]A.C. 696, per Lord Radcliffe at729.
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; I
"... a threat of compulsory purchase, and publication of a section 3 notice...does
not radically alter the nature of the contract of sale. What it does is simply to
increase the likelihood of an existing albeit remote risk becoming an
eventuality.,,45
This demonstrated an appreciation by the judge that the context of the transaction was
relevant to the court's interpretation of what the obligation to give vacant possession
meant, although this was not explicitly discussed. The determinative point from this
case was that the issue of a section 3 notice did not extend to a right to 'immediate
possession' so as to prevent the owner of the land from being able to give vacant
possession to a purchaser on completion. This was the crucial fmding; the fact that the
property may ultimately have been compulsorily purchased (pursuant to notice) after
completion, was irrelevant to whether the seller had possession (in law) and could
factually occupy pursuant to that right on completion. Barriers to vacant possession
which occur after that date are not relevant, thus supporting the timing element to the
factual part of the obligation as proposed in the previous chapter.
As such, the decision in E Johnson & Co casts doubt on the obiter comments of
Whitford J. in Korogluyan v Matheou which suggested that the service of a notice under
section 11 of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 would prevent vacant possession
being given, even though the seller remained in possession himself at the material
time.46 These comments can be seen as incorrect given that they failed to properly
consider whether the effect of the notice was to deprive the seller of legal or de facto
possession of the estate (the constituent elements of the obligation to give vacant
possession) at the point of completion. The learned judge's failure to properly consider
the legal and factual dimensions to the obligation was reinforced by Lord Jauncey's
remarks in E Johnson & Co on Korogluyan v Matheou, where he stated that:
"whether [the] views [expressed in Korogluyan v Matheou] were right or
wrong they threw no light on the effect of the notice in the case before [the
45 Ibid, 729.
46 See above, 030, per Whitford J. at 317 where it washeldthat"were it not forthe factthat I think the defendant's
case fails on special condition 9 and general condition 6, I wouldformy own part havecometo the conclusion thatin
factatthe relevant time~he plaintiffwasnot in a position to sell withvacant possession, in the sensein whichIthink
those words ought sensibly to be construed in the context ofthe wholetransaction".
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judge], since it gave the Crown no right to immediate possession before or by
the time fixedfor completion. ,,47 ::
Clearly, in E Johnson & Co Lord Jauncey accepted that the judgment in Korogluyan v
Matheou failed to address what this chapter has identified as the central issues relevant
to whether the legal right to possession, and ability to factually occupy pursuant to that
right, had passed to the requisitioning authority pursuant to the notice." Only a detailed
analysis of the constituent elements of vacant possession can explain why the decision
reached was incorrect; this follows from an understanding of the meaning of
'possession' in the context of the term 'vacant possession'.
In all the cases discussed in this chapter, the debate centred around whether the rights
conferred on the acquiring authority by the relevant notice included the right to
possession (rendering the obligation to give vacant possession as between seller and
purchaser as being 'incapable of being performed') or whether the notice did no such
thing, leaving the vendor/owner free to enjoy the land and pass the right to vacant
possession in accordance with the contract. These decisions which, on the surface,
appear inconsistent, can therefore be understood from a more informed analysis of the
constituent elements of the obligation to give vacant possession. Where the rights of
entry and inspection conferred by section 3 of the Land Acquisition Act (Barbados) fell
well short of the right of possession conferred by a requisition notice under regulation
51 ofthe Defence (General) Regulations 1939, or by notice of entry under section 11(1)
of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965 (both of which entitle the relevant authority to
dispossess the owner of the land), and rather the purchasers remained free to enter onto
the land and to use it for any purpose, the contract was capable of being performed and
vacant possession being given at the material time. This was because the seller still had
legal possession of the estate to pass, and the purchaser could take factual possession at
the point of completion pursuant to the transfer of that legal right.
As such, the obstacle posed by the service of legal notices goes to the heart of the
constituent elements of the obligation, in terms of the effect ofthe service of the notice
or subsequent actions (e.g. handing over of keys) in taking from the seller the legal right
47 See above,n35,per Vaisey J. at 631. Emphasisadded.
48 As found in theSheikh decision, when bothelements are notproperly considered, aperverse decision is arrived at.
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of possession and the factual ability. to occupy the estate, which the buyer is
immediately entitled to on completion. The character of the contract (in terms of the
vacant possession that the purchaser contracted to acquire) changes when the right to
. .
possession and ability to exercise that right can no longer be passed because of a legal
obstacle preventing the delivery of either of these constituent elements of vacant
possession on completion (or at the relevant time).
Conclusion
When an analysis of the constituent elements of vacant possession, as proposed by
chapter 5, is applied to cases concerning so-called 'legal obstacles' to vacant possession,
these apparently conflicting decisions and inconsistencies can be better understood. The
relevant determination in cases concerning compulsory purchases and requisitioning
notices was whether the notice (or subsequent acts pursuant to that notice) passed the
right to possession, and ability to occupy pursuant to that right (the essential elements of
the obligation to give vacant possession), to the requisitioning authority. Where it did,
vacant possession (as between seller and purchaser) could not be given. Again,
understanding the two essential elements to the obligation explained the decisions
reached and reasoning for the respective judgments, thus supporting the model proposed
by the previous chapter.
The judgments analysed were also shown to be highly contextually specific. A
contemporary interpretation of the obligation in the context of the specific
circumstances during the war time period, and the overriding need for the government
to have possession pursuant to the regulations, was reflected in the differing decisions
that were reached (and in the case of Korogluyan v Matheou, reached incorrectly, even
though the desired outcome was still arrived at by virtue of other conditions of the
contract that the judge placed reliance upon).49 Universal to all such decisions is the
fact that the government at no time was hindered in achieving its objectives by any of
the decisions concerning the procurement of vacant possession. This again re-affirmed
that beyond the core, objective elements, 1}1ere is an inherently fact specific element to
49 Indeed, as discussed in chapter 3, it can be argued that reliance on the 'other conditions' of the contract was itself
incorrect. The fact that the judge allowed these to be used further reinforces how the judge sought to achieve the
particular outcome desired in the case beforehim, given the.relevant circumstances in issue.
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the obligation to give Vacant possession which enables the obligation to be interpreted
in the context of the more general circumstances of the contract, and further reflects the
practical dimension of the obligation.50 This fact-specific element does, of course, make
a detailed or overarching 'definition' of the term harder to achieve.
With an understanding as to the dual nature of the obligation (as factual and legal)
having been acquired, and then tested and applied to explain otherwise contradictory
decisions, the next step is to further analyse the obligation in terms of which obstacles
do, and do not, interfere with one's ability to immediately occupy the estate in land on
completion, pursuant to the right to possession that has been passed. As will be seen,
case law has developed bespoke tests to determine whether possession is impeded by
any given obstacle, but these seem to be largely determined as questions of fact in each
case. This supports the fact sensitive nature of the obligation that has been highlighted
in this chapter. However, the courts have not clarified the scope and extent of the
obligation, and whether the state and condition of the property, and legal interests
falling short of interests in possession, can be a barrier to vacant possession in the same
terms as tangible impediments (such as chattels) can be. The next chapters address these
Issues.
50 See Topfell Ltd, above n l , per Templeman 1.
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Chapter!
Breaching the Obligation to give Vacant Possession
The constituent elements of the obligation to give vacant possession were set out in
chapter 5. A discussion of conflicting case law relating to unlawful occupation assisted
in defining the obligation to give vacant possession as concerning both the legal right to
possession, and the ability for the right holder to actually occupy the land (in a factual
sense at the point of completion). A review of literature defining key concepts such as
possession and occupation assisted in interpreting the legal right to possession (dejure),
and the factual ability to occupy (de facto), as two distinct yet interrelated elements of
the vacant possession obligation. When this analysis was then applied to cases
concerning so-called legal obstacles to vacant possession (in chapter 6), this definition
helped delineate an understanding of what were apparently conflicting decisions and
inconsistencies in the vacant possession case law. It was thereby highlighted that only a
conceptual analysis of the obligation could assist in understanding what appeared to be
otherwise contradictory decisions; as previously, whilst the inconsistencies had been
alluded to, no explanation had been provided as to how they could be accounted for.
This chapter seeks to further develop understanding with reference to what may
constitute a breach of the obligation. Whilst the obligation must have legal and factual
dimensions, as discussed in chapter 5, it is necessary to evaluate in more detail what
will amount to a breach of the factual element of the obligation at the point of
completion. This is because whether there has been a breach of the obligation will be
fundamental in determining the rights and corresponding responsibilities of the parties
in question.
This chapter firstly highlights the issues of risk and responsibility which are engaged in
such cases; this demonstrates why determinations as to breach are so important. It then
proceeds to explain the tests that case law has developed to determine whether a breach
" of the obligation has occurred, and contrasts the obligation with other 'possession-type'
concepts (actual occupation and adverse possession) which exhibit similar context
specific requirements. The comparisons also reflect how policy decisions manifest in
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recent legislation have a bearing on the outcomes for the parties involved, and how a
contractual 'definition' of vacant possession, and enhanced contractual provisions
relating to remedies, could potentially rebalance risks and responsibility between the
parties in similar terms.
Risks and responsibilities
Given that vacant possession arises on the majority ofland transactions in England and
Wales, the sheer scale on which the obligation is engaged causes the term to be relevant
to a wide range of people. 1 These include sellers and purchasers, landlords and tenants
and third party occupiers both on residential and commercial transactions. As such, in
determining whether a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession has occurred,
it is essential to be mindful of the issues of risk and responsibility that are at play for the
various parties in question on each occasion.
In the commercial world the ways that risks will fallon different parties is often
influenced by considerations of policy, convention or efficiency. As has been noted in
previous chapters, in various circumstances the law has made determinations as to who
was responsible for the non-procurement of vacant possession, and with whom the risk
of failing to pass vacant possession should rest. On the sale of a residential property, a
seller will be keen to ensure that vacant possession is provided; otherwise the buyer may
refuse to complete the purchase. In turn, this will be a matter of concern for a seller who
may have exchanged and be seeking completion themselves on the related purchase of a
new property which he or she will not be able to effect until the sale of their current
property has completed. On the purchase of the new property the seller (as buyer in
respect of that purchase) could lose their deposit if they are unable to complete on time
because the sale of their property has not taken place, causing them not to have the
funds required to complete their purchase.' If the buyer does complete, only to find that
vacant possession has not been given, this would leave the buyer entitled to damages as
I 'Shaw, K. 'Fit to be occupied' (2007) 27 Jan 2007 Estates Gazette lS2; Shaw, K. 'More to it than meets the eye'
(2010) 1 May 2010 Estates Gazette 4 and Shaw, K. 'All that you can't leave behind' (2010) 256 Property Law Journal
6; andthe discussion in chapter 1.
2 For a discussion of the return of deposits see Bowes, C. and Shaw K. 'Can I have my money back?' (2008) 204
Property Law Journal 2.
178
a consequence of the seller's default. Such damages could be quite significant and pose
a financial burden on the seller.
As noted in chapter 1, the difficulties caused by failing to give vacant possession can be
even more onerous in the commercial context. A buyer may be a commercial
organisation requiring immediate un-incumbered possession on completion in order to
ensure business continuity from their previous premises. The risks of not being able to
immediately occupy a given premises can therefore be very serious in both a residential
and commercial context. The non-procurement of vacant possession poses risks for both
parties, even though the legal responsibility for giving vacant possession rests with the
seller pursuant to the terms of a standard sale and purchase contract.
The most common situation in which vacant possession is relevant in the commercial
context is with respect to the grant and termination of business leases over properties. It
is common for a tenant to wish to bring their lease to an end before its contractual
expiry by exercise of a break option, which allows the term of the lease to come to an
end sooner.3 Clearly, when exercising a tenant's break option in a lease, it is the tenant
who must take ownership of the risk and responsibility for compliance with any
applicable pre-conditions (including, most notably, vacant possession). It must be noted,
however, that there is also risk for the landlord if it has sourced an alternative tenant to
take a new lease of the property following the break, only to then find that the tenant
does not so comply, causing the lease to continue. Whilst the parties could agree to
surrender the lease by mutual consent, the landlord would not be able to force the tenant
to vacate if the lease were to continue due to non-compliance with break conditions.4
Vacant possession is also relevant to the return of possession when a lease comes to an
end by effluxion of time (and no statutory or common law rights to remain in the
property are engaged). It is common for landlords to advance claims for damages when
a tenant does not vacate by the contractual termination date in a lease and this causes
loss or inconvenience. Here, whilst the responsibility (and liability) rests with the
3 See Martin, J. 'Tenant's Break Options' (2003) 153 New Law Journal 759 where the requirement to give vacant
fossession when operating a break option in a leaseis discussed.
See Bowes, C. and Shaw K. 'Time's up ... but I'm staying!' (2008) 218 Property Law Journal 9 and Bowes, C. and
ShawK. 'Reneging on.the deal' (2009) 222 Property Law Journal 13 for a discussion of issuesrelevant to remaining
in possession of property and thenonperformance of obligations in legalagreements.
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. tenant, there is risk for both parties in securing possession and any related implications.
The landlord may be unable to grant a new lease of the premises as desired given that
the new tenant would be unable to take up immediate occupation.
Vacant possession is therefore key to the majority of land transactions in a residential
and commercial context. Appreciation of the issues of risk and responsibility are
.essential in any determination as to whether the obligation has been complied with, or
whether a breach has arisen, as any determination will have a real impact on the parties
subject to the transaction. This chapter, in seeking to explain what will amount to a
breach of the obligation to give vacant possession, highlights how the balance of risk
can be seen to lie on the respective parties in a given situation in the legal system of
England and Wales, and who the law treats as being responsible in any particular
instance. This is then drawn upon in chapters 9 and 10 where a contractual description
of vacant possession, and improved remedies for breach, are proposed. Given the unfair
burden that is shown to be placed upon purchasers in standard sale and purchase
transactions at this time, these proposals seek to redress the balance of risk and
responsibility and allocate it more evenly between the parties. As will be shown later in
this chapter, the law has already sought to balance competing risks and responsibilities
through legislation in other cases involving the concepts of possession and occupation;
those being actual occupation and adverse possession, and reviewing literature in this
area helps to explain how legislation and policy decisions can reallocate risk between
the parties.
A breach of the obligation
The most common example of an impediment to vacant possession is when items that
should have been removed by the seller or party required to give vacant possession are
left at a property on completion. As noted in chapter 2, beer in the cellar.' furniture and
goods remaining on the premises" and other chattels of the party required to give vacant
possession' have been held to breach the obligation. In each case, leaving the items at
the premises was seen to be consistent with the seller keeping possession of the
, Savage v Dent [1736] 2 Stra 1064.
6 Isaacs v Diamond (1880) WN 75.
1 Cumberland Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264.
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premises for their own purposes; and therefore inconsistent with passing vacant
possession to the other party, As explained in Scotland v Solomons "a vendor who
leaves property of his own on the premises cannot...be said to give vacant possession
since [this is] inconsistent with the right which the purchaser has on completion to
undisturbed enjoyment"."
Historically, decisions as to whether an obligation to give vacant possession had been
breached generally proceeded on an ad hoc basis with respect to the particular case in
issue. No general principles were established, either on the face of the cases or in
conveyancing manuals or property law texts, to ensure consistency and continuity with
respect to differing decisions on (ostensibly) similar facts." For example, in Savage v
Dent ll leaving beer in a cellar was held to be consistent with the keeping of possession.
The summary to the case provides that:
"The lessee of a publick house took another, and removed his goods and
family, but left beer in the cellar. And there being rent in arrear, the landlord
sealed a lease as on a vacant possession, delivered an ejectment, and signed
judgment; which was set aside, the lessee still continuing in possession.,,12
It was also noted that the same was true with respect to the 'leaving of hay' in a barn:
"And a case was mentioned, where leaving hay in a barn at Hendon was held to
be keeping possession ... ,,13
No reference to the nature or quantity of the left over goods was made. This was also
the case in Isaacs v Diamondl 4 where furniture and goods being left on the premises
was held to be contrary to giving vacant possession. Again, no analysis of the size or
significance of these items, with respect to the rest of the premises, was undertaken. It
was not until 1946, in Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland, IS a case
concerning rubbish that had been left at a property that was sold, that the court first laid
8 [2002] EWHC 1886 (Ch).
9 Ibid, per David Kitchin QC at 1887. This follows Cumberland, above n7.
10 For example, see Savage v Dent, above es, andlsaac8v Diamond, aboven6.
H Above, nS.
12 Ibid, case summary. Judgment notreported.
13 Ibid.
14 Above n6
15 Above: n7:
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down what could be seen as a 'test' to determine whether vacant possession had been
given; that is, a formulation for vacant possession that could then be reapplied in later
cases.
Testsfor breach
In Cumberland the plaintiffs contracted to buy a disused freehold warehouse from the
defendants. By a special condition the property was sold 'with vacant possession on
completion'. The cellars extending under the whole of the warehouse were made
unusable by rubbish including many sacks of cement that had hardened thus making
their removability particularly difficult. The defendant refused after completion to
remove the rubbish and the plaintiffs brought proceedings for damages for breach of the
condition for delivery of the property with vacant possession on completion. It was held
that the defendant had failed to give vacant possession of the property sold. It was stated
that a vendor who leaves his own chattels on property sold by him to an extent
depriving the purchaser of the physical enjoyment of part of the property, failed to give
vacant possession." Such acts were consistent with the vendor seeking to continue to
use the premises for his own purposes!" rather than passing possession to the purchaser
in accordance with the terms of the contract. It was further noted that it was no answer
for the vendor to claim to have abandoned his or her ownership of the chattels on
completion to prevent a breach of the obligation. The court held that a breach of the
obligation would occur in cases where there was the existence of a physical
impediment, which substantially prevented or interfered with the enjoyment of the right
of possession of a substantial part of the property, which the purchaser did not consent
to (whether expressly or impliedly).18
16 Ibid, 268.
17 See also Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Preston [1957] 2 All ER428 where a mortgagee whichhad left
furniture in the premises after a courtorder requiring him to give up possessionhas not complied with the law and
was using the premises for his own purposes as a place for the storage of his goods. In Scotland 'V Solomon [2002]
EWHC 1886 (Ch) the HighCourtreiterated the rulethat"avendor who leaves property of his own on the premises
cannoL.be said to give vacant possession since [this is] inconsistent with the right which the purchaser has on
completion to undisturbed enjoyment".
18 Above, n7,per Lord Greene at269. It is common forparties to agree thatcertain chattels maybe left behind.
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The Cumberland decision can therefore be seen to have two distinct limbs. The first is
directed at the activities of the party required to give vacant possession (i.e. tenant on
exercising a break, or seller when transferring an interest in land), and provides that if
the conduct of the party in question indicates that they, as seller or tenant, me
continuing to use the premises for their own purposes in a non-trivial way (for example,
by leaving goods in the premises), then they will fail to establish that vacant possession
has been given. As such, this first limb can be seen to be inherently fact specific with
reference to the actual seller or tenant in question, and whether their conduct openly
manifests an intention to give vacant possession. The second test is directed at whether
the contents of the premises present, objectively speaking, a substantial obstacle to the
buyer's or landlord's own physical enjoyment of the premises on completion (or the
operative date). If they do, vacant possession will not have been given.
The courts have elaborated on both limbs of the test in recent years, in the context ofthe
procurement of vacant possession when exercising a contractual break option in a lease.
In John Laing Construction Limited v Amber Pass Limited19 the claimant was the tenant
of commercial premises under a lease granted by the defendant's predecessor-in-title. A
clause in the lease provided that the lease might be determined by, inter alia, the
"yielding up of the entirety of the demised premises".20 The claimant sought a
declaration that, pursuant to a notice given under the break clause, it had validly
terminated the lease. That claim was contested by the defendant, which sought to
counter-claim for declarations that the purported break notice was ineffective and the
lease was subsisting. The defendant contended that the claimant had not 'yielded-up' the
property, relying, inter alia, on the continued presence of security guards at the
premises and the claimant's failure to hand back the keys to the premises. It was argued
that these were inconsistent with providing vacant possession at the end of the term.
This did not persuade the court and the claim was allowed. On the facts of the case, it
was held that the claimant had plainly and obviously manifested a desire to terminate
the lease and was accordingly entitled to the declaratory relief sought. The continued
presence of security guards at the premises, and the tenant's failure to hand back the
keys, was held not to have prevented vacant possession being given. The court held that
the task of the court was:
19 [200412 EGLR 128.
20 Ibid.
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"to look objectively at what had occurred and determine whether a clear
intention had been manifested by the person whose acts were said to have
brought about a termination to effect such termination, and whether the
landlord could; if it wanted to, occupy the premises without difficulty or
bi . ,,21o [ection.
The decision in John Laing supports the first limb of the Cumberland test referring to
the intention of the party required to give vacant possession, as manifest by their
conduct:
".. to look objectively at what had occurred and determine whether a clear
intention had been manifested by the person whose acts were said to have
brought about a termination to effect such termination ..." 22
This would suggest that some intent on the part of the seller or tenant, to manifest their
desire to give vacant possession (through their actions and conduct) to the buyer or
landlord, is necessary. This intention to vacate is equivalent to the first limb of the
Cumberland test where the acts of the party required to give vacant possession are
evaluated in determining whether such actions and conduct are inconsistent with the
giving of vacant possession (for example, because the party required to give vacant
possession is purporting to continue to use the premises for their own purposes, to store
their goods and chattels).
The decision in John Laing can also be seen to have further developed the second limb
of the Cumberland test, providing guidance as to how it should be interpreted. The
decision explained that the party with the right to vacant possession must be able to
occupy without 'difficulty or objection'. Notwithstanding this further guidance, the
second limb of the test does not really help lawyers, on a day to day basis, when the test
must be applied to the facts of a particular circumstance. For example, it is unclear what
extent of 'difficulty' is required and whether this must be general inconvenience or
significant distress. The decision in Cumberland, upon which the John Laing decision is
based, suggests that a seller or tenant has to remove all chattels and also rubbish which
"substantially prevents or interferes with enjoyment of a substantial part of the
21 Ibid, per Robert RUdyard QC at 131.
22 Ibid. Emphasis added.
184
property",23 but there is no definition of what constitutes 'substantial'. It is also unclear
whether there has to be an actual interference, or whether the likelihood or potential for
the left over items to cause a substantial interference will be sufficient to prevent the.
buyer or landlord from re-occupying without difficulty at the material time. Further, it is
not clear what may count as a valid objection, and this is likely to proceed on a case by
case basis (as discussed in more detail below).
The specific characteristics of the party with the obligation to give vacant possession
(e.g. the seller or tenant) appear determinative in respect of the first limb of the test,
which is directed at their own activities, and whether they are consistent with them
seeking to give vacant possession. If they leave behind chattels and other goods, such
conduct can be seen to be suggestive of a lack of intention and commitment on their part
to vacate the premises. It can, also be suggested that specific characteristics and
contextual factors are relevant to the so called 'objective' second limb of the test in
respect of the buyer's commencement of possession (or the landlord's resumption of use
following termination of a lease). It can be argued that specific characteristics relating to
the buyer or landlord in question should be taken into account when determining
whether the seller or landlord can (objectively speaking) (re)occupy without such an
objection. Indeed, the so-called 'objective' test itself appears to refer to the specific
characteristics ofthe party with the right to vacant possession:
"and whether the landlord could, if it wanted to, occupy the premises without
difficulty or objection.,,24
As such, the second limb of the test is not completely objective, but rather can best be
understood as an objective test with reference to the particular circumstances and
characteristics of the party with the right to vacant possession. It is arguable therefore
that the test should be judged, not against any purchaser/landlord, but any
purchaser/landlord with the particular qualities of the purchaser/landlord in question. A
court should not consider more generally whether rubbish left at the property on the
break of a lease or completion of a sale prevents the average purchaser or landlord
(objectively speaking) from (re)occupying without difficulty or objection, but
aa Above, nl9,per Robert Hildyard QC at 131.
24 [1946] 1 All ER 284, per Lord Greene at 287. Emphasis added.
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(objectively speaking) the actual purchaser or landlord in question given its specific
circumstances and characteristics. As such, it is possible that a materially similar
objection could be deemed valid in one context, but not in another, given the specific
characteristics of the parties in question; and all relevant contextual circumstances. This
further highlights that whether or not vacant possession has been given will be a fact
specific determination on a case by case basis.
The decision in John Laing can therefore be seen to reformulate, in slightly different
words, the sentiment and spirit of both limbs of the Cumberland test and the focus on
both the intention of the party required to give vacant possession, as manifest by their
conduct, and whether, objectively speaking, the premises are vacant on completion and
capable of (re)occupation by the party with the right to vacant possession.
An example illustrates the issues further. Imagine that a tenant has trouble paying the
rent on a lease and decides to move to smaller premises. The tenant exercises a brealc
option in its lease with the landlord which is conditional on vacant possession being
given on the brealc date. On the break date the premises are empty except for one room
that is half filled with boxes of floor tiles that the tenant failed to remove in time for the
break date under its lease. The tenant claims that vacant possession was given and that
the lease has come to an end. The landlord claims the converse and argues the lease will
now continue until its contractual expiry in another 10 years time. The answer as to
whether a room that is half filled with tiles breaches the vacant possession condition
may tum on the nature of the tenant's business. If the tenant is a carpet tile supplier, the
landlord will have a strong argument for saying that the tenant is still using the premises
beneficially, for the storage of goods for the.purposes of its business and therefore that a
clear intention has not been manifested by the tenant to effect a termination of the lease.
As such, the tenant will fail on the first limb of the Cumberland test.25 Alternatively, if
the same tiles were brought onto the premises by the tenant, who runs an office from the
premises, to re-carpet the floor (in compliance with its repairing obligations, for
example) but it did not complete this in time, different arguments would apply, and the
25 This can be compared withLegal & Gen~ral Assurance Society Ltd v Expediters International (UK) Ltd [2006]
EWHC 1008 (Ch); [2006] L&1R 22, where a major part of the judge's decision that vacant possession had not been
given resided in the fact that the warehouse was still being used for the storage of 'a few pallets and parcels in a
largely empty warehouse', which remained useful to the tenant's business. See also Fetherstonhaugh, G. 'Can
premises that are left half empty or half full be vacant?' (2008) 31 May Estates Gazette 34.
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tenant might succeed in establishing that the tiles remaining III the premises on
completion was not consistent with the tenant continuing to use the premises for its own
purposes (the first limb),' and (if not great in number) that the tiles did not constitute a
substantial impediment to the landlord's resumption of their possession of the premises
(the second limb), and therefore did not prevent occupation without 'difficulty or
objection'. What the landlord, as the party with the right to vacant possession, will use
the premises for (compare a large industrial warehouse to a small comer shop) may also
be key in determining whether the leftover items are a substantial impediment to the
receipt of vacant possession (and therefore constitute a breach of the second limb of the
test).
Support for the contention that the second limb of the Cumberland test is not purely
objective, and must be understood as an objective test with reference to the party with
the right to vacant possession, is provided through an analysis, by analogy, with
determinations relating to actual occupation and adverse possession. This analysis
argues that more general contextual factors directly affect the determination as to
whether a given impediment prevents the party with the right to occupy from being able
to obtain enjoyment of a substantial part of the property at completion. It therefore seeks
to delineate further the currently superficial formulation of the second limb of the test to
determine what will constitute a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession. The
analysis explains the nature and form of the second limb of the test and how it must be
applied to the facts of actual cases. In the next chapter, this analysis is further developed
in the context of a discussion as to the relevance of the state and condition of the
property or land to which the obligation relates. This can also be seen to be directly
relevant to operation of the so-called 'objective' limb of the Cumberland test, and to
whether the party with the right to vacant possession can occupy without difficulty or
objection. This further analysis also draws on cases of adverse possession and actual
occupation, which are similarly sensitive to the nature of the land or property in
question, and how this can affect the relevant determination in issue.
At the present time, therefore, it remains unclear, principally due to a lack of relevant
case law, whether a breach of the obligation would be found to have occurred on any
given set of facts. It is therefore arguable whether invocation of the tests to determine a
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breach of the obligation have actually resolved a number of issues posed by the vacant
possession obligation (which would appear to be highly factually dependent in each
given case), or simply created an arena for further uncertainty and confusion.
De minimis and substantiality
Historically it was unclear whether a de minimis threshold operated in determining
whether the obligation to give vacant possession had been breached, and this may
explain the differing decisions reached by respective judges on ostensibly similar
questions offact.26 More recently, case law has suggested that the obligation is qualified
as being subject to a de minimis rule.27 Lord Greene in Cumberland stated:
"Subject to the rule de minimis a vendor who leaves property of his own on the
premises on completion cannot, in our opinion, be said to give vacant
• 1128possession,
De minimis is a Latin expression relating to 'minimal things', normally in the phrases de
minimis non curat praetor or de minimis non curat lex, meaning that the law is not
interested in trivial matters or that "the law does not care about very small matters'v"
The expression has also been used to describe a constituent or component part of a
wider transaction, where it is in itself insignificant or immaterial to the transaction as a
whole, and will have no legal relevance or bearing on the end result. In a more formal
legal sense it means something that is unworthy of the law's attention. In risk
assessment, for example, it refers to a level of risk that is too small to be concerned
with; some refer to this as a 'virtually safe' level.30
26 For example, in the cases ofSavage v Dent, above n5, and Isaacs v Diamond, above n6.
27 Above, n7.
28 Ibid, per Lord Greene at 270. Emphasis added.
29 See Ehriich, E. Amo, Amas, Amat and Morep (Harper Row, New YIJrk.1985) 100. Literally it means that "the iaw
does not concern itselfwith trifles",
30 See the National Library ofMedicine Toxicology Glossary - Risk De minimis.
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In the context of vacant possession, de minimis can be seen to refer to small or
,insignificant obstacles to the receipt of vacant possession. Whilst case law has indicated
.that the vacant possession obligation will be subject to a de minimis rule/ I how that
operates in practice remains unclear however, and this situation has not been elaborated
upon by the courts. For example, in Legal & General Assurance Society Ltd v
Expeditors International (UK) Ltd32 a rubbish bin, a table, coffee mugs and a swivel
chair left at the premises were considered unimportant and merited no further reference
in the decision on the point. Clearly, by themselves, the items would not have prevented
vacant possession from being given. By contrast, in Cumberlancf3 rubbish that filled
two-thirds of the warehouse cellars led the court to hold that vacant possession had not
been given. It is difficult to draw the line when the facts lie somewhere between these
two examples. What is clear, from the decision in Cumberland, is that the interference
must be of some substantial nature:
"When we speak of a physical impediment we do not mean that any physical
impediment will do. It must be an impediment which substantially prevents or
interferes with the enjoyment of the right of possession of a substantial part of
the property. ,,34
As such, with respect to both limbs of the Cumberland test it is clear that an element of
'substantiality' is manifest in the determination as to whether the party seeking to give
vacant possession is continuing to use the premises for their own purposes (based on
what goods and chattels are left behind), and whether the party with the right to vacant
possession can (re)commence occupation without difficulty or objection.
It would also seem that the quantity of items left, their size, movability and degree and
purpose of annexation (issues not considered by the small array of earlier vacant
possession case law)35 may be relevant factors in determining whether the items left
cause a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession. Indeed, case law suggests
that it may be relevant to consider the location of items in, around or outside the
property concerned. In Hynes v Vaughan'" a vendor left large amounts of rubbish
31 Following Cumberland, above n7 wherethe obligationwas stated as being subjectto sucha rule.
32 [2006] EWHC 1008 (Ch); [2006] L&TR 22. Upheld on appeal, [2007] All ER (D) 166 (Jan).
33 Above n7
34 Ibid.p~r Lord Greene a1287.
3S See, for example,Savage v Dent, above n5, andIsaacs v Diamond, above n6.
36 [1985] 50 P. & C.R. 444.
189
(rotting vegetation, soil, timber, broken glass, paint tins and rubble) in the garden which,
it was claimed, prevented the transfer of vacant possession. The rubbish was held to be
consistent with the character of the property sold and could not be said to substantially
prevent or interfere with the enjoyment of the right of possession of a substantial part of
the property, since it was outside in the garden:
"The state of this property of which complaint is made was, in my view,
reasonably in keeping with the character of the property. There has been no
suggestion that it was not reasonably consistent with the state of the property at
the date of the contract...The concrete blocks and the wooden frames are
neatly stacked. Their presence does not, by any stretch of the imagination,
constitute "an impediment which substantially prevents or interferes with the
enjoyment of the right ofpossession.v'"
As discussed in the next chapter with reference to the state and condition of the
property, a different decision may very well have been reached if the rubbish had been
inside the premises concerned, raising issues as to the scope of the obligation in a
particular context.
The decision in Hynes v Vaughan is useful in demonstrating that it is difficult to
interpret where a de minimis level may be set. In recent months, some further guidance
has been provided on this point from the decision in Ibrend Estates BV v NYK Logistics
(UK) Ltd 38 In this case the claimant was the landlord and the defendant was the tenant
under a lease of warehouse premises which contained a break clause permitting the
defendant, by six months' prior notice to the claimant, to bring the term to an end,
provided it had paid the rent up to date and delivered vacant possession of the premises.
37 Hynes v Vaughan, above n39,per Scott1. at 457.
J8 [20101 PLSCS 186 - June 2010.
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The defendant gave notice of its intention to break the lease in April 2009. The claimant
had prepared a terminal schedule of dilapidations in January 2009 and it was agreed on
that date that the defendant had substantially complied with its repairing and
redecorating obligations, but outstanding items of repair were identified. It was
impossible to carry these out by the break date, and so the defendant suggested that it
could carry them out within a week thereafter, and that it should in the meantime
continue its security cover of the premises. Further communications between the parties
took place including return of the keys to the premises; meanwhile, the defendant
completed the necessary repairs after the break date.
The claimant applied for a declaration that the defendant had not effectively broken the
lease since it had failed to give vacant possession on the break date. It relied on the
continued presence of the defendant's workmen to carry out the required repairs, some
items of the defendant's property, and security staff, who it claimed had prevented
access by its representative. The defendant argued that it had given vacant possession or
alternatively that the claimant had waived the breach in any event.
The court held that the claim should succeed. The court held that the tenant fell short of
compliance with the first test, given the continued presence of the defendant's workmen
to carry out repairs. Crucially, there was no obligation on the defendant to complete any
works before vacating, the only preconditions (as referred to above) were to pay rent up
to the break date and give vacant possession. As such, the tenant should have cleared
the premises by the break date and left any outstanding disputes about umepaired items
to be dealt with thereafter. By continuing to carry out works after the break date, the
defendant had remained in possession simply for its own purposes and its use of the
premises was more than de minimis. Accordingly, the defendant had not validly broken
the lease in April 2009 and thus remained liable under the terms of the lease moving
forward.39
Most interestingly however, in relation to that second test, is that it was held that the
'small quantity' of goods left by the tenant were not sufficient to amount to a substantial
obstacle to the receipt of vacant possession by the landlord. In considering that the
39 Shaw, K. 'Allthatyou can't leave behind' (2010) 256 Property Law Journal.
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tenant did not fail on the second test.fhe court noted that the second test was only likely
to be satisfied by a claimant in 'exceptional circumstances'. Whilst the court did not go
further and provide an example of-what such 'exceptional circumstances' may have
constituted (either specifically with reference to this case, or more generally), the
decision does however suggest that the second test will be 'strictly interpreted' in any
particular context. This can therefore be seen to suggest that the second limb is subject
to a more robust de minimis (or substantiality) threshold than the first.
Whilst indicative, and perhaps more helpful than all previous decisions, regrettably this
case still follows earlier cases in falling short ofproviding further detail about the nature
of the obligation to give vacant possession, and the particular application of the tests in
any given case.40 As such, application of the tests, and operation of the de minimis (or
substantiality) thresholds for each of the respective limbs, still remains unclear at this
time, even following the Ibrend decision.
The Ibrend case does, however, make plain that the respective limbs of the tests for
vacant possession are separate tests (that is, only one of the limbs of Cumberland or
John Laing needs to be made out by a claimant to establish that vacant possession has
not been given). This is something that is implicit in all previous decisions pertaining to
vacant possession, but something that has rarely been explicitly stated.
Bargaining in 'the shadow ofthe law'
It is apparent in each case in which a decision has to be made as to whether a breach has
occurred that the determination tends to be based on a judgment of the court using the
evidence available to the judge, rather than the application of a clearly delineated
formula. In many respects this creates a situation where parties in dispute over whether
vacant possession has been given (prior to court proceedings or in the conduct of
litigation prior to trial) are 'negotiating in shadow of the law,.41 As Cooter, Marks and
Mnookin explain:
40 This is true of judgments in theCountY Court and theHighCourt, as well as the Court of Appeal.
41 See alsoPosner, R.A 'AnEconomic Approach to LegalProcedure andJudicial Administration' (1973)2 Journalof
Legal Studies 399; Mn.ookin, R. H. and Kornhauser L. 'Bargaining in the shadow of the law: The case of divorce'
(1979) 88 Yale Law Journal 950; Toulmin, S. E. The Uses ofArgument (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
1958); Bibas, S. 'Plea bargaining outside the shadow ofthe trial' (2004) 117 Harvard Law Review 2464; Allen, 1. and
Games E. 'Bargaining: A Proposed Application ofthe Theory of Games to Collective Bargaining' (1956) 65 Yale Law
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"Pre-trial bargainingmay be described as a game played in the shadow of the
law. There are two possible outcomes: settlement out of court through
bargaining, and trial, which represents a bargaining breakdown. The Courts
encourage private! bargaining but stand ready to step from the shadows and
resolve the dispute by coercion if the parties cannot agree.,,42
The courts have provided some guidance which can be extracted by practitioners in
seeking to determine whether an obligation to give vacant possession has been complied
with, but have fallen short ofprescribing an actual formula which can be applied. In this
respect, they have (perhaps unintentionally, inadvertently or simply by default) retained
for themselves a great amount of discretion in being able to make a decision that they
consider appropriate. For example, as noted previously, in Legal & General Assurance
Society Ltd v Expeditors International (UK) Lta43 a rubbish bin, a table, coffee mugs
and a swivel chair left at the premises were considered unimportant and merited no
further reference in the decision on the point whereas, by contrast, in Cumberlaruf4
rubbish that filled two-thirds of the warehouse cellars led the court to hold that vacant
possession had not been given. It is difficult to draw the line when the facts lie
somewhere between these two examples and a lack of available case law means that the
judge in question will have a great amount of discretion in deciding which side of the
line his decision should fall (i.c, whether a breach or not a breach of the obligation).
Ibis state of affairs does not help the parties in dispute and the uncertainty that remains
causes their negotiations to be undertaken in the 'shadow of the law', where issues such
as personal circumstances, financial resource and contingent or connected commitments
may cause one party to achieve a better deal than the other. The uncertainty that remains
over whether the obligation has been breached in a given situation, due to the lack of a
clear formula for determination, or sufficient case law to generate rules of thumb, can be
seen to disadvantage the weaker party. Further, it can potentially give rise to settlements
that do not reflect the actual legal position as to whether, as a matter of fact and law,
Journal 660; Bellucci. E. 'Developing Compensation Strategies for the construction ofNegotiationDecision Support
Systems' (2004) PhD thesis, La Trobe University, Bundoora, Victoria, Australia; Bellucci, E. and Zeleznikow J.
'Representations fordecision making support innegotiation' (2001) 10JournalofDeciston Support 449; Kennedy, G.
McMillan,J. andBenson J. Managing negotiations (2nd edn Hutchinson Business, London 1984); Williams, G. Legal
Negotiation and Settlement (West Publishing Co, 81. Paul, Minnesota 1983); Rawls, J. A Theory of Justice (The'
Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1971).
42 Cooter, R., Maries, S. and Mnookin R. 'Bargaining in the shadow of the law: a testable model of strategic
behaviour' (1982) 11 The Journal ofLegal Studies 225.
43 Above, 035.
44 Above,n7.
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vacant possession was or was not given. Obviously if clearer, and more specific,
guidance was available, there would be less discretion for the individual judge, but .
. conversely more certainty for parties litigating on the point. The current situation
therefore has the effect (albeit unintentionally or inadvertently) of placing the risk of.
any given dispute on the weaker party who may not be the author or creator of the risk, .
and who may not be responsible for the adverse consequences in question. As noted
earlier in the chapter, at present a purchaser is more exposed to the risk of not receiving
vacant possession than a seller on a standard residential purchase, given the mechanics
of the conveyancing process which provide that completion is normally affectedprior to
an inspection of the property.
The fact sensitive nature of a determination as to whether there has been a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession makes it impossible to objectively define a
threshold at which the de minimis rule should operate in this respect, or to predict what
may be considered 'sufficiently substantial' (with respect to the second limb of the test).
Whilst this is the case, it can be noted that such a state of affairs is not unique to the
vacant possession concept; indeed, application of the test to determine a breach of
vacant possession can be usefully compared to other issues concerning possession in
property law. These include determinations in cases concerning actual occupation and
adverse possession, where a greater amount of case law is available. Here, by analogy, it
is found that the relevant test is highly fact specific and parallel issues with respect to
the relevance of specific contextual circumstances, and the nature of the land in
question, are also found to arise.
The fact sensitive nature of possession
The tests to determine a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession can be
usefully compared to other issues concerning possession in property law, such as
determinations in cases concerning actual occupation and adverse possession. These are
analysed in detail and then compared and contrasted to literature which has also .
emphasised the fact specific nature of so called 'posspssion-typc' concepts, and the .
importance of contextual considerations. In this regm;d, this discussion also highlights
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policy decisions in recent legislation which determine the rights and liabilities of given
parties in any specific set of circumstances.
Actual occupation
A parallel issue to that experienced with respect to the obligation to give vacant
possession arises with respect to persons in actual occupation of land or property. Here,
the determination under recent legislation is shown, like the second limb of the vacant
possession test, to be objective, but also with reference to the facts of any given case.
Prior to 1925, if a purchaser did not know about an equitable adverse interest affecting a
property having made full inquiries and investigations, and so did not have notice of the
interest, he or she was classed as a 'bona fide purchaser for value without notice' and
could therefore acquire the legal title to the property free of the equitable interest.
Notice meant that the purchaser knew of the equitable rights, actually or
. 1 45constructive y.
The 1925 legislation (specifically the Law of Property Act 1925 and Land Registration
Rules 1925) drastically reduced the number of estates and third party rights that could
subsist at law, and so reduced the number of interests that automatically bound a pur-
chaser. Under the Law of Property Act 1925, section 1(1) provided that the only two
estates that could subsist at law were the fee simple absolute in possession (the holder of
such an estate is effectively the owner of the land) and the term of years absolute (i.e.
the legal lease). The only legal interests that could subsist at law were listed in section
1(2) and included an easement and a charge-by way oflegal mortgage. All other estates
and interests were to take effect in equity (i.e. they are equitable interestsj."
Most notably for unregistered land, the establishment of a Land Charges Register, and
the development of the principle of overreaching, were both established under the 1925
legislation, although the doctrine of notice still applied in cases'where overreaching or
45 Actual notice amounted to actual knowledge. Constructive notice is notice of all facts of which a person would
have had actual notice if he or she had madethose inquiries and inspections which he or she oughtto have made.
Notice couldalsobe imputed by virtue of, for example, an agent's knowledge.
46 See section I. Law ofProperty Act 1925,
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registration as a land charge was not possible. For registered land, the Land Registration
Act 1925 required interests in land, which were not registerable in their own right, to be
protected by notice or caution (minor interests) if to be enforceable against purchasers
and mortgagees, except for so called 'overriding interests', which remained enforceable
whether or not they were so protected:
"Overriding interests are interests to which a registered title is subject, even
though they do not appear on the register. They are binding both on the
registered proprietor and on a person who acquires an interest in the
property ... the term itself was first introduced in the [Land Registration Act]
1925.,,47
Overriding interests were introduced by section 70 of the Land Registration Act 1925
and were created because it was perceived that, for several classes of interest, it would
be nnreasonable to expect such interests to be registered. Such interests included, for
example, short term leases, which were seen as being too insignificant an interest to
burden with the bureaucracy of registration." The justification for some interests being
overriding is that they were legal interests, which prior to the enactment of the Land
Registration Act 1925, bound the whole world. Here, the 1925 Act merely gave effect to
the status quo ante, for example, providing for legal easements and profits under section
70(1)(a), rights acquired under the Limitation Acts under section 70(1)(f), and some
leases under section 70(1)(k). It was, by contrast, not possible to justify making
equitable interests overriding interests on this basis, but possible justifications for
making the interests of persons in actual occupation capable of amounting to overriding
interests, under section 70(l)(g) of the Law of Property Act 1925, were that such
interests were likely to be created informally, in circumstances where the persons
concerned would not consider registering them, and that purchasers ought to be aware
of anybody in occupation. On this basis, it was seen as reasonable for a purchaser to be
bound in circumstances where they would have similarly been bound prior to 1925
(where the old rules ofnotice would have applied).
47 Land Registry Practice Guide 15: Overriding Interests and their Disclosure. TheLand Registry, December 2005.
Crown Copyright, p.5.
48 Section 70(1)(k), Land Registration Act 1925.
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Section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925 protected an interest in land where
its owner was in actual occupation of the land; an interest only lost its overriding status
"where enquiry is made of such person... and the rights [were] not disclosed".49 Under
section 70(1)(g), occupiers' interests were overriding whether discoverable by a
purchaser or not. Gray and Gray noted that:
"The term 'actual occupation' has a long history in the context of land
registration legislation. Although this critical expression has never been
statutorily defined, some guidance as to its meaning emerges from the case
law under the Land Registration Act 1925.,,50
It is true that the substantial body of case law on actual occupation, for the purposes of
section 70(l)(g),51 has developed our understanding of the concept's meaning.52 For
example, the courts have indicated that there must be some physical presence, and not
simply a legal entitlement to occupy, but the occupier need not be living or working at
the property.53 Parking a car regularly in a garage may amount to occupation (even
though it would not be sufficient for factual possession in the context of adverse
posscssiom" Occupation does not necessarily require the personal presence of the
person claiming the right; an employee, agent or contractor may occupy on behalf of the
employee if specifically employed for a purpose that entails being in occupation;
occupation by a friend or relative for their own purposes is not, however, sufficient.55
Temporary absence does not prevent a person from being in occupation if their presence
is still evident.56
49 Ibid.
50 Gray, K. and Gray S.F. Elements ofLand Law (5th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) 1120.
51 Section 70(1)(g), Law Registration Act, 1925 and paragraph 2, schedule 1, Land Registration 2002.
52 McFarlane, B.. Hopkins, N. and Nield S. Land Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford University Press, Oxford
2009) wrote that "Decisions made under that legislation remain of interest, although caution must he exercised,
because the current provision has made substantive differences to the scope of the provision... The general principles
developed in case law under that earlier provision may be expected to remain authoritative-but this is subject to the
qualification... that Soh 3, para 2, has introduced a defence based on reasonable inspection".
53 Lloyds Bank Pic v Rosset [1989] Ch 350
54 See Kling v Kesten Properties Ltd [19831 49 P & CR 212; Re Boyle's Claim [1961]1 WLR 339 and Epps v Esso
Petroleum Co Ltd [i973] 1 WLR 1071.
55 Strand Securities Ltd v Caswell [19651 Ch 958; Lloyds Bank Pic v Rosset [198911 Ch 350 and Abbey National BS
v Conn [199111 AC 56.
56 For example, furniture and possessions - see Kingsnorth Finance Ltd v Tizard [1986] 1 WLR 783 and Chhokar v
Chhokar [19841 FLR 313.
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With respect to determinations pertaining to actual occupation, here comparisons with
vacant possession can be made. Indeed, in analysing case law in this area under the
1925 legislation, Gray and Gray noted that "[t]he acts which constitute 'actual
occupation' vary in accordance with the nature of the premises concerned". 57 This
assertion would seem to be on the basis of the Court of Appeal decision in Lloyds Bank
v Rosset 58 where Mustill LJ stated that:
"[t]he acts which constitute actual occupation of a dwelling house, a garage or
woodland cannot all be the same. ,,59
Gray and Gray further noted that "In Rosset's case there was general agreement in the
Court of Appeal that differing standards of 'actual occupation' might be relevant to an
ordinary dwelling house fit for habitation and a semi-derelict propcrty'U"
Here a parallel can be drawn between cases of actual occupation and cases of vacant
possession. Both the test for vacant possession and determinations in cases concerning
actual occupation can be seen to share the characteristics of being fact specific, and
proceeding on a case by case basis with respect to the particular circumstances in
issue.61 This creates a lack of consistency and risk of uncertainty which may
disadvantage parties to a given dispute due to the absence of a formalised code. In a
similar manner to cases concerning vacant possession, the courts were unwilling to
establish a statutory code to delineate the test of 'actual occupation't'f no general rules
or codes formulated (save for a few generic principles or statements) have been
promulgated, possibly because it has not been possible to do so, or the courts did not
consider it their role. Instead, as in cases of vacant possession, the courts have provided
guidance in case law which can be seen to take effect as heuristic rules, or 'rules of
thumb'. Over time, case law has explained a number of facets now known to be part of
the meaning of actual occupation. Whilst the case law in this area is more extensive and
51 Above, n50, 1120.
sa [19891 Ch 350. Reversed by House of Lords [1991] 1 AC 107, but these observations were not material to the later
decisionand remain valid.
59 Ibid, per MustiIl LJ. at 394.
60 Above, n50, 1120.
61 . The issues of objectivity and discoverability of overriding interests are discussed in Sparkes. P. The
Discoverability of Occupiers of Registered Land' (1989) Conv 342; Tee, L. 'The Rights of Every Person in Actual
Occupation: An Enquiry into Section 'lO(I)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925' (1988) 57 Cl.J 328 and Smith, R.
'Overriding Interests and Wives' (1979) 95 LQR 501.
62 Hodgson v Marks [1971] Ch 892.
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therefore potentially of greater use to parties in similar situations, the plethora of
decisions which exist has, however, still not enabled a universal definition or formula to
be promulgated, again .echoing the vacant possession obligation, which remains
undefined in case law or statute.
With respect to case law relating to section 70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925,
two strands of approach are discernable: an 'absolutist' and a 'constitutionalist' view. The
absolutist view holds that a person is bound by the rights of every person in occupation,
regardless of how difficult it is to ascertain their presence. By contrast, the
constitutionalist view holds that occupation should be interpreted in light of traditional
conveyancing principles; particularly the unregistered land concept of 'constructive
notice' which is based on reasonable enquiries. Hayton specifically identified these two
approaches to the interpretation of actual occupation and wrote:
"On the absolutist view [...] a person is absolutely bound by the rights of every
person in actual occupation of the land [...]. It matters not that it is
unreasonably difficult to ascertain the actual occupier [... ]; it matters not that it
is unreasonable to expect someone to discover certain unusual rights of the
occupier...Any traditional doctrine of notice is excluded from the
self-contained paragraph ... The constitutionalist view of those accustomed to
traditional conveyancing is that a person is only bound by the rights of every
person in actual occupation ... so far as such rights are binding according to
traditional conveyancing principles (concerned with legal interests, equitable
interests and the doctrine of notice, express, constructive and imputed) except
as expressly limited or extended by statute.,,63
Which view is adopted becomes significant in cases of occupation which may not be
discoverable by a purchaser. For example, Williams & Glyn's Bank v Boland." the
House of Lords adopted an absolutist approachi'f
"Were the wives here in "actual occupation"? ... I ask: why not? There was
physical presence, with all the rights that occupiers have, including the right to
exclude all others except those having similar rights...Occupation, existing as a
fact, may protect rights if the person in occupation has rights. On this part of
6J Hayton, DJ. RegisteredLand (3'" edn Sweet & Maxwell, London 1981) 87
6' [19811 AC 487 Hl., per Lord Wilberforce at 504-6..
65 The adoption of the absolutist approach to defining occupation was only one step in the decisionthat led to the
enforcement of MrsBoland's interest, but the approach to occupation was significant. Lord Wilberforce compared
'notice! to 'actual occupation' and rejected the notion that it should be applied similarly, upholding the 'absolutist!
factual test (based onthefactof occupation alone).
199
the case I have no difficulty in concluding that a spouse, living in a house, has
an actual occupation capable of conferring protection, as an overriding interest,
upon rights of that spouse.,,66 .
The House of Lords held that Mrs Boland's beneficial interest was therefore enforceable
against the bank as an overriding interest. Tee67 criticized such an approach as being
narrow in focus, emphasising that the danger of the Boland approach was that it seemed
to leave purchasers and mortgagees vulnerable to beneficial interests claimed by those
whose occupation was not discoverable:
"The Boland judgments were uncompromising, and suggested that it would no
longer be necessary or relevant to consider concepts of notice when assessing
occupation [...]. However, such a radical departure from previously held
assumptions is not generally successfully achieved by one case alone, even if
that case emanates from the House of Lords.,,68
Despite the decision in Boland, the constitutionalist VIew of occupation gathered
support at Court of Appeal level in the decision in Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset." where
Purchas LJ. stated that:
"this appeal has given me the most concern. The provlSlons of [section
70(1)(g)] clearly were intended to import into the law relating to registered
land the equitable concept of constructive notice. Thus, a purchaser or a
chargee acquiring the title to or an interest in the land where the vendor was
not in actual possession in order to protect his interest had to make appropriate
inquiries if he found someone else in occupation of the property... In order for
the wife's interest in the property to qualify as an overriding interest under
section 70(l)(g) two things must be established: (a) was she in actual
occupation? and (b) would ag~ropriate inquiries made by the bank have
elicited the fact ofher interest?"
The majority of the Court of Appeal held that Mrs Rosset was in occupation and had a
beneficial interest enforceable against the bank. However, on appeal to the House of
Lords, it was held that Mrs Rosset did not, in fact, have a beneficial interest.71 She did
66 Above, n64,per Lord Wilberforce at 504-6.
67 Tee, above n61, 345.
68 Ibid.
69 Above,n55.
10 Ibid, per Purchas LJ. at 403-404.
11 Ibid.
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not, therefore, have any property right capable of protection as an overriding interest
and the issue of actual occupation did not arise for decision by the House of Lords.
Sparkes suggested that the approaches to occupation in Boland and Rossetmay have
separate fields of application:
"It remains to be seen how this notice-orientated test to the finding of actual
occupation [in Rosset] is to be reconciled with the plain English test proposed
by Lord Wilberforce in Boland. Lord Wilberforce was concerned with a
person who clearly was in physical occupation albeit sharing with the
mortgagor, and not a person whose occupation was marginal. It is tentatively
submitted that his dictum should not be viewed as having binding force in
these different circumstances ... The classic illustration of marginal occupation
is undiscoverable occupation. The denial by Lord Wilberforce in Boland of a
link between overriding interests and notice occurred in a case in which
occupation was obvious. It was left to academics to formulate hypothetical
cases in which the issue would precisely arise for decision. Situations which
five years ago had seemed fanciful products of the need for academic novelty
have now emerged from the examination room to become the concern of
practicing conveyancers and the courts. A choice between absolutism or
constitutionalism is likely to form the ratio of a decision very shortly, probably
in relation to undiscoverable occupiers.,,72
No such decision was forthcoming at the time of the Land Registration Act 2002. Prior
to 2002 therefore there was an apparent inconsistency as to which approach was or is
the correct one, and to what extent notice was and is a relevant consideration.
The Land Registration Act 2002 had a clear objective to further reduce the number of
overriding interests:
"The [Land Registration Act] 2002 seeks to reduce the number of overriding
interests, and to replace as many as possible of them with register entries. This
is in keeping with its overall objective of making the register as complete a
record of title as possible.v"
With that said, in 2002 the Law Commission did not consider that it was possible for
overriding interests to be made redundant altogether. In their consultative document
"Sparkes, above n61, 346-7.
73 Land Registry Practice Guide 15: Overriding Interests and their Disclosure. Above,n47, 5.
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'Land Registration for the Twenty First Century,/4 the Law Commission and the Land
Registry acknowledged that abolition of the overriding status could lead to results that
are harsh and capricious:
"The [2002] Act seeks to achieve a balance that reflects the needs of the
parties...The legislation will continue to protect those rights which, if not
afforded the status of an overriding interest, could lead to the loss of a
home... "75
As such, whilst seeking to achieve parity with the mirror principle of conveyancing.I"
attaining a transparent, accurate and comprehensive Land Register," the 2002 Act
recognised that the rights of persons in actual occupation still required some
protection.f The policy adopted by the 2002 Act (as explained by the Law
Commission) is that "interests should only have overriding status where protection
against buyers was needed, but where it was neither reasonable to expect nor sensible to
require any entry on the register".79 Further, in seeking to 'balance out' interests and
risks, and protect purchasers who may otherwise be saddled with so-called lurking
interests, they sought to achieve a fair balance by providing that an equitable interest
will only gain overriding status if the person's actual occupation is "reasonably obvious
upon a careful inspection" of the land at the time of the disposition, or if the buyer had
actual knowledge of the interest:8o
"The object of this exception is, therefore, to protect buyer and other
registered disponees for valuable consideration in cases where the fact of
occupation is neither subjectively known to them nor readily ascertainable.
Once an intending buyer becomes aware of the occupation, he or she should
make inquiry of the occupier...All of those who responded to the proposal in
74 Law Commission, 'Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century' (Law Com No 254. 1998) and Joint Law
Commission and HM Land Registry Report (Law Com 271,2001).
7S Bogusz, B. 'Bringing Land Registration into the Twenty-First Century - The Land Registration Act 2002' (2002)
65.(4) MLR 559.
76 See Thomas, M. Blackstone's Statutes on Property Law 2005-2006 (13th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford
2005).
77 Thompson, M. Modern Land Law (2nd edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2003); Bogusz, aboven75, 556-567;
Kenny, P.H. 'Children Are Spare Ribs' (1997) Conv 84; Pascoe, S. 'Triumph for Overriding Interests' (1999) Conv
144. Suchinterests arenow comprehensively listedin schedules 1 and3, LandRegistration Act 2002.
78 Hayton, D.J. Registered Land (3" edn Sweet & Maxweli, London 1981) 76.
79 Joint Law Commission and HM Land Registry Report, above n74, 8.6. Schedule3, para 2(c)(i) comprises the
qualification to the scopeofprotection afforded to occupiers based on reasonable inspection.
80 See scheduie 3, paragraph 2, Land Registration Act 2002.
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the Consultative Document that a person's actual occupation should be
apparent supported it.,,81
Firstly, this 'approach confirmed the test for actual occupation to be objective. Indeed,
the 2002 Act confirmed that it is the objective fact of being in occupation, and that
occupation being reasonably obvious upon an inspection, which is determinative of the
equitable right being overriding:
"[flor the purposes of the bill, it is not the interest that has to be apparent (as is
the case in relation to contracts for the sale of land), but the occupation of the
person having the interest. ,,82
It can therefore be noted that this category is different in its scope from all other
categories of overriding interest which confer the status of overriding interest on a
particular property right. This paragraph, in conferring the status of 'overriding interest'
on the property right held by a person in occupation, focused on the factual position of
the holder of the right (with reference to all the relevant case specific circumstances in
issue), not the type of property right held.83 As such, occupation must be understood as
the trigger for protection, but not the subject of protection (which is the occupier's
property rights). 84
Secondly, whilst the Land Registration Act 2002 does not explicitly adopt either the
absolutist or constitutionalist approach, it can be seen to limit the scope of protection
afforded to those in occupation by a 'reasonable inspection' qualification:
"This proVISIOn steers a careful course between Boland and Rosset, and
between the absolutist and constitutionalist views. The absolutist view is
rejected, in so far as the rights of those in occupation do not necessarily bind a
purchaser or mortgagee. But in mapping the scope of the exception, the Law
Commission disavows the relevance of concepts derived from the doctrine of
notice. ,,85
81 Law Commission, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century, aboven74, 167.
82 Ibid 165
83 Cooke, E. The NewLaw ofLand Registration (Hart Publishing, London 2003) 79.
84 See, for example, Webb v Pol/mount [1966] Ch 584, in which a tenant's option to purchase the freehold reversion
was protected as anoverriding interest.
85 McFarlane, B., Hopkins, N. and Nield S. Land Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2009) 508.
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Indeed, logically the insertion of the reasonable inspection qualification necessarily
means that an absolutist approach must be rejected. Nevertheless, the qualification is not
necessarily an endorsement of the constitutionalist view because, in recommending its
adoption, the Law Commission renounced the relevance of concepts derived from the
doctrine of notice, and it must be noted that the constitutionalist view necessarily
considers notice as a context in which to interpret actual occupation. The Law
Commission stated that:86
"Any requirement that [occupation should have to be apparent] it was said,
would introduce into land registration the doctrine of notice. [...] While we
entirely agree that the doctrine of notice should not be introduced into
registered land, we do not agree that limiting actual occupation to cases where
it is apparent would have that effect. ..The test is whether the right is apparent
on a reasonable inspection of the land, not whether the right would have been
discovered if the purchaser had made all the enquiries ... ,,87
McFarlane, Hopkins, and Nield suggest that, subject to the exclusion of those whose
occupation falls outside the qualitative requirement, the decision in Boland remains
authoritative "as the general approach to adopt to defming actual occupation".88 Many
however, still question the usefulness of the reasonable inspection qualification/"
A practical example illustrates the issues in more detail. One can imagine a situation in
which a vendor is selling a property with vacant possession, and he does that while his
tenant occupier is away on holiday (with all the occupier's possessions being hidden
away). Under s70(1)(g) of the Land Registration Act 1925, the occupier would have
been in actual occupation (given that under s70(1)(g) an interest lost its overriding
status only "where enquiry is made of such person... and the rights are not
disclosed")." That is, under s70(1)(g), a purchaser was bound rendering occupiers'
interests overriding whether discoverable by a purchaser or not." Under schedule 3,
86 This has its first origins in Hunt v Luck [1901] 1 Ch. 45 which provides that occupation gives notice of the
occupier'srights.
87 Law Commission, 'Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century: A Consultative Document', above 074,5.71-
5.72.
sa McFarlane, B., Hopkins,N. andNield S., above n52, 508.
8~ See Jackson, N. 'Title by Registration and Concealed Overriding Interests: The Cause and Effect of Antipathy to
Documentary Proof (2003) 119 LQR660, 665-7 argues that thereasonable inspectionqualification is misconceived.
90 Section 70(1)(g), Land Registration Act 1925.
91 In Sparkes, abovenGl, a discussion is undertaken as to the extentto which section70(1)(g) protects those whose
occupation could not be discovered by a purchaser, and whether an undiscoverable occupier should be allowed to
enjoytheprotection of anoverriding interest.
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paragraph 2 of the Land Registration Act 2002, the occupier would not be in actual
occupation for these purposes because under the 2002 legislation a purchase would not be
subject to the interest of someone "whose occupation-would not have been obvious on a
reasonably careful inspection of the land at the time of the disposition",92 as would be the
case in this example.
As such, the main effect of the Land Registration Act 2002, in altering the nature of
establishing actual occupation, can be seen to change the balance of risk between the
parties to sale and purchase transaction by making determinations of actual occupation
an objective matter of discoverability. This objective focus of the 2002 legislation
(appearing to favour the more constitutionalist approach referred to above) can be seen
to afford greater protection to buyers and lenders who, under the 1925 legislation,
would have taken a property subject to a person in actual occupation (even ifnot known
of, or obvious upon reasonable inspection) if enquiry of that person had not been made.
As such, the law has adjusted the risk and responsibility of parties to a transaction and
shifted the risk away from buyers and lenders, leaving the occupier in greater danger of
losing his or her rights of occupation, with a view to creating a more balanced allocation
ofrisk:93
"It is clear then, that the contemporary approach taken to determining questions
of actual occupation under Schedule 3, paragraph 2 expresses a decisive and
unquestioned policy choice in favour ofpurchasers. ,,94
Chapter 10, which proposes improved remedies for a breach of the obligation to give
vacant possession, highlights how adoption of a 'reasonably discoverable impediments',
condition could similarly alter the balance of power as between seller and purchaser, in
cases where there is a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession. Incorporation
of such a condition into standard conditions of sale (for example) would also reflect a
policy decision in similar terms to the policy decision manifest in the more
constitutionalist approach to actual occupation that has now been adopted by legislation.
j; ;
92 Schedule 3, paragraph 2, Land Registration Am 200Z: In many respects, the new position can be likened to the
position in unregistered landwhere the purchaser's obligation depends on whathe has (actual or constructive) notice
of.
93 Bogusz, above075.
94 Dixon, M. 'The Reform of Property Law aod the Lend Registration Act 2002: A Risk Assessment' (2003) Conv
136.
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It is clear from the above analysis that the concept of actual occupation under the Land
Registration Act 2002 shares similarities with the vacant possession construct. Both
concepts have objective tests that are fact sensitive in their application. The second limb
of the test for vacant possession is, like the test for actual occupation, inherently
objective in nature, but only capable of proper interpretation with reference to the
specific circumstances of the case in issue (including, the property or land in question).
Therefore, neither are objective tests which exist in a vacuum, but rather objective tests
in context." In cases of actual occupation there is no suggestion that intent on the part
of either party is at all relevant, with the test strictly objective in nature. This is also true
of the second limb of the test for vacant possession, but can be set apart from the first
limb of the Cumberland test for vacant possession, where the intention of the party (as
manifested by their conduct) in purporting to give vacant possession, is relevant to the
determination as to whether vacant possession is being given.
Also noteworthy is that, in taking this step towards a more constitutionalist approach, no
actual definition of actual occupation was provided by the 2002 Act. This was despite
the draft Land Registration Bill (preceding the 2002 Act) itself including a partial
definition ofactual occupation as being "physically present there",96 which the 2002 Act
did not ultimately incorporate. As such, the statutory concept of actual occupation
remains largely undefined:
"The legislation provides no guidance on the interpretation of the crucial
phrase 'actual occupation'. ,,97
This also remains true of vacant possession. The concept has originated from common
law, and not statute, but recent developments in the promulgation of tests to determine a
breach of the obligation have developed without a formal definition being provided. As
discussed below, this may well be because so-called 'possession-type' concepts are
inherently fact sensitive and so not suitable for rigid legal defmition, as further explored
in the later sections of this chapter.
95 It canalsobe foundthatspecific contextual factors are relevant to the determination asto whether a given person is
in factual possessionforthe purposes of adverse possession,whichis discussed below.
96 Joint LawCommission andHMLandRegistry Report, above074, 124.
97 Sparkes, above061.
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Adverse possession
, Acquiring land by adverse possession is the process by which a person' who is not the
legal owner of the land can acquire a title to that land by possessing the, land for a
specified period of timc." Whilst the law relating to adverse possession was considered
in some detail in a joint consultation paper by the Law Commission and the Land
Registry, and subsequently reformed in the Land Registration Act 2002,99 three
elements to a claim for adverse possession remain the same, regardless of whether the
claim is in respect of registered or unregistered land. To claim title by adverse
possession, the claimant needs to prove uninterrupted factual possession of the land by
the applicant for the requisite period, without consent, and with an intention on the part
of the claimant to possess the land during that period. What is particularly interesting
for the purposes of this thesis, however, is whether, as noted previously, the
determination is strictly objective in nature, or whether the specific context and
circumstances are also relevant. It is useful to consider cases of adverse possession
because the nature ofthe determination in such cases can be seen to share characteristics
with the tests for vacant possession, thus providing a potential parallel in so-called
'possession type' concepts.
The most recent landmark decision concerning claims of adverse possession was laid
down by the House of Lords in J A Pye (Oxford) Ltd v Graham.100 In this case the
personal representatives of the late Michael Graham (and Mrs Graham) claimed rights
to agricultural land belonging to J A Pye based on possession of the land since 1984.
Pye sought to defend the claim by arguing that they had a future intention to build on
the land and that the Grahams had not dispossessed them given their knowledge that the
land belonged to Pye and their willingness to pay for use of the land. At first instance
the Grahams case was made out, but this was reversed by the Court of Appeal who held
that the Grahams had not dispossessed Pye of the land. This, was because of the
subjective intentions and knowledge ofboth the Grahams and Pye:
98 See Bowes, C. and Shaw K. 'You snooze, you Iose' (2008) 207 Property Law Journal 6 and Bowes, C. and Shaw
K. 'Time's up ... but I'm staying!' (2008) 221 Property Law Journal 9.
99 'Land Registration forthe 21st century: A Consultative Document', aboven74.
100 [2002] 3 WRL 221.
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"The subjective intention was held to be crucial by the Court of Appeal
because it was indicative of a form of implied licence by Pye that the Grahams
could use the land. The decision in the Court of Appeal begged the question
whether a successful claim to adverse possession rested on the, subjective I
intentions of both the squatter and the paper owner or whether on the objective
intention to possess land for the requisite period of time under the Limitation
Act 1980.,,101
The House of Lords overruled the Court of Appeal decision, reaffirming the importance
of possession in common law and in claims of adverse possession. The House of Lords
did not consider that it mattered that the adverse possessor did not have an actna1
subjective belief that he or she was acting as owner, nor did it matter that a squatter was
prepared to have paid for occupation of the land. Commenting on the decision, Panesar
remarked:
"his Lordship referred to the words of Slade LJ in Buckingham County Council
v Moran who said that what was required was 'not an intention to own or even
an intention to acquire ownership but an intention to possess'. On the basis of
these principles, Lord Browne-Wilkinson explained that the Grahams had
established a satisfactory possessory title to the land belonging to Pye... Their
willingness to pay did not alter the fact that they had the necessary factual
possession for the period of time prescribed by the Limitation Act 1980.,,102
101 Panesar, S. 'Adverse Possession of Land' (2002) 24 Liverpool Law Review 237, 238. Between 1983 and 1986 a
series of articles debated the relevance of subjective intent in cases of adverse possession, and whether belief of
ownership was relevant in such cases - see Helmholz, RH. 'Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent' (1983) 61
"p;1"ashing University Law Quarterly 331; Cunningham, R.A. 'Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent: A reply to
Professor Helmholz' (1986) 64 Washington University Law Quarterly 1 and Helmholz, R.H. 'More on Subjective
Intent: A Response to Professor Cunningham' (1986) 64 Washing University Law Quarterly 64.
102 Panesar, abovenIDI,238.
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The 'implied licence theory' was established by Bramwell LJ. in Leigh v Jack, 103
namely that possession of the paper owner could .not be disturbed by a squatter if the
,
paper owner could show a future intention to use the-land. This was also rejected by the
House of Lords in Pye, affirming the Court of Appeal decision in Buckingham County
Council v Moran. 104 Any such intention of the paper title owners to use the land in the
future, even if evidenced, was deemed irrelevant in cases where the necessary factual
possession for the requisite period of time could be established. The House of Lords
held that factual possession was an objective question of fact, and not sensitive to
subjective belief or future intentions, in apparently similar terms to the fact of being
obviously in occupation for the purposes of claiming an overriding interest on the basis
of actual occupation, where intention is also not relevant (but rather the objective fact of
occupation is).lOS Clearly, the test for adverse possession relates, not just to factual
possession, but also to the squatter's 'intention to possess' the land (in addition to the
requirements for a lack of consent), and this intention can be likened to the first limb of
the Cumberland test, looking at whether the party required to give vacant possession is,
by their actions, manifesting such an intention to vacate the premises.
What is clear, however, is that both elements of factual possession, and intention to
possession, will be case specific determinations, based on fact and degree. To show
factual possession there will need to be a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control
over the land but, crucially, what is sufficient has been held to depend on the specific
circumstances in question. In Wretham v Ross and Shaw,1°6 it was noted that factual
possession should be objectively assessed by consideration of both the acts of the
claimant which it claims amount to possession and the absence of any acts of possession
on the part of the paper title owners. In particular, case law on adverse possession
suggests that the nature of the land and the manner in which land of that nature is
commonly used will be key in determining whether factual possession has been
103 (1879) 5 EX D 264.
104 [1990] Ch 623.
105 Sucha debate has also emerged in the American legal system. In the landmark 2006 case of Walling v Przyblo (7
N.Y. 3d 228. 20(6), the highest appellate court in New York, the Court of Appeals, held that actual occupation, not
subjective knowledge, determines whether the claimofright element of (U! adverse possessionclaimis satisfied. Two
years after the Walling decision by the Court of Appeals, however, the, New Ynrk State Legislature amended NeW'
YorkRealPropeity Actions and Proceedings LawSection 501 in order to overturn the precedent set by Walling. TIle '.
current positionis thatif one knows or shouldknow one is occupying someone else's land, one cannot establish a
'claimof right'. Occupation is therefore no longerdeterminative to establishing a claimof right in theAmerican legal .
. system, and subjective knowledge and intentions arerelevant in thatlegal system, in contrast to the law of England '.
aod Wales.
106 [2005] EWHC 1259.
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achieved. In discussing factual possession, Lord Browne-Wilkinson quoted Slade J. in
the case ofPowell v McFarlane:
"Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must
be a single and [exclusive] possession, though there can be a single possession
exercised by or on behalf of several persons jointly. Thus an owner of land and
a person intruding on that land without his consent cannot both be in
possession of the land at the same time. The question what acts constitute a
sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the
circumstances, in particular the nature of the land and the manner in which the
land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. Everything must depend on
the particular circumstances, but broadly, I think what must be shown as
constituting factual possession is that the alleged possessor has been dealing
with the land as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it
and that no-one else has done so."107
In other cases the courts have emphasised that, in deciding whether acts amount to
possession, regard must be had to the nature of the land, and the manner in which land
of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed. The quotation from Slade J. is a paraphrase
of an often cited dictum of Lord Hagan in Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat, 108 where he
said:
"As to possession, it must be considered in every case with reference to the
peculiar circumstances. The acts, implying possession in one case, may be
wholly inadequate to prove it in another. The character and value of the
property, the suitable and natural mode of using it, the course of conduct which
the proprietor might reasonably be expected to follow with a due regard to his
own interest. All these things, greatly varying as they must, under various
conditions, are to be taken into account in determining the sufficiency of a
possession."109
Further, in RedHouse Farms (Thorndon) Ltd v Catchpole, Cairns LJ said:
"The authorities make it clear that what constitutes possession of any particular
piece ofland must depend upon the nature of the land and what it is capable of
use for."uO
107 [1977] 38 P&CR 452 at 470. Emphasis added.
108 (1880) 5 App Cas 273.
109 Ibid, per Lord Hagan at 288. That passage was cited with approval by Lord Macnaghten in Johnson v O'Neill
[1911] AC 552 at 583, the Privy Council in Kirby v Cowderoy [1912] AC 599 at 603, and by Sir John Pennycuick
giving the judgment ofthe Court ofAppeal in Treloar v Nute [1976] I WLR 1295 at 1299G-H.
.uv [1977]2 EGLR 125. per Cairns L.1. at 126. See alsothe more recent case of Port ofLondon Authorityv Ashmore
[2009] EWHC 954 (Ch).
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As noted by Lee, the question of what amounts to an 'intention to possess', another
requirement of adverse possession, is similarly case specific:
"The question of intention to possess ...is one of fact. Whether it can be
established depends on an assessment of all the circumstances in a particular
case. nUl
The relevance of case-specific circumstances and characteristics in cases of adverse
possession can be likened to the test to determine whether an obligation to give vacant
possession has been satisfied, and specifically the second limb of the Cumberland test
with respect to the ostensibly 'objective' requirement of being able to occupy without
'difficulty or objection'. Therefore for both factual possession, in the context of adverse
possession, and actual occupation, the relevant test in each case can be seen to be
objective, but with reference to the particular context. This is consistent, by analogy,
with the second limb of the test for vacant possession, which is an objective test with
.c: tth rti I· .. 112rererence 0 epa ICU ar circumstances III Issue.
By contrast, the first limb of the test for vacant possession can be seen to be inherently
fact specific with reference to the actual seller or tenant in question, and whether their
conduct openly manifests an intention (on their part) to give vacant possession. In this
respect, some 'intention' to give vacant possession on the part of seller or tenant is
relevant, but only by reference to whether such intention is outwardly manifested in the
conduct of the party so seeking to provide vacant possession (that is, the intent is
demonstrated through conduct). If the party required to give vacant possession claimed
to have had an intention to provide vacant possession, but that was not obviously
manifested in their conduct, such a claimed intention would be irrelevant. As such, this
discussion of 'intention' is not concerned per se with 'state of mind' (or mens rea), but
rather with conduct that outwardly manifests the alleged intention (or attempt by the
party) to provide vacant possession.
III Lee, A. 'Adverse Possession and Proprietary Estoppel as Defences to Actions for Possession' (1999) 29 Hong
Kong LawJourna/31. .
112 The intended use of the property by the party with the right to vacantpossessioncan also be seen moregenerally
to formpart of the specific factual circumstances to whichthe objective testhas been shownto be subject.
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This type of intention can be compared with one's 'intention to possess' in
determinations relating to adverse possession, which similarly requires some 'intent' on,
the party making the claim, and which is also, in adverse possession terms, likely to be
manifested by conduct (for example, an intention to possess a field will be manifest by .
fencing and gating the field, and displaying signs saying 'keep out' - again reflecting the
fact specific nature of such a determination). In the next chapter, when discussing the
relevance of the state and condition of a property to the obligation to give vacant
possession, support is provided to justify the assertion that the nature of the land (as
well as other contextual factors) is relevant to determinations relating to vacant
possession (in a similar manner to adverse possession and actual occupation), thus
further supporting the fact sensitive nature of the obligation.
As such, whilst there is little case law or academic discussion on this point in a vacant
possession arena, analysis (by analogy) of (more developed) property law concepts,
which exhibit similar characteristics and which are 'possession based', give support to
the proposition advanced by this chapter that the objective second limb of the
Cumberland test should be interpreted in the context of the particular circumstances of
the case (including consideration of the party with the right to possession and the nature
of the property or land more generally). In cases of actual occupation, adverse
possession and vacant possession, case specific factors would appear to directly affect
the application of the relevant tests.
Fairness andpolicy considerations
Inherent to the discussion of whether and, .if so, to what extent, case specific factors
should be relevant to claims of adverse possession and actual occupation (and, in tum,
vacant possession) is the issue of fairness between the parties. For example, the concept
of adverse possession seeks to resolve a conflict between two parties - the legal owner
of the land and the party who purports to have acquired ownership due to previous (and
usually current) possession of the land. The doctrine of adverse possession can therefore
be seen as a means by which persons who have used land for a requisite period of time,
can avoid having such land 'taken from them' by claiming their entitlement, on the basis
that:
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"The law refrains from depriving people of lands they have long occupied
because doing so would cause them too much pain."113
In doing so, this clearly subordinates the rights of the 'true' owner to, regannng
possession of land to which they hold the paper title. Stake discusses the arguments for
and against adverse possession and highlights the balance that the law is seeking to
strike between competing rights in this regard. Stake wrote:
"..adverse possession ... does serve a useful purpose and can continue to do so
in the future. For various reasons, a judicial allocation of land can turn out to
be a lasting allocation of that land. The purpose of adverse possession is to
reduce losses by getting that allocation right. When a case of adverse
possession arises, someone loses land. Modem experimental psychology gives
us good reason to believe that the doctrine places the loss on the person who
will suffer it least - the person whose roots are less vitally embedded in the
land.,,114
It is clear that the issue of fairness is engaged in cases of adverse possession, with Stake
suggesting that the law seeks to place the loss on the party who will be least directly
prejudiced. It can be argued that this is now reflected in the three limited exceptions to
the general rule on adverse possession in the Land Registration Act 2002, which
otherwise reflects a clear policy shift in favour of protecting those with established
registered estates in land, and away from the pre-2002 position where adverse
possession was much more easily obtainable against registered titles.ll5 This was
justified on the basis that the fact of registration, and not possession, is now the basis of
title, and that this strikes a fairer balance the parties. As the commentary on the new
rules makes clear:
"The Bill ....creates new rules in relation to registered land that will confer
greater protection against the acquisition of title by persons in adverse
possession. This is consistent with one of the objectives of the Bill that it is
registration alone that should confer title ... We consider that this new scheme
strikes a fairer balance between landowner and squatter than does the present
113 Stake, I.E. 'The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession' (2001) 89 TheGeorgetown Law Journal 2419, 2473.
114 Ibid, 2420
us Cobb N. and Fox L. 'Living Outside the System: The(Im)morality of Urban Squatting after the Land Registration
Act 2002' (2007) 27 Legal Studies 236. Such achange in policy promotes the benefits of registration. This is also
reinforced by the fact that the rules relating to unregistered land have not been affected, thus favouring those
acquiring land by adverse possession. However: in balancing the rights of competing parties, the Land Registration
Act 2002 expressly acknowledged that those who obtained 12 years of adverse possession under the pre-2002
legislation havetheirright to be registered under those pre-2002 rules, provided'{following expiry of the transitional
provisions) theyhaveremained in occupation.
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law. It also reflects the fact that the basis of title to registered land is the fact of
registration, not (as is the case with unregistered land) possession.v"
In·determinations of this kind it is apparent that the law has tried to achieve fairness to
the parties, whilst at the same time being aware that one party is likely to be aggrieved
by the decision. The fact that adverse possession can still be achieved against a
registered title following an objection, if steps are not taken to evict the squatter or
regularise the position, is one such example of the law seeking to remain fair to all
parties in this regard.1l7
Such checks and balances as to fairness are also manifest in cases involving vacant
possession, where parties will be affected by a determination as to whether they are
liable for a breach of the obligation, or are entitled to compensation as a result. In cases
of vacant possession the law, in a similar manner to cases of adverse possession and
actual occupation, is effectively seeking to determine which party has suffered the
greatest (the party claiming that vacant possession has been given, or the party saying
that it has not been) and whether the party receiving a property has obtained what they
contracted for, or whether (for example) items left at the premises are actually too
substantial to allow the seller not to be held liable in some regard. This, by analogy, can
be likened to decisions concerning actual occupation where the law has to balance the
rights ofthose in actual occupation with the rights of those seeking to purchase or take a
mortgage over the property, deciding that a purchaser or mortgagor should only be
bound by rights which were reasonably discoverable under the 2002 legislation. The
law has determined that it is a greater hardship or injustice to a purchaser or mortgagor
to hold them subject to an undiscoverable overriding interest, than to deprive that person
of their equitable rights in such an instance. Such decisions are overlaid with the issues
and risk and responsibility inherent in such cases.
}16 Law Commission. LandRegistration for the Twenty-First Century, above n74, 4. Emphasis added. Thereare also
arguments basedon economic efficiencyto support the current legal stanceon adversepossession.
117 Sec Gordley, J. and Mattei U. 'Protecting possession' (1996) 44 (2) The AmericanJournal of Comparative Law
297 which explains the differing ways in which protection can be offered to the rights of persons in possession of
land.
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Manifest in all decisions relating to actual occupation, adverse possession and vacant
, ,
, .
possession, is a case specific element as to whether the given facts are sufficient to
establish factual possession, actual occupation or a breach of the obligation to give
vacant possession. It is a determination in each case for the court based on the particular
acts in issue. For example, an impediment to vacant possession that was only de
minimis (or not substantial enough in nature, with respect to the second limb of the test)
would not be held to cause a party to have breached their obligation, just as a lack of
exclusivity of possession may prevent a landowner having their title barred by adverse
possession, or a lack of obvious occupation prevent a purchaser taking a given property
subject to an overriding interest. As such, the uncertainty about whether the facts are
sufficient in any given instance leave the parties 'bargaining in the shadow of the law',
where financial resource and other factors may determine how a particular case is
settled. The fact that decisions will proceed on a case by case basis also explains why a
legal 'definition' of vacant possession is not appropriate. Rather, a 'description' of vacant
possession with its application determined on a case by case basis is more snitable.
Indeed, in chapter lOan overriding and principled statement of what vacant possession
means, which must be interpreted with reference to a number of relevant variables, is
proposed. The need for the law to provide an overriding formula (which requires
interpretation in any given case) is similar to other models of possession-like concepts;
indeed, both adverse possession and actual occupation are based in guiding principles
that have to be interpreted in a specific factual context.l'" This further implies that there
is something more generally about issues of 'possession' which require any
determination to be fact specific in a given particular context, an assertion developed
further in the next section.
Possession as afact specific determination
Chapter 5 discussed the legal and factual manifestations of the concept of possession,
and tied both the legal and factual elements to the obligation to give vacant possession.
Vacant possession was shown to relate to the right to possession (which follows from
the transfer of the estate in land) but also the fact of being able to actually occupy at the
I1S Forexample, in casesof adverse possession the law saysthe squatter must have(1) factual possession of the land
in an exclusive- manner (2) with an intention to possess the land (3) without consent - but what these mean, 'IDd_
whether theyare satisfied in anyparticular case,will be entirely determined bythe facts of the case in issue.
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point of completion, pursuant to that legal right. The above analysis has identified a
common factual dependency for the' concepts of adverse possession, actual occupation
and vacant possession, suggesting that it is a characteristic feature of possession-type
concepts more generally that their meaning cannot be adequately expressed as a strictly
legal matter (i.e. devoid of factual circumstances). That is, the law alone cannot define
and explain these concepts, legal statements must be interpreted in light of the facts of
particular cases.
As noted in chapter 5, possession has been said to be a word of ambiguous meaning"
with no other legal conception more open to a variety of meanings.V" It is true to say
that many have emphasised the complex nature of possession. For example, Salmond
wrote:
"In the whole range of legal theory there is no conception more difficult than
that ofpossession."121
Tay suggested that the difficulties with analysis may have been caused by a focus on the
theory, and not the practical manifestation of the concept ofpossession:
"The unsatisfactory state of conceptual analysis and juristic formulation in the
field of possession is now widely recognized. Some ascribe it to the
difficulties inherent in whatever basic concept of possession there may be;
others to confusions of terminology, a priori imposition of theory and a
misguided endeavour to reduce decisions that have developed in the context of
specific branches of law and of separate remedies to smooth components of a
coherent system." 122
Dias and Hughes also blame a preoccupatioll with theory and state that:
'If a topic has ever suffered from too much theorising it is that of possession,
and nowhere else is the danger of an a priori approach to jurisprudence better
illustrated. The actual working of the law has not only been obscured by a fog
II' Bourne v Fosbrooke (1865) 18 C.B. (N.S.) 515, 526; 144 E.R. 545, per Erie CJ. at 549.
120 Lyell v. Kennedy (1887) 18 Q.B.D. 796, per Fry LJ at 813.
121 Salmond, J.W. Jurisprudence (10th edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 1947) 285.
122 Tay,A. 'The Concept of Possession in the common law: Foundations for a new approach' (1963) 4 Melb UL Rev
476.
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of speculation, but, what is worse, decisions have been falsified so as to fit
them into some preconceived theory."123
In suggesting that possession must be tied to fact and cannot just be legal in nature,
Hart124 expressed the view that legal concepts cannot be defined, but only described,
and argued that there are a number of factors relevant to possession and recognised by
the courts. These factors cannot, in and of themselves, serve to define possession,
however, because no single factor is decisive. Further, Hart noted that not all factors
will always be relevant in any given instancel 25 Hart thus took the view that so-called
'living bodies of law' (like possession) cannot be constrained in such an a priori manner
for this very reason:
"A living body of law cannot be tied into the strait-jacket of an a priori
conceptual system: but to insist, as a matter ofprinciple, that we should not ask
for general conceptions underlying what appear to be specific rules separating
one possession from another, is to live in the intellectual Ice Age in which the
first forms of action were born."126
Tay claimed that the defect with early writings on possession was that the theoretical
distinctions made "confront[ed] us as ad hoc distinctions, as saving devices, forced
upon [us] in the process of fitting their scheme to the law".127 Tay claimed that in the
work of Salmond, for example, and in the process of matching his conceptual scheme
and the law, "vicious falsification of legal developments and decisions were arrived
at".128 Tay suggested that the problem with such an analysis of possession is that the
theory has been wrongly separated from practice:
"The fault, I should argue, lies not in the aim of reaching a complete theory of
possession... The fault lies in his separation of the analysis of the concept from
the study of its working in the legal system."129
123 Dias, R. and Hughes G.Jurisprudence (Butterworths, London 1964) 308.
124 Hart, H. 'Definition andTheory in Jurisprudence' (1954) 70 Law Quarterly Review 37.
125 Harris, D.R. 'The Conceptof Possession in English Law' in Guest, A.G. Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 1961).
126 Hart, H.L.A. 'The Ascription ofResponsibility and Rights' (1948-1949) 49 Proceedings ofthe Aristotelian Society
171. ProfessorHart's view has been effectively criticized by Mackie, Ll.. 'Responsibility and Language' (1955) 33
Australasian Journal afPhilosophy 143.
. 127 Tay, above n1I6.
128 See also Williams, C. 'Langnage and the Law-IV' (1945) 61 Law Quarterly Review 384, 390, 391 and (for the
distortion of decisionson findingby Salmond as well as other writers) Goodhart, A.L. 'Three Cases on Possession'
(1928) 3 Cambridge Law Journal 195.
129 Tay, abovenl16.
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Tay further explained that the important. task to focus on is not 'defining' the word
possession (or indeed, the concept ofvacant possession) as a legal tenn of art, but rather
its practical mauifestation:
"Concepts are concepts in use, 'possession' is a term with a certain role. To
understaud possession, we must look,not at the word, but at the way in which
possession entered our legal system, the parts it was called upon to play in it,
the character and problems of its development. If we do this, we do emerge
with a general concept of possession implicitly recognised aud applied in our
law. Only in terms of such a general concept, I shall ar/rie, cau we understaud
the special problems that have arisen in specific fields."I 0
This underlines the central observation made in this analysis of vacant possession,
adverse possession aud actual occupation. All three are 'possession-type' concepts and
none of the three can be understood, explained or defined, by reference just to the 'word'
(as a legal concept with a specific definition), but rather one must consider the factual
mauifestation of the possession or occupation in a particular context. This is because
possession is viewed as infra-jural, and not jural (i.e. possession is beyond just a legal
definition aud also hinges on the facts of a particular case in issue). Tay claimed that:
"The fact that possession is an infra-jural relation accounts for some of the
difficulties that have accompanied the attempt to define it. The problems of
describing and ultimately confining its nature are like those that arise in
determining what is or constitutes consent and what amounts to a tenement,
they are not like telling a man how to become a trustee or how to contract a
marriage. Precisely for this reason we need a definition that is open-textured,
that uses another infra-jural term... which gives a court guidance on the criteria
to emphasise without tying it in a straitjacket of formal definitions and
concepts."BI
This further highlights how the very essence of the concept of 'possession' is such that
understauding its meaning is only possible in a given case based on the facts of any
particular circumstauce. An a priori assumption or definition of possession type
concepts (i.e. a specifically jural definition) is impossible given the 'open textured'
nature of the term,
130 Ibid.
131Ibid.
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As suggested earlier, each and every determination, in context, will provide guidance
for future determinations, which will then enable so-called 'rules of thumb", to develop as
to what mayor may not amount to actual occupation, adverse possession or vacant
possession in a given situation or on a certain set of facts. As such, and as the next
chapters further explain, there will never be one universally agreed 'definition' of vacant
possession, but it will be possible to develop an overriding and principled statement
which must be interpreted with reference to a number of relevant variables of which
practitioners must be aware. Vacant possession cannot be confined to a strictly legal
definition (and constitute a jural definition), devoid of context and pragmatic
interpretation. This is reflected in the statement of vacant possession that is provided in
the conclusion to this thesis.
Conclusion
This chapter has explained that the test to determine a breach of the obligation to give
vacant possession has two limbs: the first is directed at the activities of the party
required to give vacant possession and provides that if the conduct of the party in
question indicates they, as seller or tenant, are continuing to use the premises for their
own purposes in a non-trivial way (for example, by leaving goods in the premises), then
they will fail to establish that vacant possession has been given. As such, this first limb
focuses on the party required to give vacant possession and whether the actions and
conduct of that party, on the facts, manifest an intention to vacate the premises. By
contrast, the second test is directed at whether the contents of the premises present,
objectively speaking, a substantial obstacle to the buyer's or landlord's own physical
enjoyment of the premises on completion (or at the operative time). The second limb of
the Cumberland test is objective in nature, but with reference to specific contextual
circumstances (such circumstances including the nature of the property or land in
question, as will be explored in more detail in the next chapter). This can be likened to,
and compared with, determinations relating to factual possession (in the context of
adverse possession), and actual occupation, where the context has been seen to be
highly relevant to application of the objective determination in each case.132
132 The next chapter further supports the contention that the nature of the land is relevant to the vacant possession
determination in thecontext of the state and condition of agivenproperty.
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In determinations connected to the second limb of the test, subjective intent has no
place; the test is objective, but objective in context and not in a vacuum. Whilst intent
has some relevance in respect of the first limb, it is only intent manifested by conduct
(as compared to purely subjective intent - mens rea) which a party with the obligation to
give vacant possession will be able to rely on in claiming that they have sought to
procure vacant possession.
Common to cases of adverse possession, actual occupation and vacant possession is the
fact that, whilst some general guidance had been laid down, any determination has been
shown to proceed on a case by case basis, with so-called 'rules of thumb' developing. As
such, no recognised definition has emerged (or, it can be argued, is capable of
emergence). Given that this is apparent from all three property law concepts, it would
seem to be more generally characteristic of the concept of possession in its various
manifestations that it requires a fact-specific determination rather than existing in its
own right as an inflexible legal term with a defined and specific meaning. Indeed, the
concept of possession has been shown to have had a long tradition of (wrongly) only
being interpreted in a strictly legal sense, devoid of factual considerations, something
which has led to perverse and incorrect definitions and analysis. This is similar to the
treatment of vacant possession as specifically just a legal right to possession in the
decision in Sheikh, as discussed in chapter 5.133
Cases of adverse possession, actual occupation and vacant possession also share the fact
that, in cases where a determination has been made, judges have appeared willing to
only provide some explanation based on the facts of that particular case, rather than
more generic principles which could be applied in subsequent cases. This highlights not
only the case specific nature of these concepts in their practical context, but also the
issues of risk, responsibility and fairness which are engaged when determinations have
to be made. Certainly, at present, parties can be seen to be negotiating in the 'shadow of
the law' in determinations relating to vacant possession, given that there is insufficient
. guidance in case law to accurately assess, or predict, how a court may rule in any given
, case. This causes issues such as bargaining strength and financial resource to be more
. salient considerations in parties' decisions to litigate or settle disputes. As more
I3J Sheikh v O'Connor [1987] 2 EGLR269.
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developed property law concepts, the existence of a greater wealth of case law for
adverse possession and actual occupation, along with legislative intervention to reflect
policy decisions, reduces the uncertainty to some extent in these cases, however, the
determinations remain fact specific and therefore-there is still an element of 'bargaining
in the shadow of the law'. Chapter 10 proposes a contractual formulation of vacant
possession, and proposed wording to ameliorate the position on available remedies, in
order to seek to more evenly distribute risk and responsibility between the parties to any
given transaction, and to reduce uncertainty and exposure for the weaker party. Such a
formulation (also explaining the variables that must be taken into account when
interpreting the test in any given context) also seeks to bring clarity to a currently
ambiguous property law concept, while at the same time acknowledging that the
concept cannot be straight-jacketed into a single legal statement. Such proposals (if
adopted) would, like legislative intervention in the cases of adverse possession and
actual occupation, reflect a policy decision that defines the rights and responsibilities of
parties in a certain way.
Whilst in the context of a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession, the tests to
establish a breach have been shown to be highly context and fact specific, it is also
relevant to consider what may (if sufficiently substantial) amount to a potential barrier
to the receipt of vacant possession, and therefore be relevant to the scope of the
obligation to which the tests must be applied. The next chapter examines the scope and
extent of the obligation in more detail, with specific reference to the nature of the
property or land, and its state and condition. This builds on the analysis and conclusions
in this chapter, further highlighting the fact specific nature of the obligation, and further
develops understanding of the vacant possession concept in a way not previously
considered by case law and commentary,
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Chapter 8
The Scope and Extent of the Obligation
Whilst the tests to establish a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession have
been shown to be highly fact specific, it is necessary to consider what may (if
sufficiently substantial) amount to a potential barrier to the receipt of vacant possession,
and therefore be relevant to application of either limb of the tests for vacant possession.
Traditionally, fixtures are not seen to be relevant to the vacant possession obligation
but, as this chapter will demonstrate, the scope and extent of the obligation can be
argued to encompass more than just chattels, which are generally understood as the
most common impediment to the receipt of vacant possession. In this context, the
uncertainty caused by interacting contractual conditions is also apparent, and analysis
from chapters 3 and 4 is drawn upon to support the propositions being advanced. The
chapter also considers the relevance of so called 'lesser interests' to the obligation, in
seeking to fully explain the scope and extent of the tests for vacant possession, and how
they necessarily relate only to impediments that affect the right of 'possession' of the
property or land in question.
Status of items
The most obvious difficulty in seeking to determine the scope and extent of the
obligation to give vacant possession is with regard to what status items left at the
property on completion may have. Disputes can arise as to whether items left behind at
a property are frxtures (and therefore part of the land) or chattels (which are personal
property of the tenant obliged to procure vacant possession, and which must therefore
be removed). Indeed, it has been commonly established that if the seller's failure to give
vacant possession is due to the presence on the property of chattels, which affect
usability of the premises, then a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession will
arise if the impediment substantially interferes with enjoyment of a substantial part of
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the premises on completion.' This is why the distinction between fixtures and chattels
has traditionally been seen to be so important.
Fixtures are physical objects which accede to the realty. Any physical object classed as
a fixture as a matter of law merges with the land, title to it automatically vests in the
owner of the freehold, and the object itself cannot be severed from the land by anyone
other than the freehold owner? Further the purchaser of a freehold is entitled to all
fixtures on the land at the date of exchange of contracts.' This is all based on the maxim
of law quicquid plantatur solo, sols cedit, meaning 'whatever is affixed to the soil
accedes to the soil'.4 Chattels are physical objects which retain their independent
character as personalty despite close association with realty. They thus do not attach to
the land and do not pass with a conveyance of the land unless stipulated in the
conveyance. A seller is entitled, and indeed obliged, to remove such items before
completion.
The fixtures and chattels distinction turns on two distinct but connected tests. The first
test concerns the degree of physical annexation to the land. The more permanently and
irreversibly the object is affixed to the land the more likely it is to be considered a
fixture. A form of gravity test for a chattel has developed out of this, in that an object
that merely rests on the land due to its own weight will be classed a chattel, and one
more permanently fixed will be classed as a fixture. In Holland v Hodgson' spinning
looms bolted to the floor were classed as fixtures, but in Hulme v Bingham' heavy
machinery otherwise unattached was considered a chattel. In Botham v TSB Bank Plc7
kitchen appliances that were only connected electrically to the land (remaining in
I See Cumberland Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264. Also, Megarry, W. and Wade w. The law ofreal property
(1h edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008) 672 state that "rcmovcable physical impediments" are relevant to the
obligation - i.e. chattels and not fixtures which are attached permanently to the land and which pass under the
contract of sale.
2 A plethora of case law exists - see Reynolds v Ashby & Son [1904] AC 466; Meeluish v BMI (No 3) Ltd [1996] AC
454; Wessex Reserve Forces and Cadets Association v White [2005] 3 EGLR 127.per MichaelHarvey QC at21 and
23; Elwes v Law (1802) 3 East 38 at 55; Wiltshear v Cottrell (1853) 1 E & B 674; neen v Andrews [1986]52 P & CR
17; Kennedy v Secretary ofState for Wales [1996] EGCS 17; Hulme v Brigham [1943] KB 152; Hamp v Bygrave
[1983]1 EGLR 174; Webb v Bevis Ltd [1940] 1 All ER 247 and Jordan v May [1947] KB 427. The degree of
affixation is not necessarily the same in every type of case; see, for example, London County Council v Wilkins
[1955]2 QB 653 - affirmed [1957] AC 362 anuBucklandv Butterfield (1820) 2 Brod & Bing 54.
J Taylor v Hamer [2002] EWCA Civ 1130.
4 Bum, E.H. and Cartwright J. Modern Law ofReal Property (17th edn Oxford University Press, Oxford 2006) 156.
5 (1872) LR 7 CP 328.
6 [1943] KB 152.
7 [1996]73 P & CRDl, CA.
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position by their own weight) were considered chattels on this test. Gray and Gray"
argue that the trend in recent case law suggests the above test is being overtaken by the
second test concerning the objectively understood purpose (or object) of the annexation.
The key question in respect of this test is whether the installation of the object was
intended to effect a permanent improvement to the realty or was merely a temporary
addition to enhance the enjoyment of the chatte1.9 Blackburn J in Holland v Hodgson'"
gave the following example:
"Blocks of stone placed one on top of another without any mortar or cement for
the purpose of forming a dry stone wall would become part of the land, though
the same stones, if deposited in a builder's yard and for convenience sake
stacked on the top of each other in the form of a wall, would remain chattels."!'
As such, both the item's degree and purpose of annexation are key in the determination
of the status of an item, which will proceed on a case by case basis, as Burn and
Cartwright state:
"[The] question of whether a chattel has been so annexed to land as to become
part of it is sometimes difficult to answer. It is a question of law for the judge,
but the decision on one case is no sure guide in another, for everything turns on
the circumstances and mainly, though not decisively, upon two particular
circumstances, the degree of annexation and the object [or purpose] of
annexation." 12
An example of the importance of this distinction for vacant possession arose in the case
of Hynes v Vaughan. 13 In this case, one issue surrounded a chrysanthemum growing
frame and sprinkler system, and whether these could be argued to be fixtures or chattels.
The seller defendants had removed these from the property after the date of the contract,
which was unlawful if they were fixtures as they had passed with the land to the
purchaser.!" In view of the functions of the chrysanthemum growing frame and
installation of the sprinkler system, it was determined that those items could not be seen
as fixtures on the property so as to pass under the contract to the plaintiff. As such, they
8 Gray, K. and Gray S.F. Elements ofLandLaw (5" edn Oxford;University Press, Oxford 2006) 32 - 38.
9 Elitestone Ltd v Morris [1997]1 WLR 687, per Lord Lloyd a1690 ..
10 (1872) LR 7 CP 328.
II Ibid, per Blackburn J. at334.
12 Burn, E.H. and Cartwright J., above n4, 156.
13 [1985] 50 P. & C.R. 444.
14 Taylor v Hamer, above n3.
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were chattels which should have been moved in accordance with the obligation to give
vacant possession. The judge explained:
"The question of whether or not the defendants were entitled to remove the
growing frame and sprinkler system after the contract for sale had been signed
depends on whether or not the apparatus could properly be described as a
fixture. If it was a fixture, the plaintiff had contracted to purchase it along with
the property, and the defendants were not entitled to remove it. If it was not a
fixture, the defendants were fully entitled to remove it before completion... ,,15
The judge went on to explain that the items were considered to be chattels, given their
degree and purpose of annexation to the land:
"I do not agree ... that it is even remotely arguable that the growing frame and
sprinkler system were a fixture. The function of a growing frame requires the
frame to be movable up and down the supports as the height of the growing
plants requires. The function of a growing frame requires that it be dismantled
from time to time in order to enable the flower bed to be cultivated and
prepared for the new seedlings. The proposition that a growing frame on a
flower bed can be a fixture contradicts its function. It is, in my view, an
untenable proposition. As to the sprinkler, it would be possible to have a
sprinkler system with underground water pipes permanently installed, but... the
sprinkler system at [the property] was attached by a rubber or plastic hose to a
garden tap. How anyone, lay person or lawyer, could regard that as a fixture
defeats me. It plainly, in my view, was not. On this part of the case, the
plaintiffs contentions [that the items are fixtures] are not, in my view, capable
ofbeing seriously argued.,,16
The judge's determination that the items were chattels was supported by witness
statement evidence of a professional nurseryman which stated that "it would be obvious
in any event, that the growing frame was removed in order during the winter months to
enable the land to be prepared for the new season's plants"Y The growing frame was
not fixed to the land so as to pass to the purchaser under the contract, and as such, the
defendant sellers were correct to remove these items; if they had not, and on the basis
that they were substantial in nature, that would have constituted a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession under the contract of sale.
15 Above, ni3,per ScoiJ. at 453.
16 Ibid, per Scot J. at 453.
17 Above, ni3 at 454.
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This is a common issue on the sale and purchase of property. Imagine that a seller
contracts to convey a property to a purchaser, the contract providing expressly that
vacant possession is to be given on completion. On the morning of completion the
transaction completes and the purchaser is given the keys. Later in tile day the purchaser
meets his proposed new tenant at the premises to sign the lease and hand the keys over.
Upon inspection of the property, however, the purchaser and the proposed new tenant
see that items have been left by the seller. The tenant refuses to sign the lease because
the tenant says that he cannot immediately occupy the property as he needs to. Instead
he takes a lease of an adjacent unit the following week. In two months time the
purchaser manages to lease out the property to a third party tenant at a rent lower than
had been agreed with the original proposed tenant due to a decline in the market. The
purchaser, however, claims that the seller was in breach of his express contractual
obligation to give vacant possession and claims that loss has been suffered as a
consequence. The seller claims that the items left were fixtures (and therefore part of the
land). The proper determination of the status of the items can be seen as a preliminary
issue in seeking to establish whether the items had been left behind by the seller
unlawfully, and therefore constitute a breach of the vacant possession obligation (if
sufficiently substantial).
The status of items (and whether they have to be removed) would therefore seem
important to interpretation of the scope and extent of the vacant possession obligation,
and whether a seller (or party with the obligation to give vacant possession) may be in
breach. However, whilst left over chattels are clearly a barrier to vacant possession,
there is reason to question whether only chattels are relevant to a breach of the
obligation, or whether fixtures, and matters pertaining to the state and condition, and
nature, of the property or land may also be relevant barriers to the receipt of vacant
possession. This, in tum, thus causes one to question whether the status of items (i.e. the
fixtures and chattels distinction) is really all that important after all in the context of
vacant possession.
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State and condition
\ I ".
Whilst items can be classified as fixtures or chattels, it is questionable whether this
,
distinction is relevant to the obligation to give vacant possession in the manner
1
previously assumed. For example, it can be questioned whether items which are more
akin to fixtures, and constitute part of the state and condition of a given property, can
ever be a barrier to the procurement of vacant possession. Further, in such a case, it
would also be necessary to question how any such impediment may be overridden in the
context of other competing contractual conditions. As noted previously, it is commonly
established that if the seller's failure to give vacant possession is due to the presence on
the property of chattels (which affect usability of the premises), then a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession will arise if the impediment substantially interferes
with enjoyment of a substantial part of the premises on completion (or at the material
time).18 There is, however, no authority on the position where the vendor's inability to
give vacant possession is due to the physical state of the property." It is therefore not
clear if an impediment to vacant possession that is not a chattel, but more 'part and
parcel' of the state and condition of the property itself (i.e. more akin to a fixture), can
ever amount to a breach of an obligation to give vacant possession. The only case that
can be argued to have some relevance to this point is the decision in Hynes v Vaughan.20
As noted previously, the first issue in this case surrounded the status of a
chrysanthemum growing frame and sprinkler system as chattels and not fixtures. The
second issue for determination related to garden and stable rubbish piles and bonfire
sites; the claimants (as purchasers) complained that the presence of these constituted a
breach by the defendants (as sellers) of their obligation to give vacant possession of the
property. There were eight areas where material of this nature was found. Seven ofthese
areas were outdoors and the material included such items as rotting vegetation, plastic,
string, paper, soil, pieces of timber, domestic furniture and prunings, concrete blocks,
broken glass, paint tins, hardcore rubble, various timbers, corrugated iron, galvanised
type wire and glass bottles." The claimants contended that the presence ofthese various
18 See Cumberland, above nl.
19 See Harpurn, C 'Vacant possession - chameleon or chimaera?' (1998) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 324, 400
(C.R.).
20 Above, nB.
21 Above, n13, 452.
227
items of alleged rubbish involved a breach by the defendants of their obligation to give
vacant possession of the property. This was based on the Court of Appeal decision in
Cumberland which, .as noted, concerned a contract for the sale of a disused warehouse.
There were cellars under the ground floor of the warehouse which had been left filled
with rubbish consisting mainly of bags of cement and empty drums. Damages for
breach by the defendant of its obligation to give vacant possession were awarded by the
court on the basis that such items were inconsistent with the obligation to give vacant
possession.
Scott J. referred to the judgment of Lord Greene in Cumberland, where it was argued
that a general condition (stating that the purchaser was deemed to buy with full notice in
all respects of the actual state and condition of the property as at exchange) could not
modify a seller's obligation to give vacant possession with respect to chattels. Lord
Greene said:
"The rubbish forms no part of the property sold and its presence upon the
property sold cannot, in our opinion, be said to be covered by [the words of the
general condition] 'state and condition of the property sold'. Those words refer,
in our view, to the physical condition of the property sold itself, such as its
state of repair, and do not extend to the case where the property sold is made in
part unusable by reason of the presence upon it of chattels which obstruct the
user. Such obstruction does not affect the 'state and condition of the property'
but merely its usability which is a different matter altogether. ,,22
This explained clearly that chattels were not connected to the state and condition of the
property and that a general condition relating to the state and condition of the property
would therefore have no relevance to left-over chattels, since they formed no part of the
property sold. Whilst making this distinction between the state and condition of the
property sold (including fixtures thereon) and chattels, Scott J. went on to note that such
a distinction, whilst possible in cases involving the interior of buildings, was not
necessarily relevant with respect to matters outside ofthe premises (such as was in issue
here). Indiscussing Lord Greene's judgment, Scott J. remarked:
"..that the [general] condition did not protect the vendor was based on his
construction of the words 'state and condition of the property sold'. Those
22 Above, nl3,per Scott J. at 453. Emphasis added.
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words, [Lord Greene] said, referred to the physical condition of the property
sold and did not cover the presence on the property of chattels. The distinction
between on the one hand the property sold and on the other hand chattels on
the property can be drawn with some clarity so far as the interior ofbuildings is
concerned. But it is a distinction which becomes blurred when applied to
gardens, paddocks, stable yards or other un-built on land. And the rougher and
more rural in character the land, the more difficult it becomes to draw the
distinction clearly.,,23
An example was given to demonstrate this:
"Take the example of piles of rubbish. All properties with house or kitchen
gardens of a fair size in rural areas are likely to have at least one and often
more than one rubbish pile. On to such piles will be thrown refuse from the
garden. Where refuse collection has in the past been infrequent or unreliable,
piles of domestic rubbish may be found. Piles of this sort will often include bits
of broken glass or bits of broken furniture. Piles of ashes may be found where
the debris of years of swept out fires have been dumped. Bonfire sites may be
found on which combustible or mainly combustible rubbish has been placed
and at regular or irregular intervals burnt. Properties with stables are almost
bound to have, nearby the stables, a place where stable manure has been
placed. Where the building of outbuildings, whether stables, sheds or garages,
has recently taken place, there is likely to be found, pushed into some
convenient comer, builders' debris, such as broken bricks, tiles or planks.
These piles of rubbish are likely in an old property to be of long standing. The
debris of earlier years will have become part of the surrounding earth. More
recent additions may still be distinguishable. But to describe the contents of
piles of rubbish such as I have described as 'chattels' and as something distinct
from the property sold would in most cases be quite unreal. ,,24
Scott 1. made clear that Lord Greene's statement of principle in Cumberland, with
respect to the fixtures and chattels distinction, was not intended to deal with ordinary
garden or stable rubbish which could not be distinguished from the rest of the property
like everyday chattels could (such as table and chairs, for example). Ordinary garden or
stable rubbish as referred to by Scott 1. was seen to be part and parcel of the property
sold, even though not affixed to the property in the way that fixtures are generally
understood to be attached to the property itself. As such, the actual state and condition
clause contained in the contract could potentially have relevance with respect to these
'non-chattel like' items. This led the judge to consider the effect of condition 13{3) of
the contract which provided:
23 Above, n IS, per Scott J. at 453. Emphasis added.
24 Above, o13,per Scott J. at 453.
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"the purchaser shall be deemed to .buy with full notice in all respects of the
actual state and condition of the property and, save where it is to be constructed,
or converted by the vendor, shall take the property as it is [that is, as it was at
exchange].,,25
Scott J. considered that the condition obliged the purchaser to take the property with its.
existing garden and stable rubbish piles and bonfire sites (which were present on the
property at exchange), because such items had merged with the actual land and become
consistent with the nature of the property (even though not strictly fixtures in a
traditional sense). The judge explained that condition 13(3) would be relevant to such
items:
"...in my judgment, condition 13(3) does provide an answer where, first, the
rubbish complained of has merged with and become part of the surrounding
soil and, secondly, where the nature and extent of the rubbish complained of is
consistent with the nature and character of the property sold.,,26
As such, several of the items complained of by the plaintiff were held to be covered by
general condition 13(3) (some others were chattels and therefore not in issue). The
judge then went on to consider what the position would have been if this were not the
case: that is, the items were not covered by the general condition; and applied the
Cumberland test to determine that these items were not substantial interferences with
possession in any event.
This judgment raises the issue of whether it is possible to suggest that matters pertaining
to the state and condition of the property could themselves be a barrier to the receipt of
vacant possession: that is, that rubbish or piles of debris connected to the state and
condition of the property, and which cannot properly be classified as chattels, could
cause a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession if sufficiently substantial. In
this context, it is necessary to consider what effect a general condition relating to the
state and condition of the property could have on such an obligation, as that would have
relevance to 'non-chattel like' items. Where the contract is subject to a general condition
relating to the purchaser taking the premises in the state and condition that it was in on
exchange, then operation of the clause would have the effect of meaning that only new
25 Above, 013,per ScottJ. at453.
26 Above, nB,per Scott J, a1453. Emphasis added.
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piles of debris or related items (which come onto the property after exchange of
contracts) could be potential obstacles to the receipt of vacant possession. As the judge
said:
"The present case is not one in which the complaint made is that after the date
of contract the vender defendants added new rubbish to existing piles or
created new piles of rubbish ...Condition 13(3) would, I think, provide no
answer to a complaint of that sort ... ,,27
This is because those items would have entered onto the property after the exchange of
contracts, and condition 13(3) relates to the point of exchange, and thus not to items
added thereafter. The judge continued by indicating that chattels would not be relevant
to condition 13(3):
"...Nor is the case one in which the piles of out-of-doors rubbish of which
complaint is made are in any way unusual or out of character for the type of
property being sold [i.e. are chattels]. If that had been the case, it may be that
condition 13(3) [relating to the state and condition of the property] would not
apply.":"
Presumably, condition 13(3) would not apply in that case for the reasons given by Lord
Greene in Cumberland, namely that chattels are not part of the state and condition ofthe
property to which condition 13(3) has application:
"...the condition does not relate to chattels. If the rubbish forms no part of the
property sold .. .it cannot be said to be covered by [the words of the general
condition] 'state and condition of the property sold'. Those words refer, in our
view, to the physical condition of the property sold itself, such as its state of
repair, and do not extend to the case where the property sold is made in part
unusable by reason of the presence upon it of chattels which obstruct the user.
Such obstruction does not affect the 'state and condition of the property' but
merely its usability which is a different matter altogether. ,,29
27 Above, nIS, per Scott 1. at 453. Emphasisadded.
28 Above, nB, per Scott J. at 453. Emphasis added.
29 Above, n13,per Scott 1. at 453. Emphasisadded.
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This indicates that the scope of the obligation to give vacant possession does not just
concern chattels, as has been traditionally perceived." The case suggests that potential
obstacles connected to the state and condition of the property, and which are not
covered by a general condition, could be a barrier to vacant possession if they could be
described as impediments which substantially interfere with the buyer's right to
possession. Accordingly, the vacant possession test must be applied in such
circumstances. Indeed, the court made clear that in order to succeed with their defence:
"the defendants must establish...that the state ofthe property as they proposed
to hand it over to the [buyer] on completion was consistent with their
obligation to give vacant possession.v"
This suggested that the ability to obtain vacant possession was relevant to the state and
condition of the property. Indeed, reinforcing this, in conclusion the judge said:
"The state of this property of which complaint is made was, in my view,
reasonably in keeping with the character of the property. There has been no
suggestion that it was not reasonably consistent with the state of the property at
the date of the contract. In my judgment, the plaintiff has failed in the evidence
she placed before me to establish any arguable case that the condition of the
property, in the state in which the defendants proposed to hand it over on
completion, would have involved a breach by them of their obligation to give
vacant possession. ,,32
This again indicated that certain matters relevant to the state and condition of the
property could, in principle, amount to a breach of the obligation to give vacant
possession. This was despite the fact that such items would likely be regarded as part of
the land or property itself, and therefore not chattels.
What would appear crucial to the decision in Hynes is the distinction that Scott J. makes
between the 'inside' and 'outside' of a given premises. In Hynes, the 'property' that was
. the subject of the sale and purchase contract was the dwelling house and surrounding
land. It was clear that Scott 1. saw the discussion in Cumberland as having been directed
at the interior ofbuildings, and judged that such comments were not similarly applicable
30 Above, n13, per Scott I. a1453.
31 Above, n13,per Scott J. a1453. Emphasis added.
32 Above, n13, per Scott I. al 453. Emphasis added.
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to determinations relating to vacant possession of external premises, land and open
surronndings where potential impediments would be less easily classified as fixtures or
chattels-and need to be assessed differently. Indeed»
"a distinction which becomes blurred when applied to gardens, paddocks,
stable yards or other unbuilt on land. And the rougher and more rmal in
character the land, the more difficult it becomes to draw the distinction
clearly.,,33
Scott J. identified certain items which could not be properly determined as chattels but
which could, if still on the property at completion, be relevant to the determination (and
application of the tests) of whether vacant possession was being given. Such items (such
as rotting vegetation and pieces of timber), more akin to fixtures given their connection
with the general state and condition of the external property, could therefore prevent
vacant possession from being given at the relevant time.
Here, a parallel can be identified with claims for both adverse possession and actual
occupation where, as discussed in chapter 7, the nature of the land has been seen as
relevant to whether factual possession or actual occupation was established. In
discussing factual possession, Lord Browne-Wilkinson quoted Slade J. in the case of
Powell v McFarlane:
"The question what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical
control must depend on the circumstances, in particular the nature ofthe land
and the manner in which land of that nature is commonly used or enjoyed.
Everything must depend on the particular circumstances..."J4
The nature, or state and condition, of the land was also decisive in claims of actual
occupation, where the Court ofAppeal in Lloyds' Bank v Rosser? distinguished between
different properties or land:
33 Above, nlS, per Scott J. at 453.
34 [19771 38 P&CR 452 at 470. Emphasis added. The quotation from Slade J. is a paraphrase of an often cited dictum
of Lord Hagan in Lord Advocate v Lord Lovat (1880) 5 App Cas 273, per Lord Hagan at 288. See also Red House
Farms (Thomdon) Ltd v Catchpole [1977] 2 EGLR 125, per Cairns L.J. at 126 and the more recent case of Port of
London Authority v Ashmore [2009] EWHC 954 (Ch).
35 [1989] Ch 350. Reversed by House of Lords [1991]1 AC 107, but these observations were not material to the later
decision and remain valid.
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"[t]he acts which constitute actual occupation of a dwelling house, a garage or
woodland cannot all be the same.,,36
As such, just as the physical nature and characteristics of the land or property will affect
the prospects of, and be relevant to, claims for adverse possession and actual
,
occupation, the nature of the land to which the obligation to give vacant possession is
engaged would appear to be relevant to the application of the tests to determine whether
a breach of the obligation has occurred. This further supports the analysis of the
preceding chapter in respect of the context specific nature of the application of the
Cumberland tests, and specifically the proposition that the 'objective' second limb of the
Cumberland test must be interpreted in the particular context, taking into account the
nature of the land as well as the characteristics of the party seeking to occupy at the
material date and other fact specific considerations. All such factors, it can be argued,
would appear to directly affect whether the given impediment prevents the right holding
party from being able to occupy without difficulty or objection at completion. This also
further supports the argument that the very nature of possession requires that any
determination is highly fact specific, and incapable of discermnent in isolation from the
practical context, including the nature of the property or land.
From this analysis, it is possible to formulate a number of questions which will be of
assistance to judges, academics and practitioners who need to undertake a structured
reasoning process in making determinations of fact. These would include:
1. is the alleged impediment inside or outside of a building?
2. what is the nature of the land?
3. to what extent is the impediment consistent with, or distinguishable from, the
surrounding land?
4. when did the impediment first appear on the property subject to the contract?3?
36 Ibid, per Mustill L.J. at 394.
31 Thisis relevant to whether other conditions ofthe contract mayaffecttheobligation - see below.
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5. what effect does the impediment have on use?
6. to what extent is the presence of the impediment inconsistent with the transfer
ofpossession?
The answers to these questions will be relevant to judges seeking to determine any
particular dispute which comes before them, and will provide guidance as to what facts
they need to consider in order to make the appropriate assessment. Indeed, as these
questions are clearly relevant in determining whether there has been a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession, it is clear that not considering these questions may
potentially lead to an incorrect decision being reached in any particular case. In tum,
such determinations (involving a structured reasoning process) will assist parties in
taking a view as to the likelihood that the alleged impediment will constitute a breach of
the obligation to give vacant possession. As such, they will provide helpful illustrations
to practitioners seeking to determine how clients should be advised in any given
instance.
In summary, the character of the alleged or potential impediment with respect to the
nature of the property or land would seem to be an essential element in the operation of
the second limb of the Cumberland test, as to whether the impediment substantially
interferes with or prevents enjoyment of a substantial part of the property. In principle,
the state and condition of the property may constitute a barrier to the receipt of vacant
possession, in a similar manner to chattels and personal items.
Since the obligation may be breached by the state and condition of a given property or
piece of land, it is therefore appropriate to consider whether it can be modified by
'actual state and condition' clauses such as are commonly found in residential and
commercial contracts for the sale and purchase of land. With respect to chattels and
legal impediments, an obligation to give vacant possession was found to interact with
general conditions such as 'subject to local authority requirement clauses' and 'no
annulment, no compensation clauSes,.38 There would also appear to be an interaction
between the obligation to give vacant possession and 'actual state and condition' clauses
in cases where the impediment complained of relates to the nature and condition of the
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land itself. This suggests that any potential impediment to the right of 'possession'
(whether a fixture or a chattel) should be treated in the same terms, and moreover
supports the contention that the fixtures and chattels distinction is somewhat artificial
and irrelevant in respect of vacant possession. The crucial question relates to whether
the obstacle (whether fixture or chattel) is a substantial impediment to possession at the
relevant time.
'Actual state and condition' clauses
The discussion in chapter 3 established that whilst a vacant possession obligation can
appear as an express clause in the contract, it is common for conditions to fail to cater
for vacant possession expressly. Ordinarily, this will mean that vacant possession will
be no more than an implied term of the contract. In Cook v Taylor39 it was held that
where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and silent as to any tenancy to which
the property is subject, there is impliedly a contract that vacant possession will be given
on completion. When an obligation to give vacant possession has arisen impliedly, it is
important to note that the implied obligation will be subject to specific circumstances
and to the actual knowledge of the parties. For example, where one party is aware, when
entering into a contract, that the interest is subject to some impediment to vacant
possession, case law makes clear that if the purchaser knows that the obstacle to the
receipt of vacant possession is irremovable, then the implied obligation to give vacant
possession will not extend so as to include that obstacle.39(' ) If at the time the contract
was made, the purchaser knew of only a removable obstacle however, then the implied
obligation to give vacant possession will not be deemed to exclude such an obstacle,
and if the removable obstacle is still on the premises on completion the obligation to
procure vacant possession will have been breached.39(b)
38See chapter 3.
39[1942] Ch. 349 at 352. Inthiscasesome importance was attached to thefactthat theproperty was seento be vacant
on inspection, but Simons 1. did say in general terms that "where a contract is silent as to vacant possession, and
silent as to any tenancyto which the property is subject, there is impliedly a contract thatvacantpossession will be ! ,
givenon completion".
39(a) Timmins v Moreland Street Property Co Ltd [1958] Ch Ll'O.
39(b)Norwich Union Life Insurance Society v Preston [1957] 1 WLR 813 establishes that a purchaser's knowledge of a
removableobjectto vacantpossession is irrelevant.
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The position on removable and irremovable obstructions with respect to theiniplied
obligation to give vacant possession, can be contrasted with the position where there is
an express obligation to give vacant possession. Here theposition is entirely different. It
has been held that an express obligation to give vacant possession will prevail regardless
of the nature of any known potential impedinient to vacant possession (removable or
irremovable). In Sharneyford Supplies Ltd v Edge40 the plaintiff purchased land from
the defendant by a contract which provided that the property was sold with vacant
possession on completion. The plaintiff, aware that the land was occupied, had stressed
from the outset that vacant possession was required and had received answers to pre-
contractual enquiries from the defendant that the occupants had no right to remain in
possession. The occupants refused to vacate the land on completion. The express
obligation to give vacant possession meant that the defendant was in breach even
though the plaintiff purchaser knew, at the time the contract was formed, of an
irremovable obstruction to the delivery of vacant possession, namely the Iease.l'
The potential for the state and condition of the property (or land) to constitute a barrier
to the receipt of vacant possession is apparent both in the context of physical disrepair,
and also in relation to legal obstacles. In both cases the effect of an 'actual state and
condition' clause may need to be considered.
Physical disrepair
Where there exists an express undertaking to give vacant possession on completion, the
purchaser's knowledge of any known impediment is immaterial.42 An actual state and
condition clause would therefore logically be of no assistance and contribute nothing to
modify an express obligation to give vacant possession.P Where there is an express
special condition that vacant possession will be given, a seller should not be able to rely
on an 'actual state and condition' clause (normally incorporated into the contract 'as a
general condition) to qualify the vacant possession obligation, in the same terms as
purported reliance on 'subject to local authority requirement clauses' and 'no annulment,
40 [1987] Ch 305.
41 See also Hissett v Reading Roofing Co Ltd [1996] 1 WLR 1757.
42 Above, n40::
43 Top/ell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979]1 W.L.R. 446, per Templeman J. at 450. This is also the view of Charles
Harpum - see Harpurn, above n19, 400.
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no compensation clauses' was shown to be inappropriate in the context of an express
undertaking to give vacant posscssion.l" Whether the purported impediment was
.connected to the state and condition of the property, or otherwise, should also be
irrelevant.
If a contract is silent as to vacant possession (and therefore vacant possession is only an
implied term of the contract), and at the time of the contract there is some physical
impediment to such possession, for example, in the form of garden rubbish which
caunot be classified as a chattel but rather forms part of the state and condition of the
premises, then there is nothing in case law or statute to preclude, in principle, the fabric
of the premises being construed as a removable physical obstruction to the receipt of
vacant possession. In such a case, it is possible that the seller may try to use an 'actual
state and condition' clause to claim that, whilst the obligation to give vacant possession
extends to that part of the fabric of the premises or land, the 'actual state and condition
clause' excludes liability in respect of that impediment." The seller would rely on the
general 'actual state and condition' clause to claim that the purchaser is bound to take the
property in the condition it was in on exchange, thereby taking the property subject to
the physical impediment complained of (which, if sufficiently substantial, would
otherwise constitute a breach). Logically, in such a case, the general 'actual state and
condition' clause (as an expressly incorporated provision) would take precedence over
the implied obligation to give vacant possession, and could therefore be relied upon by
the seller. If, however, the impediment known and complained of was irremovable, then
the implied obligation to give vacant possession would not extend so as to include that
obstacle in the first place. In such a case, reliance on other conditions of the contract to
escape liability for breach would not be necessary.
Legal impediments
The potential for the state and condition of the property to be a barrier to vacant
.possession is apparent in the context of not just physical disrepair, but also potential
legal obstacles. Indeed, an 'actual state and condition' clause may be relevant in cases
44 See chapter 3.
45 Thiswouldfollowtheargument and reasoning inHynes v Vaughan.
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with facts similar to those in Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd"6with respect to a legal
obstacle to the receipt of vacant possession. As noted above, in Topfell the seller
contracted to sell a property that was partly tenanted and partly vacant. The facilities
provided on the premises were inadequate for the existing occupants. After contract but
before completion, the local authority served a notice under the Housing Act 1985,
limiting the number of persons who were permitted to occupy the premises until
additional facilities were provided. As a result the vendor was unable to give vacant
possession of the untenanted part of the premises.
If the contract contained an express condition that vacant possession would be given on
completion, then the purchaser's knowledge of the physical state of the property at the
time of the contract should be irrelevant; in such cases, the express term for vacant
possession should prevail regardless of the nature of any known potential impediment to
vacant possession (removable or irremovable)." Further, as noted earlier, an express
special condition to give vacant possession will prevail over any conflicting contractual
terms, whether special or general conditions.
The position is, again, less clear-cut with respect to cases where the obligation to give
vacant possession is only implied Where a contract is silent as to vacant possession and
the contract incorporates an 'actual state and condition' clause, then this clause could
prevent a buyer arguing that the state and condition of the premises is a barrier to the
receipt of vacant possession. A seller would argue that a general 'actual state and
condition clause' would take precedence over an implied obligation to give vacant
possession, on the basis that it is not possible to imply, into a contract, a term that is
inconsistent with an express term of the contract.48 Accordingly, the seller would claim
that because the 'state and condition impediment' to vacant possession was known of (or
deemed to be known of) on exchange, and is removable (i.e. could be remedied by way
of compliance with the order) the buyer cannot complain of it and must take the
property with that impediment on completion. If the impediment was known of on
exchange, but irremovable however; the implied obligation to give vacant possession
46 Above, n43,per Templeman J.
47 Above, n40.
48 See Rignall Developments Ltd v Halil [1988] Ch. 190, per Millett 1. at 200. See also Squarey v Harris-Smith
[1981]42 P. & C.R. lI8,per Oliver, LJ. at 128.
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would not include such an obstacle in the first place, and there would be no need to rely
on a general 'actual state and condition' clause to escape liabillty."
It would clearly be advisable for the contract to provide that any impediment to vacant
possession occasioned by the state and condition of the property is the concern of the
purchaser; but normally this situation arises because the contract fails to expressly deal
with vacant possession in the first place.50 As such, whilst there is a distinct lack of case
law in this area, these examples illustrate how a physical or legal impediment,
connected to the state and condition of a given property, could potentially constitute a
barrier to the receipt of vacant possession. In turn, these examples further highlight how
any breach of the obligation to give vacant possession on such a basis could be modified
(or negated) by a seller relying on the 'actual state and condition' clause. This would
likely be in cases where the obligation to give vacant possession is implied.i'
Summary
In chapters 3 and 4, it was suggested that vacant possession, rather than being a term
with a clearly defmed and understood meaning, was rather a concept that currently
lacked coherence and formulation. The above analysis suggests that the scope of the
obligation to give vacant possession may not be limited to chattels, as has been
traditionally considered by case law and property textbooks.52 Traditional views of
vacant possession as concerned only with personal items may therefore need to be
reconsidered in light of the comments in Hynes v Vaughan.53
The scope of the obligation may thus encompass more than originally suggested by
definitions in property textbooks and case law and also extend to items or impediments
49 Given the wording of an 'actual state and condition' clause, it is unlikely that a purchaser would ever be able to
claimthat it didnot know (or was not deemed to know) of the stateand condition of the premises at exchange. and
therefore the 'state and conditionimpediment' complained of.
so See Harpum,above n19. 40Q
51 Ifthe vacant possession clause was only a general condition, however, withthe same status as the 'actual state and
condition' clause, then arguments '!S to whichshould havepriority would arise in similar terms to those discussed in
chapter 3.
52 See for example, Cumberland, aboven I, whichdistinguishes chattels fromthe stateand condition of the property.
Megarry, W. and Wade W., above nl, 672 state that "removeable physical impediments" are relevant to the
obligation - i.e. chattels mid not fixtures which are attached permanently to the land and which pass under the
contract of sale.
53 Above, n13, 452.
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more akin to fixtures, or the fabric or state and condition of the premises or land. If such
impediments are sufficiently substantial, they too may constitute a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession at the material time. This further suggests that any
impediment which affects 'possession' will be relevant to the obligation, and reinforces
how the fixtures and chattels distinction may therefore be somewhat artificial in the
context of vacant possession. Further, general conditions with respect to the state and
condition of the property may affect and modify an implied obligation to give vacant
possession, in a similar manner to chattels and legal impediments (as demonstrated in
chapter 3).
Lesser interests
The proposition that any impediment to 'possession' will be relevant to the obligation
can be further developed in respect of 'lesser interests'. While the discussion above has
centred on tangible/physical impediments to vacant possession, it has also touched on
so-called 'legal obstacles' to vacant possession in the context of how the state and
condition of a given property may contravene statutory restrictions on use, thus
preventing the giving of vacant possession. Compulsory purchase orders and
requisitioning notices, as the main types of 'legal impediments' to vacant possession,
were discussed in detail in chapter 6. Crucially, in all such cases, the analysis
undertaken was set in the context of claims, and competing restrictions, to 'possession'
of the property in question. It is, however, possible to acquire or be granted less
extensive rights over land which do not amount to 'possession'. It is relevant to consider
the effect of such 'lesser interests' when interpreting the scope and extent of the
obligation to give vacant possession.
There is no definition, as such, of so-called 'lesser interests' but such an expression is
likely to refer to interests amounting to something short of exclusive possession. An
example would be an incorporeal hereditament. Incorporeal hereditaments are burdens
on an estate in land in the form of "rights which are attached to some estate, and have
become part of it, so as to be enforceable by the person in possession of it",54 but are not
themselves estates in land (in theit own right). One type of incorporeal hereditament
"Wonnacott, M. Possession a/Land (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) 142.
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that merits consideration in this context is a profit-a-prendre;" a non-possessory interest
in land, which gives the holder the right to take natural resources such as petroleum,
minerals, timber, or wild game from the land of another. Due to the necessity of
allowing access to the land so that resources may be gathered, every profit contains an .
implied easement for the owner of the profit to enter the other party's land for the.
purpose of collecting the resources permitted by the profit. Whatever the type of profit
(whether it be rights to graze stock, plant and harvest crops, quarry stone, sand or
gravel, or take timber) in practice the exercise of that right gives the owner of it a
substantial degree of control over the burdened land.56 As such, it can be questioned
whether such rights, while amounting to less than possession but still encumbering the
estate being transferred in some way, would also amount to a legal obstacle to the
receipt of vacant possession, if sufficiently substantial.
Imagine that a seller contracts to convey land to a purchaser. The contract provides
expressly that vacant possession is to be given on completion. Between exchange and
completion a third party reveals a profit against the property that will prevent
development of the land by the purchaser in the manner desired. While the purchaser
may have contractual remedies against the seller with respect to disclosure of third party
rights, from a vacant possession perspective it can be questioned whether the seller is
able to transfer the land to the purchaser on completion in compliance with the seller's
obligation to give vacant possession. The third party's right is clearly an interest over the
land rather than a competing claim to possession, but it prevents delivery ofthe property
free from a claim of right over the land (i.e. the right to pass and re-pass) that is adverse
to the purchaser. The purchaser may claim that the third party's right constitutes (albeit
infrequent) third party occupation of the land. The purchaser could clearly argue that the
adverse right was a legal impediment that prevented it from obtaining the quality of
possession for which it had contracted. If a seller's obligation to procure vacant
possession does not refer to transferring the estate free from all conceivable adverse
legal obstacles to enjoyment, it is necessary for the law to determine which 'lesser
interests' constitute obstacles to the receipt of vacant possession.
55 From theMiddle French expression meaning 'right of taking'.
"Ibid, 141.
242
The law at present does not provide a satisfactory account of how an obligation to give
vacant possession is affected by intervening legal matters, such as non-possessory
interests in land that act as obstacles to the procurement of vacant possession. Indeed,
Horton v Kurzke'' would appear to be the only case that can be seen to have relevance
on this point. This case concerned the sale and purchase of land (with vacant
possession) where, following exchange, the purchaser learnt of an agricultural- grazing
'tenancy' purportedly affecting the land. The purchaser asked that completion be
deferred until after the result of arbitration proceedings to decide the tenancy claim. The
seller refused and, by notice under the contract, required completion of the contract
within 28 days. On the purchaser's refusal, the seller claimed that she could forfeit the
deposit and resell the property, The purchaser issued a writ for specific performance of
the contract, with an abatement in price if the agricultural grazing claim should be
upheld; and she later issued a sununons for sununary judgment, The arbitrator had
meanwhile decided there was no legitimate claim for the agricultural grazing right but
the purchaser did not know that until after the issue of her sununons. Completion took
place and the proceedings became abortive, The case therefore concerned the costs
awarded against the seller given its conduct throughout the matter,
Relevant from this decision are the comments made by the court as to whether the
agricultural grazing 'right' (if established) would be an issue of title, or vacant
possession. Whilst the purchaser claimed that thll agricultural grazing tenancy could be
a barrier to the procurement of vacant possession, Goff J. was clear that this was the
wrong approach:
"The plaintiff opened her case on the footing that in the circumstances the
defendant was not at any material time able to give vacant possession. I doubt
whether that is an entirely COITIlCt way of approaching it. I think the real
question is whether the defendant was able to prove her title, As, however,
there is no sufficient evidence that the alleged claimant was in actual
occupation, and the inability to give vacant possession therefore-e- if there
were such inability- was based upon the right to possession, I think whether
one looks at it as a question of vacant possession or of title, one gilts back to
the sam~ position and must apply the same test, ,,58 ;
57 [197111 W.L.R 769.
" Ibid, per Goff J. at 771.
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The 'same test' can be seen to be a reference as to whether the impediment/defect could
,
be remedied by completion, and therefore vacant possession/good title could be given
by the seller in accordance with the contract.
The differences between the legal impediments previously discussed, and the potential
legal impediment here, can be explained by reference to the nature of the right or
interest. Unlike compulsory purchase orders and requisitioning notices, which pass the
right to possession of the property in question to the acquiring authority (or another
party), or in the case of statutory restrictions on user, prevent possession from being
legally possible, so called 'lesser interests' do not amount to barriers to 'possession' of
the property, as they are only rights over the land, rather than competing claims to
possession of the land itself.
Indeed, whilst the judgment in Horton does not specifically discuss or explain the
potential overlap between vacant possession and title, the issue with the agricultural
grazing 'tenancy' would appear to centre on what the right specifically constituted. On
the facts, it would seem that the grazing rights were more akin to a profit, and did not
involve exclusive possession (i.e. clearly not a freehold or leasehold interest). In this
context, 'tenancy' appeared to have been used to designate a contractual arrangement,
but not an estate in land; indeed, the seller of the land remained the party with the right
to possession which was held to have been transferred to the purchaser pursuant to the
contract. This decision does not clarify, but does suggest, that so called 'lesser-interests'
are not issues of vacant possession, but rather issues of title, and the case has been
treated as authority for the proposition that lesser interests will only be relevant to title,
and not to the delivery of vacant possession.59 This would seem logical; the scope and
extent of an obligation to give vacant possession, dealing with barriers to 'possession',
should not encompass rights which, by their very nature, do not amount to possession.
59 Megarry, W. and Wade W., above nl, 672. The interaction between vacant possession and title is discussed in
chapter 8.
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The responsibility for passing good title rests with the party asserting the title who is
normally bound under the contractual documentation to provide necessary evidence,
and then convey as provided for by the contract. The risk ofpurchasing a given property
subject to some lesser interests is therefore put on, or shared by, the particular parties
with respect to the disclosure of incumbrances in the contractual documentation relating
to the sale. What is particularly noteworthy from the Horton decision is that the risk of a
purchaser buying subject to an adverse lesser interest is seen by the law as being
categorised as a defect in title; impediments which amount to less than possession are
therefore legal issues of title. This marks such an issue out as distinct from the vacant
possession obligation (which relates to competing claims to possession itself). Thus,
legal impediments, in the form of compulsory purchase orders and requisitioning
notices, can be distinguished from legal impediments such as certain profits and
incorporeal hereditaments; the latter being legal rights amounting to less than
possession of the land to which they pertain, and therefore not being relevant to the
vacant possession obligation. This discussion aids a characterisation of the scope and
extent of the obligation as being concerned with all barriers (i.e. whether fixtures,
chattels or otherwise) to 'possession', but not all conceivable rights pertaining to the land
which fall short of fully fledged possession. The decision in Horton also reflects further
the need for close analysis of available case law in order to determine the scope and
extent of the obligation with reference to the particular impediment in issue.
Given that the type of legal impediment (e.g. compulsory purchase order, statutory
restriction on user, requisitioning notice or lesser adverse right) will determine whether
a given obstacle is an issue of vacant possession or title, the distinction between vacant
possession and title can be seen to be subtle and potentially capable of confusion. The
similarities between giving vacant possession and giving good title, and instances in
which the two become blurred, are discussed in more detail in the following chapter, in
order to explain the parallels further.
Conclusion
The obligation to give vacant possession includes an inherently factual element: the
ability to take possession in a practical sense at the date of completion. Certain tangible
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impediments, such as chattels or persons in occupation will clearly be relevant to
whether the obligation has been breached. Conversely, interests amounting to less than
possession will clearly not be, given that by their very nature they amount to something
less than 'possession' and cannot therefore be a barrier to the receipt of possession,
which is inherent in the obligation to give vacant possession (as was explained by the
model proposed in chapter 5). There is, however, some uncertainty as to whether other
obstacles can be relevant in interpreting the scope and extent of the obligation. There
remains little authority on whether the state and condition of a property can itselfbe a
barrier to the procurement of vacant possession. This chapter has, however, developed
argrunents in support of the proposition that matters more akin to the state and condition
(and nature) of the property or land in question, are relevant to the obligation to give
vacant possession, if they amount to barriers to 'possession' of the estate in question."
Indeed, the analysis in this chapter has shown the obligation to relate to any impediment
with 'possession', but not an interest or matter that falls short of 'possession'. As such,
and as explained with reference to the decision in Hynes, the status of items as fixtures
or chattels does not matter in this context which is concerned with whether they are
impediments to the enjoyment of the right to 'possession' on completion (or the
operative date). Accordingly, the question is not how obstacles should be classified (or
labelled), but whether they amount to a barrier to 'possession' on completion (and, if so,
then how substantial they are in the particular context in question).
The analysis in this thesis therefore supports a new understanding of potential obstacles
to the receipt of vacant possession. In light of the analysis undertaken, the previous
classification ofpotential impediments as either fixtures or chattels can be understood as
no more than an 'artificial' distinction that was (somewhat) wrongly assumed by
property textbooks and case law to explain which items can, and cannot, be barriers to
vacant possession.
In determining whether certain items constitute a breach of the obligation to give vacant
possession, this chapter has also demonstrated once more that any such determination
60 Inturn, general conditions thatpertain to the stateand condition of theproperty or landin question (incases where
thereis not an express special condition providing for vacant possession) will also potentially have an effect on the
vacantpossession obligation.
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will be made with reference to the particular context in question, including the nature of
the land or property. Building <In, the conclusions of the previous chapter, this was also
shown to be comparable with the tests to determine factual possession in the context of
claims for adverse possession; and actual occupation, again demonstrating the close
association of 'possession-type' concepts in this regard.
On the basis that an impediment was relevant to the scope of the obligation, and
constituted a breach at the operative time, the next determination for a court will be the
remedy or relief that can be awarded to the successful party. As noted previously, the
remedy normally awarded to an injured party for a breach of the obligation to give
vacant possession will be damages, which can often be largely unsatisfactory to a
purchaser who, having already paid their money before finding the property is not
vacant, will be unable to occupy the property as they wish to. Chapter 9 explores the
remedies available with reference to the connection and interaction between vacant
possession and title, in seeking to consider whether vacant possession as a proprietary,
rather than contractual, obligation would more evenly balance the issues of risk and
fairness between parties.
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Chapter 9
Vacant Possession and Title
On the basis that an obligation to give vacant possession has arisen and is breached by
the party required to give vacant possession, it is iroportant to consider where this leaves
the party who had contracted for something more than is actually obtained at the
relevant time. An enquiry into the current remedies available upon a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession reveals how, at present, they are intrinsically
unsatisfactory, whether in the context of a standard sale and purchase contract, or the
termination of a lease. This chapter, in concluding the detailed exploration in this thesis
of the concept of vacant possession, contrasts the concept of giving vacant possession
with giving good title. Given that a number of similarities are evident between the two,
an analysis is undertaken of contrasting remedies for a breach of the obligation to give
vacant possession and for not giving good title.
The chapter explores how the remedies for breaching the obligation to give vacant
possession could be iroproved in the event that the vacant possession obligation were,
like title, to become proprietary in nature, rather than remaining contractual. Here,
whilst there would be certain advantages in terms of the additional remedies available, it
is demonstrated that there is no independent justification for such a proposal and that the
right to repudiate (currently available in the context of good title) could expressly be
provided for as a remedy for a breach of the existing contractual obligation to give
vacant possession. As such, it is concluded that vacant possession can best be
interpreted as a more clearly defmed and articulated contractual obligation. Based on
the analysis in this and previous chapters, the fmal chapter of this thesis is then able to
promulgate a proposed 'definition' of the concept, with appropriate justification, along
with contractual provisions that may assist with the remedies available to a purchaser in
the event of a seller's default.
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Remedies for breaching an obligation to give Vacant Possession
In relation to vacant possession, if on the day of completion (but before completion is
effected) a purchaser was to inspect the premises and see that they were not vacant; they
would have the following options:
1. Apply to the court for an order for specific performance, I and claim damages
for the impediment;
2. Serve a notice to complete on the seller2 and after expiry of that notice (which
will be determined by contractual provisions) rescind the contract, recover any
deposit paid and claim damages; or
3. Choose to complete without prejudice to a right to claim damages.'
Commonly, however, a given property is not inspected prior to completion." The first a
purchaser knows about the problem with vacant possession is after completion when
they arrive at the premises to find that all is not as they had expected. At this point, the
contract has been completed (the seller has the sale monies in cleared funds) and the
purchaser is left with the burden ofhaving to action the claim thereafter.5
I According to Wroth v Tyler [1964] Ch 30 a seller will not normally he obliged by an order for specific performance
to undertake 'hazardous! litigation to obtain possession, but would still remain liable in damages. A vendor who sold
with vacant possession had, ifnecessary, to take proceedings against any wrongful occupant but he would not usually
he required to embark on difficult or uncertain litigation.
2 This is in order to make time of the essence of the contract, and thus be able to rescind upon expiry of the notice if
vacant possession is not provided before hand, thus allowing the sale to complete. As discussed, there is no right to
immediately rescind the contract for a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession.
3The availability and amount of damages will depend on the circumstances and the nature of the losses. A purchaser's
remedies may also be restricted by the express terms of the contract, as explained later in this chapter.
4 It is stated on Lexis Nexis Butterworths Document [547] 10 Occupiers (accessible via subscriber service) that
ideally lithe buyer's conveyancers should check for any evidence as to rights of occupiers by either personally
inspecting the property or advising the buyer client to do so ... the buyer's conveyancers should raise a requisition of
the seller's conveyancers requesting confirmation that vacant possession of the whole of the premises will be given on
completion and that all occupiers have agreed to vacate". In practice this does not normally occur however because
the mechanics of completion are such that legal completion is normally effected before the purchaser takes
possession in residential property transactions. It is standard. on the day of completion, that the buyer of the subject
property will be vacating their current home and will not arrive at their new property until much later in the day. As
sales of residential properties take place on 'chain' (where each is selling and also buying on the same day) it would
be practically cumbersome for each property to be inspected. in tum, before completion in each particular case.
S It is not general practice to stipulate that completion is required at a specific time on the day of completion in
standard sale and purchase contracts. As such, the task of the court will be to seek to give effect to the true bargain
between the parties based on a fair interpretation of the contract as a whole. The effect of this, in practice, is to allow
a seller to satisfy his obligation to give vacant possession if the purchaser secures possession at some point during the
day of completion. See Cooper v Mysak [1986] 54 O.R. (2d) 346 and Re Lyne-Stephenson and Scott-Miller's
Contract [1920] 1 Ch. 472. See also the Court of Appeal decision in Chinnock v Hocaoglu [2008] EWCA Civ 1175.
Whilst it is not the general practice to stipulate that completion is required at a specific time on the day of completion,
certain contractual consequences may flow if the money is not received by a certain time. For example, completion
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Non-merger
, Indeed, a breach of an obligation to give vacant possession gives a purchaser the right to
action the breach after completion. This is because the obligation to give vacant
possession has been said not to merge in the conveyance or transfer but to remain
actionable after completion (even in the absence of an express non-merger clause)."
In Hissett v Reading Roofing Co Ltd? the defendants contracted to sell to the first
plaintiff property comprising offices, depot space and a flat; the property was sold
subject to the special condition that vacant possession be given on completion.
Condition 33 of the Law Society's Conditions of Sale 1953 stated that:
"notwithstanding the completion of the purchase any General or Special
condition or any part or parts thereof to which effect is not given by the
conveyance and which is capable of taking effect after completion... shall
remain in full force and effect.,,8
The contract was completed and on the direction of the first plaintiff it was transferred
to the second plaintiff, a company. The plaintiff was unable to get vacant possession of
the whole property because the flat was at all material times occupied by a protected
tenant. The plaintiff claimed damages for breach of the sale agreement. It was held that
the first plaintiff was entitled to damages for breach of contract because the defendant
failed to give vacant possession in accordance with the special condition which was (in
the words of condition 33) a condition 'capable of taking effect after completion'; further
the condition did not merge with the conveyance which covered only part of the ground
covered by the contract for sale.9
.can be deemed to take place the following working day with the technical requirement for 1 day's interest on the
payment of completion monies becoming due to the seller- see Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second
Edition) (The Law Society, London 2003), and Standard Conditions of Sale (Fourth Edition) (The Law Society,
London 2003).
; 6 Seeking to action the breach post-completion by unraveling the contract (as opposed to claiming damages),
"however, is subject to the purchaser having not affirmed the contract. This is because the remedy of rescission is
equitable innature.
7 [1969] 1 WLR 1757. In Hissett the obligation was express butthe result shouldhe the same even if the term for
vacant possessionwas implied.
8 The Law Society's General Conditions of Sale 1953 (The Law Society, London 1953) condition 33.
9 Above,n7.
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A party may try to action a breach of the obligation, post-completion, by seeking to
unravel the contract, rather than claiming damages. In Gunatunga v DealwislO it was
noted that there was established authority for the proposition that a contractual term that
vacant possession shall be given on completion did not merge in the conveyance. In that
case the respondent's conduct post-completion, seeking to run the business in order to
prevent its collapse and the loss of its goodwill, was not held to amount to affirmation
of the contract that would bar its right to the equitable remedy of rescission. The failure
by the appellants to give vacant possession on the relevant date was held to have given
rise to a 'new and separate cause of action' each day.
In practice, by the time a purchaser becomes aware of the breach of vacant possession a
period of time (sometimes a number of days) will have passed 11 and the purchaser may
have commenced using the premises and can therefore, by conduct, be deemed to have
affirmed the contract (although as noted in Guntunga this will normally be a question of
fact and degree given the circumstances ofthe case). Even then, with the monies having
been transferred over to the seller to effect completion, this leaves the purchaser having
to embark on expensive court action (which they may not be able to fund) to seek to
action the breach by way of rescission of the contract, and have the monies returned. As
such the non-merger provision is unlikely to be of use to a party, who finds that they
have not been given vacant possession on completion, in an attempt to unravel the
contract post-completion, and a purchaser will normally action the breach only by way
of damages in such a case.
At present, therefore, the current law and practicalities of completion put the seller in a
much stronger position as far as a breach of a vacant possession obligation is concerned.
A purchaser will often be left in the difficult position of advancing a claim for damages'
having suffered interruption as a consequence of not being able to immediately occupy
without difficulty or objection. If the obstacle to vacant possession is a person or entity
with a right to remain in occupation, the purchaser may have difficulty in removing
them from the premises and may have to take the premises subject to their interest.12
10 [1996] n P.&C.R. 161.
11 On residential sale andpurchases the purchaser is likelyto arrive at the property on the afternoon of completion or
the followingday; on investment purchases, this canoftenbe a number of daysafterwards.
12 For a discussion of the doctrine of constructive notice (with respect to overriding interests and other adverse
interest to which a sale may be subject, notwithstanding thata purchaser may not actually be aware of interests), see
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Further, the purchaser may lose a proposed letting opportunity (and thus suffer even
greater detriment) if they had already contracted to demise the premises to a tenant on
the basis that a transfer to them takes place. This can result in the purchaser themselves
being subject to breach of contract claims (with respect to an anticipated tenant) giving
rise to consequential losses.':' This is largely unsatisfactory for a purchaser, and
highlights the flaws in the remedies currently available for a breach of the obligation
and the greater element of risk that lies at the door of the purchaser. At the present time,
the purchaser is unevenly exposed to, and bears, the greater risk of not receiving vacant
possession from a seller on completion.
Title and remedies for breach
Title is normally seen as a comprehensive term referring to the legal basis of the
ownership of property by a person. The idea of title in property law is equated with
ownership, legal right or legal ownership." Throughout this thesis the passing of good
title has been referred to as an element of a standard sale and purchase transaction. As
discussed below, the issues relevant to giving good title can be seen to be analogous to
those pertinent to the procurement of vacant possession. For this reason, and as an
alternative perspective, the relevance of title in the context of vacant possession is
examined in this chapter. This is in order to both highlight similarities between the two
that have not previously been made apparent, and also to question how close the two
concepts are, and perhaps could become, in theoretical terms.
Title to a proprietary interest can be either absolute or relative and, in the common law
tradition, titles in property law are normally understood to be relative. is This effectively
amounts to saying that any given title is subject to a better title to the object of interest
in question. The classic analysis of title demonstrates that title is the set of facts upon
Howell, J. 'Notice: A Broad View anda Narrow View' (1996) Conv 34; Partington, M. 'Implied Covenants for Title
in Registered Freehold Land' (1988) Conv i8 and Sheridan, L.A. 'Notice and Registration' (U50) NILQ 33.
13 As noted earlier, in the leasehold context, the landlord (in a similar manner to the tenant in the freehold context)
currently has the upper hand and-can use the issue of vacant possessionto seek to prevent their tenant exercising a
contractual break option in a lease if the landlord would prefer the lease to continue. This is not just when vacant
possession is an express condition of lawful operation of the break, but also in circumstances where the break is
conditional upon material compliance with covenants which, by virtue of the yielding-up obligation, will includea
requirement to give a form of vacant possessionin anyevent.
l4 See Megarry, W. and Wade w. The law ofreal property (7'" edn Sweet and Maxwell, London 2008) 86.
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which a claim to some legal right, liberty, power or interest is founded. 16 Lawson and
Rudden wrote that "title is a shorthand term used to denote the facts which, if proved,
will enable a plaintiff to recover possession or a defendant to retain possession of a
thing". 17
Remedies for a defect in title are similar in nature to those available for a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession. A party can seek specific performance of an
obligation to deduce title; 18 a notice to complete can be served as a precursor to seeking
to end the contract, or a party may complete and then claim damages.!" Of particular
relevance here, however, is that a defect in title can also enable a party to repudiate a
contract (without the need for a notice to complete to be served) and that statute
provides that certain covenants are implied when a party purports to sell with 'full' or
'limited' title. These have a significant effect on the remedies which thus become
available to the purchaser, in contrast to those available to a purchaser upon a breach of
the obligation to give vacant possession.
Rescission
It is well established that a vendor is under a 'two-fold' obligation when it comes to
deducing title to their property.i" A vendor is obliged to disclose, prior to (but, in any
event, by) the exchange of contracts, all latent defects in title, except those of which a
purchaser is already aware?l Further, a vendor must, by the completion date prescribed
by the contract, be able to prove he has the title which he contracted to pass to the
purchascr.f In the event that a vendor contracts to sell property or land which he cannot
prove title to, as provided for by the contract, then the purchaser is able to rescind the
contract immediately:
15 Ibid, 90. See also Jones, J.W. 'Forms of Ownership' (1947) 22 Tulane LR 82. The idea of relativity of title
originates from the nature of possession in law -which has the effect of making ownership a relative concept as
opposedto anabsolute one. See also Panesar, S. General Principles ofProperty Law (Longman, Essex 2001) 141.
16 Salmond, J.W. Jurisprudence (12 ili edn Stevens.and Haynes, London 1966) 265.
17 Lawson, F.H. and Rudden B. The Law ofProperty (2" edn Clarendon, London, 1982) 44.
18 Orfordisclosure of certain documents prior to"completion.
19 Above, n14, 81. .
20 Ibid.
21 Harpum, C. 'Exclusion Clauses and Contracts for the Sale ofLand' (1992) 108 LQR 280.
22 SeeRe Haedicke and Lipski's Contract [1901] 2 Ch 666 at 668.
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"If a vendor contracts to sell land which he does not own or to which the title is
bad, the purchaser may at once treat the contract as repudiated and [to] sue the
vendor for damages. He does not have to wait until the contractual completion
date."n .
This position was established in Barlett v Tuchin. 24 This right to rescind (before
completion) is on the basis of the vendor being in breach of a contractual obligation
which is distinct from being required to give good title on the date fixed for completion.
The decision in Stevens v Adamson'? suggests that a failure to disclose a defect in title
would be sufficient to constitute such a breach, giving rise to the right to rescind at that
point." Such a breach would, however, have to involve either a substantial or
irremovable defect, otherwise the right to rescind would not arise27 and the buyer would
normally seek specific performance of the contract subject to an abatement of the price
in respect of the insubstantial or irremovable defect in title.28
As such, the obligation to give good title differs from the obligation to give vacant
possession in that, in relation to the former, a breach can arise and be actioned before
completion, whereas with vacant possession the obligation (and potential breach
thereof) arises only on completion (or the operative date), as explained in chapter 5.
Further, in respect of a breach, in relation to title this can give the purchaser a right to
rescind the contract (either before or at completion) whereas, with vacant possession, a
breach can only come about on completion and does not give rise to an express right to
immediately rescind (a notice to complete must be served first, as a precursor to then
treating the contract as dischargcdj.i"
23 Above, n14, 81. Empbasis added.
24 (1815) I Marsh 586. See also, Roper v Coombs (1827) 9 Dowl & Ry 562; Brewer v Broadhead (1882) 22 CH D
105; Lee v Soames (1888) 36 WR 884; Pips (Leisure Productions) Ltd v Walton [1980] 43 P & CR 415 and Pinekerry
Ltd v Needs (Kenneth) (Contractors) Ltd [1992] 64 P & CR 245. See also Oakley, AJ. 'Tbe conveyancing problems
of rapId re-sales' (1993) CLJ22.
25 (1818) 2 Stark 422.
26 Ibid, andPeyman v Lanjani [1985] Ch457 at497. The breach of an obligation to give vacant possessionwill only
becomeactionable on completion, as thatis whenthe obligation is engaged - see below.
27 Pips, above n24 at 424.
28 Above, n14, 81; Dyer v Hargreave (1805) 10 Ves 505, <it 507 and Rutherford v Acton-Adams [1915] AC 866 at
869,870. No abatement of the purchase pricewouldbe appropriate if the removable defectwas to be remedied before
thedate of contractual completion.
29 A purchaser serving a notice to complete in such circumstances is uncommon and normally they would seek
specific performance of the contract; however, in a downward market, it can be usedas a wayto ultimately discharge
the purchaser from completing the contract (which, may for example. be attractive where the landvaluehad dropped
significantly between exchange 'and completion). The crucial point to note is that the purchaser cannot rescind
immediately for a breach of theobligation to give vacant possession.
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Implied covenants for title
Covenants for title are assurances given by the owner of a property about ownership and
the owner's right to dispose of the property." The law relating to title covenants was
reformed by the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994,31 which broadly
repealed aspects of the Law of Property Act 1925 relating to implied covenants for title
in certain cases,32 and introduced a new regime. The provisions of the Law of Property
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 were supplemented by the Land Registration
(Implied Covenants for Title) Rules 1995, which amended the Land Registration Rules
1925 and applied the provisions of the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act
1994 to registered land.33
Under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994, the use of 'full title
guarantee' or 'limited title guarantee' implies a set of covenants into the 'disposal
instrument,34 (for example, a transfer documenn" The covenants implied by these two
defmed phrases are the same except for the covenant that relates to incumbrances (i.e.
matters to which the title of the property is subject).36 If neither of the key phrases is
used, no covenants will be implied;37 the parties are, however, at liberty to vary any
30 Above, n14, 83.
31 This came into force on 1 July 1995. The Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994 deals with implied
covenants for title in Part 1.
sa Prior to the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994, title covenants were addressed under section 76
of the Law of Property Act 1925. Certain covenants as to title were implied if the entity disposing of an interest in
land was expressed to do so as beneficial owner, whilst other covenants as to title were implied if the seller were
expressed to be selling as settler, trustee, mortgagee, personal representative or under an order of the court. There
were also certain covenants implied under section 24(l)(a) of the Land Registration Act 1925, which applied only to
registered leasehold properties. These overlapped to some extent with some of the implied covenants under section 76
of the Law ofProperty Act 1925, but went a little further in what they covered and when they applied.
33 The Land Registration Act 2002, which came into force on 13 October 2003, does not significantly change the
regime under the Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994. The Land Registration Act 2002 does,
however, repeal the Law of Property Act 1925 in its entirety, and is supported by the Land Registration Rules 2003
(as amended by the Land Registration (Amendment) Rules 2008).
J4 Rule 67(1), Land Registration Rules 2003.
35 The set of implied covenants for title may be implied into any 'instrument effecting or purporting to effect a
disposition of property' - section 1(1), Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994. A disposition .of
property is defined in section 205(ii) of the Law of Property Act 1925 as including a transfer or conveyance of an
existing interest in property. Property is given the same definition as in section 205(xx) of the Law of Property Act
1925 and includes any thing in action and any interest in real or personal property..
36 Full title guarantee implies that the property is free from mown encumbrances. whereas selling with limited title
guarantee implies that the property is free from known encumbrances since the last disposition for value - section-S,
Law ofProperty (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act1994.. i
37 There is no actual obligation on the parties to give full or limited title guarantee, except in relation to transitional
arrangements when the Act first came into force. Full or limited title guarantee is a matter for the parties to agree
between themselves.
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implied covenant or agree bespoke title covenants expressly under the contract or
transfer.38
Of particular relevance here, is the obligation implied in relation to using reasonable
efforts to give title.39 The statute implies that the person disposing of the property will,
at its own cost, make reasonable efforts to give to the new owner of the property the
same title that it has said it will give." This is an obligation that will take effect on
completion and subsist thereafter. In relation to incumbrances, the implied covenants
will imply either that the property is free from known incumbrances, or free from
known incumbrances since the last disposition for value."
It is clear therefore that, in relation to title, a seller has an implied duty to use reasonable
endeavours to give good title, at and following completion. In the case of vacant
possession, the obligation arises (and may be breached) on completion but, once the
transaction has formally completed, thereafter the seller has no implied obligation to
remedy the breach and it normally falls to the purchaser to take action and then sue for
damages.f This is significant when one considers the uneven distribution of risk and
responsibility that currently exists with regard to the procurement of vacant possession,
with the purchaser more exposed in the event that vacant possession is not given. In the
conveyancing process, with respect to title, the purchaser has greater redress than the
seller under the implied covenants for title, which provide the purchaser with some
38 In relation to these impliedcovenants, the personmaking the disposition is not liablefor any particular matter to
whichthe disposition is expressly madesubject (section6(1), Lawof Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994);
anything which at the time of the disposition is within the actual knowledge of the person to whom the disposition is
made (section 6(2)(a), Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994) or anything which at the time of the
disposition is a necessary consequence of facts that are then within the actual knowledge of the person to whom the
disposition is made (section 6(2)(b), Law ofProperty (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994).
39 Section 2(1)(b) and (2), Law ofProperty (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994.
40 Ibid.
41 Section 3. Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1994. The scope of the implied covenant depends on
which of the key phrases has been used: 'full title guarantee! or 'limited title guarantee'. Full title guarantee implies
thatthe disposal is free fromall charges, incumbrances and all rights exercisable by third parties except anycharges,
incumbrances or rights which the persondisposing of the property does not andcouldnot reasonably be expected to
know about - i.e. free from all knownincumbrances. So, if a sellerknowsor oughtreasonably to haveknown about
.an incumbrance, it shoulddisclosethatincumbrance to the buyer, whether thatincumbrance was created by theseller,
'a previous owner or a third party, andno matter when it was created. Limited title guarantee impliesthatthe person
disposing hasnot andas far as it is aware no-one else has, sincethe last disposition of the property.for value, charged
or incumbered the property or granted anythird party rights overit whichstill subsist. ~
aa When the purchaser completes and then sues for damages, if the impediment is irremovable (e.g. where the
property is let to a tenant), the measure of damages will be the difference betweenthe purchase price andthe market
price of the property subject to the impediment, plus any consequential loss - see Beard v Porter [1948] 1 KB 321
(where costs arising from the purchase of another property were held to be recoverable). If the impediment is
removable (for example, a substantial quantity of chattels remains on the property) then the purchaser may recover
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assurance post-completion. The position of the purchaser is therefore more adequately
protected in the context of title, with the comparison between vacant possession and
title revealing a legal position in which risk and responsibility is more evenly distributed
in the context of title (albeit still slightly more in favour of the seller), as compared to
vacant possession. This justifies further enquiry into the apparent closeness of the two.
Title and Vacant Possession
Whilst there is an analogy (and indeed, overlap) between vacant possession and title,
. additional remedies are available in the case of title (as compared to vacant possession).
Harpum, in his 1988 paper, argued that the obligation to give vacant possession is very
similar to a vendor's obligation to show a good title free from encumbranccs.t' This is a
view which has also been expressed by other commentators.44 The analogy can be seen
to apply both in cases where the obligation to give vacant possession, or good title, is
implied or express.
Implied obligations
As noted in chapter 3, the decision in Cook v Taylor45 is authority for the legal principle
that vacant possession will be an implied term of a sale and purchase contract, if there is
no express provision to the contrary.l" The implication that vacant possession will be
given can, however, be rebutted by conflicting conditions of sale. In chapter 4, it was
noted that it has been established that the implied obligation will not arise if it would be
inconsistent with an express provision of the contract. 47 Further, in addition to being
capable of rebuttal by conflicting conditions of sale, an implied obligation to give
the cost of doing so - see Cumberland Consolidated Holdings Ltd v Ireland [1946] KB 264 (where the costs of
removing therubbish were recoverable).
43 Harpum, C. 'Vacant possession - chameleon or chimaera?' (1988) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 324.
44 Forexample, see Farrand, J.T. Contract and conveyance (OyezPublications, London 1964) 175.
45 [1942] Ch. 349. ,
46 See also Re Crosby's Contract [1949] I All E.R. 830, per Romer I. at 834; Midland Bank Ltd v Farmprtde
Hatcheries Ltd [1981] 2 EGLR 147; Edgewater Developments Co v Bailey [19741 118 Sol 101 312 and Farrell v
Green [19741232 EG 587.
47 Rignall Developments Ltd v HaW [1988] Ch. 190, per Millett J. at 200. This was in an alternative context hut the
statementIs of general application. See also Reynolds v Doyle [1919] 19 S.R. (N.S.W.) 108, per Harvey J. at 110 and
Squarey'v Harris-Smith [1981] 42 P. & C.R. l18,per Oliver LJ. at 128.
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·vacant possession will not arise with respect to irremovable48 incumbrances which were
either known to the purchaser49 or were patent at the time of contracting. 50
, i
Harpum notes in this regard that there is "a striking parallel with the vendor's obligation
under open contract to show a good title free from encumbrances which will be implied
(and rebutted) in similar circumstances'V' Indeed this was established in Hughes v
Jones'" where it was held that:
"There is not on the face of the particulars any qualification of the interest in
the estate purported to be offered for sale, and it was, as I conceive, the
vendors' duty to qualify upon the fact of the particulars the interest which they
intended to sell, if they did not intend to offer for sale an unqualified estate in
fee. Under these particulars of sale, therefore, the vendors were, in my opinion,
bound to prove a title to an unqualified estate in fee ... ,,53
This was also confirmed in Leominster Properties Ltd v Broadway Finance Ltd54 where
it was clearly stated that:
"In the absence of express stipulation to the contrary... a contract for the sale of
land in fee simple obliges the vendor to make a good title to the whole legal
and equitable interest in the freehold free from encumbrances." 55
Also in Re Ossemsley Estates Ltd, 56 this proposition oflaw was held:
"If a vendor is contracting to sell land, his obligation, of course, is to make a
good title to the land free from any encumbrance. If there is an encumbrance,
48 The purchaser's knowledge of a removable impediment fo vacantpossession is irrelevant - see Norwich Union Lift
Insurance Society v Preston [1957] 1 W.L.R. 813.
49 If the sellerknew(oroughtto haveknown) of the impediment and hadfailedto makefull and frank disclosure of it
to the purchaser, then the seller will not be ableto rely on any condition of sale in general terms which excludes or
modifies their obligationto give vacantpossession. The implied obligationto give vacantpossession willnot readily
be excluded or modified in such a circumstance (see Re Crosby's Contract, aboven46). This is anapplication of the
rule that if there is any ambiguity. a condition of sale will be construed against the vendor because it restricts the
rights ofthe purchaser (see Leominster Properties Ltd v Broadway Finance Ltd [1981]42 P. & C.R. 372, per Slade 1.
.1387).
50 A defect will be patentif there is somethingon the landwhich necessarilyleads to the conclusionthatthere is some
adverse rlghl- see Yandle v Sutton [1922] 2 Ch. 199,per Sargant.J. at 210. See Cook v Taylor [1942] 2 All E.R. 85,
per Simonds J.at 87.
51 Above, n43.
52 (1861) 3 De G.F. & 1. 307.
53 Ibid, per Turner L.J. at 313-314.
54 [1981] 42 P & CR 372.
55 Ibid, per Slade 1. .1380.
56 [1937]3 All E.R. 774.
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his contractual obligation is, by some means or other, to get rid of it, so that the
purchaser may have a clean title. ,,57
Further, the obligation to give good title free from incumbrances is similarly qualified
by the exception that a purchaser takes the land subject to irremovable defects in the
title which were either patent or known of at the date of contract. For example, it was
stated in Timmins v Morel and Street Property Co LtiS that:
"If no interest is mentioned, then prima facie an unencumbered freehold
interest will be implied. No such implication arises, however, if the purchaser
knew at the time of the contract (as the defendants knew in the present case)
that some lesser interest or some incumbered interest was to be the subject of
the sale.,,59
As such, both in cases of giving vacant possession and good title, the obligation will be
implied (if not expressly stated) and, when implied, will be rebuttable if the seller can
show that the irremovable impediment or incumbrance was known to the purchaser, or
was patent (or was otherwise covered by a conflicting condition of sale). That is, in
cases of both vacant possession and title, the obligation is impliedly created and capable
ofbeing discharged in similar terms.
This highlights the similarity between vacant possession and title when both exist as
implied obligations. The analogy between vacant possession and title also applies with
respect to express obligations to give vacant possession.
Express obligations
If a vendor expressly contracts to sell land free from encumbrances then such an
obligation is absolutc.i'' Even if the purchaser was aware of the existence of some defect
in the vendor's title, or that the property was subject to some patent irremovable
57 Ibid,per GreeneM.R at 778.
58 [1958] Ch 110.
59 Ibid, per at 132. See also Yandle Sons v Sutton, abovenSO at 210 in relation to patent versus latent defects anda
purchaser's liability to take theproperty 'subject to thosedefects whichare patent to the eye'.
60 Above. n43.
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incumbrance, this will be no defence to an action for breach of an express undertaking
to give good title. It was stated in Barnett vWheeler 61 that:
"The defendant has entered into an express contract to deduce a good title to
the premises by a specified day: and it affords no reason for his not performing
that contract that the plaintiff, at the time of the sale, was aware of the defect of
title by the breach of the covenant to repair.,,62
Similarly, as established in chapter 3, an express undertaking to give vacant possession
amounts to a "guarantee by the vendor that upon completion of purchase the purchaser
will be put into possession'Y''
"... a condition of this kind is recognised as amounting to a guarantee by the
vendor that upon completion of the purchase the purchaser will be put into
• 1164possession,
Other principles applicable to title which derive from the vendor's duty of disclosure are
equally applicable to vacant possession. For example, a vendor who knows or ought to
have known of a defect in his title may not rely on a general condition of sale to cover
the defect unless he has made full and frank disclosure of it. This was established in
Rignall Developments Ltd v Halil:65
"It is, however, a well-established rule of equity that, if there is a defect in title
or encumbrance of which the vendor is aware, the vendor cannot rely upon
conditions such as those in the present case unless full and frank disclosure is
made of its existence. ,,66
In turn, a vendor who knew or ought to have known of an impediment which would
preclude him from giving vacant possession, should not be able to rely on a general
61 (1841) 7 M. & W. 364. See 'also, Cato v Thompson (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 616, per Jessel M.R. at 620; Re Allen and
Driscoll's Contract [1904] 2 Ch.226, per Romer L.Jat 231. Thecourt will not permit parol evidence to be adduced
to contradict the express undertaking to make a good title - see Cato v Thompson (1882) 9 Q.B.D. 6I6,per Lindley
L.J. at 620 andRe Gloag and Miller's Contract (1883) 23 Ch.D. 320, per Fry J. at 327.
62 (1841) 7 M. & W. 364,per Park B. at 367.
63 Isaacs v McGuire (1888) 14 V.L.R. 815,per Higinbotham C.J. at 817-818.
64 Ibid. See Topfell Ltd v Galley Properties Ltd [1979] I W.L.R. 446. See also SharneyJord Supplies Ltd v Edge
[1987] Ch. 305 at 325. As discussed in chapter 5, and argued by Harpum in (1988) 'Vacant possession - cbameleon or
chimaera?', above n43, the overriding nature of anexpress obliga.tion to give vacant possession wasnotappreciated in
the decision of Deputy Judge Wheeler in Sheikh v O'Connor [1987] 2 EGLR 269.
65 [1988] Ch. 190.
66 Ibid, per Millett J. at 197. See also Becker v Partridge [1966] 2 Q.B. ISS, CA.
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condition of sale to escape liability; unless before contract he made adequate disclosure
ofthe matter.67
As such, vacant possession and title (both when express or implied) can be seen to share
a number of similarities, even though the obligations in form are separate and distinct:
"The vendor's obligation to give vacant possession on completion is a separate
obligation, distinct from his duties to show a good title free from encumbrances
and to take reasonable care of the property until completion.,,68
The similarities between vacant possession and title have been touched upon in previous
chapters, where confusion arose as to whether the issue in question was one of vacant
possession or one of title. It is useful to review these in order to highlight how the
similarities between the two have led to confusion.
Confusing Vacant Possession and Title
The fact that a number of principles applicable to title are equally applicable to vacant
possession may explain why there has, on occasion, been confusion as to whether the
relevant issue is one of vacant possession or title. Throughout the discussion in this
thesis, a number of instances have been highlighted where this has been the case and a
review of such instances is appropriate in order to draw together these parts of the
thesis, and to reinforce how the similarities between vacant possession and title are
apparent, and can be confused. Examples in three specific respects can be drawn upon
in this regard.
,
67 See chapter 3, andthe decisions in Flight v Booth (1834) 1 Bing. (N.Q) 370:in respect of mis-description "and-Re
Puckett and Smith's Contract [1902] 2 Ch. 258 C.A. concerning non-disclosure. Also Nottingham Patent Brick and
Tile Co v Butler (1885) 15 Q.B.D. 261, per Wills 1. at 271; subsequently applied by Millett J. in Rignal/
Developments Ltd. v Halil [1988] Cb. 190 at 197-198. Harpum, C (198:8) 'Vacant possession - chameleon or
chimaera?', above043, 324 also suggests thatthis is correct.
68 Above, n43, 324.
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Lesser interests
A discussion in chapter 8 related to the relevance of so called 'lesser interests' to vacant
possession including, for example, incorporeal hereditaments such as certain profits.69
As noted in chapter 8, the law at present does not provide a satisfactory account of how
an obligation to give vacant possession is affected by intervening legal matters, such as
non-possessory interests in land that may act as obstacles to the procurement of vacant
possession. In Horton v Kurzke 70 the court had to determine whether the agricultural
grazing right (if established) would be an issue of title, or vacant possession. Whilst the
purchaser claimed that the agricultural grazing tenancy could be a barrier to the
procurement of vacant possession, Goff J. was clear that this was the wrong approach:
"The plaintiff opened her case on the footing that in the circumstances the
defendant was not at any material time able to give vacant possession. I doubt
whether that is... entirely correct.. .. I think the real question is whether the
defendant was able to prove her title. ,,71
With that said, the judge emphasised that the same test must be applied, regardless of
whether it is an issue ofvacant possession or title:
"As, however, there is no sufficient evidence that the alleged claimant was in
actual occupation, and the inability to give vacant possession therefore-- if
there were such inability- was based upon the right to possession, I think
whether one looks at it as a question of vacant possession or of title, one gets
back to the same position and must apply the same test. ,,72
The 'same test' can be seen to be a reference to whether the impediment or defect could
be remedied by completion, and therefore vacant possession or good title could be given
by the seller in accordance with the contract. This clearly showed similarities in nature
and form between the two obligations. The decision in Horton did not clarify, but
suggested, that so called 'lesser-interests' are not issues of vacant possession, but rather
. issues of title, and the case has been treated as an authority for the proposition that
,69 Andother non-possessory interests in land.
10 [197111 W.L.R. 769.
71 Ibid, per Goff J at 771.
72 Ibid, per Goff J at 771.
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lesser interests will only be relevant to title, and not to the delivery of vacant
possession.f It was argued in chapter 8 that the vacant possession obligation will only
relate toimpediments that represent a competing claim to the right to 'possession', and
thus not lesser claims or rights that do not amount to possession.
Thus, some types of legal impediments, in the form of compulsory purchase orders and
requisitioning notices, can be distinguished from other legal impediments, such as
certain profits and incorporeal hereditaments; the latter being legal rights amounting to
less than possession of the land to which they pertain, and therefore not being relevant
to the vacant possession obligation. Given that the type of legal impediment (e.g.
compulsory purchase order, statutory restriction on user, requisitioning notice or lesser
adverse right) will determine whether a given obstacle is an issue of vacant possession
or title, the distinction between vacant possession and title can understandably
sometimes be confused as specific consideration of the nature of the impediment will be
required to determine whether issues of vacant possession, or title, are engaged. A broad
statement that 'legal impediments' will be relevant to the obligation to give vacant
possession is thus not correct or helpful.
Conditions ofsale
A second example of the potential confusion between vacant possession and title, and
where the two can be seen to have been conflated, was in the context of standard
conditions of sale. In chapter 4 it was noted that under the first edition of the Standard
Conditions of Sale in 199074 vacant possession was specifically dealt with as a general
condition under condition 3 marked 'Tenancies'. Condition 3.3.1 stated:
"The buyer is to be given vacant possession of all the property on completion;
this does not apply to any part of it included in a lease or tenancy ("tenancy")
subject to which the agreement states the property is sold.,,75
73 For example, see Megarry, W. and Wade W., above n14, 672. The interaction between vacant possession and title
is discussed in chapter 8. As explained in chapter 8, this would seem logical; the scope and extent of an obligation to
give vacant possession, dealing with barriers to 'possession', should not encompass rights which, by their very nature,
do not amount to possession. This also supports the model of vacant possession proposed in chapter 5.
14 The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) (The Law Society, London March 1990).
75 Ibid, condition 3.3.1.
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It was explained in chapter 4, in a discussion of the evolution of the standard conditions
of sale, that this provision was interpreted as a general condition that vacant possession
'was to be given subject to any disclosed tenancies, a view supported by commentaries
on the conditions and texts on the interpretation of the general conditions.f Of
particular interest was the standard form of special conditions to the 1990 edition which
did not specifically include a special condition where any tenancies (as barriers to
vacant possession) could be explicitly listed. This differed from the pre-fusion standard
conditions of sale which included a form of special condition which provided, for
example:
"G The property is sold ...
State whether the property is sold with vacant possession or subject to
tenancies (giving particulars of them). ,,77
Or in other editions, a standard form special condition which provided:
"The property is sold with vacant possession on completion
OR
The property is sold subject to the following leases or tenancies .... "78
76 Standard Conditions »f Sale (First Edition): a guide- for clients (Miscellaneous publications of the Law Society)
(Law Society, Law Society Stationery Society, London 1990). See-also Silverman, F. Standard Conditions a/Sale: a
conveyances guide (3" edn Format Publishing, London 1990) 149.
77 The National Conditions of Sale, 16th Edition, August 1953 (special conditions) (The Solicitor's Law Stationery
Society Limited, London 1953).
18 The Law Society's Contract for Sale (1980 Edition) (The Law Society, London 1980) special condition F.
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As such, if the property was to be sold subject to a tenancy or lease then an additional
special condition would need to be manually added in the special conditions to the 1990
edition listing the tenancies 'iI). question, as suggested by Silverman.79 This was,
however, contrary to the spirit 'Ofthe standard conditions of sale which were intended to
provide standard form wording for the conveyancer. For this reason, it was arguable
whether a barrier to vacant possession in the form of a tenancy could be treated as a
'burden' on the property, and therefore be covered by, and listed under, special condition
2, which provided:
"The Property is sold subject to the Burdens on the Property [as explicitly
listed under the heading 'Burdens' on the standard form contract] and the Buyer
will raise no requisitions on them.,,80
Indeed, it was possible to interpret the 1990 standard conditions as suggesting that
barriers to vacant possession (in the form of tenancies) could, and should, be disclosed
as 'burdens' pertaining to title, rather than the contractual obligation to give vacant
possession in its own right (as the separate and distinct obligation). This would also
potentially have had an effect on the remedies available for a breach or non-disclosure
of a tenancy (as discussed in more detail belowj." This example, in illustrating the
similarity between issues of vacant possession and title, demonstrates that such
similarity has in previous years led to the two being, to some extent, fused together,
with impediments to vacant possession being treated alike with incumbrances on title in
the context of the disclosure of incumbrances in contracts for the sale and purchase of
land. This is despite vacant possession being interpreted as a separate and distinct
obligation.82
19 Silverman, above 076, 149.
80 The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) (The Law Society, London March 1990) special condition 2.
81 The' internal inconsistency created appears to have been something that was known of at the time; indeed,
comments from one ofthe authors ofthe first edition reflected howthenewconditions had beendrafted veryquickly,
whichmay explain why greater thought wasnot given to the form of special conditions (see Silverman, above n76,
vi).
82 Above, n43, 329.
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Principles ofconveyancing
A third example of vacant possession and title being confused with each other is found
in the decision in Sheikh v O'Connor. 83 As discussed in chapter 5, in Sheikh the vendor
contracted to sell a property to the plaintiff. Most of the property was tenanted but the
vendor expressly contracted to sell one of the rooms with vacant possession. After
completion, the purchaser complained that the room which should have been vacant was
in fact occupied by one of the tenants as a trespasser. The purchaser sued the vendor for
damages for his failure to give vacant possession. One of the issues was purely factual
and concerned whether the tenant had taken possession of the room before, or after, the
completion date. Deputy Judge Wheeler concluded that it had been after completion,
which was sufficient to dispose of the case in the defendant's favour and have the action
dismissed. However, the judge went on to consider (obiter) the position in the event that
his finding of fact was incorrect and the trespasser had been in unlawful occupation of
the premises at the material time.
The judge accepted that a vendor who had contracted to give vacant possession did not
fulfill his contractual obligation if, at the date fixed for completion, there was a third
party who had a legal claim to possession, but he considered the position to be different
in relation to a trespasser. In such a case he considered that it was for the purchaser to
seek his remedy in the county court against the trespasser, given that the legal right to
possession had passed to the purchaser on completion.
As discussed in chapter 5, the problem with the judge's obiter comments in this decision
is that, if correct, they take all substance from the vendor's contractual undertaking to
give vacant possession. The obiter comments suggest that a vendor will not be liable,
even if he expressly contracts to give vacant possession, in the event that persons with
no lawful claim prevent the delivery of vacant possession on completion. This will leave
a purchaser with no remedy against the seller and no legal right to sue or seek specific
performance of obligations. It therefore negates the obligation being operative in the
sale and purchase contract between the parties, and is contrary to established authority/"
83 [1987] 2 EGLR 269.
84 See chapter 5.
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Harpum85 provides an extensive criticism of the decision in Sheikh and seeks to explain
why it could not be treated as reliable obiter. In doing so, he highlights the strands .of
reasoning provided by the judge for making the erroneous decision:
"There are...two strands in this reasoning. First, a vendor's obligation to 'gtve
vacant possession will not be broken if there happen to be persons on the
property without claim of right at the date of completion. Secondly, after
contract, the purchaser bears the risk of any supervening impediment (other
than one of title) which prevents the vendor from giving vacant possession.,,86
With respect to the first strand, Harpum justified his criticism with reference to vacant
possession case law, including the effect of an express undertaking to give vacant
possession as a "guarantee by the vendor that upon completion of purchase the
purchaser will be put into possession".87 Therefore the purchaser's knowledge of the
impediment (whether patent or otherwise, lawful or unlawful) should be immaterial.
With respect to the second strand, the reasoning given in the decision in Sheikh was that
after contract the risk of squatters coming on to the premises fell upon the purchaser.
Harpum compared this to principles of standard conveyancing practice to argue that
such principles were (wrongly) being applied by this judge in this case to determine
whether there had been a breach ofthe obligation to give vacant possession.
Indeed the analysis undertaken in the case is consistent with three fundamental
propositions ofconveyancing law, namely:
I. It is the duty of a vendor under open contract to show a good title free from
encumbrances;
2. It is a vendor's duty, after contract and before completion, to use reasonable
care to preserve the property in a reasonable state of preservation, and, so far as
may be, as it was when the contract was made; and
85 Above, n43, 329.
86 Ibid. Empbasis added.
87 Royal Permanent Building Society v Bomash [1887135 ChD. 390, per Kekewich J. at 394.
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J. After contract and prior to completion, by virtue of the doctrine of conversion,
the property is at the purchaser's risk in relation to all matters except
supervening defects of title.88
Harpum suggested that the judge's decision was based on the fact that, after contract,
when conversion opcratca/" the risk of defects passes to the purchaser as owner in
.equity of the property. The judge in Sheikh can therefore be seen to have confined the
seller's duties to those of a trustee in possession who is required to take reasonable care
of the premises. In so doing he ignored the vendor's contractual obligation to give
vacant posscssion.f" Harpum claimed that Deputy Judge Wheeler in Sheikh was:
"beguiled into underestimating the extent of the vendor's obligation to give
vacant possession, by its chameleon-like character.,,91
The judge clearly failed to appreciate the "overriding nature of an express obligation to
give vacant possession'y" and the difference between the obligation and principles of
title associated with standard conveyancing. Indeed, whilst the obligation to give vacant
possession is directly analogous to the vendor's duty to show a good title free from
incumbrances, the vendor's obligation to give vacant possession on completion is a
separate obligation which is quite distinct from showing a good title free from
incumbrances and taking reasonable care of the property until completion.f
The decision in Sheikh therefore highlights the danger of confusing the obligation to
give vacant possession with a requirement to give good title as part of the conveyancing
process, leading to the incorrect conclusion that the presence of unlawful occupiers did
not constitute a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession.
88 Ibid. Support for the propositions canbe found in Re Ossemsley Estates Ltd, above056 at 778, per Greene M.R.;
Clarke v Ramuz (1891) 2 Q.B. 456 at 459-460, per Lord Coleridge c.J. and Amalgamated Investment & Property Co
Ltd v John Walker & Sons Ltd [1977] 1 W.L.R. 164,per Lawton LJ. at 175. On the vendor's liability for supervening
defects oftitle, see Wroth v Tyler, above 01.
89 Conversion takes place at the moment when the vendor makes title, but is then retrospective to the date of the
contract - see Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch.D. 499, per Jessel M.R. at 506-507, 510, 518. See also, Oakley, A.I.
Constructive Trusts (4th edn Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, London 2009) 164.
90 Thecondition requires the purchaser to take the property as it stands on that date and cannot be invoked in respect
of matters arising thereafter. It does not qualify in any way the vendor's dutyas trustee in possession of the property
to takereasonable care of the property pending completion: Davron Estates Ltdv Tumshire Ltd [1982] CAT (where a
vendor was held liablefor damages caused to the property by squatters who entered the premises after contract) and
Hynes v Vaughan [1985150 P. & C.R. 444,per Scott I. at 456.
"Above, n43, 329.
92 Ibid.
" Ibid.
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A close association
The ;three issues identified above demonstrate the close association between vacant
possession and title, and the confusion that can easily be caused by applying principles
of title to vacant possession, which are not coterminoua"
What is most noticeable is that each of the three examples shows the confusion that is
manifest by different sets of stakeholders. In the first example, lawyers wrongly argued
that the issue was one of vacant possession rather than title, with the judge in Horton
explaining that lesser interests were actually issues of title. In the second example,
draftsmen on the Law Society's Conditions of Sale allowed impediments to vacant
possession to be listed along with other burdens on title. The third example provides an
illustration of how the courts failed to appreciate the nature, scope and extent of an
obligation to give vacant possession as quite separate to the standard conveyancing
process and the issues of title relevant thereto. This supports the observations made in
earlier chapters (in particular chapters 3 and 4) that lawyers, judges and legal draftsmen
have all had difficulty in understanding and interpreting the vacant possession
obligation.
A question remains as to whether, since vacant possession is so close to title, it could
more appropriately be classified in such terms. The next section considers whether
vacant possession could become part of the passing of good title itself, and therefore
shift from being a contractual obligation to becoming proprietary in nature.
Vacant Possession as proprietary
Given the similarity between vacant possession and title, and the confusion between the
two as highlighted above, it can be questioned whether the distinction made between the
two, whilst a correct statement of law, is the most appropriate formulation or strategy,
and whether vacant possession would be more appropriately viewed as part of the
passing of good title itself. As an alternative perspective, it is useful to consider the
94 Ibid.
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implications (both legally and practically) of allowing, or seeking to justify, vacant
possession to become part of the proprietary element ofpassing good title.
The effect of making vacant possession part of title would be that the remedies available
for a breach of the vacant possession obligation would, in line with those for not giving
good title, potentially be more satisfactory to the purchaser. This could resultin a more
even distribution of risk and responsibility between seller and purchaser. If a purchaser
could repudiate on the day fixed for completion for a breach of the obligation to give
vacant possession (rather than having to serve a notice to complete and wait 10 working
days) then a seller would be significantly more concerned with, and aware of, the need
for the premises to be vacant. This would result in the balance of power being more
evenly distributed with a greater element of risk thus lying on the seller. In line with
repudiating for not giving good title, it is likely that only a substantial or irremovable
defect would be appropriate to allow the repudiation, otherwise in line with the case law
on title (and vacant possession) the purchaser would be able to sue for damages." This
would provide greater comfort to a purchaser who at present has to sue for specific
performance on completion, or serve a notice to complete and ultimately wait 10 days
before being able to treat the contract as discharged and recover their deposit."
It has already been established that whilst a breach of the obligation to give vacant
possession is actionable after completion (by way of damages or by way of seeking to
uuravel the contract), a purchaser is unlikely to seek to uuravel the contract when the
completion monies have been sent over to the seller (and instead will seek to advance a
damages claim). Under the implied covenants for title, a purchaser has an implied duty
to use reasonable endeavours to assist with providing good title on completion and
thereafter; if vacant possession were to be part of title then this would apply to vacant
possession in similar terms, which is currently not the case. At present, once the
transaction has formally completed, the seller is under no duty as far as vacant
possession is concerned.
9S See Pips (Leisure Productions) Ltd v Walton, aboven24 at424, Megarry, W. and Wade W., aboven14, 81;Dyer v
Hargreave, aboven28 at507 andRutherfordv Acton-Adams, aboven28 at869, 870.
96 Unlike with title, the rightto repudiate couldnot arise beforethe date set for completion, when the obligation is
operative.
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While this issue has not yet been explored in the case law or in academic literature,
there are a number of potential arguments that can be identified both for and against
such a proposal. These arguments are set out below, where it is ultimately shown that
there is no independent theoretical justification for making the obligation to give vacant
possession proprietary in nature. A discussion of the arguments does, however, assist in
explaining the reasons for why vacant possession is, and must remain, separate from
title and, in tum, provides justification for improving the current understanding of the
contractual obligation to give vacant possession (as a means of seeking to more fairly
distribute risk and responsibility between seller and purchaser) as detailed in the
concluding chapter of this thesis.
The case in support ofvacantpossession as a title issue
Whilst the so-called 'better remedies' that would flow from making vacant possession
part of title are not, in and of themselves, justification for treating vacant possession in
proprietary terms, it is relevant to note how the law has previously sought to assist
parties who would otherwise be disadvantaged in order to ensure their remedies will
either exist, or will be more appropriate to the circumstances. By analogy, such
examples provide justification for the proposition that vacant possession could be made
proprietary in order to improve the remedies available to a purchaser, given that, in each
of the examples referred to, no independent justification (other than improving the
position on remedies) can be found.
The first example relates to the right of an injured party to damages in lieu of an
injunction. Commonly the breach of a covenant or right will be actionable, but not
sufficiently serious to warrant the grant of an injunction, and damages (in lieu of an
injunction) will be awarded at the equitable discretion of the court." An award for
damages arising out of a breach of covenant is normally intended to place the injured
party, so far as money can, in the position that they would have been in should the
97 Power to award damages is in lieu of an injunction, the power originating from the section 2 of the Chancery
Amendment Act 1958 (known as the Lord Cairns' Act) and therefore the breach must be 'injunctable' in nature. See
Bickford-Smith, S. and Shaw K. 'Seeing the light' (2006) ISOSolicitors: Journal 45; Baker, M. and ShawK. 'Speed of
light' (2007) lSI Solicitors Journal 13; Shaw, K. 'Soon to see the light again?' (2007) Real Estate Matters: Issue I (12
April 2007) 2, Pinsent Masons LLP; Shaw, K. (2007) 'Development's dark side' Yorkshire Post: Business Supplement
(22 May 2007), Romeike Ltd; Baker, M. and Shaw K. 'New lease ... new rent'. (2007) 194 Property Law Journal 32;
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covenant not have been breached; that is, the award seeks to compensate the injured
party for their loss.98 This is usually calculated with reference to the diminution in the
value ofthe injured party's land as a result ofthe breach." This can enhance the position
of the party in breach, especially where the injured party has suffered little (or perhaps
no) actual loss, and yet the offending party has benefited significantly from the
interference with another's right. IOOIn recent years case law has suggested that judges
are increasingly willing to assess damages for breach of covenant as the greater of the
damages to compensate and so-called 'buy-out' damagcs.i'" which refers to a sum based
on what reasonable people in the position of the parties would, hypothetically, have
negotiated for a release of the right (i.e. for loss of the covenant). This was established
in Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd 102 Here, the offending party
commenced developing land in breach of a freehold covenant. Brightman J. ordered the
developers to pay damages, not by reference to the injured party's negligible loss but
rather with regard to the sum that the injured party might reasonably have demanded for
relaxation of the covenant (i.e. to 'buyout' the right). As was explained in the judgment,
this was to achieve a fairer result for the parties:
"The basic rule in contract is to measure damages by that sum of money which
will put the plaintiff in the same position as he would have been in if the
contract had not been broken. From that basis, the defendants argue that the
damages are nil or purely nominal, .. In my judgment a just substitute for a
mandatory injunction would be such a sum of money as might reasonably have
been demanded by the plaintiffs...as a quid pro quo for relaxing the
covenant."103
Shaw, K. 'A shadow of doubt' (2007) Estates Gazette 176 and Baker, M. aud Shaw K. 'What sort of damages?' (2008)
213 Property Law Journal 2.
98 Livingstone v Raywards Coal Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, per Lord Blackburn at 30.
99 See Carr-Saunders v Dick McNeil Associates Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 922 and Co/beam Palmer Ltdv Stock Affiliates
Pty Ltd [1968] 122 CLR 25.
100 See Baker, M. andShawK. 'Infringement couldproveto be costly' (2006) 28 Oct2006 Estates Gazette 170.
101 See Lunn Poly Ltd v Liverpool & Lancashire Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 430. See also A-G v Blake [2000]
All ER (D) 1074; A-G v Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 (HL); Bracewell v Appleby [1975] Ch 408;
Deakins v Hooklngs [1994] 14 EG 133; Esso Petroleum Co Ltd v Naid Ltd [2001] All ER(D) 324; Experience
Hendrix LLC v PPX Enterprises Inc and Edwards Chaplin [2003] EWCA Civ 323; Forsyth-Grant v Allen [2008] All
ER (D) 110 (Apr); Livingstone v Raywards Coal Co, aboven98;Lunn Poly Ltd v Liverpool & Lancashire Properties
Ltd [2006] All ER (D) 264 (Mar); Marine and General Mutual Life Assurance Society v St James' Real Estate Co Ltd
[1991]38 EG 230; Regan v Paul Properties DPF No 1 Ltd [2006] All ER (D) 327 (Oct); Tamares (Vincent Square)
Ltd v Fairpoint Properties (Vincent Square) Ltd [1007] All ER (d) 103 (Feb) and UnitedAustraliaLtd
v Barclays Bank Ltd [1940] AC I.
102 [1974] 2 All ER 321.
1031bid, per Brightman J. at 339.
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As such, the effect of the court making an award of buy-out damages is to give the
injured party a better(and more appropriate) remedy. It also prevents infringing parties
from ignoring legal rights by making them accountable for such a breach. This can be
seen as an example of the courts seeking to achieve equity for a wronged party by
giving the injured party a more appropriate remedy. In tum, deeming vacant possession
to be proprietary in nature would have the effect of giving an injured purchaser fairer
remedies in all the circumstances, which would also place them in a stronger position
with respect to the other (breaching) party.
A second example, in which the court has sought to assist parties with obtaining a
remedy relates to the use of a legal fiction. A legal fiction is, broadly speaking, a fact
assumed or created by the courts which is then used in order to apply a legal rule which
was not necessarily designed to be used in that way, or which could not be used without
the fiction. Legal fictions are mostly encountered under common law systems which
have placed great reliance on legal fictions historically:
"[a] legal fiction ... is an assumption of a possible thing as a fact, which is not
literally true, for the advancement ofjustice, and which the law will not allow
to be disproved, as far as concerns the purpose for which the assumption is
made."Hf4
Blackstone says that "a fiction becomes understandable only when we know why it
exists, and we can know that only when we know what actuated its author" .105 It is true
to say that the English courts have found legal fictions "highly beneficial and useful,,106
in seeking to create a right of action that would otherwise not exist:
"The English Courts were in the habit ofpretending that a chattel, which might
in fact have been taken from the plaintiff by force, had been found by the
Defendant...in order to allow an action which otherwise would not have
lain." 107
104 Stoner v Skene [1918144 OLR 609, per Justice Lennox at 609.
105Blackstone, W. Commentaries on the Laws ofEngland (Clarendon Press,Oxford 1987) 43.
106 Fuller, L. Legal Ftctions (Stanford University Press, Stanford 1968) 4.
107 Blackstone, aboven105, 152.
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Indeed, an example of this can be found in the doctrine of 'Lost Modem Grant', which.
was developed by the courts to help parties who could not establish a prescriptive right
on the basis of common law prescription:
"The doctrine of lost modem grant has in its origins the increasing difficulty
which the courts encountered in establishing the presumption of enjoyment of
an easement back to 1189. Thus, by analogy with the period of 30 years fixed
by the Statute of Limitations 1623, it became possible to assert that enjoyment
of an easement for 20 years, without any other lawful explanation, could be
presumed to have had its origin in a grant. The grant was of course
fictionaI.,,108
The doctrine of lost modem grant provides a legal fiction based on proof of user for at
least 20 years (not necessarily the last 20 years). It will be presumed that the user is as a
result of a grant made since 1189, such grant having now been lost. This doctrine may
also be used if there has been an interruption of the user during the last 20 years, such as
would prevent a claim under the Prescription Act 1832/09 for which it is necessary to
prove 20 years' continuous (and uninterrupted) enjoyment up to the time when legal
proceedings were commenced. For example, the exercise of a right, such as an access
right, for a period between 1981 and 2001 can give rise to an easement under the
doctrine of lost modem grant by virtue of that user, even though such use may have
ceased subsequently:110
"... the courts... obviated the inconvenience which must have arisen from
allowing long enjoyment to be defeated by showing that it had not had a
uniform existence during the whole period required by introducing a new kind
oftitle by presumption of a grant made and lost in modem times."11l
108 Ibid, 57.
109 The gist of the principle upon which a lost modem grant is presumed is that the state of affairs is otherwise
unexplained: "When the courtfinds an open anduninterrupted enjoyment of property for a long periodunexplained,
omnia praesumuntur rite esse acta, and the court will, if reasonably possible, find a lawful origin for the right in
question": AII-Gen v Simpson [190112 Ch. 671,per Farweii J. at 698.
110 Simpson v Godmanchester Corp (1897) A.C. 696. In Tisdall v McArthur & Co (Steel and Metal) Ltd [19511 I.R.
':I 228, it was contended thata prescriptive rightto light cannotariseunder a presumption of modem lost grant, butthis
was not accepted. This was described as "the modern and better view" in Marlborough v Wilks Head & Eve [1996]
NLD 138, per Lighlman I.
111 Bickford-Smith, S. and Francis A. Rights of Light: The Modern Law (Jordons, Bristoi 2004) 53. The earliest
reported decision to this effect is that ofLewis v Price [176112 Wms. Saund and Dalton v Angus (1881) 6App. Cas.
812,per Lord Blackburn at 812.
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The courts have had frequent recourse to this doctrine and have repeated and applied in
.various ways the words of Lord Herschell in Phillips v Halliday: 112
"Where there has been long-continued possession in assertion of a right, it is a
well-settled principle of English law that the right should be presumed to have
had a legal origin if such a legal origin was possible, and the courts will
presume that those acts were done and those circumstances existed which were
necessary to the creation ofa valid title."113
The courts have presumed a lost grant in a wide range of cases including the right to
ventilate a cellar through adjoining property;114 a grant in the nature of an agreement
substituting one way for another;115 and as to paying a quit rent.1I6 As regards the
Crown, the courts have presumed a grant of a lost charter.ll7 They have presumed a
grant from the Crown to a corporation of the right to discharge sewage into a tidal
river.1I 8 They have also presumed the grant of a manor.!" or of a several fishery in tidal
waters.l2O As such, the effect of the legal fiction is to provide a party with the right in
circumstances where it would otherwise not be possible to establish that right.
As such, the law provides the party with a cause of action that would otherwise not
exist, by deeming a grant to have been made. The law invokes a legal fiction ".. .in
order to allow an action which otherwise would not have lain.,,121 In the same terms, the
courts could deem vacant possession to be a title issue in order to provide a purchaser
with better remedies, which stem from title, and would otherwise not be available to
them, in the interests ofjustice.122
112 (1891) AC. 228 at 231. Those words were repeated by Lord Halsbury in Clippens Oil Co v Edinburgh District
Water Trustees [19041 AC. 64; by Joyce J. in Halbert v Dale [1909] 2 Ch. 570; by Lord Reading in General Estates
Co v Beaver [1914] 3 K.B. 926 and by Lord Denning M.R. in Davis v Whitby 11974] Ch. 186. The doctrine of lost
modern grant was morerecently applied, by theHouseofLords, in Bakewell Management Ltd v Brandwood [2004] 2
AC.519.
113 (1891) AC. 228, per Lord Herschell at 231.
114 Bass v Gregory (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 481.
115 Hulbert v Dale [1909] 2 Ch. 570.
116 Bamford v Neville [1904] 1 I.R. 474 and Foley's Charity Trustees v Dudley [1910] 1 K.B. 317.
117 Goodtttle :v Baldwin (1809) 11 East 490 and LordRivers v Adams (1878) 3 Ex.D. 365. M to a lost grant by the
Crown, seeAIt-Gen v Horner (1885) 11 App. Cas. 66 and Att-Gen v Horner (No.2) [1913] 2 Ch. 140.
118Somersetshtre Drainage Commissioners v Bridgwater Corp [1904] 81 L.T. 729.
119 Merttens v Hill [1901] 1 Ch. 851.
120 Goodman v Saltash Corp (1882) 7 App. Cas. 633.
121 Blackstone, above nl05, 152.
122 It is correct to suggestthat the doctrine of LostModemGrant is morefocused on evidential issues in nature.
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Arguments against
There are a number of arguments against making vacant possession part of the passing .
of good title. The effect of making vacant possession proprietary in nature would be to
make the factual element of the obligation part of the legal transfer of title itself. It has
been established in legal theory that whilst contract law provides for private ordering,123
by contrast property law recognises only a limited and standard list of mandatory
interests.124 As such, making vacant possession a part of title would not therefore be
possible, unless there was a very clear policy reason for doing SO.125 This
'standardisation' is known as the numerus clausus and originates from the civil law
concept that the "number is closed":126
"A central difference between contract and property concerns the freedom to
"customize" legally enforceable interests. The law of contract recognises no
inherent limitations on the nature or the duration of the interests that can be the
subject of a legally binding contract... The law of property is very different in
this respect. Generally speaking, the law will enforce as pro¥erty only those
interests that conform to a limited number of standard forms."1 7
The numerus clausus concept has been the subject of much debate and thinking in
recent years,128 with some arguing that standardisation enhances efficiency, scales
property interests appropriately for productive use, and reduces information-cost
123 Merrill, T.W. and Smith H.E., above n123, 4. In this regard, the numerus clausus serves a distinctly different
function than standardisation in contract law whichgenerally provides default rules where parties havenot, orwhere
it is less efficient to have, completed the terms of their agreement. See Ayres. 1. and Gertner R. 'Filling Gaps in
Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules' (1989) 99 Yale La Jaurnal87, 92-93 (discussing 'the
sources of contractual incompleteness'). This is true atthe.structural level of contract law, andit is also an important
part of the practical negotiation of contracts. See Ahdieh, R.B. 'The Strategy of Boilerplate' (2006) 104 Mich Law
Review 1033, 1036-37.
124 Above, n123.
125 See Merrill, T.W. and Smith HE. 'Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus
Principle' (2000) 110 Yale Law Journal 1, 23 - "[Tjhe numerus clausus exerts a powerful hold on the system of
property rights... [and] from theperspective ofthe practicing lawyer. the entire systempresents thepicture of a fixed
menu of options from which deviations will not be permitted". The numerus clausus principle is embodied in
contemporary property law in the palette of estates in land, servitudes, security interests in property, and in
intellectual property, as well as in emerging forms ofproperty.
126 See Merrill, T.W. andSmith H.E., aboven123. The numerus clausus principle has long been anexplicitaspect of
civil law systems. See Paisley, R. Real Rights: Practical Problems and Dogmatic Rigidity' (2004) 9 Edinburgh Law
Rev 267 (discussing thenumerus clausus principle in Scottish law,a mixedcommon law andcivil lawjurisdiction).
127 Ibid.InLatin numerus clausus literally means 'closed category'.
128 See, for example, Merryman, J.H. 'Policy, Autonomy, and theNumerus Clausus in Italian andAmerican Property
Law' (1963) 12 Am.J.Comp.L. 224; Rudden, B. 'Ecouomic Theory v. Property Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem',
in Eekelaar, J. and Bell J. (eds) Oxfard Essays in Jurisprudence (3rd edition Oxford University Press, Oxford 1987)
239.
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extemalities.V' Others suggest that the numerus clausus embodies inherent categories
of meaning and reflects the normative coherence of existing social patterns, the
objective well-being of interest holders, or underlying democratic values. 130 Versions of
the numerus clausus are found in Roman law and recur throughout the history of feudal
and post-feudal English common law.l3l Likcwisc.somc form of a standard list appears
in disparate modem civil law and common law systems throughout the world,132 It was
stated in Keppel! v Bailey 133 that 'incidents of a novel kind' cannot "be devised and
attached to property at the fancy or caprice of any owner." 134 As such, this is potentially
an argument against allowing vacant possession to become proprietary in nature, and
changing the established list of forms that currently exists.
With that said, in respect of the content of the existing forms, although standardisation
is a stable feature of property law, the particular list of forms and their internal
substance have always been understood as dynamic. 135 That is, even though they are
standardised, these bundles can retain great flexibility. Davidson claims that this
dynamism has three dimensions: in the list itself, in the mandatory limits imposed on
each given form, and in the permissible range of variation allowed to private parties in
altering the forms. 136 Davidson claims that, historically, forms have been added and
removed from the universe of recognised property types and that the contemporary 'list'
is a product of significant contestation.F" This view is expressed despite scholars
arguing that the universe of interests (commonly referred to as the 'list') is now
closed. 138 Davidson claims that the list continues to fluctuate in modem law:
129 See Bell, A and Parchomovsky G, 'Of Property and Federalism' (2005) 115 Yale Law Journal 72 (discussing the
numerus claususprinciple in the context of federalism); Dagan,H. 'TheCraft of Property' (2003) 91 California Law
Review 1517, 1565-70 (offering a modern Legal Realist view of the numerus clausus principle); Hansmann, H. and
Kraakman R. 'Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights'
(2002) 31 J. Legal Studies 373 (arguing thatthe numerus claususprinciple servesto 'aidverification ofthe ownership
of rights offered for conveyance'); Lewinsohn-Zamir, D. 'The Objectivity of Well-Being and the Objectives of
Property Law' (2003) 78 New York University Law Review 1669, 1730-39 (discussing an objective theory of well-
being as ajustification forthe numerus clausus principle); Heller,M.A. 'TheBoundaries of Property' (1999) 108 Yale
Law Journal 1163, 1176-78 (discussing the' numerus clausus principle). See also Munzer, S.R. Commons and
Anticommons in the Law and Theory ofProperty, in Golding,M.P andEdmundson W.A. TheBlackwellGuide to the
Philosophy ofLaw and Legal Theory (Biackweii, London 2005) 148, 156-57,
130 Davidson,N.M. 'Standardization andPluralism in Property Law'(2008) 61 VanderbiltLaw Review 6, 1601.
I3l Rudden, aboven128, 241-42.
132 Ibid. "
133 Keppell v Bailey (1834) 39 Eng. Rep, 1042\ 1049,
134 Ibid.
135 Davidson, aboven130.
136 Ibid.
1J7 Ibid.
138 Ibid.
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"even a cursory glance at the generative capacity of property law over the past
fifty years - a period that has seen the recognition of forms such as the
timeshare, significant upheaval in the law of servitudes, and the creation of the
droit de suite, to name a few examples - belies the notion that the list has
ceased developing."139
Crucially, even if the list is now not subject to change, the numerus clausus principle
does not preclude dynamic interpretations in the changing internal content and meaning
that the law imposes on any given form. Davidson explains that public definition of the
mandatory content of the forms is an ongoing process, so that even the same nominal
form can have significantly different content over time and across jurisdictions. He
gives an example of the fee simple for which "the most important characteristics of the
conceptual category changed by active regulatory intervention.,,140 A similar
transformation occurred with the tenancy:
"... although modern law recognises a 'form' of property called the 'tenancy by
the entirety', that form has a very different social and practical meaning than it
did in early modernity and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction today."l4l
As such, Davidson emphasises the changing nature of the content of given property
forms:
"Throughout the law of property, forms persist with nominal stability at the
same time that the default content of those forms changes, at times
incrementally, and at times radically. Additions and eliminations from the list
are an important part of the history of the numerus clausus, yet internal
dynamism is arguably an even more central aspect of standardisation.,,142
On this basis, it can be argued that making or deeming vacant possession part of the
passing of good title would not, in and of itself, be contrary to the numerus clausus
theory. Making vacant possession part of passing good title, and therefore being
proprietary in nature, could reflect the internal dynamism which Davidson claims is an
even more central aspect of 'standardisation'. This would be as part of the ongoing
139 Ibid. Oneof the mostrecent innovations in the forms ofpmperty is arguably the chattel servitude as it is emerging
in the context of digital property. See Robinson, G.O. 'Personal Property Servitudes' (2004) 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1449,
1516-21 (discussing the increasing popularity of digital rights management tools, which are self-enforcing restriction
mechanisms that are hardwired intoproducts).
140 Davidson, above n130.
141 Ibid 1613
142 Ibid~ .
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flexibility of the established bundles in reflecting the changing internal content and
meaning that the law imposes on any given form: Indeed, notwithstanding numerus
clausus theory, the theoretical and practical justifications of the policy (whether in the
form of case law or legislation) could dictate that there was an overwhelming need to
allow vacant possession to become a proprietary interest. As discussed throughout this
thesis, the level of risk and responsibility which is attributable to the purchaser could be
one justification for doing so, given the improved remedies that would thus become
available. The shift would not be based on legal theory or doctrine in such a case, but on
policy, in terms of which party to a transaction can be seen to require greater protection
with respect to the procurement ofvacant possession.
With that said, it must be questioned whether making vacant possession a part of
passing good title is appropriate, even if one could propose a clear policy reason for the
shift of the obligation from contractual to proprietary. Indeed, the model of vacant
possession proposed by chapter 5 suggested that vacant possession had two dimensions
(de jure and de facto) namely:
1. Vacant possession is the legal right to possession that follows from the transfer
of a non-reversionary estate inland; but
2. Vacant possession is only given when the party with the legal right to
possession (which comes with the transfer of the estate in land) can:
(i) actually enjoy that right ofpossession in a factual and practical sense
(ii) immediately on completion (or at the operative date).
Chapter 5 thus highlighted that the legal right to possession was linked with the transfer
of the estate in land (i.e. the legal title) and that the right to factual possession stemmed
from the legal right to possession having been acquired. Whilst this emphasised the
close relationship between legal ownership and the right to possession on completion or
the operative date, it also highlighted the distinction between the legal right to
possession and factual possession in the sense ofbeing in actual occupation of the estate
in land. Deputy Judge Wheeler in Sheikh focused only on the legal aspect of vacant
possession when he said:
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"[vacant possession] is a right, and it is a right which, in the absence of some .
competing legal claim, passes to the purchaser on completion [i.e. when the .
estate in land is transferred]." 143 ,
Chapter 5, and earlier in this chapter, explained why such an analysis failed to properly
appreciate both dimensions of the vacant possession obligation. The effect of making.
vacant possession part of title would therefore be to make the factual element part of the
legal transfer oftitle itself.
Deeming vacant possession to be part of passing good title is arguably consistent with
the rights that a purchaser obtains (in law) on completion.1M The right to possession of
an estate in land runs with the estate and it is not personal to the contracting parties. If
trespassers are in unlawful occupation on completion, for example, the party with the
legal right to possession may commence action to remove them, even though they were
not party to the contract.145 As noted in chapter 6 and above, legal possession has been
said to be enforceable in rem (that is, against the whole world at large), with a person
having a right to possess an estate if they have acquired a title to it which is 'vested in
possession'. As such, given that the legal right to vacant possession runs with the estate
in a similar manner to the legal title to the estate and other benefits of the estate (e.g.
rights which benefit the property), it could be seen as appropriate to conflate the two
obligations and make vacant possession (both legal and factual) part of the proprietary
element.
There is, however, theoretical opposition to such an approach. As noted earlier, the
classic analysis of title demonstrates that title is the set of facts upon which a claim to
some legal right, liberty, power or legal interest is founded.146 Lawson and Rudden
wrote that "title is a shorthand term used to denote the facts which, if proved, will
enable a plaintiff to recover possession or a defendant to retain possession of a thing".147
As Salmond explained:
143 Sheikh, above n64,per Deputy Judge Wheeler at271.
144 See belowforfurther analysis of the implications of thls proposition.
145 See Tolley's Claims to the Possession ofLand (LexisNexis Butterworths, London April 2009) A1.5.
146 Salmond, aboven16, 58.
147 Above, nl?, 44.
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"title is the de facto antecedent of which the right is the de jure consequent. If
the law confers a right upon a man which it does not confer upon another, the
reason is that certain facts are true of him which are not true of the other, and
these facts are the title to the right."148
However, as Panesar explains in his commentary, the use of the word 'facts' in this
context does not denote 'physical' facts (such as the fact of taking up possession in the
sense of commencing occupation) but "[r]ather the inquiry is into the legal facts
pertaining to a person's standing in relation to some object or asset".149 Pottage confirms
the view that title is about legal, and not factual, rights and that "title is an abstract
quality, which depends upon an interpretation of rights rather than the identification of
physical facts".150 These suggest that making the factual element of the obligation to
give vacant possession part of the passing of title would be inconsistent with the
understanding that title is about evidencing ownership, which itself constitutes a
collection of legal rights, powers and immunities, rather than factual manifestations.
There are also more practical arguments against making vacant possession part of title.
If vacant possession was to be deemed a title issue, it is arguable that other elements of
a standard sale and purchase contract should also be treated in such terms. It could be
argued that a premises not delivered on completion in the state and condition they were
in on exchange should also give rise to the right to repudiate, along with various other
aspects of the transaction such as the agreed boundaries of a given property. Further,
there is technically no need to deem vacant possession part of title when the contract
could expressly provide for a repudiation to be possible in cases where vacant
possession had not been given, as a contractual term. This possibility is considered in
the conclusion to this thesis.
These practical observations are also relevant to potential invocation of a legal fiction,
as set out in the preceding section, to justify making vacant possession proprietary in
nature.: As discussed above, the effect of a legal fiction is to treat some state of affairs as
being different to the actual state of affairs. This is normally for convenience, where the
law wishes to reach a result which is more suitable, or preferable, even though that end
1411 Salmond, above016,56.
149 Panesar, aboven15, 8139.Emphasis added.
150 Pottage. A. Evidencing Ownership in Bright, S. and Dewar 1. (eds) Land Law Themes and Perspectives (Oxford
University Press, Oxford 1988) 131.
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outcome is not doctrinally sound. However, the effect of allowing a legal fiction can
also lead to potentially unfair or unsound outcomes. An example would be the doctrine
of constructive notice, which was discussed earlier in chapter 5. Constructive notice!5!
is a type of legal fiction which deems a party with having knowledge which they did not
in fact have. This is common in cases where, for example, a third party asserts a right to
property and a purchaser or charge-holder is deemed to have constructive notice oftheir
interest, and thus be bound by that interest.152 Given that a party is deemed to know
something which they actually do not know, many have highlighted the unfair nature of
the use of such a legal fiction, some going as far as to suggest the doctrine of
constructive notice is 'dangerous':
"The doctrine is a dangerous one. It's contrary to the truth. It is wholly founded
on the doctrine that a man does not know the facts, and yet is said that
constructively he does know them.,,153
It could be argued that seeking to make vacant possession proprietary in nature, simply
as a matter of convenience and in order to provide more favourable remedies to a
purchaser, is also 'dangerous'. In many respects, it could be viewed as a manipulation of
the nature and form ofthe contractual obligation, making it into something that it is not.
This consequentialist-type approach would be devoid of doctrinal support and an ad hoc
'quick fix' to a problem more deeply routed in the contractual sphere. There are
therefore arguments against the use of legal fictions per se, as well as arguments as to
why the use of a legal fiction would specifically not be appropriate or necessary in
respect ofmaking vacant possession proprietary in nature.
Conclusion
On the basis that an obligation to give vacant possession has arisen and is breached by
the party required to give vacant possession, it must be considered where this leaves the
party who had contracted for something more than is actually obtained at the relevant
time. An enquiry into the current remedies available upon a breach of the obligation to
151 See also Howell, above n12; Partington, above nl2 and Sheridan, above n12.
152 Forexample, see rule in Hunt v Luck [1901] Ch 45 whichgives constructive noticeto a purchaser of the equitable
interest of someone in occupation of property.
153 AI/en v Seckham (1879) 11 Ch D 790, per Lord Esher at 794.
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give vacant possession reveals that, at present, they are intrinsically unsatisfactory to a
purchaser. This chapter contrasted the concept of giving vacant possession with giving
good title and highlighted a number of similarities. between the two obligations. This
chapter analysed contrasting remedies for a breach of the obligation to give vacant
possession and for not giving good title, and explored how the remedies for breaching
the obligation to give vacant possession could be improved in the event that the vacant
possession obligation were to become proprietary rather than contractual in nature.
From a discussion of the relevant considerations it is clear that, whilst there would be
certain advantages in terms of the additional remedies available, there is no independent
theoretical justification for deeming vacant possession to be part of title. Further, it is
arguable that it is not appropriate to make the factual element of the obligation to give
vacant possession part of passing title, given that title depends upon an interpretation of
legal rights rather than the identification of physical facts. Moreover, any proposal to
make vacant possession proprietary in nature (on the basis of a policy decision that
considers it necessary in order to enhance the remedies of a purchaser, and thus provide
greater protection to a purchaser) is further discredited when one considers how the
right to repudiate could expressly be provided for as a remedy for a breach of the
existing 'contractual' vacant possession obligation. This discredits any contention that
there is a unique policy reason why a new category of property law interest, in the
context of the numerus clausus theory, should be permitted.
It can thus be concludedthat vacant possession is best interpreted as a more clearly defined
and articulated contractual obligation and, in that regard, a proposed description of the
concept arising out of the analysis in this and previous chapters is promulgated in the
conclusionof this thesis. The legal articulation of the concept of vacant possessionis shown
to make reference to a number of variables that must be considered when seeking to
interpret the obligation in context, and with reference to the facts of any given case. This
reflects the de jure and de facto nature of the obligation, and that the obligation cannot be
'straight-jacketed' into a specific legal definition or statement. Suggested proposals to
enhance the existing contractual remedies that would be available to an injured party are
also made, along with (specifically in the leasehold context) a proposal to ameliorate the
problems associated with the procurement of vacant possession upon the exercise of
conditional break options.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
The motivation for researching this thesis was to consider in depth a previously
undeveloped and generally neglected, but not the less commonly used, property law
concept. A wide range of people use the expression 'vacant possession', including
conveyancers, litigators, surveyors, estate agents and others, including property owners,
landlords and tenants, and many more concerned with property. Yet, despite the
importance and common occurrence of this term, the nature and meaning of vacant
possession has previously been dealt with in property textbooks and handbooks in a
very superficial way. This is unfortunate since, as this thesis has shown, vacant
possession is a pervasive concept, and it raises a number of interesting and difficult
issues that have generally been neglected, disregarded or unappreciated by those
connected to the property industry, along with legal academics and commentators.
Whilst the concept is an everyday term that is used by many, behind the familiarity of
this common expression this thesis has identified uncertainty, misunderstanding and
general neglect of the development of a sound and coherent theoretical model of vacant
possession. There is very little judicial guidance available, due to limited case law on
the subject, and this has inhibited the development of a more satisfactory and detailed
jurisprudence on the concept. In 1988, in two articles in the Conveyancer and Property
Lawyer, Charles Harpum provided what probably remains the most insightful learned
scholarship on the subject,' but since then the concept appears to have warranted very
little scholarly or practitioner attention.
The consequence is that the concept of vacant possession has been misunderstood by a
wide variety of people. The review in this thesis of case reports, journal articles, and
minutes of historic law society meetings has indicated that this confusion has resulted
across four broad stakeholder groups.
1 Harpum, C. 'Vacant possession - chameleon orchimaera?' (1988) Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 324.
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Firstly, judges have struggled to interpret the nature and effect of an obligation to give
vacant possession. Chapter 3 highlighted that, until 1979, the courts had failed to
recognise the precedence of a special condition for vacant possession over other
conflicting contractual conditions. Further, in seeking to appreciate both the legal and
factual dimensions to the obligation, chapter 6 demonstrated that some judges did not
recognise that the factual element of the obligation had to be met on completion, instead
seeing vacant possession as a legal 'right' which passed to the purchaser who was then
empowered (after completion) to pursue the vacant possession for which they had
contracted.
Secondly, professionals have failed to understand the meanmg and significance of
vacant possession. Estate agents have sought to distinguish, in their advertising
particulars, between 'full vacant possession', 'immediate vacant possession' or 'complete
vacant possession'; there is no real distinction as the preceding adjective in each case
adds nothing to the message that they are seeking to convey to prospective purchasers,
in relation to what they can expect to obtain on completion. Lawyers talk about 'giving
VP on completion', but few documents ever actually define what vacant possession
means with a capitalised 'V' and ,p,.z Professionals have for generations made use of the
term somewhat loosely and without proper attention as to what they really mean by it.
Thirdly, draftsmen and commentators have struggled to understand the intricacies of
vacant possession. A detailed review of the various editions and revisions to standard
conditions of sale since 1904 explicated an inconsistent and confused evolution of the
term 'vacant possession'. It was not used as a term in and of itself until the 1950s,
whence followed a series of seemingly ad hoc shifts back and forth in respect of its
incorporation as a general or special condition. Further, its interaction with other terms
was shown to be misunderstood, with the drafting of the conditions of sale providing for
various internal inconsistencies and conflicts with other terms of the standard set of
conditions. Notable examples included the National Conditions of Sale 1953,3 which
provided as a special condition that the property was sold with vacant possession other
2 Shaw, K. 'Fit to be occupied' (2007) 27 Jan 2007 Estates Gazette 182; Shaw, K. 'More to it than meets the eye'
(2010) 1 May 2010 Estates Gazette 4 and Shaw, K. 'All that you can't leave behind' (2010) 256 Property Law Journal
6.
3 The National Conditions of Sale, 16th Edition, August 1953 (The Solicitor's Law Stationery Society Limited,
London 1953).
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than with regard to any tenancies explicitly listed, but also contained a general condition
providing that the property was sold subject to all tenancies to which the property was
subject, whether mentioned in the particulars ofsale or not.
Fourth1y, lay people, the consumers of property transactions, have misunderstood what
giving vacant possession actually means or involves. Particularly in the leasehold
context, tenants have found (to their cost and expense) the dangers of not fully
appreciating how a contractual break option in a lease may be frustrated by the
requirement to give vacant possession. This is not just when vacant possession is an
express pre-condition for exercise of the break, but also more generally where the break
is conditional on yielding-up the property, or on compliance with all covenants at the
break date (which will thereby include an express or implied requirement to yield-up the
property, and therefore to give vacant possession).
These confusions can be explained by the lack of clarity that has existed with respect to
the constituent elements of the obligation (both legal and factual) and how these
elements of the obligation can be breached in practice. It would seem from the case law
that many have confused the term 'vacant possession' with use of the same expression in
so called "summary in ejectment cases" dating back to the l800s. In this context, it was
necessary for a premises to be 'completely deserted', whereas, in the modern property
law context, vacant possession has been shown to have a different meaning. Analysis of
case law and commentary in this thesis has clearly demarcated the 'legal' (de jure) and
'factual' (de facto) aspects of the obligation to give vacant possession. This
demonstrated that vacant possession is not just concerned with the transfer of the legal
right to possession (which follows from the transfer of the estate in land) but also with
whether the party with the legal right to vacant possession is able to actually occupy and
enjoy that right immediately on completion. The benefits of providing this formulation
were illuminated when previously inconsistent case law with regard to so-called 'legal
obstacles' was explained by analysing the form of obstacle to vacant possession with
reference to the constituent elements of the obligation that had been identified by the
model proposed.
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Understanding the constituent elements of the obligation also facilitates, a more
; scholarly inquiry into what will amount to a breach of the obligation, at tIN point of
completion. Analysis of the tests proposed by case law to determine a breach of the
obligation exemplified that any determination as to a breach of the obligation to give
vacant possession would be inherently fact specific. This is true both in cases where
such a determination is based on the first limb of the test, directed at the party required
to give vacant possession, or the second limb, which focuses on whether the
impediment represents a substantial obstacle to the receipt of possession at the point of
completion. Here a comparison, by analogy, with more developed property law
concepts, such as actual occupation and adverse possession, enabled a deeper
understanding of the nature of 'possession-type' concepts, and why they must remain
fact sensitive. The concept of 'possession' was therefore explained as a property law
concept which can not be 'straight-jacketed' into a single legal definition or statement
devoid of context and relevant case specific circumstances, and that no check list or
formula for vacant possession, unlike other (more fixed) property law concepts, can
therefore be promulgated. This highlighted the factual dynamism of this inherently
infra-juralobligation.
A more informed understanding of the relevant tests to determine a breach of the
obligation precipitated further analysis into the scope of the obligation. Whilst there
remains no legal authority on whether the state and condition of a given property can be
a barrier to the receipt of vacant possession, an analysis of the various likely
impediments explained how any obstacle that prevented or restricted the receipt or
enjoyment of the right of 'possession' could potentially amount to a breach of the
obligation. As such, so-called lesser-interests (falling short of the fully fledged
possession) were shown not to be relevant to the vacant possession obligation, even
though the representations in the case of Horton v Kurzke4 seemed to consider that they
were. This analysis articulated a more coherent understanding of the scope of the
obligation to give vacant possession in referring to any and all impediments to the 'right
ofpossession'. This articulation improves on the artificial distinction that had previously
been regarded as significant in issues of vacant possession, namely the difference
between the status of items as fixtures or chattels. This thesis has shown that classifying
4 [1971] 1 W.L.R. 769.
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items in such terms is not the starting point in determining whether any given obstacle
can be a barrier to the receipt of vacant possession, thus reformulating the approach.
.1 taken to understanding and appreciating potential obstacles to vacant possession.
The scope of the obligation to give vacant possession also led into a more fundamental
discussion of the 'form' of the obligation itself, specifically whether vacant possession-
would be more appropriately positioned as a proprietary right, than a contractual
obligation. Tills discussion was based on a series of cases and circumstances where
vacant possession had been treated as an issue pertaining to title. Indeed, when
considering the contractual form of the obligation, it was not just the representations of
counsel in the case of Horton (as alluded to above) which seemingly confused or
merged issues of title with vacant possession. The Standard Conditions of Sale 19905
seemed to allow potential impediments to vacant possession to be listed along with
other burdens on 'title', and reasoning in some judgements of the court sought to treat
the obligation to give vacant possession in similar terms to standard conveyancing rules
pertaining to passing a clean title. This thesis explained that the current contractual
obligation to give vacant possession is a separate and distinct obligation, quite apart
from any obligation to give good title free from incumbrances. Further, in examining
whether the contractual nature of the obligation to give vacant possession is appropriate,
and noting how the principles relevant to the obligation to give vacant possession have
been shown to be closely analogous with a seller's duty to disclose good title, the thesis
has identified the theoretical and practical reasons why the obligation must remain a
contractual obligation, rather than being deemed proprietary in nature. The benefits that
could be gained, in terms of the remedies available from a breach of good title, are
equally as available in the contractual sphere without expanding the 'closed category' of
property law interests by including vacant possession as a title issue, someth.ing for
which no clear theory driven, or policy motivation, could be advanced.
Whilst the journey travelled by this thesis has identified and explained problems with
understanding of the obligation in the past, and has for the first time developed a more
scholarly understanding of the concept of vacant possession for the present, the story of {
5 The Standard Conditions of Sale (First Edition) 1990 (The Law Society, London 1990), known also as The National
Conditions of Sale21stEdition andtheLawSociety's General Conditions of Sale 1990.
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vacant possession does not end here. hnplicit in the current uncertainty and confusion
that remains apparent are the key issues of .risk and responsibility which overlay
transactions involving vacant possession, where sellers and buyers and landlords and
tenants are all responsible for, or exposed to, the procurement or non procurement of
vacant possession, and corresponding obligations, liabilities and implications. The
recent economic decline, causing parties to, more than ever before, seek to find novel
(or convenient) ways to avoid payments and liabilities under contractual documents and
other agreements, has only served to increase the number of contractual disputes
concerning vacant possession. This is why it is necessary to go a step further than
explaining the problems, and also to seek to address the issues that have been identified,
to assist and facilitate future operation of the vacant possession term in practice.
Whilst this thesis has advanced an understanding of the constituent elements of the
obligation, and the tests to determine a breach in various contexts, alongside a clearer
understanding of the scope of the obligation, what remains lacking is a clear description
of the obligation that can be used to characterise the underlying legal and factual
elements that are central to it. One step forward to address the uncertainty associated
with the term, given its inconsistent evolution and understanding in case law, is to
provide a principled description of the obligation as a contractual term, which could be
used in standard contracts for the sale and purchase of land, or leases and other
agreements pertaining to land.
Whilst the concept of vacant possession cannot be straight-jacketed into a single
definition or legal phrase, in practice it would assist (and be possible) to attach some
agreed meaning to the term when appearing in standard form sale and purchase
contracts, which currently do not define 'vacant possession' as they do virtually all other
contractual terms. From the comprehensive review of the obligation undertaken in the
preceding chapters, it is suggested that a so-called 'contractual definition' of vacant
possession, which would be included into sale and purchase contracts, would be as
follows:
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"Vacant Possession" means:
The Purchaser [or party with the right to vacant possession] being able to
actually enjoy their right of possession immediately on Completion without
any form oflmpediment which is Substantial in nature.
In this definition, "Impediment" means:
An object or issue (whether physical or legal) which prevents or interferes with
the Purchaser [or party with the right to vacant possession] being able to
occupy the whole or a Substantial part of the Property without Difficulty or
Objection.
In this definition, what constitutes "Substantial", "Difficulty" and "Objection"
are each questions of fact and degree, to be objectively assessed in the specific
circumstances of the given case and taking into account (a) the nature of the
premises (b) the state and condition of the premises (c) the circumstances and
characteristics of the parties in question and (d) the current or (if different)
intended use of the Property (at Completion)."
This definition reflects the fact that whilst certain parts of the vacant possession
'definition' can clearly be articulated, other elements will be fact specific determinations
in each given case (thus reflecting that a single (or precise) legal definition is not
possible). The definition does, however, improve on current understanding in this regard
by prescribing the relevant variables that should be taken into account when interpreting
the tests for vacant possession in a specific context, and therefore characterising the
issues that are relevant in understanding the obligation, thus it applies the reasoning of
Tay and others by showing that any purported 'definition' must make reference to
factual circumstances. Providing a 'definition' as part of the standard conditions of sale
in a way which reflects the infra-jural nature of the obligation will provide greater
certainty for the parties and a better understanding of how the tests to determine vacant
possession will operate in practice, and the author of this thesis is liaising with the
relevant working party committee at the Law Society in that regard at the present time.
In addition to providing a clearly articulated (albeit, slightly infra-jurali definition of
Vacant Possession, a contract for the sale and purchase of land would also benefit from
6 Capitalised tenus (such as 'Completion') would be defined in the Standard Conditions of Sale in which this
'definition! would appear.
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amendment in respect of the remedies that may be available upon a breach of the
obligation. As explained through the thesis, whilst issues of risk and responsibility are
relevant to all parties to a given transaction, at presentthe seller can be seen to have the
( -!
upper hand in cases where a breach of the obligation has, or is alleged to have taken
place. Contractually amending the remedies could, in turn, be used to rebalance the risk
and responsibility between the parties (without changing the form of the contractual
obligation to give vacant possession). The work undertaken in this thesis has identified
that the current remedies associated with the obligation could be improved or
ameliorated in the following ways.
Firstly, in contracts where vacant possession on a particular day is absolutely
fundamental to the contract (opposed to where it is just important), it may be
appropriate to seek to make 'time of the essence' in respect of the vacant possession
provision." The effect of this will be to provide the parties with immediate remedies on
the day of completion if vacant possession is not given (i.e. rescission immediately
without the need to first make time of the essence by serving a notice to complete, and
then waiting (normally) ten working days).
A seller may seek to reject such a provision, because making time of the essence for a
vacant possession obligation will clearly impose on the seller greater risk, and thus a
burden, of ensuring that there is no conceivable argument that vacant possession has not
been given, in view ofthe immediate rights of the buyer from the day set for completion
in the event that vacant possession is not given on that day. It would, however, have the
effect of focusing the seller's attention on the procurement of vacant possession on
completion, and provide the buyer with greater assurance that they are likely to receive
what they have contracted for on completion (or the immediate right to discharge itself
thereafter if not). If the seller is promising that 'vacant possession' will be given, then it
can be argued that they should be prepared to deal with potentially harsher and more
immediate consequences in the event that it is not.
Secondly, the provisions relating to 'Notice to Complete' may be capable of refinement.
. ,
Under the current editions of the Standard Conditions of Sale and Standard Commercial
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Property Conditions, a notice to complete must allow ten working days in order to give \
the party the right to thereafter rescind the contract.8 If ten working days are not
provided for by the notice, then the rescission could itself be deemed unlawful, giving
rise to legal proceedings.
There is, however, nothing to stop the parties amending the relevant general condition
and providing that only 5 working days need to be given on the service of a notice to
complete (whether generally or specifically with regard to the issue of vacant
possession). This can be useful in cases where a proposal to make time ofthe essence in
respect of the vacant possession obligation (as suggested above) is refused by a seller.
Requiring a notice to complete to only prescribe 5 days expedites the time at which the
parties' remedies and actions can then take effect, thus still resulting in the seller
needing to give greater attention to procuring vacant possession. This would also
rebalance the risk and responsibility of the parties a little further (but not completely) in
favour of the buyer.
A third proposal arising out of this work concerns damages. Whilst case law on
damages explains, in principle, what can be claimed by an injured party in the event that
there is a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession, if parties are aware (from
the outset) of the potential losses that could be incurred by a given party then it may be
worth expressly providing for certain pre-agreed damages if vacant possession is not
given on completion.
Liquidated damages are a fixed or pre-determined amount which the parties can agree
will contractually become payable upon a given breach of the contract. The issue with
purported liquidated damages clauses, however, is that the amount stipulated must be a
genuine pre-estimate of loss to be sustained in a particular circumstance. If not, the
clause is likely to be seen to constitute a penalty, thus rendering it unenforceable."
7 See, for example, Eagle Limited v Golden Achievement Limited [1997] Cl'C 16 and British and Commonwealth
Group pic v Quadrex Holdings Inc [1989] 3 All ER 492.
• See Standard Conditions of Sale (Fourth Edition) (The Law Society, London 2003), condition 6.8 aod Standard,
Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition) (The Law Society, London 2003),. condition 8.8. ,
9 See, for example, Pneumatic Tyre Company Limited v New Garage Motor Co Limited [1915] AC 79; Impresa
Castelli SpA v Cola Holdings Ltd [2002] EWHC 1363 aod Alfred McAlpine Projects Limited v Tilebox Limited
[2005] EWHC 281 (TCC).
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If, for example, a buyer requires vacant possession ofa property in order to complete on
. an agreement for a lease which it has entered into with a prospective tenant, which itself
is conditional on the buyer (as proposed landlord under the agreement for lease)
procuring vacant possession of the said property, then a liquidated damages clause
could be useful. In this and similar circumstances, it would be possible to .estimate the
likely loss from losing the proposed tenant (on a weekly basis) and thereafter any
difference in value between securing the letting that was the subject of the agreement
for lease, and securing an alternative tenancy at perhaps a lower rent. In similar terms, if
vacant possession of a property is required for a specific purpose or event, then again
the costs of having to relocate the event or change the arrangements are likely to be
capable ofquantification in advance, thus making a liquidated damages clause possible.
Obviously if a seller contracts to pay specified damages in the event of not procuring
vacant possession on completion, the seller is more likely to take active steps to ensure
compliance with all obligations in this regard. It will, of course, depend on the wider
context of the overall transaction as to whether a seller would be prepared to allow a
liquidated damages clause to enter into the contract. In such cases, a seller may be well
advised itself to consider insuring against the additional risk that arises from such a
potentially onerous contractual provision becoming operative due to a failure to provide
vacant possession.
Fourthly, and perhaps more controversially, one could draw on the 'reasonably
discoverable' qualification used in the provisions of the Land Registration Act 2002
relating to 'actual occupation' to address the problem of completion almost always
taking place before an inspection of the property has revealed whether the premises are
vacant. One view is that, whilst the seller is responsible for ensuring that vacant
possession is given, a buyer should themselves take on some of the responsibility for
ensuring that what they have contracted for is conveyed to them on completion and
before the monies are paid over.
Parties: to a contract could provide that an inspection (revealing no impediment to
vacant possession) is 'deemed' to have taken place before completion and that no claim
for a breach of the obligation to give vacant possession can be made thereafter (in
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respect of impediments that would have been reasonably discoverable from such an
inspection). It is likely that tangible impediments would be those that a clause of this
kind would most probably relate to, as legal impediments (e.g. a Housing Act notice)
are unlikely to be discoverable on an inspection of the property (but would be from an
inspection ofpublic registers, for example).
Ibis has particular advantages to the seller because it ensures that, once completed, the
risk of non-procurement of vacant possession has passed to the buyer, with no
arguments or claims thereafter being capable of being advanced by the buyer (in respect
of matters that were reasonably discoverable on such an inspection). Such a clause
would obviously encourage a buyer to undertake a reasonable inspection to ensure that
vacant possession has been given (as far as can be determined) before completion takes
effect, something which should happen but often does not. Implementation of such a
contractual term in, for example, standard conditions of sale would reflect a policy shift
from the current position whereby a buyer who had not inspected the property prior to
completion would later be able to action a breach of the obligation to give vacant
possession. Obviously, unlike in the context of actual occupation under the Land
Registration Act 2002, a contractual provision of this nature could be expressly dis-
applied by the parties.
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As such, there are various means by which the remedies available for a breach of the
obligation to give vacant possession can be improved upon without making vacant
possession proprietary in nature. This further undermines the justification for making
vacant possession part of passing good title on jhe basis that conflating vacant
possession with title is not necessary to improve the remedies available.
Whilst this thesis has been critical of the attention that has, or it has claimed, has not
been paid to the obligation to give vacant possession, it is correct to say that the
property industry is catching up in showing an awareness of the particular problem
posed by the issue of vacant possession, specifically in the leasehold context.
The Code for Leasing Business Premises in England and Wales 200io is the result of
collaboration between commercial property professionals and industry bodies
representing both owners (landlords) and occupiers (tenants). The Code aims to promote
fairness in commercial leases, and recognises a need to increase awareness of property
issues, especially among small businesses, ensuring that occupiers of business premises
have the information necessary to negotiate the best deal available to them. It is
commonly viewed as being shorter, easier to understand and more focused than the
previous version of the Code in 2004. The Code is entirely voluntary and there is no
requirement that every single part of the Code is kept to at all times. However, the
working group that re-wrote the Code sought to achieve a workable document that
provides a fair and level playing field between the parties. In respect of break options,
the Code prescribes only three pre-conditions to the exercise of a tenant's break option:
1. The tenant should be up to date with the main rent, (the basic rent, not service
charge).
2. The tenant should give up occupation. This is not the same as giving vacant
possession - see below.
3. The tenant should leave behind no continuing subleases.
- .' 1 ,
What is important to note about these three conditions is that they are wholly within the
10 CodeforLeasing BusinessPremises in England andWales 2007, 1.Available from:
www.leasingbusinesspremises.cosuk.
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tenant's ability to comply with. Indeed, the code actually suggests that the obligation to
give vacant possession should be avoided as a pre-condition altogether. The proposed
lease conditionality focuses on the first element of the vacant possession test, looking at
whether a clear intention to determine the lease has been manifested by the party
required to give vacant possession .or, in the terms of the lease code, to 'give up'
occupation. The second part of the John Laing test, as to whether, pursuant to the
intended determination by the tenant, the landlord could, if it wanted to, 'reoccupy the
property without difficulty or objection' is not necessary under the proposed
conditionality prescribed by the code This is because the requirement to 'give up'
occupation does not, in line with common misunderstandings, require the party to give
vacant possession. As the Code states, "any disputes about what has been left behind or
removed should be settled later".u As such, the Code avoids some of the commonest
issues relating to the provision of vacant possession which often cause a tenant
compliance difficulties when seeking to exercise a break option, and takes from the
landlord the ability to seek to frustrate a tenant's compliance with a pre-condition.
In terms of whether the problems of vacant possession are 'solved' by the above
suggestions, the answer is clearly that they are not. It will take much more than a
definition of vacant possession in contracts, some proposals for the terms of contractual
break options in leases and better contractual remedies to completely eradicate the
problems that are apparent. Indeed, whilst use of the obligation to give vacant
possession in the leasehold context is at least on the radar of the property industry
(unlike in the freehold context at this time), in practice the voluntary nature of the Code
results in such proposed conditionality being rarely incorporated into leases and other
documents, where freedom of contract dictates that the party with the greater bargaining
strength is likely to be able to impose their proposed terms on the weaker party. This
just serves to highlight how the concept of 'bargaining in the shadow of the law' is
relevant to all aspects of the vacant possession obligation. A proposal not discussed in
this work, but perhaps worthy of consideration in the future, is whether legislation is
actually required to further improve the position on vacant possession; that is, not just to
understand and explain the obligation itself: but also to prescribe the use for which the
obligation can be made in various coutex\s. Here a whole host of new issues arise,
11 Ibid.
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including philosophical debate as to whether the law is entitled to interfere in the free
contracting of obligations between parties to a given agreement.
I ,
Whilst further development and practical application' of the obligation is clearly still
necessary to bridge the gap between understanding of the theory and practical
application of the term in real life scenarios, this thesis can, however, be seen to
represent an important first step along the path of the eventual development of a
principled, sound and coherent theoretical and applied understanding of the term by
those who regularly encounter it,
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CONTRACT
Incorporating the Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition)
Date
Seller
Buyer
Property
(freehold/leasehold)
Title Number/Root of title
Specified incumbrances
Completion date
Contract rate
Purchase price
_Deposit
The seller will sell and the buyer will buy:
(a) the property, and
(b) any chattels which, under the special conditions, are included in the
sale
for the purchase price.
WARNING
Signed
This is a formal document,
designed to create legal
rights and legal obligations.
Take advice before using it. Authorised to sign on behalf ofSeller/Buyer
STANDARD COMMERCIAL PROPERTY CONDITIONS (SECOND EDITION)
LEASES AFFECTINGTHE PROPERTY
General
This condition applies if any part of the property is sold subject to a lease.
The seller having provided the buyer with full details of each lease or
copies of documents embodying the lease terms, the buyer is treated as
entering into the contract knowing and fully accepting those terms.
The seller is not to serve a notice to end the lease nor to accept a
surrender.
The seller is to inform the buyer without delay ifthe lease ends.
The buyer is to indemnify the seller against all claims arising from the
lease after actual completion; this includes claims which are
unenforceable against a buyer for want of registration.
MATTERSAFFECTINGTHE PROPERTY
Freedom from incumbrances
The seller is selling the property free from incumbrances, other than those
mentioned in condition 3.1.2.
The incumbrances subject to which the property is sold are:
(a) those specified in the contract
(b) those discoverable by inspection of the property before the contract
{c} those the seller does not and could not reasonably know about
(d) matters, other than monetary charges or incumbrances, disclosed or
which would have been disclosed by the searches and enquiries which
a prudent buyer would have made before entering into the contract
(e) public requirements.
After the contract is made, the seller is to give the buyer written details
without delay of any new public requirement and of anything in writing
which he learns about concerning a matter covered by condition 3.1.2.
The buyer is to bear the cost of complying with any outstanding public
requirement and is to indemnify the seller against any liability resulting
from a public requirement.
Physical state
The buyer accepts the property in the physical state it is in at the date of
the contract unless the seller is building or converting it.
A leasehold property is sold subject to any subsisting breach of a
condition or tenant's obligation relating to the physical state of the
property which renders the lease liable to forfeiture.
A sub-lease is granted subject to any subsisting breach of a condition or
tenant's obligation relating to the physical state of the property which
renders the seller's own lease liable to forfeiture.
Retained land
Where after the transfer the seller will be retaining land near the property:
(a) the buyer will have no right of light or air over the retained land, but
(b) in other respects the seller and the buyer will each have the rights over
the land of the other which they would have had if they were two
separate buyers to whom the seller had made simultaneous transfers
of the property and the retained land.
The transfer is to contain appropriate express terms.
(b) agrees that there will be no exercise of the election to waive
exemption in respect of the property, and
(c) cannot require the buyer to pay any amount in respect of any liability
to VAT arising in respect of the sale of the property, unless condition
1.4.2 applies.
If, solely as a result of a change in law made and coming into effect
between the date of the contract and completion, the sale of the property
will constitute a supply chargeable to VAT, the buyer is to pay to the seller
on completion an additional amount equal to that VAT in exchange for a
proper VAT invoice from the seller.
The amount payable for the chattels is exclusive of VAT and the buyer is to
pay to the seller on completion an additional amount equal to any VAT
charged on that supply in exchange for a proper VAT invoice from the
seller.
Assignment and sub-sales
The buyer is not entitled to transfer the benefit of the contract.
The seller may not be required to transfer the property in parts or to any
person other than the buyer.
4.
4.1
4.1.1
4.1.2
4.1.3
3.3
3.2.3
3.2
3.2.1
3.1.4
3.1.3
3.1.2
3.
3.1
3.1.1
3.2.2
4.1.4
4.1.5
2.3
2.3.1
2.2.2
2.2
2.2.1
2.1.2
FORMATION
Date
If the parties intend to make a contract by exchanging duplicate copies by
post or through a document exchange, the contract is made when the last
copy is posted or deposited at the document exchange.
If the parties' conveyancers agree to treat exchange as taking place before
duplicate copies are actually exchanged, the contract is made as so
agreed.
Deposit
The buyer is to pay a deposit of 10 per cent of the purchase price no later
than the date of the contract.
Except on a sale by auction the deposit is to be paid by direct credit and is
to be held by the seller's conveyancer as stakeholder on terms that on
completion it is to be paid to the seller with accrued interest.
Auctions
On a sale by auction the following conditions apply to the property and, if
it is sold in lots, to each lot.
2.3.2 The sale is subject to a reserve price.
2.3.3 The seller, or a person on its behalf, may bid up to the reserve price.
2.3.4 The auctioneer may refuse any bid.
2.3.5 Ifthere is a dispute about a bid, the auctioneer may resolve the dispute or
restart the auction at the last undisputed bid.
The auctioneer is to hold the deposit as agent for the seller.
If any cheque tendered in payment of all or part of the deposit is
dishonoured when first presented, the seller may, within seven working
days of being notified that the cheque has been dishonoured, give notice
to the buyer that the contract is discharged by the buyer's breach.
2.3.6
2.3.7
1.5
1.5.1
1.5.2
2.
2.1
2.1.1
1.4.2
1.4.3
PART 1
1. GENERAL
1.1 Definitions
1.1.1 In these conditions:
(a) "accrued interest" means:
{il if money has been placed on deposit or in a building society share
account, the interest actually earned
(ii) otherwise, the interest which might reasonably have been earned
by depositing the money at interest on seven days' notice of
withdrawal with a clearing bank
less, in either case, any proper charges for handling the money
(b) "apportionment day" has the meaning given in condition 8.3.2
(e) "clearing bank" means a bank which is a shareholder in CHAPS
Clearing Co. Limited
(d) "completion date" has the meaning given in condition 8.1.1
(e) "contract rate" is the Law Society's interest Tate from time to time in
force
(f) "conveyancer" means a solicitor, barrister, duly certified notary public,
licensed conveyancer or recognised body under sections 9 or 23 of the
Administration of Justice Act 1985
(g) "direct credit" means a direct transfer of cleared funds to an account
nominated by the seller's conveyancer and maintained at a clearing
bank
(hl "election to waive exemption" means an election made under
paragraph 2 of Schedule 10 to the Value AddedTax Act 1994
(i) "lease" includes sub-lease, tenancy and agreement for a lease or sub-
lease
(j) "notice to complete" means a notice requiring completion of the
contract in accordance with condition 8
(k) "post" includes a service provided by a person licensed under the
Postal Services Act 2000
([) "public requirement" means any notice, order or proposal given or
made (whether before or after the date of the contract) by a body
acting on statutory authority
(m) "requisition" includes objection
(n) "transfer" includes conveyance and assignment
(0) "working day" means any day from Monday to Friday (inclusive)
which is not Christmas Day, Good Friday or a statutory Bank Holiday.
1.1.2 In these conditions the terms "absolute title" and "official copies" have the
special meanings given to them by the land Registration Act 2002.
1.1.3 A party is ready, able and willing to complete:
(a) if it could be, but for the default of the other party, and
(b) in the case of the seller, even though a mortgage remains secured on
the property, if the amount to be paid on completion enables the
property to be transferred freed of all mortgages (except those to
which the sale is expressly- subject).
1.1.4 (a) The conditions in Part 1 apply except as varied or excluded by the
contract.
(b) A condition in Part 2 only applies if expressly incorporated into the
contract.
1.2 Joint parties
If there is more than one seller or more than one buyer, the obligations
which they undertake can be enforced against them all jointly or against
each individually.
1.3 Notices and documents
1.3.1 A notice required or authorised by the contract must be in writing.
1.3.2 Giving a notice or delivering a document to a party's conveyancer has the
same effect as giving or delivering it to that party.
1.3,3 Where delivery of the original document is not essential, a notice or
document is validly given or sent if it is sent:
(al by fax, or
(bl bye-mail to an e-mail address for the intended recipient given in the
contract.
1.3.4 Subject to conditions 1.3.5 to 1.3.7, a notice is given and a document
delivered when it is received.
1.3.5 (a) A notice or document sent through the document exchange is
received when it is available for collection
(b) A notice or document which is received after 4.00 p.m. on a working
day, or on a day which is not a working day, is to be treated as having
been received on the next working day
(c) An automated response to a notice or document sent bye-mail that
the intended recipient is out of the office is to be treated as proof that
the notice or document was not received.
1.3.6 Condition 1.3.7 applies unless there is proof:
(a) that a notice or document has not been received, or
(bl of when it was received.
1.3.7 Unless the actual time of receipt is proved, a notice or document sent by
the following means is treated as having been received as follows:
(al by first class post: before 4.00 pm on the second
working day after posting
(bl by second-class post: before 4.00 pm on the third working
day after posting
(c) through a document exchange: before 4.00 pm on the first working
day after the day on which it would
normally be available for collection
by the addressee
(d) by fax: one hour after despatch
(e) bye-mail: before 4.00 p.m. on the first working
day after despatch.
1.3.8 In condition 1.3.7, "first crass post" means a postal service which seeks to
deliver posted items no later than the next working day in all or the
majority of cases.
1.4 VAT
1.4.1 The seller:
(a) warrants that the sale of the property does not constitute a supply that
is taxable for VATpurposes
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At least five working days before
completion date
Three working days after receiving the
replies
On the expiry of the relevant time limit under condition 6.2.2 or condition
6.3.1, the buyer loses his right to raise requisitions or to make
observations.
Six working days after either the date of
the contract or the date of delivery of the
seller's evidence of title on which the
requisitions are raised whichever is the
later
Four working days after receiving the
requisitions
Defining the property
The seller need not, further than it may be able to do from information in
its possession:
(al prove the exact boundaries of the property
{bl prove who owns fences, ditches, hedges or walls
(c) separately identify parts of the property with different titles.
The buyer may, if to do so is reasonable, require the seller to make or
obtain, pay for and hand over a statutory declaration about facts relevant
to the matters mentioned in condition 6.4,1. The form of the declaration is
to be agreed by the buyer, who must not unreasonably withhold its
agreement.
Rents and rentcherqes
The fact that a rent or rentcharge, whether payable or receivable by the
owner of the property, has been or will on completion be, informally
apportioned is not to be regarded as a defect in title.
Transfer
The buyer does not prejudice its right to raise requisitions, or to require
replies to any raised, by taking steps in relation to the preparation or
agreement of the transfer.
Subject to condition 6.6.3, the seller is to transfer the property with full title
guarantee.
The transfer is to have effect as if the disposition is expressly made subject
to all matters covered by condition 3.1.2.
If after completion the seller will remain bound by any obligation affecting
the property and disclosed to the buyer before the contract was made, but
the law does not imply any covenant by the buyer to indemnify the seller
against liability for future breaches of it:
(a) the buyer is to covenant in the transfer to indemnify the seller against
liability for any future breach of the obligation and to perform it from
then on, and
(b) if required by the seller, the buyer is to execute and deliver to the seller
on completion a duplicate transfer prepared by the buyer.
The seller is to arrange at its expense that, in relation to every document
of title which the buyer does not receive on completion, the buyer is to
have the benefit of:
(a) a written acknowledgement of the buyer's right to its production, and
(b) a written undertaking for its safe custody (except while it is held by a
mortgagee or by someone in a fiduciary capacity).
INSURANCE
Responsibility for insuring
Conditions 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 apply if:
(a) the contract provides that the policy effected by or for the seller and
insuring the property or any part of it against loss or damage should
continue in force after the exchange of contracts, or
(b) the property or any part of it is let on terms under which the seller
(whether as landlord or as tenant) is obliged to insure against loss or
damage.
The seller is to:
(a) do everything required to continue to maintain the policy, including
the prompt payment of any premium which falls due
!bJ increase the amount or extent of the cover as requested by the buyer,
if the insurers agree and the buyer pays the additional premium
Timetable
Subject to condition 6.2 and to. the extent that the seller did not take the
steps described in condition 6.1.1 before the contract was made, the
following are the steps for deducing and investigating the title to the
property to be taken within the following time limits:
Step Time limit
1. The seller is to comply Immediately after making the contract
with condition 6.1.1
2. The buyer may raise
written requisitions
3. The seller is to reply in
writing to any requisitions
raised
4. The buyer may make
written observations on
the seller's replies
The time limit on the buyer's right to raise requisitions applies even where
the seller supplies incomplete evidence of its title, but the buyer may,
within six working days from delivery of any further evidence, raise further
requisitions resulting from that evidence.
The parties are to take the following steps to prepare and agree the
transfer ofthe property within the following time limits:
Step Time limit
A. The buyer is to send the At least twelve working days before
seller a draft transfer completion date
B. The seller is to approve Four working days after delivery of
or revise that draft and the draft transfer
either return it or retain it
for use as the actual
transfer
C. If the draft is returned
the buyer is to send an
engrossment to the
seller
Periods oftime under conditions 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 may run concurrently.
If the period between the date of the contract and completion date is less
than 15 working days, the time limits in conditions 6.2.2, 6.3.1 and 6.3.2
are to be reduced by the same proportion as that period bears to the
period of 15 working days. Fractions of a working day are to be rounded
down except that the time limit to perform any step is not to be less than
one working day.
6.2.3
6.6.4
6.6.3
6.4.2
6.3.2
6.3
6.3.1
6.6.2
6.4
6.4.1
6.6.5
6.6
6.6,1
6.3.3
6.3.4
6.5
7.1.2
7.
7.1
7.1.1
If the property does not include all the land let, the seller may apportion
the rent and, if the lease is a new tenancy, the buyer may require the seller
to apply under section 10 of the Landlord andTenant (Covenants) Act 1995
for the apportionment to bind the tenant.
Property management
The seller is promptly to give the buyer full particulars of:
(a) any court or arbitration proceedings in connection with the lease, and
(b} any application for a licence, consent or approval under the lease.
Conditions 4.2.3 to 4.2.8 do not apply to a rent review process to which
condition 5 applies.
Subject to condition 4.2.4. the seller is to conduct any court or arbitration
proceedings in accordance with written directions given by the buyer from
time to time (for which the seller is to apply), unless to do so might place
the seller in breach of an obligation to the tenant or a statutory duty.
If the seller applies for directions from the buyer in relation to a proposed
step in the proceedings and the buyer does not give such directions within
10 working days, the seller may take or refrain from taking that step as it
thinks fit.
The buyer is to indemnify the seller against all loss and expense resulting
from the seller's following the buyer's directions.
Unless the buyer gives written consent, the seller is not to:
(a) grant orformally withhold any licence, consent or approval under the
lease, or
(b) serve any notice or take any action (other than action in court or
arbitration proceedings) as landlord under the lease.
When the seller applies for the buyer's consent under condition 4.2.6:
(a) the buyer is not to withhold its consent or attach conditions to the
consent where to do so might place the seller in breach of an
obligation to the tenant or a statutory duty
(b) the seller may proceed as if the buyer has consented when:
min accordance with paragraph (a), the buyer is not entitled to
withhold its consent, or
{ii)the buyer does not refuse its consent within 10 working days.
If the buyer withholds or attaches conditions to its consent, the buyer is to
indemnify the seller against all loss and expense.
In all other respects, the seller is to manage the property in accordance
with the principles of good estate management until completion.
Continuing liability
At the request and cost of the seller, the buyer is to support any
application by the seller to be released from the landlord covenants in a
lease to which the property is sold subject.
RENT REVIEWS
Subject to condition 5.2, this condition applies if:.
(a) the rent reserved by a lease of all or part of the property is to be
reviewed,
(b) the seller is either the landlord or the tenant,
(c) the rent review process starts before actual completion, and
(d) no reviewed rent has been agreed or determined at the date of the
contract.
The seller is to conduct the rent review process until actual completion,
after which the buyer is to conduct it.
Conditions 5.4 and 5.5 cease to apply on actual completion if the reviewed
rent will only be payable in respect of a period after that date.
In the course of the rent review process, the seller and the buyer are each
to:
(a) act promptly with a view to achieving the best result obtainable,
(b) consult with and have regard to the views of the other,
(c) provide the other with copies of all material correspondence and
papers relating to the process,
(d) ensure that its representations take account of matters put forward by
the other, and
tel keep the other informed of the progress of the process.
Neitherthe seller nor the buyer is to agree a rent figure unless it has been
approved in writing by the other (such approval not to be unreasonably
withheld).
The seller and the buyer are each to bear their own costs ofthe rent review
process.
Unless the rent review date precedes the apportionment day, the buyer is
to pay the costs of a third party appointed to determine the rent.
Where the rent review date precedes the apportionment day, those costs
are to be divided as follows:
(al the seller is to pay the proportion that the number of days from the
rent review date to the apportionment day bears to the number of
days from that rent review date until either the following rent review
date or, if none, the expiry of the term, and
(b) the buyer is to pay the balance.
TITLEANDTRANSFER
Proof of title
Without cost to the buyer, the seller is to provide the buyer with proof of
the title to the property and of his ability to transfer it, or to procure its
transfer.
Where the property has a registered title the proof is to include official
copies ofthe items referred to in rules 134(1)(a) and (b) and 135(1)(a) ofthe
Land Registration Rules 2003, so far as they are not to be discharged or
overridden at or before completion.
Where the property has an unregistered title, the proof is to include:
(a) an abstract of title or an epitome of title with photocopies of the
documents, and
(b) production of every document or an abstract, epitome or copy of it
with an original marking by a conveyancer either against the original
or an examined abstract or an examined copy.
Requisitions
The buyer may not raise requisitions:
(a) on the title shown by the seller taking the steps described in condition
6.1.1 before the contract was made
(b) in relation to the matters covered by condition 3.1.2
Notwithstanding condition 6.2.1, the buyer may, within six working days
of a matter coming to his attention after the contract was made, raise
written requisitions on that matter. In that event steps 3 and 4 in condition
6.3.1 apply.
5.2
5.5
5.
5.1
4.3
5.4
4.2.9
4.2.6
4.2.4
4.2.7
4.2.6
5.3
4.2.5
5.7
5.8
4.2.3
4.2
4.2.1
4.2.2
4.1.6
6.1.2
5.6
6.
6.1
6.1.1
6.2.2
6.2
6.2.1
6.1.3
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(c) permit the buyer to inspect the policy, or evidence of its terms, at any
time
(d) obtain or consent to an endorsement on the policy of the buyer's
interest, at the buyer's expense
(e) pay to the buyer immediately on receipt, any part of an additional
premium which the buyer paid and which is returned by the insurers
(fl if before completion the property suffers loss or damage:
(iJ pay to the buyer on completion the amount of policy moneys which
the seller has received, so far as not applied in repairing or
reinstating the property, and
(ii) if no final payment has then been received, assign to the buyer, at
the buyer's expense, all rights to claim under the policy in such
form as the buyer reasonably requires and pending execution of
the assignment, hold any policy moneys received in trust for the
buyer
(g) on completion:
(i) cancel the insurance policy
(ii) apply for a refund of the premium and pay the buyer, lmmedlatelv
on receipt. any amount received which relates to a part of the
premium which was paid or reimbursed by a tenant or third party.
The buyer is to hold the money paid subject to the rights of that
tenant or third party.
7.1.3 The buyer is to pay the seller a proportionate part of the premium which
the seller paid in respect of the period from the date when the contract is
made to the date of actual completion, except so far as the seller is entitled
to recover it from a tenant.
7.1.4 Unless condition 7.1.2 applies:
(a) the seller is under no obligation to the buyer to insure the property
(b) if payment under a policy effected by or for the buyer is reduced,
because the property is covered against loss or damage by an
insurance policy effected by or for the seller, the purchase price is to
be abated by the amount of that reduction.
7.1.5 Section 47 of the Law of Property Act 1925 does not apply.
3,3 Apportionments
3,3.1 Subject to condition 8.3.6 income and outgoings of the property are to be
apportioned between the parties so far as the change of ownership on
completion will affect entitlement to receive or liability to pay them.
1.3.2 The day from which the apportionment is to be made ('apportionment
day') is;
(a) if the whole property is sold with vacant possession or the seller
exercises its option in condition 9.3.4, the date of actual completion,
or
(b) otherwise, completion date.
l.3.3 In apportioning any sum, it is to be assumed that the buyer owns the
property from the beginning of the day on which the apportionment is to
be made.
J.3.4 A sum to be apportioned is to be treated as:
tal payable for the period which it covers, except that if it is an instalment
of an annual sum the buyer is to be attributed with an amount equal
to 1/365th of the annual sum for each day from and including the
apportionment day to the end of the instalment period
(b) accruing-
mfrom day to day, and
(ii)at the rate applicable from time to time.
1.3.5 When a sum to be apportioned, or the rate at which it is to be treated as
accruing, is not known or easily ascertainable at completion. a provisional
apportionment is to be made according to the best estimate available. As
soon as the amount is known, a final apportionment is to be made and
notified to the other party. Subject to condition 8.3.8, any resulting balance
is to be paid no more than ten working days later, and if not then paid the
balance is to bear interest at the contract rate from then until payment.
1.3.6 Where a lease of the property requires the tenant to reimburse the
landlord for expenditure on goods or services. on completion:
tal the buyer is to pay the seller the amount of any expenditure already
incurred by the seller but not yet due from the tenant and in respect of
which the seller provides the buyer with the information and vouchers
required for its recovery from the tenant, and
(b) the seller is to credit the buyer with payments already recovered from
·the tenant but not yet incurred by the seller.
:.3.7 Condition 8.3.8 applies if any part of the property is sold subject to a lease
and either;
(a) mon completion any rent or other sum payable under the lease is due
but not paid
WIthe contract does not provide that the buyer is to assign to the
seller the right to collect any arrears due to the seller under the
terms of the contract, and
(iii) the seller is not entitled to recover any arrears from the tenant, or
(b) (i) as a result of a rent review to which condition 5 applies a reviewed
rent is agreed or determined after actual completion, and
(ii) an additional sum then becomes payable in respect of a period
before the apportionment day.
10. LEASEHOLD PROPERTY
10.1 Existing leases
10.1.1The following provisions apply to a sale of leasehold land.
REMEDIES
Errors and omissions
Ifany plan or statement in the contract, or in the negotiations leading to it,
is or was misleading or inaccurate due to an error or omission, the
remedies available are as follows.
When there is a material difference between the description orvalue of the
property as represented and as it is, the buyer is entitled to damages.
An error or omission only entitles the buyer to rescind the contract:
[a] where the error or omission results from fraud or recklessness, or
(b) where the buyer would be obliged, to its prejudice, to accept property
differing substantially (in quantity, quality or tenure) from that which
the error or omission had led it to expect.
Rescission
If either party rescinds the contract:
(a) unless the rescission is a result of the buyer's breach of contract the
deposit is to be repaid to the buyer with accrued interest
(b) the buyer is to return any documents received from the seller and is to
cancel any registration of the contract
(c) the seller's duty to pay any returned premium under condition 7.1.2(e)
(whenever received) is not affected.
Late completion
If the buyer defaults in performing its obligations under the contract and
completion is delayed, the buyer is to pay compensation to the seller.
Compensation is calculated at the contract rate on the purchase price (less
any deposit paid) for the period between completion date and actual
completion. but ignoring any period during which the seller was in default.
Any claim by the sellerfor loss resulting from delayed completion is to be
reduced by any compensation paid under this contract.
Where the sale is not with vacant possession of the whole property and
completion is delayed, the seller may give notice to the buyer, before the
date of actual completion, that it will take the net income from the
property until completion as well as compensation under condition 9.3.1
After completion
Completion does not cancel liability to perform any outstanding obligation
under the contract.
Buyer's failure to ccmplv with notice to complete
If the buyer fails to complete in accordance with a notice to complete, the
following terms apply.
The seller may rescind the contract, and if it does so:
fa) it may
(i) forfeit and keep any deposit and accrued interest
(ii) resell the property
(iii) claim damages
(b) the buyer is to return any documents received from the seller and is to
cancel any registration of the contract.
The seller retains its other rights and remedies.
Seller's failure to comply with notice to complete
If the seller fails to complete in accordance with a notice to complete, the
following terms apply:
The buyer may rescind the contract, and if it does so:
(al the deposit is to be repaid to the buyer with accrued interest
(b) the buyer is to return any documents it received from the seller and is,
at the seller's expense, to cancel any registration of the contract.
The buyer retains its other rights and remedies.
B.B
8.8.1
8.3.8 (a) The buyer is to seek to collect all sums due in the circumstances
referred to in condition 8.3.7 in the ordinary course of management,
but need not take legal proceedings or distrain.
(b) A payment made on account of those sums is to be apportioned
between the parties in the ratio of the amounts owed to each,
notwithstanding that the tenant exercises its right to appropriate the
payment in some other manner.
(c) Any part of a payment on account received by one party but due to the
other is to be paid no more than ten working days after the receipt of
cash or cleared funds and, if not then paid, the sum is to bear interest
at the contract rate until payment.
8.4 Amount payable
The amount payable by the buyer on completion is the purchase price
(less any deposit already paid to the seller or its agent) adjusted to take
account of:
(a] apportionments made under condition 8.3
(b) any compensation to be paid under condition 9.3
(c) any sum payable under condition 7.1.2 or 7.1.3.
8.5 Title deeds
8.5.1 As soon as the buyer has complied with all its obligations on completion
the seller must hand over the documents of title.
8.5.2 Condition 8.5.1 does not apply to any documents of title relating to land
being retained by the seller after completion.
8.6 Rent receipts
The buyer is to assume that whoever gave any receipt for a payment of
rent which the seller produces was the person or the agent of the person
then entitled to that rent.
8.7 Means of payment
The buyer is to pay the money due on completion by direct credit and, if
appropriate, by an unconditional release of a deposit held by a
stakeholder.
Notice to complete
At any time on or after completion date. a party who is ready, able and
willing to complete may give the other a notice to complete.
The parties are to complete the contract within ten working days of giving
a notice to complete, excluding the day on which the notice is given. For
this purpose, time is of the essence of the contract.
8.8.2
9.3.2
9.2
9.3
9.3.1
9.1.2
9.4
9.3.3
9.3.4
9.1.3
9.
9.1
9.1.1
9.5.2
9.5
9.5.1
9.5.3
9.6
9.6.1
9.6.3
9.6.2
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COMPLETION
Date
Completion date is twenty working days after the date of the contract but
time is not of the essence of the contract unless a notice to complete has
been served.
If the money due on completion is received after 2.00 p.rn.. completion is
to be treated, for the purposes only of conditions 8.3 and 9.3, as taking
place on the next working day as a result of the buyer's default.
Condition 8.1.2 does not apply if:
(a) the sale is with vacant possession of the property or a part of it, and
(b) the buyer is ready, willing and able to complete but does not pay the
money due on completion until after 2.00 p.m. because the seller has
not vacated the property or that part by that time.
Place
Completion is to take place in England and Wales, either at the seller's
conveyancer's office or at some other place which the seller reasonably
specifies.
3.1.2
3.1.3
s.z
s,
'.1
3.1.1
10,1.2 The seller having provided the buyer with copies of the documents
embodying the lease terms, the buyer is treated as entering into the
contract knowing and fully accepting those terms.
10,1.3 The seller is to comply with any lease obligations requiring the tenant to
insure the property.
10.2 New leases
10.2.1 The following provisions apply to a contract to grant a new lease.
10.2.2The conditions apply so that:
"seller" means the proposed landlord
"buyer" means the proposed tenant
"purchase price" means the premium to be paid on the grant of a lease.
10.2.3The lease is to be in the form of the draft attached to the contract.
10.2.4If the term of the new lease will exceed seven years, the seller is to deduce
a title which will enable the buyer to register the lease atthe Land Registry
with an absolute title.
10.2.5The seller is to engross the lease and a counterpart of it and is to send the
counterpart to the buyer at least five working days before completion
date.
10.2.6The buyer is to execute the counterpart and deliver it to the seller on
completion.
10.3 Consents
10.3.1 (a) The following provisions apply if a consent to let, assign or sub-let is
required to complete the contract
(b) In this condition "consent" means consent in a form which satisfies
the requirement to obtain it.
10.3.2 (a) The seller is to:
(i) apply for the consent at its expense, and to use all reasonable
efforts to obtain it
[il] give the buyer notice forthwith on obtaining the consent
(bl The buyer is to comply with all reasonable requirements, including
requirements for the provision of information and references.
10.3.3Where the consent of a reversioner (whether or not immediate) is required
to an asslqnmentcr sub-letting, then so far as the reversioner lawfully
imposes such a condition:
(a) the buyer is to:
(i) covenant directly with the reversioner to observe the tenant's
covenants and the conditions in the seller's lease
Oi) use reasonable endeavours to provide guarantees of the
performance and observance of the tenant's covenants and the
conditions in the seller's lease
(iii) execute or procure the execution of the licence
{b] the seller, in the case of an assignment, is to enter into an authorised
guarantee agreement.
10.3.4Neither party may object to a reversioner's consent given subject to a
condition:
(a) which under section 19A of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 is not
regarded as unreasonable, and
{b} which is lawfully imposed under an express term of the lease.
10.3.5 If any required consent has not been obtained by the original completion
date:
(a) the time for completion is to be postponed until five working days
after the seller gives written notice to the buyer that the consent has
been obtained or four months from the original completion date
whichever is the earlier
(b) the postponed date is to be treated as the completion date.
10.3.6At any time after four months from the original completion date, either
party may rescind the contract by notice to the other, if:
[a] consent has still not been given, and
(bl no declaration has been obtained from the court that consent has
been unreasonably withheld.
10.3.7 If the contract is rescinded under condition 10.3.6 the seller is to remain
liable for any breach of condition 10.3.2{a) or 10.3.3(b) and the buyer is to
remain liable for any breach of condition 1O.3.2(b) or 10.3.3(a). In all other
respects neither party is to be treated as in breach of contract and
condition 9,2 applies.
10.3.8A party in breach of its obligations under condition 10.3.2 or 10.3.3 cannot
rescind under condition 10.3.6 for so long as its breach is a cause of the
consent's being withheld.
11. COMMONHOlD
11.1 Terms used in this condition have the special meanings given to them in
Part 1 of the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.
11.2 This condition applies to a disposition of commonhold land.
11.3 The seller having provided the buyer with copies of the current versions
of the memorandum and articles of the common hold association and of
the common hold community statement, the buyer is treated as entering
into the contract knowing and fully accepting their terms.
11.4 Ifthe contract is for the sale of property which is or includes part only of a
common hold unit:
(a) the seller is, at its expense, to apply for the written consent of the
commonhold association and is to use all reasonable efforts to obtain
it
(b) either the seller, unless it is in breach of its obligation under paragraph
{a}, or the buyer may rescind the contract by notice to the other party
if three working days before completion date (or before a later date on
which the parties have agreed to complete the contract) the consent
has not been given. In that case, neither party is to be treated as in
breach of contract and condition 9.2 applies.
12. CHATTELS
12.1 -The following provisions apply to any chattels which are included in the
. contract,
12.2 The contract takes effect as a contract for the sale of goods.
12.3 The buyer takes the chattels in the physical state they are in at the date of
the contract.
12.4 Ownership of the chattels passes to the buyer on actual completion but
they are at the buyer's risk from the contract date.
A.
A1.
A1.1
A1,2
A1.3
A2
A2.1
A2.2
A2.3
A2.4
A2.5
A2.6
A2.7
A2.8
A2.9
B
B1
82.1
82.2
83.1
83.2
C
C1.
C1.1
C1.2
C2.
C2.1
C2.2
C2.3
PART 2*
VAT
Standard rated supply
Conditions 1,4.1 and 1.4.2 do not apply.
The seller warrants that the sale of the property will constitute a supply
chargeable to VATat the standard rate.
The buyer is to pay to the seller on completion an additional amount equal
to the VATin exchange for a proper VATinvoice from the seller.
Transfer of a going concern
Condition 1.4 does not apply.
In this condition "TOGC" means a transfer of a business as a going
concern treated as neither a supply of goods nor a supply of services by
virtue of article 5 of the Value AddedTax (Special Provisions) Order 1995.
The seller warrants that it is using the property for the business of letting
to produce rental income.
The buyer is to make every effort to comply with the conditions to be met
by a transferee under article 5(1) and 5(2) for the sale to constitute aTOGC.
The buyer will, on or before the earlier of:
fa) completion date, and
(b) the earliest date on which a supply of the property could be treated as
made by the seller under this contract if the sale does not constitute a
TOGC,
notify the seller that paragraph (2B) of article 5 of the VAT (Special
Provisions) Order 1995 does not apply to the buyer.
The parties are to treat the sale as a TOGC at completion if the buyer
provides written evidence to the seller before completion that it is a
taxable person and that it has made an election to waive exemption in
respect ofthe property and has given a written notification ofthe making
of such election in conformity with article 5(2) and has given the
notification referred to in condition A2.5.
The buyer is not to revoke its election to waive exemption in respect of the
property at any time.
If the parties treat the sale at completion as a TOGC but it is later
determined thatthe sale was not aTOGC, then within five working days of
that determination the buyer shall pay to the seller:
(a) an amount equal to the VATchargeable in respect of the supply of the
property, in exchange for a proper VATinvoice from the seller; and
(b) except where the sale is not aTOGC because of an act or omission of
the seller, an amount equal to any interest or penalty for which the
seller is liable to account to HM Customs and Excise in respect of or
by reference to that VAT.
lfthe seller obtains the consent of HM Customs and Excise to retain its VAT
records relating to the property, it shall make them available to the buyer
for inspection and copying at reasonable times on reasonable request
during the six years following completion.
CAPITAL ALLOWANCES
To enable the buyer to make and substantiate claims under the Capital
Allowances Act 2001 in respect of the property, the seller is to use its
reasonable endeavours to provide, or to procure that its agents provide:
(a) copies of all relevant information in its possession or that of its agents,
and
(b) such co-operation and assistance as the buyer may reasonably
require.
The buyer is only to use information provided under condition 81 for the
stated purpose.
The buyer is not to disclose, without the consent of the seller, any such
information which the seller expressly provides on a confidential basis.
On completion, the seller and the buyer are jointly to make an election
under section 198 of the Capital Allowances Act 2001 which is consistent
with the apportionment in the Special Conditions.
The seller and the' buyer are each to submit the amount fixed by that
election to the Inland Revenue for the purposes of their respective capital
allowance computations.
REVERSIONARY INTERESTS IN FLATS
No tenants' rights
In this condition, sections refe-r to sections of the Landlord and Tenant Act
1987 and expressions have the special meanings given to them in that Act.
The seller warrants that:
(a) it gave the notice required by section 5,
(b) no acceptance notice was served on the landlord or no person was
nominated for the purposes of section 6 during the protected period,
and
(cl that period ended less than 12 months before the date of the contract.
Tenants' right of first refusal
In this condition, sections refer to sections of the Landlord andTenant Act
1987 and expressions have the special meanings given to them in that Act.
The seller warrants that:
(a) it gave the notice required by section 5, and
(bl it has given the buyer a copy of:
0) any acceptance notice served on the landlord and
(ii) any nomination of a person duly nominated for the purposes of
section 6.
If the sale is by auction:
tal the seller warrants that it has given the buyer a copy of any notice
served on the landlord electing that section 88 shall apply,
(bl condition 8.1.1. applies as if "thirty working days" were substituted for
"twenty working days':
(c) the seller is to send a copy of the contract to the nominated person as
required by section 8B{3), and
(d) if the nominated person serves notice under section 8B(4):
mthe seller is to give the buyer a copy of the notice, and
{Ii} condition 9.2 is to apply as if the contract had been rescinded.
5
*The conditions in Part 2 do not apply unless expressly incorporated. See
condition 11.4(b).
SPECIAL CONDITIONS
1. This contract incorporates the Standard Commercial Property Conditions (Second Edition).
2. The property is sold with vacant possession.
(or) 2. The property is sold subject to the leases or tenancies set out on the attached list but otherwise
with vacant possession on completion.
3. The chattels at the Property and set out on the attached list are included in the sale. [The amount
of the purchase price apportioned to those chattels is £ ]
4. The conditions in Part 2 shown against the boxes ticked below are included in the contract:
o Condition A1 (VAT: standard rate)
[or] 0 Condition A2 (VAT: transfer of a going concern)
o Condition B (capital allowances), The amount of the purchase price apportioned to plant
and machinery at the property for the purposes of the Capital Allowances Act 2001
is £
o Condition C1 (flats: no tenants' rights of first refusal)
[or] 0 Condition C2 (flats: with tenants' rights of first refusal)
Seller's Conveyancers":
Buyer's COllveyancers*: .
*Adding an e-mail address authorisesservice bye-mail: seecondition 1.3.3(b)
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